INSTITUTE OF TOWN PLANNERS, INDIA vs MAHENDER SINGH MEHRA

VINOD GOEL, J.

This writ petition impugns the orders dated 02.05.2018 and 04.05.2018 passed by Ld.Presiding Officer, Labour Court-XVII, Dwarka Courts, Delhi

(in short ‘POLC’) in LIR No.774/2018.

The relevant facts leading to file the present writ petition are that the Government of NCT of Delhi on raising of an industrial dispute by the

respondent made a reference to the Labour Court.

The term of reference are as under:- “Whether the services of Sh. Mahender Singh Mehra S/o Sh Diwan Singh Mehra aged 32 years have

been terminated by the Management illegally and/or unjustifiably and if so, to what relief is he entitled and what directions are necessary in this

respect?â€​

 4. The parties to the petition appeared before the ld. POLC on 19.04.2018 when the Statement of Claim was filed by the respondent and matter

was adjourned to 26.04.2018 for filing of the written statement by the petitioner. On 26.04.2018, the written statement could not be filed, however, on

behalf of the petitioner/Management, the authority letter in favour of Sh. Pramod Gupta, Authorized Representative/Advocate (in brief ‘AR’)

was filed. The ld. POLC directed to file the written statement on or before 02.05.2018 as last opportunity. On 02.05.2018, on behalf of the petitioner,

the proxy AR filed written statement which was not taken on record being not signed on behalf of the petitioner/Management. Its copy was supplied

to the AR of the respondent and the original written statement was returned to the proxy AR for the petitioner/Management with the direction to file

after getting it signed on behalf of the petitioner. For wasting the time of the Court, a cost of Rs.5,000/- was also imposed on the petitioner. The matter

was adjourned to 04.05.2018.

On the adjourned date i.e. 04.05.2018, ld. POLC passed the following order:- “04.05.2018 Present: Sh. B.N.Sharma, Ld.ARW with claimant

Sh.P.C.Dogra, proxy counsel for Sh.Pramod Gupta, Main ARM. Sh. P.C.Dogra is accompanied by a lady namely Ms.Akriti who is claiming herself to

be the intern of Mr.Pramod Gupta. She tried to place on record WS signed by one Mr.Mahesh claiming himself to be Office Secretary. The

vakalatnama in favour of Sh. Pramod Gupta has also been signed by said Mr.Mahesh. But there is no board resolution/authorization letter in favour of

Mr.Mahesh. So, it cannot be said that the vakalatnama and WS has been signed by proper person on behalf of Management. When there is no

vakalatnama by a proper person, it cannot be said that there is any main counsel in the case on behalf of management. Same was the position on the

last date. Hence, it is held that there was no representation on behalf of management on the last date and today and so, it is proceeded exparte.Put up

for ex-parte W.E on 9.5.2018.â€​

 6. On 04.05.2018, the written statement duly signed and verified by Office Secretary Sh. Mahesh of the petitioner and vakalatnama in favour of Sh.

Pramod Gupta, Advocate were filed before ld. POLC. However, as the same were not being accompanied by the Board Resolution/Authorization

Letter, the same were not taken on the record and the ld. POLC observed that there is no proper vakalatnama by a proper person on behalf of the

petitioner, and hence the petitioner was proceeded ex-parte. Matter was listed for ex-parte evidence for 09.05.2018.

It is submitted by ld. senior counsel for the petitioner that the ld. POLC has been acting in a very hasty manner and did not accept the written

statement duly signed and verified by the Office Secretary of the petitioner/Management along with the affidavit. He submits that earlier on

02.05.2018 also, the ld. POLC did not accept the written statement, which was though not signed on behalf of the petitioner/Management but was

signed by their counsel and annexed with a duly sworn affidavit. He submits that the ld. POLC has hastily imposed a cost of Rs.5,000/- on the

petitioner on the pretext of wasting the time of the Court. He further submits that even the written statement duly signed and verified, which was filed

on 04.05.2018, was not taken on record and without applying its judicial mind, the ld. POLC, in a haste, proceeded the petitioner ex-parte. He submits

that after stay of the proceedings by this Court, on 15.05.2018 the ld. POLC had adjourned the matter to 29.05.2018 for ex-parte evidence. He has

placed on record the copy of the order dated 15.05.2018. He submits that the rules of natural justice and fair play have been violated and the petitioner

is being denied its right to defend without any justification and fault.

Per contra, it is submitted by the learned counsel for the respondent that since the written statement was not signed and verified by a duly

authorized person on behalf of the petitioner, the same was rightly not taken on record and there is no merit in the writ petition.

