Jagarnath Singh and Others vs Francis Kharia and Others

Meredith, J.—These applications are by the second party in two proceedings u/s 145, Criminal P.C., relating to two different villages, but which were disposed of by the same judgment.

The proceedings started in May 1946, and on 27tb November 1946, they were converted from Section 144 to Section 145. Thereafter the learned Subdivisional Magistrate, Simdega, heard evidence on nth, 12th and 13th of December 1946. The matter was then adjourned for argument, and arguments were not heard until 4th January 1947. After that judgment was reserved without fixing any date directly against the directions several times issued by this Court. On 26th February, the Magistrate further adjourned the matter to 21st April.

Thereafter he was transferred. On 2lst April, these-cases came before his successor who recorded "No time. Put up on 3rd May." On 3rd May he noted that judgment was not ready. "Put up on 5th of June," and finally on 5th June orders were passed without hearing any fresh arguments.

It is difficult to speak with moderation of the course which these proceedings took. Here, we have proceedings which are intended to be summary to preserve the peace. The hearing was concluded on 13th December, and an adjournment of nearly three weeks for argument was granted. The matter is then postponed for one reason or another, and the judgment is not finally delivered until June--nearly six months after the conclusion of the hearing--and finally the judgment is written by a Magistrate who has heard no arguments in the case. A Magistrate may no doubt act in suitable cases on evidence recorded by his predecessor, but I fail to understand how he can act upon arguments made before his predecessor which he has never heard. I am certainly not prepared to uphold orders passed in such circumstances, and I must express my strong disapprobation of the conduct of both these Magistrates. Nor am I prepared to allow the matter to be disposed of now merely after hearing fresh arguments because the cases have become so stale that the whole situation may have changed.

In the circumstances the order in these two cases will be set aside, and, should the Magistrate find that there is now any danger of a breach of the peace, proceedings should be initiated de novo. The rule is accordingly made absolute.