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Judgment
The present appeal has been preferred against the judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 22.04.2004 passed by the learned Additional District & Sessions Judge (Fast Track Court-IV), Ara in Sessions Trial No.947 of 1992, arising out of Udwantnagar P.S. Case No.79 of 1992, whereby appellant nos. 1, 2 and 3 have been convicted under section 323 read with section 34 of the Indian Penal Code and they have been sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for one year each, whereas appellant no.4 has been convicted under section 324 read with section 34 of the Indian Penal Code and he has been sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for three years. On the same day, the learned trial Court granted provisional bail to the appellants for a period of one month to enable them to prefer the appeal, and by order dated 05.05.2004, a Coordinate Bench of this Court, while admitting the appeal, directed that the appellants be enlarged on bail, on which they have remained ever since.
During the pendency of the present appeal, appellant no. 2, namely, Jaggu Yadav @ Jaggu Singh, passed away on 01.10.2015 and, vide order dated 20.02.2025, the present appeal stood abated as against him. This appeal is now confined to appellant nos.1, 3 and 4 only.
Pursuant to the direction of this Court, the Superintendent of Police, Bhojpur, Ara, by his letter dated 31.12.2025, has reported, on the basis of the verification made by the Station House Officer, Udwantnagar, that the three surviving appellants are alive and are living with their families at their village.
The prosecution case, as instituted on the basis of the written report of the informant Gopal Singh, is that on 27.05.1992 at about 10:00 A.M., while the informant was repairing the ridge (medh) of his agricultural land, the accused persons, namely, Jai Kumar Singh, Jaggu Yadav and Srikant Yadav, variously armed with lathi, along with Awadhesh Yadav armed with a bhala, arrived at the place of occurrence and started abusing the informant and thereafter assaulted him by means of lathi and bhala, causing injuries on his hands, and also assaulted the elder brother of the informant, namely, Tapan Singh. The genesis of the occurrence, as stated in the written report itself, is a long-standing land dispute subsisting between the parties in respect of the land in question.
On the basis of the written report of the informant, Udwantnagar P.S. Case No.79 of 1992 was instituted on 27.05.1992 under sections 341, 323 and 324 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code. After completion of investigation, the police submitted charge-sheet against all the accused persons, whereupon the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Ara took cognizance of the offences under sections 341, 323, 324 and 307 read with section 34 of the Indian Penal Code on 14.10.1992 and, thereafter, the case was committed to the Court of Sessions vide order dated 30.11.1992. Charges were framed against the accused persons on 09.04.2002, the contents whereof were read over and explained to them in Hindi, to which they pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried.
During the course of the trial, altogether seven witnesses were examined in support of the prosecution case, who are as under:-
| P.W.-1 | Tapan Singh, elder brother of the informant | |
| P.W.-2 | Baliram Singh, seizure-list witness. | |
| P.W.-3 | Krishna Kumar Singh, seizure-list witness. | |
| P.W.-4 | Hanuman Singh. | |
| P.W.-5 | Pukar Yadav (declared hostile). | |
| P.W.-6 | Gopal Singh, the informant and injured. | |
| P.W.-7 | Murat Ram | |
| 7. Apart from the oral evidence, the following documentary evidence has been exhibited on behalf of the prosecution:- | ||
| Exhibit-1 | Signature on the seizure list of blood-stained earth. | |
| Exhibit-2 | Formal F.I.R. | |
| Exhibit-3 | Injury report of Tapan Singh, said to have been prepared by Dr. Vijay Kumar Singh. | |
| Exhibit-3/1 | Injury report of Gopal Singh, said to have been prepared by Dr. Vijay Kumar Singh. | |
| Exhibit-4 | Case diary. | |
After completion of the prosecution evidence, one witness, namely, D.W.-1 Kaushal Kishore Prasad, was examined on behalf of the appellants. The defence has also adduced the following documentary evidence in support of its case :-
| Exhibit-A | Rent receipt of 1985-86. |
| Exhibit-A/1 | Rent receipt of 1987-88. |
| Exhibit-B | Old Survey Khatiyan. |
| Exhibit-B/1 | New Survey Khatiyan. |
| Exhibit-C | Parwana of the Anchal Adhikari. |
| Exhibit-D | Letter of the Additional Collector, Ara. |
| Exhibit-E | Settlement order. |
| Exhibit-E/1 to E/8 | Certified copies of orders dated 29.01.1979, 05.02.1980, 17.02.1981, 12.05.1988, 13.12.1988, 28.06.1990, 24.07.1993 and 27.05.1999 respectively, passed in the revenue/allied proceedings between the parties in respect of the land in question. |
The learned trial Court, upon appreciation of the evidence adduced at the trial, found all the four accused persons guilty and passed the impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence. At the hearing on sentence, the plea of the convicts for the minimum sentence or release after due admonition or on probation of good conduct, they being first offenders, was rejected by the trial Court by observing that the learned trial Court deems it appropriate to give a right message to society and the convicts deserve punishment. Aggrieved by the judgment of conviction and order of sentence, the appellants have preferred the present Criminal Appeal.
