Ingram Micro India Private Limited vs Integrated Batteries India Pvt. Ltd.

By the present Application filed under Section 11(6) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, the Applicant seeks appointment of a Sole Arbitrator in terms of the arbitration agreement contained in Clause 6.9 of the Purchase Agreement dated 11 December 2022 entered into between the Applicant and the Respondent. The Applicant and the Respondent had executed the said Purchase Agreement on 11 December 2022. The agreement contains an arbitration clause in Clause 6.9, appearing at page 42 of the Application. It provides for resolution of disputes through arbitration and Mumbai is stated to be the venue of the arbitration proceedings.

On 23 July 2024, the Respondent filed a suit against the Applicant before the Learned Commercial Court No. 4, South-East District, Saket Courts, New Delhi, being CS (Comm.) No. 2909 of 2024. The suit was filed in respect of disputes and differences arising out of and relating to the Purchase Agreement. On 10 December 2024, the Applicant filed an application under Section 8 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, seeking that the dispute be referred to arbitration in accordance with Clause 6.9 of the Purchase Agreement. On 24 September 2025, the Learned Commercial Court No. 4, on the basis of the statement made by the authorised representative of the Respondent, allowed the application filed by the Applicant under Section 8 of the Act and disposed of the suit. However, on 15 October 2025, despite the said order referring the parties to arbitration, the Respondent initiated conciliation proceedings before the MSMFC, Meerut Division, hereinafter referred to as “the Council”. On 1 November 2025, the Applicant filed its Affidavit-in-Reply before the Council. In the said reply, the Applicant raised a preliminary objection that the proceedings before the Council were not maintainable in view of the arbitration clause contained in the Purchase Agreement and in view of the order dated 24 September 2025 passed by the Learned Commercial Court.

On 20 February 2026, the Council passed an order recording, inter alia, that conciliation could not take place because of the non-participation of the Applicant. Thereafter, on 27 March 2026, the Applicant filed the present Petition under Section 11 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 before this Court. The Applicant relied upon Clause 6.9 of the Purchase Agreement, which provides Mumbai as the venue of arbitration. On 28 April 2026, the Applicant filed Writ Petition No. 17751 of 2026 before the Allahabad High Court challenging, inter alia, the order dated 20 February 2026 passed by the Council. On 30 April 2026, the first arbitration hearing before the Council took place. Thereafter, without prejudice to the pending Section 11 proceedings and the Writ Petition, the Applicant filed its Statement of Defence before the Council on 10 July 2026.

Learned Advocate for the Applicant submits that the present Application has been filed under Section 11(6) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, hereinafter referred to as “the Act”, for appointment of an Arbitral Tribunal in accordance with Clause 6.9 of the Purchase Agreement dated 11 December 2022. According to the Applicant, Clause 6.9 provides that all disputes, controversies or claims arising out of or connected with the Purchase Agreement are to be resolved by arbitration in accordance with the Act. It is submitted that Mumbai was agreed to be the seat and venue of arbitration and that the Courts at Mumbai alone have exclusive supervisory jurisdiction over the arbitration proceedings. It is submitted that before filing the present Application, the Learned District Judge, Commercial Court, South-East District, Saket Courts, New Delhi, by order dated 24 September 2025 in CS (Comm.) No. 2909 of 2024, had allowed the Applicant’s application under Section 8 of the Act and had referred the parties to arbitration in terms of Clause 6.9 of the Purchase Agreement. The Applicant issued a notice dated 9 January 2026 under Section 21 of the Act for commencement of arbitration. However, by communication dated 22 January 2026, the Respondent declined to agree to the constitution of the Arbitral Tribunal. It is submitted that when the Applicant’s application under Section 8 of the Act was being considered by the Learned Commercial Court, Managing Director of the Respondent, made a statement on solemn affirmation before the Learned District Judge, Commercial Court No. 04, South-East District, Saket Courts, New Delhi, on 24 September 2025. The said statement was recorded by the Learned Judge and forms part of the record of CS (Comm.) No. 2909 of 2024. In that statement, the Managing Director of the Respondent stated that he was authorised on behalf of the plaintiff, namely, the Respondent herein, to state that the plaintiff did not wish to object to the application filed by the Applicant under Section 8 of the Act and that the plaintiff would file its dispute in arbitration in accordance with the rules. It was on the basis of this statement that the Learned Commercial Court allowed the Applicant’s Section 8 application by order dated 24 September 2025 and disposed of the suit. According to the Applicant, this statement is a clear admission and election by the Respondent, made through its Managing Director on oath and recorded by a competent Court, that the disputes between the parties were to be resolved through arbitration. It is submitted that the Applicant presently has a plain copy of the said statement and has applied for its certified copy on 19 August 2026. The Applicant undertakes to place the certified copy, after receiving the same, on record and seeks permission to rely upon it.

It is submitted that proceedings before the Micro & Small Enterprises Facilitation Council, Meerut Zone-1, Meerut, hereinafter referred to as “the Council”, being Arbitration Reference No. 278 of 2025, titled M/s Integrated Batteries India Private Limited v. Ingram Micro India Private Limited, are pending. The said proceedings were initiated by the Respondent as Claimant under Section 18 of the Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises Development Act, 2006, hereinafter referred to as “the MSMED Act”. The Applicant is the Respondent in those proceedings. It is submitted that from the beginning the Applicant has objected to the maintainability of the proceedings before the Council and to the Council assuming jurisdiction over the dispute. The Applicant has filed Writ Petition No. 17751 of 2026 before the Allahabad High Court challenging the continuation of the proceedings before the Council.

