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Judgment
Mockett, J.—This is a petition to adjudicate as insolvents Mr. J. McIver and Mr. H. Hadow, who carry on business as partners under the
name of Huson, Tod & Co. Stockbrokers, in Madras. The petition alleges that the debtors owed the petitioner on 25th May of this year Rs.
1,32,915-10-11, of which a payment of Rs. 33,338-11-9 had been made leaving on the date of the petition a balance of Rs. 99,686-12-2 due. It
is convenient to state at this stage that it is not denied by the debtors that this amount is due to the petitioner. The acts of bankruptcy upon which
the petition is laid are three in number. Para. 11 of the petition alleges a preferential payment in favour of Mr. J. W. Macfarlane of Rs. 4,062 on
3rd May 1935, and a similar preferential payment of Rs. 24,986 to Mr. W. H. Warren on 9th May 1935. With regard to this latter payment it was
stated from the Bar by Mr. Grant that it was paid to Mr. Warren not in his personal capacity, but as the representative of a missionary trust.
Though not strictly relevant, I regret that this matter was not cleared up in evidence, because although payment to a missionary trust may be as
much a preferential payment as to an individual, a transaction loses much of the sinister aspect ascribed to it by the petitioner, if instead of being a
payment to an individual of the same nationality as was stressed, it was in fact payment to a missionary society who are not presumably applying
their funds for the purpose of converting Europeans. The other ground is a notice to creditors within the meaning of Sub-section (g), Section 9,
Presidency Towns Insolvency Act, given at a meeting held on 22nd May 1935.
The debtors resist this petition and the grounds for their resistance will appear from an examination of the history of the case. It is common
ground that in March and April of this year, this firm became heavily involved and at least by the beginning of May they were quite unable to meet
their obligations. I would at this stage state that I have not investigated the cause of the firm''s losses. I have not endeavoured to assign the blame
therefore to any individual because in my view it is totally irrelevant for the purpose of this application to decide the cause of the debtors'' losses. It
is sufficient for the purposes of this case that there were such losses. It may be that in other litigation in other Courts, these matters will be
investigated at the instance of persons interested, and it is indeed evident that one civil suit at least has been filed which will presumably involve the
investigation of all the surrounding circumstances, and since the greater part of this judgment was written, it seems that an inquiry in a criminal Court
will follow. Suffice it then to say that in May the firm of Huson Tod & Co. were unable to pay their debts, and Mr. McIver, as he states in his
affidavit, cabled to his partner, Mr. Hadow, who very shortly before had gone to England on leave. Mr. Hadow immediately returned to Madras
by aeroplane and he arrived on 20th May. The debtor''s Solicitors were Messrs. King and Partridge, and Mr. W. H. Sell of that firm has virtually
represented, with the occasional assistance of Counsel, the debtors throughout these proceedings. Mr. Sell summoned a meeting of the creditors
on 22nd May, at which Mr. Nugent Grant was present. What happened at that time is fortunately recorded in writing. Mr. K.S. Krishnaswami
Iyengar, who is a creditor for a very large sum, made a note which is marked Ex. 1 in this case and which is accepted as substantially accurate.
At that meeting Mr. Grant stated that the firm was unable to pay its debts and that it was open to the creditors to have the firm adjudicated, or
the firm itself would, if the creditors preferred, apply to be adjudicated. The liabilities were stated to be 7 lakhs of rupees, and the firm''s assets
were said to be under Rs. 25,000. Mr. Grant pointed out that
the partners of the firm were anxious to do their honest best and that in order to inspire confidence among the creditors, he made a suggestion that
a small committee of creditors might cooperate with Messrs. King and Partridge and himself in seeing that all that could be done was being
properly done and nothing left undone.
What were called the ''difficulties'' in the administration of affairs through the Official Assignee were mentioned and the advantage of saving the
Official Assignee''s commission emphasised. A hint of the possibility of suing successfully third parties was given and an indication that those suits
were likely to be successful conveyed. But Mr. Grant
did not ask the creditors to make up their mind there and then, but said that it was for them to consider and take whatever action they thought best.
And so the meeting broke up, and the creditors left to reflect on their position. It is clear-and no one suggests otherwise-that on May 22nd the
creditors never bound themselves to anything. Nothing further happened until 29th May. On 29th May a second meeting: was held in response to a
notice sent out by Messrs. King and Partridge on the 28th, and it is of the utmost importance to examine with care what happened at this meeting.
