High CourtsSingle Bench(2026) 10 BOM CK 5793

Jagannath Devidas Garkar vs Dilip Vithalrao Lonsane & Ors.

Bombay High Court, Aurangabad Bench · Decided on 22 October 2026

HON’BLE JUDGES
Ajit B. Kadethankar, J
CASE NUMBER
First Appeal No. 993 of 2015

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Judgment

55 paragraphs · 2,251 words

. Preface: Whether a permanently disable ‘Cleaner’ on a truck, is entitle for an additional compensation of Rs.1,24,003/- towards loss of earning capacity; and whether he is entitled for benefit of amended Sub section 2A of Section 4 of the Employees' Compensation Act 1923 for medical reimbursement of Rs. 2,55,000/- are the short issues in this appeal.

2.

Subject-matter : Feeling aggrieved by the Judgment and Award dated 15.03.2014 passed by the Ex Officio Commissioner for Employees’ Compensation @ Civil Judge Senior Division, Hingoli in Non Fatal Accident application No.02 of 2011, the claimant is before this Court seeking enhancement in the compensation.

3.

Vide an order dated 07.09.2026, this court framed following Substantial Questions of Law :

1 Whether the learned Commissioner of Employees Compensation has erred in treating the percentage of disability as same as percentage of loss of earning capacity ?

2 Are the findings with respect to 30% loss of earning capacity perverse, being arrived at without adverting to the evidence brought on record by the appellant/claimant.

4.

All the learned advocates for the respective parties insist for final disposal of the First Appeal. For the sake of convenience, the parties are referred as to their factual status i.e. claimant, employer and insurer.

Submissions:

5.

At the outset when the matter was taken up for hearing, another issue of debate was raised by the both the sides. While Mr. Pavankumar S. Agrawal, learned Advocate for the appellant claimed benefit of amended sub section 2A to Section 4 of the Employees' Compensation Act 1923 for reimbursement of medical bills, Mr. Aniruddha S. Usmanpurkar, learned Advocate for respondent no.2 strenuously objected this prayer on the count that the learned Commissioner did not mark those bills with exhibit numbers. In view of the controversy, I deem it appropriate to frame an additional Substantial Question of Law in following terms:

3 Whether the learned Commissioner erred in not advancing medical reimbursement as per Section 4 (2A) of the Employees' Compensation Act 1923 for want of exhibiting the bills?

6.

Heard learned advocates for the respective parties on all the Substantial Questions of Law. Both the sides have argued much on the newly framed Substantial Question of Law. Their submissions are widely discussed in the later part of the judgment. Perused the case papers, the record and proceeding. Facts are not in dispute, hence they are not reproduced. On the basis of rival arguments, I proceed to record my findings as follows.

7. Discussion:

7.1

Answer to the first two Substantial Questions of Law need to be ascertained from the nature of job that the claimant was doing, and the adverse impact of the injury sustained by the claimant. Both these Substantial Questions of Law are interlinked, and hence discussed together.

7.1.1

For that, it is pertinent to note that it is an undisputed fact that the appellant/claimant was working as a ‘Cleaner’ on the insured truck. The job of the ‘Cleaner’ is not only cleaning of the truck or the inside material, but the labour jobs incidental to use of the truck including to assist the driver, semi-skilled work incidental to use of the vehicle e.g. removing the punctured wheels, loading/unloading the material, etc. and so on. These works are necessarily involve heavy physical works for which only physically fit person is competent to do the job.

7.1.2

Witness No.2- Dr. Bhagwan Pundge deposed that he examined the claimant and found Crush Lacerated Wound, fracture to pelvis with Rupture Urethra with stiffness to left lip joint and contusion to both knee joints with stiffness to both knee joints. The percentage of the disability was certified @ 30%. After much discussion, even accepting the explanation given by the doctor on the date of certificate, learned Commissioner accepted that the claimant suffered permanent disability @ 30%. While accepting the permanent disability certificate and its contents, learned Commissioner also accepted the evidence tendered by one Dr. Harish Darade (Exh.61).

7.1.3

Neither the employer nor the insurer has challenged the finding of the Learned Commissioner on permanent disability.

