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Judgment
B. Sudershan Reddy, J.—The instant two writ petitions can be disposed of by this Common Judgment, as the question involved is one and the same.
The petitioner in these two writ petitions is aggrieved by an interlocutory order passed by the 1st respondent-Labour Court, Guntur on 20th October, 1995 allowing the application filed by the 2nd respondent - Staff Association. The Labour Court by the impugned order directed the petitioner company to produce certain documents mentioned in the petition on or before 10-11-1995.
Factual matrix: The petitioner is a company within the meaning of the Companies Act, 1956 and is engaged, inter alia, in the business of procuring, threshing and export of tobacco to various countries for which purpose it has a division called the Indian Leaf Tobacco Development Division (ILTD) having its Headquarters at Guntur. There are about 2500 employees in various categories in the petitioner''s company and it is stated that mere are three different Trade Unions. The 2nd respondent union consists of Clerical /Class A staff (non-seasonal and seasonal employees). The petitioner is stated to have entered into a settlement on 20th February, 1986 with the 2nd respondent union after negotiations u/s 12(3) read with Section 18(3) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. It appears that the dispute arose with regard to implementation and interpretation of Clause XIII of the said settlement "which reads as follows:
"(a) Taking into account the technological changes needed in Company''s operations and cope-up with them, it is mutually agreed to confirm 25 seasonal clerical employees during the period of the Settlement, on the following basis:
12 Nos., shall be as per Blue Print Seniority:
13 Nos. shall be graduates on merit from among seasonal based on written test given by the company.
(b) Future permanent clerical requirements, if any, shall be met with on the following basis:
80% of the required number in a year by seniority according to Blue Print and 20% of the balance number in a year by graduates on the basis of a written test from the Blue Print".
It may not be necessary to refer in detail the nature of controversy and disputes that arose between the parties.
Be that as it may, the Government of Andhra Pradesh vide G.O.Rt. No. 1430/1701 dated 30th May, 1990 and 7th July, 1990 respectively has referred the said Clause XIII of the said settlement for interpretation to the 1st respondent herein and the same are pending consideration in I.T.I.D. Nos. 1 /90 and 216/90 respectively.
Pursuant to the said reference by the Government, in exercise of its power u/s 36A of the Industrial Disputes Act, the 2nd respondent Association stated to have filed a claim statement and the petitioner has also filed its counter-statement. The petitioner has taken categorical plea before the Industrial Tribunal/Labour Court that all that was required to be done by the Labour Court is the mere interpretation of Clause XIII and not the application of Clause XIII to the alleged facts in the claim statement. However, the main case is still pending consideration before the 1st respondent Labour Court/ Industrial Tribunal.
While the matter stood thus, the 2nd respondent-Association filed interlocutory application for the relief of production of documents namely:
(1) Names of the persons and total number of persons who were appointed by the respondent under so called staff ''Y'' cadre, after the said settlement dated 28-2-86 came into force i.e., 1-2-86 till today.
(2) Appointment orders of the persons who were appointed by the respondent under so called staff ''Y'' commercial/Computer coordinators-cadre after said settlement came into force i.e., from 1-2-86 till today."
In the interlocutory application, it is categorically stated that Clause XIII of the settlement dated 28-2-1986 relate to the manner of recruitment and employment of clerical personnel from the seasonal employees of the petitioner management It is averred that instead of following Clause XIII of the said settlement in appointing the clerical personnel from the seniority list of existing seasonal employees, to fill up the requirements the respondent/management created one more cadre namely staff ''Y'' commercial/computer co-ordinators to employ their own men and accordingly it had taken so many persons from outside at their whims and fancies as permanent employees and the same being contrary to Clause XIII of the said settlement. In the circumstances the 2nd respondent Union/Association prayed for the production of the documents referred to here in above. The application was resisted by the petitioner/ management and the matter was heard by the 1st respondent/Labour Court/ Industrial Tribunal. The 1st respondent-Tribunal allowed the application holding that by mere production of documents, the interest of the petitioner-management will not in any way prejudice and whether those documents are relevant or irrelevant has to be decided at the time of considering the merits and demerits of the case. It is also observed by the 1st respondent-Labour Court that the Association /Union''s contention that the management had made appointments by creating separate cadre ''Y'' in violation of Clause XIII of the settlement has to be examined. In this connection and for deciding the said issue, the Labour Court thought it fit to direct the respondents to produce those documents, as the some would not cause any prejudice to the interest of the management. All that the Labour Court did was to direct the respondents to produce the documents relating to the appointment of certain staff in cadre ''Y''. The petitioner is aggrieved by the same and hence the writ petitions.