Mr. Sell was able to tell the creditors that Mr. Hadow had furnished full details of his personal fortune which ""on an approximate valuation came to
Rs. 1,73,000 odd"" (�12,700 or so) in the form of securities. These securities, said Mr. Sell, would be converted into money as quickly as
possible. Mr. McIver''s personal property was stated to consist of two life policies-only payable after the death of the assured. Taking into account
a charge, their surrender value might be �l,000. It was proposed to pay four annas in the rupee as soon as may be, but Mr. Sell stated that it
was impossible to do this with prosecutions pending or to be instituted against Mr. McIver. Mr. Sell said that if such prosecutions went on, he
would immediately get the firm adjudicated because with prosecutions hanging over their heads the partners-could not devote their attention to the
conversion of the securities or the carrying on of the business. I agree that it is difficult for a man to carry on business efficiently with a criminal
prosecution pending, but I do not see why a criminal prosecution should prevent anybody selling their shares. It is effected by the simple process of
instructing a, broker to sell them, and handing him over the relative securities, Mr. Hadow was not being prosecuted. This however is not of
importance. What is of importance and what must be borne in mind is that Mr. Sell''s interest then, as-stated by Mr. K.S. Krishnaswami Iyengar
and admitted by Mr. Sell, was to disperse the cloud of criminal prosecution. There was such a cloud on May 14th. Rao Bahadur Soora
Lakshmayya Chetti had launched criminal proceedings against Mr. McIver and Mr. K.S. Narasimhachari, and another creditor, Mr. Balakrishnan,
was obviously contemplating criminal proceedings.
The payment to Mr. Macfarlane and the payment, as I will so describe it, to Mr. Warren, were discussed and apparently made the subject of
unfavourable comment:
Mr. Balakrishnan asked whether after the payment of the four annas the partners could undertake to pay six pies at least per month in order to
make further payments available to the creditors. It was not the intention to accept the four annas in full settlement of the entire claim and the rights
and remedies in respect of the balance due remained open to the creditors.
That, according to Mr. Krishnaswanii lyengar, is what Mr. Sell said. I propose to set out verbatim a part of Mr. K.S. Krishnaswami Iyengar''s
statement an Ex. 2 as it is of the greatest importance and it is quite evident that the meeting of 29th June ended on this note.
Mr. Krishnaswami lyengar:
explained that he was taking the four annas without commitment of any kind. If further information or disclosures should happen to be made, he
was going to keep his powder dry and he was not binding himself not to take such steps as further information might incline him to take. He
suggested that none of the other creditors need be under the apprehension that by taking this four annas they or any of them were jeopardising their
rights and remedies in any way against the firm or the individual members thereof, but as matters stood, it was not (Possible to take any definite
step and accordingly he was agreeable to take the four annas offered.
I think it is possible by reading those ''words to understand what was in the mind at least of Mr. Krishnaswami lyengar, and, I think, also of the
other creditors who were, I gather, ready to take a lead from him - naturally so. Mr. Krishnaswami Iyengar was anxious that all attempts should be
made to effect economies in the establishment charges and there should be no more preferential payments. There is one further matter. It was
emphasised that the expenses of running the business should not exceed the income made by the firm and the partners should not be permitted to
make drawings in their old way. Mr. Sell answered that the drawings of course would not be on the old scale, but emphasising that the partners
could not be penniless suggested that Rs. 750 for each of them might be a fair figure. Mr. Sell said he would ask the committee to look into the
accounts and be in constant touch with the current business of the firm, to satisfy themselves that everything was in order. In Mr. Sell''s own words
in evidence, they were to be ""watchdogs"". This of course was the committee that had been referred to at the meeting of 22nd May. Finally Mr.
Alagappa Chetti, the petitioner in this case, Mr. Balakrishnan and Mr. Kissendoss, were appointed to constitute the committee. Now on the
proceedings at that meeting is founded a part of the debtors'' case. They allege that apart from the legal consequences there was a definite
agreement on that day which precludes the petitioner from bringing in these proceedings. The suggested agreement, as I understand it, is as was
put by Mr. Grant to Mr. Krishnaswami Iyengar, namely, that in consideration of the creditors getting four annas in the rupee they agreed to allow
the business to go on, but subject to certain safeguards, which were (1) that all attempts should be made to effect economies in the establishment
charges, and (2) that no further payments of the kind made to Mr. Macfarlane or to Mr. Warren or indeed any payments to any creditors of the
firm should be made. There is a further definite allegation, namely that on 15th June a payment of Rupees 33,338-14-9 representing four annas in
the rupee was made to the petitioner Mr. Alagappa Chetti on the terms that he was not to take any action against the debtors for the space of
three months. Out of these contentions arise questions both of fact and of law.
