Jagdish vs The State Of Madhya Pradesh

With consent the matter is heard finally.

The present criminal appeal has been preferred under Section 415(2) of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (corresponding to Section 374(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973) assailing the judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 30.12.2025 passed by the learned Special Judge (SC/ST Act), Harda in Special Sessions Trial (SCATR) No.03/2021, whereby the appellant has been convicted for the offences punishable under Sections 366 and 376(2)(n) of the IPC and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for 5 years and 10 years with fine of Rs. 2,000 and Rs. 10,000 respectively, while being acquitted of the charges under the POCSO Act, Section 363 IPC and the provisions of the SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act.

The prosecution case, in brief, is that on the intervening night of 14/15.11.2020, the father of the victim lodged a missing report stating that his daughter had gone outside the house and did not return. During investigation, the victim was recovered on 01.12.2020. She alleged that the appellant, who was her neighbour, forcibly took her on a motorcycle to Village Pokharni, thereafter to Khandwa and subsequently to Maharashtra, where he repeatedly established physical relations with her against her will. On completion of investigation, charge-sheet was filed against the appellant and the co-accused was acquitted by the Trial Court.

Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the Trial Court recorded a finding that the prosecution failed to prove that the victim was a minor and held her to be a major, therefore, the case has to be examined from the standpoint of consent. It was argued that the victim travelled with the appellant through several public places without raising any alarm or seeking assistance, indicating that she had voluntarily accompanied him. It was also contended that the DNA report, by itself, only proves sexual intercourse and not absence of consent. Learned counsel further argued that there were material omissions and contradictions in the testimony of the victim, the medical witnesses and the Investigating Officer, which were ignored by the Trial Court. On these grounds, it was prayed that the conviction under Sections 366 and 376(2)(n) IPC be set aside and the appellant be acquitted.

Per contra, learned Government Advocate submitted that the prosecution has succeeded in proving the guilt of the appellant beyond reasonable doubt through the consistent testimony of the victim, which stands corroborated by the medical and scientific evidence, including the DNA report. It was contended that the Trial Court has appreciated the oral and documentary evidence and rightly concluded that the victim was subjected to repeated sexual assault by the appellant. It was further submitted that minor discrepancies in the evidence do not affect the core of the prosecution case and that the conviction recorded by the Trial Court is fully justified. Accordingly, it was prayed that the appeal, being devoid of merit, deserves to be dismissed.

Heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the record

The Trial Court, after a detailed appreciation of the evidence relating to the age of the victim, has recorded a finding that the prosecution failed to establish that the victim was a minor on the date of the incident. Consequently, the appellant was acquitted of the offences under the POCSO Act and Section 363 of the IPC. The said finding has attained significance because once the victim is held to be a major, the question whether she voluntarily accompanied the appellant assumes considerable importance while examining the offences under Sections 366 and 376(2)(n) IPC.

The principal contention advanced on behalf of the appellant is that the relationship between the parties was consensual and that the victim was a willing participant throughout the period she remained with the appellant. In support of this submission, learned counsel has invited the attention of this Court to paragraphs 14 to 17 of the cross-examination of the victim. From her own admissions, it is evident that after leaving her house she resided with the appellant for about eight days in a hut situated near a canal where several farmers used to work in the adjoining fields. Despite having ample opportunity to seek assistance or disclose the alleged incident to any of those persons, she admittedly did not make any complaint. She further admitted that thereafter she travelled with the appellant to Khandwa on a motorcycle and during the journey they passed through public places where several persons and police personnel were present, yet she neither raised any alarm nor requested anyone for help. These admissions clearly indicate that she had sufficient opportunities to leave the company of the appellant had she been acting against her will.

The victim has further admitted that she and the appellant belong to the same caste. Her evidence also discloses material contradictions and omissions with reference to her previous statement (Ex.D/1), which affect the reliability of her allegations regarding forcible abduction and repeated sexual assault. These inconsistencies, coupled with her conduct during the entire period of her stay with the appellant, create a serious doubt regarding the prosecution version that she was continuously under force or coercion.

The relevant statutory presumption under Section 114A of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 reads as under:

The presumption under Section 114A of the Indian Evidence Act is undoubtedly attracted where the statutory prerequisites are satisfied; however, it is a rebuttable presumption and not an irrebuttable conclusion of law. In the present case, even assuming the presumption arises, the same stands displaced on a cumulative appreciation of the evidence on record. The victim, in her cross-examination, admitted that she continued to remain with the appellant for several days, travelled with him through public places without raising any alarm, and had sufficient opportunity to seek help but chose not to do so. Her conduct, coupled with the material omissions and contradictions in her version, probabilities the defence plea of voluntary companionship and creates serious doubt regarding the alleged absence of consent. The Supreme Court in Pankaj Singh v. State of Haryana, (2024) 19 SCC 256, reiterated that while Section 114A creates a statutory presumption in appropriate cases, the prosecution must first satisfy the statutory prerequisites for its invocation, and even thereafter the evidence has to be appreciated as a whole. The accused is not required to lead independent defence evidence if the prosecution evidence itself or the surrounding circumstances probabilise the defence version. In the present case, the cumulative effect of the admissions made by the prosecutrix in her cross-examination, the material omissions and contradictions in her previous statements, and her conduct during the period she remained with the appellant create a reasonable doubt regarding the prosecution version. Consequently, the statutory presumption stands rebutted. Accordingly, this Court is of the considered opinion that the Trial Court committed an error in convicting the appellant under Sections 366 and 376(2)(n) IPC despite recording a finding that the victim was major and the evidence on record indicating that she had voluntarily accompanied the appellant. The prosecution has failed to establish the guilt of the appellant beyond reasonable doubt, and the appellant is entitled to the benefit of doubt.

Accordingly, this Court is of the considered opinion that the Trial Court committed an error in convicting the appellant under Sections 366 and 376(2)(n) IPC despite recording a finding that the victim was major and the evidence on record indicating that she had voluntarily accompanied the appellant. The prosecution has failed to establish the guilt of the appellant beyond reasonable doubt, and the appellant is entitled to the benefit of doubt.

Consequently, the present criminal appeal deserves to be and is hereby allowed. The judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 30.12.2025 passed by the learned Special Judge in Special Sessions Trial (SCATR) No.03/2021, convicting the appellant for the offences punishable under Sections 366 and 376(2)(n) of the IPC, is hereby set aside. The appellant shall be released forthwith, if not required in connection with any other case. Fine, if deposited, shall be refunded.

The record of the Trial Court be transmitted back for compliance.