Jai Kamal Paints vs K. Krishna

M. Chockalingam, J.—The tenants who were directed to vacate the petition mentioned premises by an order of the Rent Controller namely

the XI Judge, Court of Small Causes, Madras, in RCOP No. 745/2005 and also by the Rent Control Appellate Authority namely the VII Judge,

Court of Small Causes, Madras, in RCA No. 545 of 2006, have challenged the said orders of eviction.

The Court heard the learned Counsel on either side.

The respondent-landlord filed a petition for eviction before the Rent Controller stating that he is the owner of the property in Door Nos. 125,

126 and 127, Ramanaicken Street, Royapuram, Madras; that his son is carrying on his business in Door Nos. 126 and 127, while Door No. 125

is being occupied by the tenants on a monthly rental basis; that in view of the extensive operation of the business of the son, the premise which is

now under the occupation of the tenants, is required; that the landlord required the same for the purpose of additional accommodation; that it was

a bonafide requirement, and hence, they were to be evicted.

The petition was severely resisted by the tenants stating that it is not correct to state that the son of the landlord is carrying on his business in the

other two premises in Door Nos. 126 and 127; that there is no need at all; that neither there is expansion of business, nor it is required for

additional accommodation; that it is thoroughly lack of bonafide; that further, it would be very difficult for them to secure an accommodation like

this; that apart from that, the relative hardship would be more for the tenants if they are ordered to be evicted, and under the circumstances, the

petition was to be dismissed.

On enquiry, the Rent Controller agreed with the case of the landlord and ordered eviction. The aggrieved tenants took it on appeal, which also

met the same fate. Under the circumstances, this revision has arisen before this Court.

In support of the revision petition, the learned Counsel for the petitioners would submit that in the instant case, Door Nos. 125, 126 and 127 are

three different and distinct properties; that Door Nos. 126 and 127 are being occupied by the son of the landlord to carry on his business, while

Door No. 125 is in the occupation of the tenants, who are the revision petitioners herein, for their painting business, where not less than 20 persons

are available; that in the instant case, the petition has been filed u/s 10(3)(c) of the Act on the ground of additional accommodation and not on the

ground of personal use and occupation; that in order to extend the business of his son, a landlord cannot ask for eviction invoking the provisions of

Section 10(3)(c) of the Act; that if it is a case of personal use and occupation, he can well invoke that provision; that the provisions of Section

10(3)(c) can be strictly applied only for the landlord himself and not for any one else, even from the family members; that under the circumstances,

the petition itself was not maintainable and should have been dismissed outright; but, both the authorities below have not considered this legal

position and the factual position also, in that the relative hardship by making an eviction order would be more for the tenants than to the landlord,

and under the circumstances, the orders of the authorities below have got to be set aside. In support of his contention, the learned Counsel relied

on the following decisions:

(i) M. Ramalingam Vs. Kothandaraman, ;

(ii)89 L.W. 601 A. Muthukumaraswamy v. A. Devaraj and

(iii) AIR 1989 SuC 302 Gangaram v. N. Shankar Reddy.

Contrary to the above contentions, the learned Counsel for the respondent would submit that in the instant case, all these three Door Nos. 125,

126 and 127 are actually three sheds within the same compound; that it is an admitted position that the part of the property in Door Nos. 126 and

127 are actually being occupied by the son, who is carrying on his business; that it is also true that the landlord has required the premises in Door

No. 125, which is being occupied by the tenants and has sought for eviction on the ground of additional accommodation; and that the contention

put forth by the opposite side that Section 10(3)(c) of the Act cannot be applied to such a situation by the landlord for additional accommodation,

since it is not his business which is to be extended, cannot be countenanced for the reason that under that provision, even the landlord can ask for

eviction on the ground of additional accommodation for any one of the members of his family also, if they are carrying on the business therein. In

support of his contentions, he relied on the following decisions:

(i) 1997 III L.W. 196 G. Sastha and Anr. v. O. Gomathiammal and

(ii) 1998 I L.W. 65 Alagarsamy v. S.N. Ramamoorthy.

Added further the learned Counsel that in the instant case, it is an admitted fact that the son of the landlord is carrying on his business in

aluminium foil in the portion; that in order to extend his business, he required the other part also; that when a real need is available and that is also

genuine, no difficulty could be felt for ordering eviction, which has been rightly done by the authorities below; that the contention that the relative

hardship, if measured, would be more for the tenants than to the landlord has got to be discountenanced in view of the existence of the real need as

stated above, and hence, the orders of the authorities below have got to be sustained.

The Court paid its anxious consideration on the submissions made both factual and legal, and also perused the decisions relied on by either side.

Concededly, the respondent-landlord owns the property which is situated in Door Nos. 125, 126 and 127. It would be very clear from the

available evidence marched before the Rent Controller, that all these three door numbers relate to the same building by way of three sheds coming

under the same compound, and thus, it cannot be stated as three different properties; but, they constituted only one property having three door

numbers. It is also an admitted position that the tenants are occupying Door No. 125 for their painting business, while Door Nos. 126 and 127 are

being occupied by the son of the landlord for his aluminium foil business. Now, the legal contention put forth by the learned Counsel for the

petitioners that a landlord cannot invoke Section 10(3)(c) of the Act for the purpose of additional accommodation as asked for in the instant case,

and he can invoke the provisions only for himself and not for any of the family members, cannot be countenanced. It is true that Section 10(3)(c) is

meant for additional accommodation of the landlord. Section 10(3)(a)(iii) envisages a situation where a landlord can ask for eviction on the ground

of personal use and occupation. This Court is unable to appreciate the contention put forth by the learned Counsel for the petitioners that only

Section 10(3)(a)(iii) of the Act can be invoked by a landlord for his personal use and occupation. Once such a situation arises for the personal use

and occupation, the landlord can ask for eviction of the tenant under the said provision. If that provision can be applied for the members of the

family also, why not the same can be applied to a case where a landlord comes for extension of the business of any one of the members of the

family who is carrying on the same in his own premises as one found in the instant case. A comparative reading of both the provisions would make

it abundantly clear that Section 10(3)(c) of the Act is actually another species of own occupation coming u/s 10(3)(a)(i) or Section 10(3)(a)(iii) of

the Act, and further, in a case like this, the only test that has got to be applied by the Courts is whether the claim of the landlord is genuine or not.

In the case on hand, even though the word ""members"" is not actually used in Section 10(3)(c) of the Act, the interpretation of the Supreme Court

as well as this Court is that the members of the family are also included, and a landlord can also seek eviction of a tenant for additional

accommodation, for being used by a member of his family also.

As stated above, the only test what has got to be applied, is whether it is genuine or not. The entire evidence would go to show that the reason

what has been put forth by the landlord, was actually genuine, and under the circumstances, this Court, after applying the said test, feels no

impediment in finding that the reasons are genuine, and it is actually required for additional accommodation, and the landlord can also seek for

eviction on the ground of additional accommodation for the business being carried on by any one of the members of the family. In such

circumstances, he can well invoke the provisions of Section 10(3)(c) of the Act for getting eviction. This Court is of the view that it has got to be

applied, and accordingly, the orders of the authorities below are sustained. However, considering the facts and circumstances of the case, 9 (nine)

months'' time is granted for vacating and handing over possession. An affidavit of undertaking shall be filed within a period of two weeks herefrom.

In the result, this civil revision petition is dismissed. No costs. Consequently, connected MP is also dismissed.