Jagadambal and Others (Legal Representative of the Deceased Appellant Swaminatha Vanniar) vs Angammal and Others

Veeraswami, J.—The second appeal and the writ petition have been heard together as they both relate to the character of the land which the Appellant, who is also the petitioner in the writ petition, sought to recover from the Defendants. The Petitioner entered upon the land in or about 1948 as a lessee and in 1952 or so, applied to the Deputy Collector, Thanjavur u/s 55 of the Estates Land Act for a patta. This proceeding is under that provision regarded as a suit. Though the claim by the Petitioner there was on the footing that he was a ryot entitled to a patta for the holding the whole controversy before the Deputy Collector centred round whether there was a forcible dispossession of the Petitioner. The Deputy Collector found that there was such dispossession, and on that view granted patta. On appeal, the District Court of Thanjavur affirmed that finding. In the course of hearing before that Court, the Defendants, who are the Respondents before this Court wanted to file an additional written statement raising a new plea that the land was a pannai or private land and not ryoti in character. The District Court considered that this plea was beyond the scope of the suit and declined leave to receive the additional written statement. In fact, it was of the view that it would still be open to the Defendants to institute a separate suit in a civil Court for a declaration that the lands were private lands. The inam village of Marungai Pinnallur Vattam, Thanjavur taluk, in which the land covered by the suit is situate, was notified in or about 1954 under the provisions of Madras Act XXVI of 1948. Thereafter the Defendants applied u/s 13 of that Act for grant of a patta in respect of the land. There the Assistant Settlement Officer decided that the land was pannai in character and granted patta. The plaintiff was a party to those proceedings. On appeal, the Tribunal took a similar view and affirmed the grant of patta to the Defendants It is to quash this order the writ petition has been filed.

After the proceedings u/s 55 of the Estates Land Act and the appeal arising there out had come to an end, the Plaintiff instituted the suit out of which the second appeal arises for possession on the ground that the land was ryoti in character. The Courts below rejected that claim, they being of the view that the decision in the proceedings arising out of the

Defendant''s petition u/s 13 of Madras Act XXVI of 1948 was final so far as the civil Courts were concerned. The prayer for possession in the suit being within the purview of civil Courts it was naturally held that the suit was maintainable as that relief could not be granted by the Tribunal set up under Madras Act XXVI of 1948.

So far as the writ petition is concerned, the Petitioner has failed to satisfy this Court that the Tribunal''s order suffers from any error apparent on its face. It has not been stated that for the Petitioner that the Tribunal misdirected itself as to the tests applicable to a determination of the character of the land as pannai or ryoti. With reference to the evidence before it, and having regard to the treatment of the land throughout and the short term leases and the conduct of the Defendants and their predecessors-in-title it considered that the Assistant Settlement Officer, had arrived at the correct conclusion that the land was proved to the pannai in character. The jama-bandhi accounts of certain faslis which were filed before the Assistant Settlement Officer described the land as a private land. This land formed part of a wider extent of land measuring about five velis which once belonged to the junior Prince of Thanjavur. He sold the land in 1932 and eventually it came into the hands of the Defendants by right of purchase. There were besides the jamabhandhi accounts, lease deeds with surrender clauses. One of the witnesses examined in the proceedings u/s 13 deposed that the land was noted as Iruvaram in the Record of Rights Register. It is true that this expression Iruvaram may not by itself be conclusive as to the character of the land. But it is one of the factors which may legitimately be taken into account along with other circumstances. It seems to me, therefore, the Tribunal does not appear to be in error when it agreed with the Assistant Settlement Officer and held that the land was proved to be pannai. It follows that this finding will not only dispose of the writ petition but also the second appeal.

But it is contended for the Appellant that the decision of the District Court in the proceedings arising out of Section 55 of the Estates Land Act would would operate as res judicata and that therefore the character of the land was not open for a fresh consideration in the proceedings u/s 13 of the Madras Act XXVI of 1948. In support of the contention reliance is placed on Section 64-A of Madras Act XXVI of 1948. Section 55 of the Estates Land Act relates to suits to obtain patta when a land-holder for three months after demand, fails to grant a patta, in such terms as the ryot is entitled to receive, it shall be lawful for the ryot to sue for such a patta before the Collector. Section 189 of this Act provides for an appeal from any order passed u/s 55. An appeal lies under Schedule B to the District Court having jurisdiction in the matter. Though Section 55 does not in so many terms say that the Collector in a suit filed for patta could determine the character of the land, when the question was raised, he would have to decide it as incidental to the grant of patta. But the Defendants in the suit u/s 55 did not raise any point that the Plaintiff there was not a ryot because the land was not ryoti in character. As stated at the outset of this judgment, the whole proceedings u/s 55 centred round whether or not there was a forcible dispossession of the plaintiff .The Defendants would appear to have realised at the appellate stage in those proceedings that they should have raised the question relating to the character of the land. But then the District Court was not prepared to entertain that question and decide. In fact, its observations show that the matter was left open and the Defendants were at liberty to agitate the question in independent proceedings. It may be that if the CPC had applied to the proceedings u/s 55, there might be some force in the plea based on res judicata. But the plea so far as the proceedings u/s 13 of Madras Act XXVI of 1948 are concerned, can only be based on Section 64-A which on its terms does not take within its scope any constructive res judicata. For Section 64-A to apply, the decision must be of a civil Court and on a matter falling within its purview and the parties are in issue on that very matter in subsequent proceedings. That is not the case here. It follows that Section 64-A has no application.

The second appeal and the writ petition are dismissed with costs in the former. No leave.