7.1.4

Thus, now it is to be seen as to whether the 30% permanent disability results into 100% loss of earning capacity.

7.1.5

While Mr. Pawankumar Agrawal, learned advocate stresses his arguments that the permanent disability has permanently disabled the claimant of doing the job of Cleaner on the heavy vehicle as he was doing earlier. He submits that on this count only it be held that the claimant/appellant has lost every capacity to earn as a Cleaner.

7.1.6

Mr. Aniruddha Usmanpurkar, learned advocate for the Insurer relies upon the admission given by CW- Dr. Bhagwan Pundge that the claimant may find difficulty in doing labour work in future.

7.1.7

With the able assistance of the learned Advocates for both the sides, I have cautiously gone through the main complaint, the pleadings and the evidence tendered by the claimant.

7.1.8

The list of the injuries to hold permanent total disablement is mentioned in the Part I of the Schedule-I. The other part of Schedule-I mentions the injuries which are held to result into permanent partial disablement. It can not be disputed that the injuries sustained by the claimant fall withing the meaning of Section 4 (1)(c) (ii).

That way, the arithmetical calculation for the compensation done by the learned Commissioner cannot be faulted with.

7.1.9

However, at this juncture the Courts and Tribunals need to bear in mind the guidelines laid down by the Honorable Supreme Court in the case of Raj Kumar Vs. Ajay Kumar and Anr. reported at 2010 SCC OnLine SC 1166 at page 352. Hon’ble Supreme Court observed thus:

19.

We may now summarise the principles discussed above:

(i)

All injuries (or permanent disabilities arising from injuries), do not result in loss of earning capacity.

(ii)

The percentage of permanent disability with reference to the whole body of a person, cannot be assumed to be the percentage of loss of earning capacity. To put it differently, the percentage of loss of earning capacity is not the same as the percentage of permanent disability (except in a few cases, where the Tribunal on the basis of evidence, concludes that the percentage of loss of earning capacity is the same as the percentage of permanent disability).

(iii)

The doctor who treated an injured claimant or who examined him subsequently to assess the extent of his permanent disability can give evidence only in regard to the extent of permanent disability. The loss of earning capacity is something that will have to be assessed by the Tribunal with reference to the evidence in entirety.

(iv)

The same permanent disability may result in different percentages of loss of earning capacity in different persons, depending upon the nature of profession, occupation or job, age, education and other factors.

7.1.10

It must never be lost out of mind that, while dealing with such a beneficial piece of legislation, neither the quantum of disability nor the statements of witnesses be accepted mechanically. True that the Courts are not the medical experts; still the Court has to render finding on loss of earning capacity appreciating the nature of injuries, the nature of disability, and nature of the job that the claimant was doing. Obviously, when a person sustains a permanent disability which prevents him from continuing with earlier job, he shall do something for his survival. Such possibility of doing something, even assuming that the person does something for his survival must not be taken that he has not sustained 100% loss of earning capacity.

7.1.11

In this case, the claimant sustained severe fracture injuries including fracture of pelvis. The court accepted the permanent disability. Learned Commissioner that way accepted the permanent disability certificate which mentions that the appellant suffered Rupture Urethra. Neither the employer nor the insurer adduce any evidence in rebuttal.

7.1.12

In such circumstances, merely because the doctor asserted that the claimant may suffer difficulty to do labour work can not be taken that the claimant is fit to work on his previous job of Cleaner. Neither from the Claimant’s side, nor from the respondents’ side, and pertinently nor even by the learned Commissioner has taken into account the impact of Rupture Urethra on a person who has to work as Cleaner on truck which includes heavy travelling, continuous up and down from the truck, and heavy physical work. The percentage of loss of earning capacity needs to be assessed pragmatically, which the Honorable Supreme Court has observed in the case of Raj Kumar (Supra).

