Jagmohan Singh vs Nitya Nand

G.S. Chahal, J.

Jagmohan Singhpetitioner, by means of this petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, seeks a direction from this court for proceeding against the respondents for offences under Sections 197 and 199 IPC and for issuance of such other direction as the Court may deem fit.

The petitioner is working as a Technical AssistantI (TAI) with the Food Corporation of India. He was posted to Kharar w.e.f. Nov. 5, 1990. He was transferred from Kharar to Sangrur vide order dated May 16, 1991. He challenged that order by filing a suit and the District Judge, Chandigarh who entertained the suit issued temporary injunction on June 24, 1991 in the following terms :

"............In the meanwhile till further order, operation of the order dated 16.5.1991 is stayed."

In spite of this interim stay, the petitioner was transferred to Kurali and then again to Chandigarh. Petitioner then moved a misc. application and the order dated Dec. 15, 1992 was stayed by the learned Sub Judge vide his order dated February 11, 1993.

The petitioner claims that the respondents, with a view to create evidence for being under during the course of judicial process passed orders dated Feb. 15, 1993 Annexures P1 and Feb. 16, 1993 Annexure P2. Petitioner had then filed a petition under JUDGMENT 39 Rule 2A, but he now wanted that this Court should proceed against the respondent under Section 340 Cr.P.C. for commission of offences under Sections 197 and 199 IPC. He claims that Annexures P1 and P2 had been created falsely in order to circumvent the interim order passed by the Courts below.

The learned counsel for the respondent has raised a preliminary objection as to the competency of the petitioner.

Article 227 of the Constitution of India vests this Court with the powers of Superintendence over all Courts and Tribunals throughout its territories.

To explain the scope of this Article relating to the powers to be exercised by this Court, I may refer to the following observations of Nasir Ullah Beg, J. In Jodhey & others v. State, AIR 1952 Allahabad 788 :

"14. A reading of the entire Art. 227 of the Constitution of India in the light of the antecedent law on the subject leads one to the irresistible conclusion that the purpose of the Constitution makers was to make the High Court responsible for the entire administration of justice and to vest in the High Court an unlimited reserve of judicial power which could be brought into play at any time that the High Court considered it necessary to draw upon the same. Springing as it does from the Constitution, which is the parent of all Acts and Statutes in India, the fact that the judgment or order of a Court or Tribunal has been made final by an Act or the fact that the body performing judicial functions is a special tribunal constituted under a Statute cannot be set up as a bar to the exercise of this power by the High Court. The prohibited area is to be found within the four corners of the Constitution itself and nowhere else."

The petitioner seeks a direction to the Court to initiate proceedings with respect to the documents which are claimed to have been forged with a view to circumvent the judicial process. Such a direction can be given if this Court finds any inaction on the part of the trial Court.

There is, thus, no merit in the argument of the learned counsel for the respondent that the petition is not competent.

I, however, find force in the contention of the learned counsel for the respondent that unless the petitioner moves an application under section 340 Cr.P.C. before the trial Court and that Court refuses to act, no direction should be given.

I would have left the matter as it is at this stage, but certain facts which are apparent on record call for certain directions. The petitioner had been ordered to be relieved from his duties at Kharar and that order had been stayed by the District Judge. To circumvent that order, but without getting the interim injunction vacated, the officers of the FCI issued another order relieving the petitioner of his duties from Kharar and sending him to Kurali. This will prima facie amount to willful flouting of the order of the District Judge dated June 24, 1991. The petitioner being an employee of the FCI suffered that order and complied with the same and it was only when another transfer order was issued to him shifting him from Kurali to Chandigarh that he moved the Court for further protection. The nonmoving of an application by the petitioner immediately after he was shifted from Kharar for the second time to Kurali cannot absolve the concerned officers of the FCI from their liability for flouting the order of the District Judge. A copy of this petition be sent to the trial Court for treating it to be an application under JUDGMENT 39 Rule 2A of the CPC and to proceed with it according to law and decide the matter within six weeks from the next date of hearing. If the petitioner feels that some acts of forgery have been committed with respect to Annexures P1 and P2, he shall move the trial Court with a proper petition under section 340 Cr.P.C.

Nothing stated above, shall, however, amount to decision on the merit of the commission of contempt by any of the respondents.

With the above observations, this petition stands disposed of