Learned counsel for the appellants has assailed the impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence as being contrary to the weight of the evidence available on the record. It has been submitted that though P.W.-1 Tapan Singh has supported the prosecution case and has deposed that while he, along with his brother Gopal Singh, was constructing the medh over their land, the accused persons came there variously armed with lathi and bhala and assaulted them. It has been argued by the learned counsel for the appellants that his deposition ought not to have been relied upon by the learned trial Court while convicting the appellants, as he is a highly interested witness, being the real brother of the informant and being deeply involved in the underline land dispute between the parties.
Learned counsel for the appellants has next submitted that the enmity between the parties stood admitted, inasmuch as P.W.-1 Tapan Singh has himself admitted in his cross-examination that the land in question was previously gairmazarua land and that there existed a dispute regarding its settlement and possession. It is submitted that the land was settled by the Government in favour of appellant no.1, who is a retired military personnel and that a series of orders of the revenue authorities, brought on record as Exhibits C, D, E and E/1 to E/8, were passed in respect of the same land. Further, in the proceeding under section 145 of the Cr.P.C., the possession of the appellants over the disputed land was declared, a fact which the informant himself accepted in his deposition. It is, therefore, submitted that the admitted and long-standing civil dispute furnishes a ready ground for the false implication of the appellants.
It has next been submitted that the central allegation against the appellants is of causing injuries to the informant and his brother, however, the prosecution has failed to examine Dr. Vijay Kumar Singh, the Medical Officer, who is said to have prepared the injury reports, and as such, the nature and severity of the injuries sustained by the informant and his brother were never proved during the trial. P.W.-7 Murat Ram, the formal witness, merely proved the handwriting and signature on the injury reports, he is not a witness who can prove their contents. It is further pointed out that even on the face of the injury reports, the injuries are incised wounds, simple in nature and not on any vital part, and no penetrating wound was found which is wholly irreconcilable with the specific allegation, as deposed to by P.W.-4, that 2 to 3 bhala blows were given to Gopal Singh with the intention to kill him. According to learned counsel, the manner of occurrence alleged by the prosecution thus stands falsified by its own medical reports.
It has also been argued by learned counsel for the appellants that though the police claims to have seized blood-soaked earth from the place of occurrence, P.W.-3 Krishna Kumar Singh, in his cross-examination, has admitted that the police had in fact obtained the signatures of the seizure-list witnesses not at the place of occurrence but at the Police Station, on a plain paper, which casts serious doubt on the genuineness of the seizure itself. The blood-stained earth, moreover, was never sent to the Forensic Science Laboratory for examination as to whether the blood was human blood at all. With regard to P.W.-2 Baliram Singh and P.W.-3 Krishna Kumar Singh, it has been contended that they are merely seizure-list witnesses and their evidence does not materially advance the prosecution case.
Learned counsel for the appellants has also assailed the testimony of P.W.-4 Hanuman Singh by submitting that he is a chance witness, closely associated with the informant. It is argued that though P.W.-4 claimed to have seen the occurrence while working in his adjoining field, his testimony appears to be tailored to support the prosecution story. He has further admitted that the accused persons remained standing at the place of occurrence even after the alleged assault, thereby rendering the prosecution story unnatural and improbable.
It has further been submitted that the conduct of the informant, P.W.-6 Gopal Singh, itself belies the prosecution story. It is pointed out that, as per the investigation itself, no sign of digging of earth was found in the field, although the specific case of the prosecution is that the informant was constructing the ridge at that very time. Learned counsel has argued that the unexplained interval between the alleged altercation and the institution of the F.I.R. was utilized by the informant for deliberation and concoction and as such, the case of the prosecution cannot be countenanced.
It has also been argued that the prosecution has not produced any independent witness, though the alleged occurrence took place in broad day light at about 10:00 A.M., the witnesses examined are either family members, interested persons or persons closely associated with the informant, and the solitary independent witness examined i.e. P.W.-5 Pukar Yadav, did not support the prosecution case and was declared hostile.