Three witnesses have given evidence : Mr. Sell on behalf of the debtors, the petitioner himself, Mr. Alagappa Chetti, and Mr. K.S.
Krishnaswami Iyengar, the Government Pleader, and a well known and respected member of the Bar. (His Lordship then examined the evidence
and held that there was no contract between the petitioner and the debtors at the time the amount was paid, His Lordship then continued.) When
the arguments are analysed there are really two legal positions taken up by the debtors in this case although in the course of argument they have
become intermingled. The first is that the creditors are estopped from relying on the acts of insolvency pleaded; secondly that by reason of the
conduct of the petitioner I should u/s 13(4-b), Presidency Towns Insolvency Act, dismiss this petition. That section reads as follows:
The Court shall dismiss the petition if the debtor appears and satisfies the Court that he is able to pay his debts, or that he has not committed an act
of insolvency or that for other sufficient cause no order ought to be made.
Mr. Srinivasa Iyengar has argued that ''other sufficient cause should be construed ejusdem generis in relation to the earlier part of the section. I
am unable to take that view. The Presidency Towns Insolvency Act is based on the English Bankruptcy Act and I am inclined to follow the
construction put upon those words by English Courts. It will be seen from Ex parte Dixon (1884) 13 QBD 118 that Baggallay, L.J., puts the
widest possible interpretation on the words ''sufficient cause'' I am asked to make a distinction here because the words are other sufficient cause'',
but I think the English and the Indian statutes have the same meaning and intention.
Now on what facts is this plea of estoppel based ? It is based on this : that the petitioner with full knowledge of an act of insolvency received a
part-payment and allowed the debtors to carry on business, even becoming a member of a committee of inspection. There is no decision on facts
similar to these, but Mr. Grant argues that on the analogy of the English decisions, which are unquestionably accepted in India: see Rukmani
Ammal v. Rajagopala Iyer 1924 48 Mad 294 his plea of estoppel is good, will shortly summarise those cases. It is settled law that a creditor who
is a party to, or privy to, a deed of assignment to creditors cannot rely upon the execution of that deed as an act of bankruptcy, although he may
rely on an independent act of bankruptcy. That position was accepted in In re Mills (1906) 1 KB 389 In re Sunderland (1911) 2 KB 658 and In
re a, Debtor (1924) 94 LJ Ch. 42. The latter case holds that the recognition of the deed would preclude a petitioning creditor from relying on it as
an act of bankruptcy. In order to appreciate what underlies these decisions it is necessary to examine the old case law. The position is summarised
in the case of In re Stray (1867) 2 Ch App 374. There Lord Cairns explained it as follows:
It is well settled by a series of authorities, of which the case of Ex parte Alsop (1860) l De GF & J 289 may be mentioned as the last, that a
creditor, who is a* party or privy to a deed of the description mentioned in the statute, or who has acted in any way which would be equivalent to
an assent, recognition or approval of the deed, cannot allege that the execution of the deed is an act of bankruptcy.
I apprehend that the principle upon which those cases (the authority of which cannot now be questioned) have gone is this: that inasmuch as,
under the statute the petitioning creditor is obliged to allege that the act in question is a fraudulent act, any person who has been a participator or
sharer in the fraud cannot be heard to claim any benefit or advantage from the act. This is what a distinguished bankruptcy practitioner, Mr. Muir
Mackenzie, describes in his argument in In re Hawley (1897) 4 Manson 41 as ''the peculiar doctrine'' of estoppel by recognition, and in that case
Vaughan Williams, J., points out that there need not be fraud in fact proved but merely fraud in law. I am unable to see how those cases assist the
debtors. They all rest on the fact that the debtors executed a deed of assignment, a. document void against creditors, to which the petitioning
creditors were parties or privies and that such creditors were estopped from going behind their express or implied assent. There is of course no
estoppel against non-assenting creditors, the theory being that it is in fraud of them that the assignment has been made. In the case of the partners in
Messrs. Huson Tod no deed of assignment has been executed; indeed a very large sum remained in the firm as capital. The act of insolvency on
which this petition mainly rests is a. statement that the debtors were unable to pay their debts. I am unable to follow how a creditor can be privy to
a voluntary statement of that sort except under very special circumstances, none of which are present here. A deed of assignment is a legal fraud as
pointed out in the authorities. A statement of inability to pay debts is nothing of the sort.