The learned Counsel for the petitioner vehemently contends that the impugned order suffers from non-application of mind and the Labour Court has exceeded its jurisdiction in passing the impugned order. It is submitted that even in the main case what is involved is the interpretation of Clause XIII of the settlement in terms of reference made by the Government u/s 36A of the Industrial Disputes Act. According to the learned Counsel for the petitioner, the order suffers from incurable infirmities and therefore, has to be quashed by issuing an appropriate writ particularly one in the nature of writ of Certiorari.
Before considering the merits of the submissions, it would be appropriate to refer to Section 36A of the Industrial Disputes Act which reads as follows:-
"36-A. Power to remove difficulties:-
(1) If, in the opinion of the appropriate Government any difficulty or doubt or doubt arises as to the interpretation of any provision of an award or settlement, it may refer the question to such Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal as it may think fit.
(2) The Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal to which such question is referred shall, after giving the parties an opportunity of being heard, decide such question and its decision shall be final and binding on all such parties."
The controversy between the parties relate to the manner of recruitment and employment of clerical personnel from the seasonal employees of the respondent-management and as to whether the same is in accordance with Clause XIII of the said settlement. In this connection, a doubt arose as to the interpretation of Clause XIII of the said settlement and the question as such was referred to the Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal by the Government The learned Counsel for the petitioner submits that all that the Labour Court has to do is to interpret Clause XIII of the said settlement. Such contention is totally misconceived. The Courts cannot take such narrow, limited and pedantic view of the matter. The controversy between the parties and the back-ground and the circumstances under which the matter was referred by the Government to the Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal cannot be ignored. The substantial question would be as to whether the recruitment and employment in certain categories by the petitioner-management is in accordance with Clause XIII of the settlement or not and only in that connection, the issue has arisen as to the interpretation of Clause XIII of the said settlement. Interpretation of Clause XIII of the settlement cannot be in a vacuum. Undoubtedly difficulty has arisen and doubt arose about the true nature, scope and meaning of Clause XIII of the settlement. In this back-ground, the Labour Court would have to interpret Clause XIII of the said settlement.
But what is interpretation? Is it a mere reading of a grammatical construction or something more. According to Law Lexicon interpretation means:
"The determination of the meaning of a writing; the art of finding out the true sense of any form of words, that is the sense in which their author intended to convey, and of enabling others to derive from them the same idea which the author intended to convey; the art of finding out or collecting the intention of a writer either from his words, or from other conjecture, or from both; the use of some other signs or marks, besides the words of the speaker or writer, in order to collect his meaning; the mere finding of the true sense of the special form of words used (Ame. Cyc.)
Interpretation'' is the act of making intelligible what was before not understood, ambiguous, or not obvious. It is the method by which the meaning of the language is ascertained. Resort to interpretation is never to be had where the meaning is free from doubt.
"Common sense and good faith are the leading stars of all genuine interpretations. In arriving at the meaning of the parties to a contract, the language must be given a reasonable interpretation. If the language involving the intent of the parties is uncertain, an interpretation of it which is unreasonable and places one of the contracting parties at the mercy of the other must give way to one which is equitable. And if one of the contracting parties has by artifice or duplicity in the use of language misled the other respecting its meaning, the sense in which the latter understood it will prevail in the interpretation of the language."
The art or process of discovering and ascertaining the meaning of a statute will, contract or other written documents. The discovery and representation of the true meaning of any signs used to convey ideas. (Black''s Law Dictionary)
It is therefore, obvious that the Labour Court is under legal obligation and is under duty to find out the true meaning, nature and scope of Clause XIII of the said settlement earlier entered into by the parties. In this connection, it would be obligatory for the Tribunal to find out with reference to the orders of appointment issued by the petitioner-management as to whether they are in conformity with Clause XIII of the said settlement. All that the Labour Court directed was the production of the documents subject to their proof and relevancy. The submissions made on behalf of the petitioner that the Labour Court was bound to decide the relevancy of the documents and then summon the production of the documents cannot be accepted. The learned counsel for the petitioner placed strong reliance upon the Judgments reported in The Kirloskar Oil Engines Ltd. v. The Workmen and Ors. 1962 FLR 4, Britannia Engineering Co. Ltd. and Anr. v. W. Basu Mazumdar and Ors. 1961 FLR 8, Rivers Steam Navigation Company Ltd. and Anr. v. Inland Steam Navigation Workers'' Union 1964 (I) LLJ 98, The Management of Kammavar Achukudam Ltd., Coimbatore and Others Vs. The Industrial Tribunal, High Court Buildings, Madras and