The Hon’ble Supreme Court has held in State through Special Cell, New Delhi vs. Navjot Sandhu @ Afshan Guru & Ors. (2003) 6 SCC 641

that powers under Article 227 of the Constitution of India are wide and can be used, to meet the ends of justice. The powers under Article 227 can be

used to interfere even with an interlocutory order. The purpose to exercise the power under Article 227 is to keep the subordinate Tribunals within the

limits of their authority and to see that they obey the law. Paragraph 28 of the judgment reads as under:- “28. Thus the law is that Article 227 of

the Constitution of India gives the High Court the power of superintendence over all courts and tribunals throughout the territories in relation to which

it exercises jurisdiction. This jurisdiction cannot be limited or fettered by any Act of the State Legislature. The supervisory jurisdiction extends to

keeping the subordinate tribunals within the limits of their authority and to seeing that they obey the law. The powers under Article 227 are wide and

can be used, to meet the ends of justice. They can be used to interfere even with an interlocutory order. However the power under Article 227 is a

discretionary power and it is difficult to attribute to an order of the High Court, such a source of power, when the High Court itself does not in terms

purport to exercise any such discretionary power. It is settled law that this power of judicial superintendence, under Article 227, must be exercised

sparingly and only to keep subordinate courts and tribunals within the bounds of their authority and not to correct mere errors. Further, where the

statute bans the exercise of revisional powers it would require very exceptional circumstances to warrant interference under Article 227 of the

Constitution of India since the power of superintendence was not meant to circumvent statutory law. It is settled law that the jurisdiction under Article

227 could not be exercised “as the cloak of an appeal in disguiseâ€​.

 10. In Ramesh Chandra Sankla & Ors. Vs. Vikram Cement & Ors. (2008) 14 SCC 58, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has affirmed the view

taken by the High Court of Allahabad in a leading case of Jodhey vs. State AIR 1952 All. 788, wherein it was held that there are no limits, fetters or

restrictions placed on this power of superintendence under Article 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India and the purpose is to arm the High Court

with a weapon that could be wielded for the purpose of seeing that justice is meted out fairly and properly by the bodies mentioned therein.

Paragraphs 90, 91 and 98 read as under:- “90. Now, it is well settled that jurisdiction of the High Courts under Articles 226 and 227 is discretionary

and equitable. Before more than half a century, the High Court of Allahabad in the leading case of Jodhey v. State AIR 1952 All. 788 observed:-

 “10. … There are no limits, fetters or restrictions placed on this power of superintendence in this clause and the purpose of this article seems to

be to make the High Court the custodian of all justice within the territorial limits of its jurisdiction and to arm it with a weapon that could be wielded for

the purpose of seeing that justice is meted out fairly and properly by the bodies mentioned therein.â€​

 91. The power of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution conferred on every High Court over all courts and tribunals throughout the

territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction is very wide and discretionary in nature. It can be exercised ex debito justitiae i.e. to meet the

ends of justice. It is equitable in nature. While exercising supervisory jurisdiction, a High Court not only acts as a court of law but also as a court of

equity. It is, therefore, power and also the duty of the Court to ensure that power of superintendence must “advance the ends of justice and uproot

injusticeâ€​.

 98. From the above cases, it clearly transpires that powers under Articles 226 and 227 are discretionary and equitable and are required to be

exercised in the larger interest of justice. While granting relief in favour of the applicant, the court must take into account the balancing of interests

and equities. It can mould relief considering the facts of the case. It can pass an appropriate order which justice may demand and equities may

project. As observed by this Court in Shiv Shankar Dal Mills v. State of Haryana (1980) 2 SCC 437 courts of equity should go much further both to

give and refuse relief in furtherance of public interest. Granting or withholding of relief may properly be dependent upon considerations of justice,

equity and good conscience.â€​

It would be profitable for the ld. POLC to advert to Order XXIX Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (in short ‘CPC’) which

provides as under:- “1. Subscription and verification of pleading.â€" In suits by or against a corporation, any pleading may be signed and verified on

behalf of the corporation by the secretary or by any director or other principal officer of the corporation who is able to depose to the facts of the

case.â€​

In United Bank of India vs. Naresh Kumar & Ors. 1996 (6) SCC 660, the above provision and Order VI Rule 14 of the CPC came up for

consideration before the Hon’ble Supreme Court. It was held that even in the absence of any formal letter or authority or power of attorney

having been executed, a person referred to in Rule 1 of Order XXIX CPC can, by virtue of the office which he holds, sign or verify the pleadings on

behalf of the Corporation. In the absence of resolution of Board of Directors, in cases where the pleadings have been signed by one of its officers, a

Corporation can ratify the said action of its officer in signing the pleadings. The relevant paragraph 10 of the judgment reads as under:- “10. It

cannot be disputed that a company like the appellant can sue and be sued in its own name. Under Order 6 Rule 14 of the Code of Civil Procedure a

pleading is required to be signed by the party and its pleader, if any. As a company is a juristic entity it is obvious that some person has to sign the

pleadings on behalf of the company. Order 29 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, therefore, provides that in a suit by or against a corporation the