It must follow therefore that this curious form of estoppel has application only to a deed of assignment and cannot afford any protection to the
debtors in this case. It would indeed be a strange thing that creditors, who after hearing a statement of inability to pay debts do not press their
bankruptcy rights but accept a portion of their just dues and do not interfere with the carrying on of the debtor''s business, should be in the same
position as creditors who by a written document, which is at best a technical fraud, deliberately plan to administer the debtor''s estate not in
bankruptcy but by a special private arrangement all the assets being put into a pool. No case has been quoted to me which takes this doctrine to
any length approaching this. Mr. Grant relied on two cases, or rather observations in two cases; In re Sunderland (1911) 2 KB 658; to which I
have already referred, and Re Newbury (1924) 95 LJ Ch 199. Both these cases proceed on the legal position as enunciated in In re Stray (1867)
2 Ch 374; but in In re Sunderland (1911) 2 KB 658 it is argued from certain remarks of Kennedy, L.J., that there is authority for the proposition
that a creditor can be estopped by being privy to a declaration under Sub-section (g), Section 9, Presidency Towns Insolvency Act.
An examination of that case shows that the learned Judge took a different view of the facts to that taken by the other Lord Justices and was
prepared to hold that the creditors'' conduct was improper, i.e., that there was sufficient cause u/s 7, Bankruptcy Act of 1883. In Re Newbury
(1924) 95 LJ Ch 199 ''the acknowledgment of an act of bankruptcy'', referred to by Astbury, J., at p. 200, was in fact a deed of assignment which
takes the debtors'' argument no further. In In re Carr (1902) 85 LT 553 it is clearly indicated by Wright and Phillimore, JJ., that attendance at a
meeting and not expressing dissent does not estop the creditor. And the same learned Judges in Be Day (1903) 86 LT 238 point out that whereas
in In re Carr (1902) 85 LT 553 the delay in filing the petition was unexplained, in the case before them the agent expressly stated that he-reserved
all his rights including the right to take bankruptcy proceedings and there was no acquiescence in any deed of assignment. That is very much the
position here if one believes, as I do the evidence of Mr. K.S. Krishnaswami Iyengar. Mr. Srinivasa Iyengar relied on. the interesting decision of
Ex parte Mendelssohn (1903) 1 KB 216 affirmed by the House of Lords. in Mendelssohn v. Ratcliff (1904) AC 456. It appears that, under the
London Stock Exchange Rules, the assets of defaulters vest in an Official Assignee of the Stock Exchange and the creditors appear to have
accepted their share under the distribution by the Official Assignee. It was held that such a state of affairs does not place the Stock Exchange
creditors in the same position as creditors who have assented. to a deed of composition or to distribution of the debtors'' assets under a deed..
That being so, still less does it seem to me can a part payment affect the creditors'' rights. I am unhesitatingly against Mr. Grant''s argument with
regard to. estoppel. It is argued that according to Wharton, ''privy'' means ''having a participation or interest or knowledge'' and the creditors were
told of the suits against the Bank. I do not see how the debtors were prejudiced by this and I only mention this point because it was argued. One
other point must be noticed. u/s 51 of the Act, a period of three months is given within which a petition may be filed. The creditor is not bound
immediately an act of insolvency comes to his knowledge to take action. This is clearly a beneficient provision as it gives time for reflection and
possibly for the debtor to restore his position qua the creditors.
It remains to consider whether in this. case ''other sufficient cause'' has been shown why no order should be made. I think the position is that,
when the necessary facts u/s 13(2) have been made out, the petitioning creditor is entitled to an order and that it is for the debtor to satisfy the
Court that that right should be taken away u/s 13(4-b). Mr. Grant has rested this part of his case largely on the ground that the petitioner''s conduct
was such that I ought to dismiss this petition. He did not argue that it is fraudulent within the meaning of Be Shaw (1901) 83 LT 754 but he did
argue that it was morally dishonest and an abuse of the process of the Court and that the payment from Mr. Sell was obtained by a plot. I already
found that there is no basis for the last suggestion and I will repeat that it is beyond my comprehension why a man who had been promised an
unconditional payment and went in that frame of mind to receive it should have to plot to get it.
Now to consider his general conduct, 1 do not understand that anybody suggests that he did anything improper be-fore the 15th June. It would
have been better if he had taken a more active part in the committee, but there is nothing improper in not doing so. I do not suppose that his
absence was the cause of much regret to anyone on the debtors'' side. With regard to the incident of the 15th I have already dealt with it, and I
leave it with this comment that, taking the debtors'' case, it is clear to me that no condition was attached to this payment until the 15th. I am not
satisfied that Mr. Sell had authority to attach such a condition if the previous promise had been unconditional. I do not think there was any sort of
agreement. The debtors had arranged to pay a quarter of their indebtedness and the creditors stood on their legal rights. Then it is said that Mr.