Another, , The Management of the Agri Horticultural Society, Madras Vs. The Workmen of Agri Horticultural Society and Another, , Ashoka Marketing Ltd. Vs. Rothas Kumar and Others, and the Supreme Court Judgment in Kirloskar Brothers Ltd. v. Its Workmen 1963 (6) FLR 113. The learned Counsel for the petitioner also relied upon the judgment reported in Tandur & Navandgi Stone Quarries (P) Ltd., Basheerabad v. Their Workmen 1964 (8) FLR 277. There is no point in multiplying the Judgments and no need to refer to them elaborately except to the two Supreme Court Judgments reported in Tandur and Navadgi Stone Quarries (P) Ltd., Basheerbad v. Their Workmen (8 supra) and Kirloskar Brothers Ltd. v. Its Workmen (7 supra). In both the Judgments, the Apex Court was concerned about the preliminary objection about competence of - Tribunal to decide preliminary objection before examining merits of the case. The Court for the present is not concerned with any such issue. The judgment referred to in The Kirloskar Oil Engines Ltd. v. The Workmen and others (1 supra) considered the relevance of the enquiry permitted under the proceedings contemplated by Section 36A of the Industrial Disputes Act and held that the scope of the enquiry u/s 36A is limited to the decision of the difficulties or doubts arising as to the interpretation of any provision in the award. The Apex Court further held that the question about the propriety, correctness or validity of any provision of the award would be outside the purview of the enquiry contemplated by the Section and the enquiry u/s 36A is limited to the question of interpretation of the provision of the award in question and no more. I fail to understand as to how and in what manner the said decisions of the Apex Court would render any assistance to the petitioner in this case. By the impugned order, the Labour Court did not pronounce upon the propriety, legality or the validity of Clause XIII of the settlement as such. By the impugned order, the Labour Court merely directed the production of documents. With a view to appreciate and analyse the plea advanced on behalf of the workmen/ association that the appointment order issued by the petitioner-management with regard to some employees was not in accordance with Clause XIII of the said settlement, the Labour Court did not even express any opinion with regard to the relevancy of the document, as it has proposed to decide the same after the documents are produced. This order of the Labour Court is attacked on the ground that the same is contrary to Order XI Rule 18 of the Civil Procedure Code. Rule 18 of Order XI of the C.P.C. may not be strictly applicable, as the application before the Labour Court is not filed under the said provision. Therefore, the reliance placed upon the Judgment referred to supra by the learned Counsel for the petitioner are of no relevance. The Court at any time during the pendency of the proceedings can order the production of such of the documents in the possession of a party relating to any matter in question and the Court may deal with such document, when produced, in such manner as shall appear thus (sic. just). Section 11 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 relate to procedure and powers of Conciliation Officers, Boards, Court and Tribunals. Section 11(3) of the said Act provides that the Labour Court /Tribunal shall have the same power as are vested in a Civil Court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 in respect of;
(a) ...........
(b) Compelling the production of documents and material objects.
It is obvious that the Labour Court exercised its power and directed the petitioner herein to produce the documents in its custody and has reserved its right to deal with such documents after production, in such manner as it shall appear to the Court as just and proper.
Be that as it may, can it be said that the order passed by the Labour Court is ex facie illegal or is vitiated on account of any error apparent on the face of the record? After an elaborate consideration of the matter, the Court has good reason to hold that the order does not suffer from any such error of jurisdiction, so as to be corrected by this Court in exercise of its Certiorari jurisdiction. The order does not cause any prejudice whatsoever to the petitioner-management and it has not resulted in any grave injustice to any of the parties. The order does not suffer from any procedural infirmities. The impugned order does not adversely affect the rights of the parties and therefore, need not be corrected by this Court in this judicial review proceedings. The order does not result in any injustice or miscarriage of justice. Assuming for the argument sake that the order is wrong for some reason, the same need not be corrected by this Court in exercise of its extra ordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Issuance of a writ is not a matter of course. A Constitutional Bench of the Apex Court in Ebrahim Aboobakar and Another Vs. Custodian General of Evacuee Property, held:
"A writ of Certiorari cannot be granted to quash the decision of an inferior Court within its jurisdiction on the ground that the decision is wrong. It must be shown before such a writ is issued that the authority which passed the order acted without jurisdiction or in excess of it or in violation of the principles of natural justice. Once it is held that the Court has jurisdiction but while exercising it, it made a mistake, the wronged party can only take the course prescribed by law for setting matters right inasmuch as a Court has jurisdiction to decide rightly as well as wrongly".
It is settled law that no writ need be issued by the higher Courts in cases where they are satisfied that there was no failure of justice. No cause for issuance of a writ of Certiorari is made out There are no merits in the writ petitions and they are accordingly dismissed. No costs.