Secretary or any Director or other Principal Officer of the corporation who is able to depose to the facts of the case might sign and verify on behalf of

the company. Reading Order 6 Rule 14 together with Order 29 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure it would appear that even in the absence of any

formal letter of authority or power of attorney having been executed a person referred to in Rule 1 of Order 29 can, by virtue of the office which he

holds, sign and verify the pleadings on behalf of the corporation. In addition thereto and dehors Order 29 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as a

company is a juristic entity, it can duly authorise any person to sign the plaint or the written statement on its behalf and this would be regarded as

sufficient compliance with the provisions of Order 6 Rule 14 of the Code of Civil Procedure. A person may be expressly authorised to sign the

pleadings on behalf of the company, for example by the Board of Directors passing a resolution to that effect or by a power of attorney being

executed in favour of any individual. In absence thereof and in cases where pleadings have been signed by one of its officers a corporation can ratify

the said action of its officer in signing the pleadings. Such ratification can be express or implied. The court can, on the basis of the evidence on record,

and after taking all the circumstances of the case, specially with regard to the conduct of the trial, come to the conclusion that the corporation had

ratified the act of signing of the pleading by its officer.â€​

On 04.05.2018 when the written statement duly signed and verified by the Office Secretary of the petitioner was filed, the ld. POLC could not

have refused to accept and make it a part of the record. Similarly, the vakalatnama duly signed by the Office Secretary of the petitioner in favour of

Sh.Pramod Gupta should have been taken on record. There was no question to proceed the petitioner ex-parte by observing that there was no

authorization. In view of the provision contained in Order XXIX Rule 1 CPC and judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court in United Bank of India

(supra), there was no requirement of any Board Resolution when vakalatnama was signed by Office Secretary of the petitioner. Even if there was no

Board Resolution or authorization in favour of Shri Mahesh, the Office Secretary of the petitioner/Management, the petitioner could have ratified the

action of Shri Mahesh, Office Secretary expressly or impliedly at any subsequent point of time during the course of proceedings.

No doubt the Labour Court/Tribunal/National Tribunals are enjoined to answer the reference made to it within a period of six months from the

commencement of its inquiry under Section 14 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The object underlying is to expedite the hearing and not to scuttle

the same. The process of justice may be speeded up and hurried but the fairness which is the basic element of justice cannot be permitted to be

buried.

The often repeated two maxims ‘Justice delayed is justice denied’ and ‘Justice hurried is justice buried’ needs a realistic

reconciliation. Passing of such harsh and hasty orders/decisions by getting annoyed from any stakeholder does not serve the ends of justice. If such

hasty orders are passed without recourse to the judicial approach and going through the relevant provisions of law, justice is the ultimate casualty and

litigant is the victim. By passing the impugned orders dated 02.05.2018 and 04.05.2018, the ld. POLC has caused more harm than good resulting in

total miscarriage of justice. The post of a judge obviously is a seat of power. They have the absolute and unchallengeable control of the Court domain

but they cannot misuse their authority by intemperate comments, undignified banter or scathing criticism of counsel, parties or witnesses or their

authorized representatives.

In view of the above discussion, both the orders dated 02.05.2018 and 04.05.2018 are hereby quashed. However, the cost of Rs.5,000/- which was

imposed on 02.05.2018, if paid by the petitioner/Management shall not be claimed back from the respondent/workman. The petitioner/ Management is

directed to file the letter of authorization/ vakalatnama in favour of its representatives and its written statement along with affidavit before the ld.

POLC on the next date of hearing which shall be taken on record.

Before parting with the order, this Court feels the necessity of referring the subsequent order dated 15.05.2018 passed by the ld. POLC after

staying the proceedings by this Court on 09.05.2018. The order reads as under:- “15.05.2018 Present : Sh. B.N.Sharma, ARW with claimant The

management is ex-parte vide order dt. 04.05.2018. The matter is fixed for ex-parte WE and the claimant is very much present in person. He is having

his affidavit in evidence in his hand but this Court has received order dt. 09.05.2018 passed by Mr. Justice Vinod Goel that there shall be stay of the

proceedings till 22.05.2018. Due to that reason, the matter is adjourned to 29.05.2018 for ex-parte WE. (UMED SINGH GREWAL) PILOT

COURT/POLC-XVII DWARKA COURTS NEW DELHI/15.05.2018â€​

 18. The ld. POLC seems to be ignorant and non-caring towards the orders of the higher courts. The language adopted in noting down the stay order

passed by this Court lacks sobriety, deference and humility to be shown to the higher courts. This approach shows the passion of the Judge, however,

a judge always needs to be impassionate, to be learned, gracious in choosing the words, in expression and erudite in his writings. The subsequent order

lacks the elements of dignity, decorum and respect towards the higher courts. No rancour should reflect in any judicial order. This court feels such

ignorant officer be counselled by senior colleague within the fraternity. The observation is made only to inculcate the essence of respect and

obedience to the higher courts which is essential for any judicial officer. Hence, the learned District and Sessions Judge, Dwarka, is requested to call

the officer and counsel and guide him in choosing the vocabulary and thus maintain temperance, sobriety, deference and decorum in passing the

judicial orders. Let the ld. District & Sessions Judge send a compliance report within a month.

The petition along with pending application being CM No.19101/2018 is disposed of accordingly.

List for directions on 16.07.2018.