It has lastly been contended that, at best, the evidence on record may suggest a minor scuffle between the parties arising out of the land dispute, but the prosecution has failed to establish the charges against the appellants beyond all reasonable doubt by cogent and reliable evidence, therefore, the appellants are entitled to the benefit of doubt and consequent acquittal.
Learned APP for the State has supported the impugned judgment of conviction and sentence and has submitted that no ground for interference is made out. He has submitted that the learned Trial Court, after duly appreciating the evidence on record, has passed a reasoned judgment of conviction and, therefore, the same does not suffer from any illegality and this Court may not interfere with the same.
I have heard learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants as well as learned APP for the State and have carefully perused the lower court records.
Having considered the rival submissions and the material on record, the first circumstance which stares from the record is the admitted, long-standing and hotly-contested land dispute between the parties in respect of the very land which is the situs of the alleged occurrence. The land was previously gairmazarua, which came to be settled in favour of appellant no.1, a retired military personnel. A succession of orders of the revenue authorities spanning almost two decades was brought on record of the trial Court and, significantly, in the proceeding under Section 145 of the Cr.P.C., the possession of the appellants over the disputed land was declared, which is a fact accepted by the informant himself in his deposition.
It is well settled that enmity is a double-edged weapon. It may supply the motive for the crime, but it may equally supply the motive for false implication. Where the genesis of the occurrence is a bitter civil dispute of this description, the evidence of the witnesses aligned with one side of that dispute must be scrutinized with more than ordinary care.
Tested on that touchstone, the ocular evidence does not inspire confidence. P.W.-1 is the real brother of the informant and P.W.-6 is the informant himself, both are the parties to the land dispute. P.W.-4, who claims to have watched the occurrence from his adjoining field, is a chance witness closely associated with the informant, and his assertion that the accused persons remained standing at the place of occurrence even after the alleged assault renders the story unnatural. Though the occurrence is alleged to have taken place in broad daylight at about 10:00 A.M., no independent witness of the village supported the prosecution case and the only independent witness examined, P.W.-5 Pukar Yadav, resiled and was declared hostile. Different witnesses have given conflicting versions of the prosecution story, and there are discrepancies in their statements regarding the specific assailant, the weapon used, and the seat of the injuries.
The medical evidence, far from curing these infirmities, compounds them, inasmuch as, Dr. Vijay Kumar Singh, who is said to have examined both the injured and prepared the injury reports (Exts.-3 and 3/1), was never examined at the trial. The reports were tendered through P.W.-7 Murat Ram, a formal witness, who proved nothing beyond the handwriting and signature upon them. A Coordinate Bench of this Court in the case of Chandradeep @ Chandeep Sao & Ors. vs. State of Bihar reported as 2014 2 PLJR 286 = 2014 SCC OnLine Pat 191 has held as under:-
“6.On a bare perusal of Section 324 or Section 323 of the Penal Code, 1860, what may be found is that the act has to be ‘voluntary’ and the act of causing hurt in case of an offence under Section 324 of the Penal Code, 1860 should be done by using a weapon which is an instrument either of shooting or of cutting or of stabbing, etc. as per the language of that particular provision of the Penal Code, 1860. Word “voluntarily” gets defined by Section 39 of the Penal Code, 1860 as causing an effect by employing a means intending the effect to be caused by such employment of a means or with the necessary knowledge that by employing such means that particular effect shall be caused. Thus, what appears from Section 39 of the Penal Code, 1860 is that the ‘means’ has also to be judged from the facts as regards the application of Sections 324 or 323 of the Penal Code, 1860, if there is a case of ‘effect’, that is to say, any injury being caused to the injured or the victim.
This is the reason that in some of the decisions of this Court also, a particular view percolated on the above basis that though there might not be any necessity of the medical evidence being adduced in support of a charge under Section 323 of the Penal Code, 1860, but if there is a case of a particular bodily injury being caused by the voluntary act of the accused, then in that case there could be the necessity for the Court to look to the medical evidence.
7.The other aspect regarding the constitution of an offence under section 324 of the Penal Code, 1860 as may appear naturally coming out of that particular provision of the Penal Code is that mere causing an injury voluntarily may not constitute an offence under Section 324 of the Penal Code, 1860. What is important is the ‘means’ which appears in Section 39 of the Penal Code, 1860 which, in my opinion, naturally by its ordinary grammatical meaning, refers to the nature of the weapon which had been employed by the accused in inflicting the injuries, i.e., causing the ‘effect’. Therefore, it is always a necessary part of judging that while evaluating a judgment of conviction as regards proof/disproof of a charge under Section 324 of the Penal Code, 1860, the Court has to scrutinize the facts from that particular angle of definition as appears from the provision of Section 324 of the Penal Code, 1860.