7.1.13

Mr. Usmanpurkar, learned Advocate for the insurer submitted that Dr. Pundge was not a Neurologist to count the permanent disability referring to Rupture Urethra while issuing the permanent disability certificate. To that, I find that no question to that effect is put by the insurer to the said Doctor in the cross examination, nor the insurer has adduced any medical evidence in rebuttal. Pertinently, neither the Insurer nor the employer has challenged the finding of the learned Commissioner in which the permanent disability and permanent disability certificate have been accepted. Hence the objection raised by Mr. Usmanpurkar as also learned Advocate for employer, in my opinion do not stand on any footing.

7.1.14

No separate arguments are advanced before me on behalf of the employer.

7.1.15

Considering the nature of injuries, the nature of job that the claimant was doing, and the adverse impact on claimant’s job performance capacity, I am of the opinion that the loss of earning capacity ought to be applied @ 75% (instead of 30%) to meet the ends of justice. This is to meet the ends of justice and to balance the equities, keeping in mind the guidelines laid down by the Honorable Supreme Court in the case of Raj Kumar (Supra).

7.2

Now so far as grant of medical expenses is concerned, amendment to Section 4 of the Employees' Compensation Act 1923 thereby incorporating the Section 4(2A) became effective from January 2010. The accident occurred lateron. Obviously, the benefit of medical expenditure reimbursement is applicable to the claimant.

7.2.1

The only issue is that the learned Commissioner did not endorse the medical bills as an exhibit. From the Record and Proceedings produced before me, I have gone through the medical bills submitted by the claimant with a list of documents. The list of document was produced during the Trial. The bills are computer generated and some are original bills.

7.2.2

True that the claimant did not examine the medicine vendor to prove the receipts; however in the cross examination conducted by the Insurer, not a single question is put to the claimant denying that he incurred that much medical expenses. It is trite law that the provisions of the Evidence Act are not to be strictly and hyper-technically applied to these summery proceedings which are piece of beneficial legislation. If those are applied in the peculiar circumstances, it would straightway defeat the very object of the enactment itself.

7.2.3

A genuine claimant must not suffer lapse on the part of an Advocate to request the Court/Tribunal to comply the formality, nor the failure of the Tribunal/Commissioner to say something about such documents should adversely affect the claimant. This is not a routine Civil Suit, it is an enquiry. It is expected that the authority which has conducted such an enquiry would look into the record of the case, deal on every document either this way or that way, provided - by giving reasoning and calling upon the parties as to why any material document is filed, why it should be accounted, or why it should not be accounted, as the case may be.

7.2.4

Keeping in mind the very object behind the Employees' Compensation Act 1923 and the corresponding provisions, I feel that the claimant must not be deprived of his legitimate claim in view of the amended sub section 2A.

8. Conclusion:

For the reasons stated, I answer the Substantial Questions of Law as follows:

No.Substantial Question of Lawfinding
iWhether the learned Commissioner of Employees Compensation has erred in treating the percentage of disability as same as percentage of loss of earning capacity ?Yes
ii iii

Are the findings with respect to 30% loss of earning capacity perverse, being arrived at without adverting to the evidence brought on record by the appellant/claimant.

Whether the learned Commissioner erred in not advancing medical reimbursement as per Section 4 (2A) of the Employees' Compensation Act 1923 for want of exhibiting the bills?

Yes Yes
9.

In view of above, I pass following order:

ORDER

a. First Appeal is partly allowed;

b. Appellant is held entitled for compensation holding his loss of earning capacity @ 75% instead of 30% unlike observed by the learned Commissioner in paragraph No.22 of the impugned Judgment and Award. Total award is quantified to Rs.2,06,671/-;

c. The appellant is held entitled for reimbursement of medical bills worth Rs. 2,55,000/-, however without any interest;

d. To the extent of above, the Judgment and award stand modified. Modified Award be drawn accordingly;

e. The respondent No.2 shall deposit the enhanced compensation of Rs.1,24,003/- in this Court within a period of 08 weeks from today with accrued interest.

f. In addition to the directions given by the learned Commissioner at Clause 3 of the operative part of impugned Judgment and Award, the Respondent no.1 is directed to pay 50% of the enhanced compensation with 12% interest thereon within a period of Eight weeks from today.

g. No order as to the costs.

h. Record and proceeding be remitted back.