Jagjtt Singh, Deputy Supdt. of Police vs Dalip Singh Gill and Others

M.M. Punchhi, J.—Admitted and disposed of simultaneously.

The Petitioner is one Jagjit Singh, a Deputy Superintendent of Police of the Vigilance Department (now retired). The complainant-Respondent Dalip Singh Gill accused him of offences under Sections 392/296/448/323/504/148/149, Indian Penal Code, having, been committed by him as a member of unlawful assembly in which the other members were Respondents 2 to 6, out of whom Respondent No 2 Rup Chand Sharma has since died. The complainant-Respondent filed a complaint in the Court of the Judicial Magistrate 1st Class, Bhatinda. The trial Court, after recording preliminary evidence, summoned the accused persons inclusive of the Petitioner under Sections 323/504/149,-Indian Penal Code.

On appearance, the Petitioner objected to the continuance of proceedings against him by taking shelter u/s 197, Criminal Procedure Code. He took the plea that without sanction from the State Government, his Trial under those sections was illegal and thus proceedings against him required to be dropped. Mr. Jaswant Singh Korey, the Presiding Officer of the Court, vide order dated 8.9.1983 allowed the application and directed the complainant to obtain sanction from the State Government on or before 6.10 1983. The complainant applied for the requisite sanction but was unable to get it before 6.10.1983 the date fixed in the case. Accordingly, the legal consequence which ensued was that the proceedings as far as the Petitioner was concerned stood dropped. The complaint, however, proceeded against the remaining accused. On 26.7.1984 vide order Annexure P. 6., the accused were discharged since the complainant did not put in appearance on the date fixed in the case.

That the discharge of accused would tantamount to an acquittal is clear from the mandatory provisions of Section 256, Code of Criminal Procedure ; since the learned Magistrate did not adjourn the case ; rather he ordered the file to be consigned. There however appeared in the said order a line which is to the effect that the personal appearance of the accused Jagjit Singh has already been exempted. In other words, the learned Magistrate, while passing order of discharge, noted the presence of the accused other than the Petitioner and in the body of the order,he specifically mentioned that the personal appearance of the Petitioner had been exempted, so as to discharge on the dismissal of the complaint, for non appearance of the complainant, all the accused inclusive of the Petitioner. This is crystal clear from the language and tenor of the order.

The complainant-Respondent, however, could obtain sanction u/s 197, Criminal Procedure Code, from the Government on 11.10.1985 to prosecute the Petitioner. The sanction was wide enough to cover offences under Sections 392/420)506/296/448/323/504/148/149, Indian Penal Code. On the strength of such sanction, the complainant-Respondent filed a fresh complaint against all the accused inclusive of the Petitioner on which an order was passed summoning all the accused under the aforesaid sections.

Mr. Ujagar Singh, learned Counsel for the Petitioner, maintains that when all the accused inclusive of the Petitioner had been discharged on 26.7.1984 on non appearance of the complainant, the order was equivalent to an order of acquittal and thus no summoning order could be passed by the learned Magistrate on a fresh complaint. He has relied on the strict letter of the said order. As observed earlier, it is patent that proceedings against the Petitioner were dropped on the allowance of his application vide order dated 8.9.1983 and can it best be said to be binding against the Petitioner till 6.10.1983 upto which the date complainant-Respondent was required to obtain sanction from the State Government. On his failure to do so, at least from 6.10.1983 onwards, the Petitioner ceased to be a party to the complaint on dropping of proceedings. However, the other Respondents continued to remain accused in the proceedings. Thus it is idle for the Petitioner to contend that on obtaining of sanction, a second complaint on the same facts was not possible.

However, this glaring fact cannot be lost sight of that the complainant did not challenge the earlier summoning order at any stage whereby the accused were only summoned under Sections 323/504/149, Indian Penal Code, and not under any other sections of Indian Penal Code. Respondents 3 to 6 in no event can be summoned again when they stand acquitted in the complaint not only for offences under Sections 323/ 504/149, Indian Penal Code, but also for offences for which the learned Magistrate did not deem them fit to be summoned. Thus the summoning order against accused-Respondents 3 to 6 seems to be nothing but an abuse of the process of the Court and proceedings against them necessarily have to be dropped.

So far as the case of the Petitioner is concerned, he has been rightly summoned for there is a sanction to prosecute him. However, the summoning order needs to be modified so as to keep in accord with the earlier summoning order and confine to offences under Sections 504/323/149, Indian Penal Code. The reason is obvious. Had the complainant-Respondent obtained the requisite sanction within the time allotted by the Magistrate i. e. by 6.10.1983, or the Petitioner not raised any objection to drop proceedings, the complaint could have proceeded against the Petitioner but only for offences under Sections 504/323/149, Indian Penal Code. The mere fact that the complainant-Respondent has obtained sanction which has a wider net docs not ipso facto mean that the Courts have to proceed in the complaint on the dictates of the sanction. Repetitively it need be said that the complainant-Respondent was never dissatisfied with the earlier summoning order. At his instance, the sumoning order cannot be widened. Of course, it is a different matter if the Court which has taken cognizance of the offence comes to the view that a different offence has been committed than for which the accused-Petitioner was summoned. If such a situation arises, the Court can at the appropriate time frame a charge or cause amendment of the charges, if framed already, and if not, make its verdict in view of its findings. The Court is altogether in that event free to take such steps to further the cause of justice.

For the foregoing reasons, the Petitioner is granted partial relief by modifying the summoning order so that it confines to offences under Sections 323/504/149, Indian Penal Code, and relief is granted to Respondents 3 to 6 that the summoning order shall not affect them in face of their earlier acquittal. Ordered accordingly. The concerned parties through their counsel are directed to put in appearance before the learned Magistrate on 6th August, 1986.