Alagappa Chetti behaved improperly over the Chartered Bank suit. He is, of course, entitled to hold any view he thinks fit with respect to any legal
position, and that cannot be improper conduct. How-ever it is insinuated that he is in some way conspiring with the Chartered Bank to frustrate this
suit. It must be remembered that he has been associated for years with the Chartered Bank and, as he says, saw Mr. Clarke daily. I think he
talked far too much with Mr. Clarke who must have been much interested, but I do not think he gave anything away because I do not think he
knew anything. It was known to Mr. Sell that he was constantly at the Chartered Bank because Mr. Sell described him as ''the Bank''s
ambassador.'' Mr. Alagappa Chetty may be wrongheaded about this suit. I do not say he is, but I should require a great deal of proof that he
deliberately and necessarily for a consideration was endeavouring to obstruct it. If this suit succeeds, he is liable to get a very large sum of money.
As to the abuse of the process of the Court I made a special note of Mr. Grant''s argument as to that. He said that it was ''that the agreement
had been broken.'' That agreement was the agreement of the 29th May, or alternatively the 15th June. But I have already indicated my views about
this agreement. Then it is said on the lines of certain remarks of Baggalay, L.J., in Ex parte Dixon (1884) 13 QBD 118 that there were
proceedings pending by means of which, if the debtor should be successful, he would obtain ample funds that would enable him to pay his debts. If
satisfactory material had been put before me to show that as far as was possible to see there was an unanswerable suit against the Bank or anyone
else ''which would reimburse the estate, I might have thought that was ''sufficient cause''; but I have no material before me. It is true that there is the
opinion of counsel, but I should be very reluctant to lay down that it was sufficient cause for dismissing a petition merely because the petitioner had
been advised that they had a good cause of action. On the other hand if it was a suit on a promissory note or even a suit for personal injuries in a
motor accident, it might be very easy to satisfy the Court that prima facie the suit was bound to succeed. I can easily picture a set of facts
appropriate to this view. There is another feature of this case which I cannot omit to note and that is that as between Mr. Balakrish-nan who is
owed Rs. 1,50,000 and Mr. Alagappa Chetty who is owed Rupees 1,35,000-I disregard for the moment the four anna payment-these two
gentlemen have a very large claim and are entitled to have a considerable say. Then it is said that Mr. Alagappa Chetti''s conduct in the manner that
he filed this petition is improper and mala fide. If he is entitled to file a bankruptcy petition his motive in doing so is immaterial, see King v.
Henderson (1898) AC 720 a striking case. The petitioner has been criticised because he did not inform Mr. Sell that he was filing this petition. I
think that under the circumstances he should have done so; but there was no obligation on him to do so in law. The explanation of course is that the
petitioner was frightened of Mr. Sell and preferred ''fait accompli'' to a preliminary discussion which, in his own words, might have been ''fatal.'' I
do not sit here as an arbiter of good taste.
Another reason was urged why I should use my discretion in this case. It was said that insolvency would be most detrimental to the suits
against the banks; and in this connection it must be re-called that Mr. Sell was very anxious that the evidence should come out for the first time in
these suits and for'' this reason was insistent that the criminal proceedings should be discontinued. I infer from this that the evidence in the criminal
proceedings is likely to be, in parts at least, the same as in the civil suit. Without expressing an opinion whether that reason is good or bad it can
only now be said that criminal proceedings are in fact to- go on. Then it is said that if the firm is dissolved the clerks-the important witnesses-may
not be available. I do not think that is necessarily so. The fact is that if the creditors want this suit to go on, it will go on whether this firm is
adjudicated or not. If on the grounds of the suit, I use my discretion in favour of the debtors it will mean that not for a very long time will the matter
be finally concluded. A very large sum of money is involved. It is impossible to shut one''s eyes to the fact that the probability of the matter being
concluded by an Original Side trial is very remote. In such matters an appeal as usual and a further appeal to the Judicial Committee not unusual.