8.Here in the present case, undisputedly, the doctor was not examined. There was non-production of the medical report. As such, there was no evidence on record that there was any injury either on the person of the informant or on the person of his father and again, there was absence of the evidence that if there was any injury, it had been caused by use of a particular weapon. Thus, the necessary ingredient of Section 324 of the Penal Code, 1860 that the injuries to the informant or his father might have been caused by employing the means, i.e., the weapon a Talwar or a Sword was absent. As such, is the inherent absence of the evidence that the injury had really been caused by any such instrument which is spoken of by Section 324 of the Penal Code, 1860.
9.In the above view of the evidence, this Court is of the view that conviction of Chandradeep Sao and Bhim Prasad under Section 324 of the Penal Code, 1860 was completely erroneous and against the very provisions of the Penal Code, 1860 as no offence under that particular provision was constituted.” (emphasis supplied)
Further, it is settled that an injury report can be read in evidence only through the testimony of the doctor who prepared or authored it, proof of handwriting is not proof of its contents. In the absence of the doctor, the nature and severity of the injuries whether simple, grievous or dangerous, were never proved in the trial and the defence stood denied the opportunity of cross-examination on the vital question whether the injuries could at all have been caused in the manner alleged. Even taking the reports at their face, all the injuries are simple incised wounds, not on any vital part, and importantly, no penetrating wound was found although the specific case of the prosecution, carried by P.W.-4 to the length of deposing that 2 to 3 bhala blows were given to Gopal Singh with the intention to kill him, is of repeated blows by a bhala. If a bhala is treated to be a sharp cutting weapon, only simple injuries are alleged to have been caused and the absence of any penetrating injury is wholly irreconcilable with the alleged repeated thrusts of a bhala.
The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Uttarakhand vs. Darshan Singh reported as (2020) 12 SCC 605, after considering various precedents on the question of conflict between medical evidence and ocular testimony, including Ram Narain Singh vs. State of Punjab reported as (1975) 4 SCC 497 has held that where the evidence of the witnesses for the prosecution is totally inconsistent with the medical evidence, it amounts to a fundamental defect in the prosecution case and, unless reasonably explained, it is sufficient to discredit the entire case. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Darshan Singh (Supra) has held as under:-
“43.In Abdul Sayeed v. State of M.P. (2010) 10 SCC 259, this Court discussed elaborately the case law on the subject of conflict between medical evidence and ocular evidence: (SCC pp. 272-74, paras 32-39)
“Medical evidence versus ocular evidence
32.In Ram Narain Singh v. State of Punjab (1975) 4 SCC 497, this Court held that where the evidence of the witnesses for the prosecution is totally inconsistent with the medical evidence or the evidence of the ballistics expert, it amounts to a fundamental defect in the prosecution case and unless reasonably explained it is sufficient to discredit the entire case.
33.In State of Haryana v. Bhagirath (1999) 5 SCC 96 it was held as follows: (SCC p. 101, para 15)‘
15.The opinion given by a medical witness need not be the last word on the subject. Such an opinion shall be tested by the court. If the opinion is bereft of logic or objectivity, the court is not obliged to go by that opinion. After all opinion is what is formed in the mind of a person regarding a fact situation. If one doctor forms one opinion and another doctor forms a different opinion on the same facts it is open to the Judge to adopt the view which is more objective or probable. Similarly if the opinion given by one doctor is not consistent with probability the court has no liability to go by that opinion merely because it is said by the doctor. Of course, due weight must be given to opinions given by persons who are experts in the particular subject.
34.Drawing on Bhagirath case (1999) 5 SCC 96, this Court has held that where the medical evidence is at variance with ocular evidence, ‘it has to be noted that it would be erroneous to accord undue primacy to the hypothetical answers of medical witnesses to exclude the eyewitnesses' account which had to be tested independently and not treated as the “variable” keeping the medical evidence as the “constant”.
35.Where the eyewitnesses'account is found credible and trustworthy, a medical opinion pointing to alternative possibilities cannot be accepted as conclusive. The eyewitnesses' account requires a careful independent assessment and evaluation for its credibility, which should not be adversely prejudged on the basis of any other evidence, including medical evidence, as the sole touchstone for the test of such credibility.
‘21. … The evidence must be tested for its inherent consistency and the inherent probability of the story; consistency with the account of other witnesses held to be creditworthy; consistency with the undisputed facts, the “credit” of the witnesses; their performance in the witness box; their power of observation, etc. Then the probative value of such evidence becomes eligible to be put into the scales for a cumulative evaluation.’
[Vide Thaman Kumar v. State (UT of Chandigarh) [Thaman Kumar v. State (UT of Chandigarh), (2003) 6 SCC 380 : 2003 SCC (Cri) 1362] and Krishnan v. State [Krishnan v. State, (2003) 7 SCC 56 : 2003 SCC (Cri) 1577] at SCC pp. 62-63, para 21.]
36.In Solanki Chimanbhai Ukabhai v. State of Gujarat (1983) 2 SCC 174, this Court observed: (SCC p. 180, para 13)
‘13. Ordinarily, the value of medical evidence is only corroborative. It proves that the injuries could have been caused in the manner alleged and nothing more. The use which the defence can make of the medical evidence is to prove that the injuries could not possibly have been caused in the manner alleged and thereby discredit the eyewitnesses. Unless, however, the medical evidence in its turn goes so far that it completely rules out all possibilities whatsoever of injuries taking place in the manner alleged by eyewitnesses, the testimony of the eyewitnesses cannot be thrown out on the ground of alleged inconsistency between it and the medical evidence.’
37.A similar view has been taken in Mani Ram v. State of U.P. 1994 Supp (2) SCC 289, Khambam Raja Reddy v. Public Prosecutor (2006) 11 SCC 239 and State of U.P. v. Dinesh (2009) 11 SCC 566 .
38.In State of U.P. v. Hari Chand, (2009) 13 SCC 542 : (2010) 1 SCC (Cri) 1112] this Court reiterated the aforementioned position of law and stated that: (SCC p. 545, para 13)
‘13. … In any event unless the oral evidence is totally irreconcilable with the medical evidence, it has primacy.
’39. Thus, the position of law in cases where there is a contradiction between medical evidence and ocular evidence can be crystallised to the effect that though the ocular testimony of a witness has greater evidentiary value vis-à-vis medical evidence, when medical evidence makes the ocular testimony improbable, that becomes a relevant factor in the process of the evaluation of evidence. However, where the medical evidence goes so far that it completely rules out all possibility of the ocular evidence being true, the ocular evidence may be disbelieved.” (emphasis in original)
In the present case, the statements of the witnesses are conflicting to a degree that they become irreconcilable with the medical / injury reports on the record. The inconsistency in the statements of the prosecution witnesses, coupled with the state of the injury reports, creates a serious doubt on the prosecution case, and on the basis of such conflicting statements the appellants could not have been convicted.
The investigation lends no assurance either. Though the police claims to have seized blood-soaked earth from the place of occurrence, P.W.-3 has admitted in his cross-examination that the signatures of the seizure-list witnesses were obtained on a plain paper at the Police Station itself and not at the place of occurrence, which casts serious doubt on the genuineness of the seizure itself. Moreover, the blood-stained earth was never sent to the Forensic Science Laboratory to ascertain even whether the blood was human. The weapons of assault, i.e., the bhala and the lathis, were never seized from the accused persons. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Munna Lal vs. State of Uttar Pradesh reported as (2023) 18 SCC 661, has held that the failure to seize and produce such material assumes importance where the credibility of the ocular account is otherwise open to question. Therefore, in the absence of such seizure, the case of the prosecution further weakens. It has also come on record, from the investigation itself, that no sign of digging of earth was found in the field though the entire genesis of the prosecution case is that the informant was then constructing the ridge (medh) which strikes at the very root of the story of the occurrence.
In view of the aforesaid discussions, I am of the view that the prosecution has not been able to prove its case against the appellants beyond reasonable doubt and, therefore, the appellants deserve acquittal.
Accordingly, this appeal stands allowed. The impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 22.04.2004 passed by the learned Additional District & Sessions Judge (Fast Track Court-IV), Ara in Sessions Trial No. 947 of 1992, arising out of Udwantnagar P.S. Case No. 79 of 1992, is hereby set aside in so far as the surviving appellants are concerned. The appeal qua appellant no.2, Jaggu Yadav @ Jaggu Singh, has already abated vide order dated 20.02.2025.
The appellants, namely, Jai Kumar Singh (appellant no. 1), Srikant Yadav @ Srikant Singh (appellant no. 3) and Awadhesh Yadav @ Awadhesh Singh (appellant no. 4), are acquitted of all the charges levelled against them. The appellants are on bail, they are discharged from the liabilities of their bail bonds.
The lower court records be remitted forthwith to the learned trial Court along with a copy of this judgment.
Pending interlocutory application(s), if any, stand disposed of.