The idea that three months would see this matter settled one way or the other is in my opinion optimistic beyond words. The authorities on what is
''sufficient cause'' are not very helpful, as naturally each case must be decided on its special facts, but an examination of this shows that under two
heads only does the judicial discretion seem to have been actually used in favour of debtors: (1) on the principle of estoppel, which in several cases
has been treated as being ''sufficient or good cause'' a blend of two different ideas. I have referred to many of them which deal with the estoppel
point. (2) Fraudulent or improper conduct on the part of the petitioning creditor. Mr. Grant relied strongly on a decision of Ghose, J., in Ex parte
Harsukh Das Balkissen Das 1924 39 CLJ 512, and emphasised that jurisdiction in bankruptcy is entirely discretionary. My only comment is that
on the facts in that case which revealed spiteful and indeed, morally dishonest conduct on the part of the creditor, I should, had it come before me,
have used my discretion in exactly the same way as did Ghose, J., who described the petitioner''s conduct as vexatious and oppressive and an
abuse of the process of the Court. But that case is not this case.
There remains the question of the preferential payments, with which I can deal very shortly. I do not think that these were preferential payments
has been proved before me. I think it is evident that Mr. Srinivasa Iyengar really relied on the statement of 22nd May. The only evidence before
me is the fact of such payments; but Mr Sell has said that with regard to Mr. Warren''s money it was paid on the advice of counsel on the ground
that it was trust money. Similarly with regard to the payment to Mr. Macfarlane. I have no evidence before me that it amounted to a fraudulent
preference. I think however I should say that if I had held that the petitioner could not rely upon the statement on the 22nd, I should equally have
held that he could not rely on these payments even if proved to be fraudulent preferences. My reason is that if the proceedings of the 29th gave the
debtors a clean sheet with regard to the statement, I think it will give them a clean sheet with regard to these payments which were fully discussed
at the meeting, and I should have exercised my discretion u/s 13 and dismissed the petition. I think the case of In re Woodroffe (1897) 4 Manson
46 is analogous. That position however does not arise in view of the conclusions at which I have arrived. This of course does not conclude the
question whether these payments are preferential payments or not. It is open to the Official Assignee to have that matter investigated in the
insolvency proceedings.
I will conclude by referring to two matters. It was stated in the clearest possible terms by Mr. Grant that the debtors'' ease was that these
proceedings were instigated by the Chartered Bank. That charge, though not pressed, has not been withdrawn and it is of course a very grave
charge. I therefore think it right to state also in the clearest possible terms that there has not been any evidence before me suggesting that the
Chartered Bank in any Way inspired this petition. I have already sufficiently indicated that I do not consider that Mr. Alagappa Chetty''s conduct
has been improper. There is one other matter, this time an allegation by the petitioner. In his affidavit he charges the debtors with concealing assets.
In his evidence, he quite fairly stated that he did not refer to personal assets but that assets of the firm, e.g., Rs. 10,000 has not been at once
brought to the creditors'' knowledge. With regard to this charge, I also think it right to say that there is no evidence before me of any concealment
of assets by the debtors. On the other hand, as Mr. Krishnaswami Iyengar has pointed out, the conduct of Mr. Hadow made a most favourable
impression on the creditors-as it did on me. His conduct seems to have been a model of correctness since his firm got into difficulties, and although
as a result of the order I am about to make, he must fall with the firm, losing apparently everything he has in the world, I do not think on the facts as
revealed before me in this inquiry that he should be ashamed to look any man in the face. As a result of the conclusions at which I have arrived
there was in my opinion an act of bankruptcy available to the petitioning creditor on the 22nd of May and in spite of the arguments addressed to
me I do not find, after considering the facts moat anxiously, that there is any sufficient cause why I should dismiss this petition. As it has been
adumbrated in this case ever since May, that this firm cannot carry on business with a criminal prosecution pending against Mr. McIver, I imagine
that the following order merely anticipates events. The elimination of criminal proceedings was the primary basis of any alleged arrangement or
course of conduct adopted by any one concerned-a basis which has now disappeared. The necessary result of my findings is that there will be an
order of adjudication. The petitioner will have his taxed costs out of the estate. As I have already said that the petitioner is entitled to his taxed
costs out of the estate, having regard to the dimensions of the case, those costs will be on the Original Side scale and I certify for two counsel.
Also having regard to the circumstances of the case, I direct that the debtors, taxed costs will be payable out of the estate on the Original Side
scale, and in both cases the parties may add to it the costs of the shorthand note. In order '' that the creditors may make up their minds as to the
future of this firm, it is important that the business should not be instantly stopped. I therefore permit Mr. Wilson to continue this business until the
26th of this month on which day all concerned should appear before me and let me have their views as it is primarily the concern of the creditors.