It is submitted that, in view of the order dated 30 April 2026 passed by the Council and the order dated 13 July 2026 referred to by the Applicant, the Applicant was required to file its Statement of Defence. Accordingly, and without accepting the jurisdiction of the Council, the Applicant filed its Statement of Defence and Counter Reply dated 10 July 2026 before the Council on 27 July 2026, after giving an advance copy to the Respondent. The Applicant submits that it continued to maintain all its objections regarding maintainability, jurisdiction, arbitrability and continuation of the proceedings before the Council. According to the Applicant, the Statement of Defence was filed under protest only to comply with the procedural direction of the Council and was not an acceptance of the jurisdiction of the Council.

It is submitted that the Recall Application, e-mails, Writ Petition, orders dated 30 April 2026 and 13 July 2026, Application dated 10 July 2026, Statement of Defence and Counter Reply, Rejoinder and the Respondent’s Affidavit of Evidence and Written Submissions are relevant for deciding the present Application. According to the Applicant, these documents show that the objection to the jurisdiction of the Council was raised at the earliest opportunity and, in any event, before and at the very beginning of filing the Statement of Defence. The Applicant submits that the said objection has throughout been maintained, even though the Applicant has replied to the case of the Respondent on merits without prejudice to its objection. It is submitted that the Applicant has never accepted the jurisdiction of the Council or given up its right to have the dispute decided by an Arbitral Tribunal constituted under Clause 6.9 of the Purchase Agreement. According to the Applicant, the question of constitution of the Arbitral Tribunal under Clause 6.9 therefore arises for consideration in the present Application. It is submitted that the proceedings before the Council are moving ahead on merits and the Applicant seeks an early hearing and disposal of the present Application. The Applicant submits that filing the Statement of Defence under protest cannot be treated as an act by which the Applicant accepted the jurisdiction of the Council or gave up the reliefs sought in the present Application.

Learned Advocate for the Respondent submits that the present Application under Section 11(6) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 is not maintainable. According to the Respondent, it is a registered Micro or Small Enterprise and has invoked the statutory remedy available under Section 18 of the MSMED Act before the Micro and Small Enterprises Facilitation Council, Meerut. It is submitted that the provisions of the MSMED Act have an overriding effect over the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. According to the Respondent, the arbitral proceedings before the Tribunal constituted by the MSEFC, Meerut have commenced, and both parties have appeared before the said Tribunal. It is submitted that Meerut has been fixed as the seat and venue of arbitration and a schedule has been fixed for completion of pleadings, evidence and written submissions. The parties were directed to file their respective pleadings and documents, followed by rejoinder, documentary evidence on affidavit and written submissions within the time fixed by the Tribunal.

It is submitted that, by order dated 20 February 2026, the Learned MSEFC, Meerut Division recorded that sufficient opportunity had been given to the Applicant to participate in conciliation under the beneficial provisions of Section 18(2) of the MSMED Act. According to the Respondent, the person having authority to take financial decisions for settlement of the dispute did not come forward for effective conciliation or settlement. No settlement proposal or relevant document was placed before the Council. The Respondent therefore submits that the Council could not conduct conciliation because of the Applicant’s non-participation. The Council proceeded to take up the dispute under Section 18(3) of the MSMED Act. The Respondent submits that the proceedings under Section 18(3) constitute statutory arbitration and are governed by the relevant provisions of the MSMED Act read with the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.

It is submitted that the Respondent’s earlier proceedings before the Commercial Court at Saket, which resulted in the order dated 24 September 2025 referring the matter to arbitration, do not prevent the Respondent from subsequently using the statutory remedy under the MSMED Act. According to the Respondent, there was no undertaking given by it before the Learned Commercial Court that it would initiate or conduct arbitration only under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. It is submitted that the order dated 24 September 2025 did not direct the Respondent to mandatorily proceed under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act for initiating arbitration. According to the Respondent, the order merely gave liberty to the Respondent to refer its dispute to arbitration.

Learned Advocate for the Respondent submits that two arbitration proceedings concerning the same dispute cannot proceed simultaneously between the same parties. Reliance is placed on the judgment of the Supreme Court in Gujarat State Civil Supplies Corporation Ltd. v. Mahakali Foods Pvt. Ltd., (2023) 6 SCC 401. According to the Respondent, the Supreme Court has held that the provisions of the MSMED Act override the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 and that the existence of an independent arbitration agreement does not prevent a party from making a reference to the MSEFC.

It is submitted that the Applicant, while filing the present Petition and during the arguments, did not disclose that on 20 February 2026 the MSEFC had proceeded to initiate arbitration. According to the Respondent, the present Petition had therefore become infructuous even before it was filed. On this basis, the Respondent submits that the present Petition deserves to be dismissed with costs, as the Applicant allegedly concealed a material fact and thereby caused wastage of the valuable time of this Court.

In reply to the Applicant’s case, the Respondent submits that the present Application under Section 11(6) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 is misconceived and not maintainable because the dispute between the parties is pending under Section 18 of the MSMED Act before the Micro and Small Enterprises Facilitation Council, Meerut. Reliance is placed on Section 18(2) of the MSMED Act. It is submitted that, after receiving a reference under Section 18(1), the Council is required either to conduct conciliation or to seek the assistance of an institution or centre providing alternate dispute resolution services. It is submitted that Sections 65 to 81 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 apply to such conciliation proceedings.

The Respondent admits that the Purchase Agreement contains an arbitration clause. However, that clause is subject to the overriding provisions of the MSMED Act and cannot prevent the Respondent from exercising the statutory remedy available under that Act. In view of the aforesaid submissions, Learned Advocate for the Respondent submits that the present Application filed by the Applicant under Section 11(6) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 deserves to be dismissed in the interest of justice.

I have considered the submissions made by the learned Advocates appearing for both sides.

There is not much dispute between the parties regarding Clause 6.9 of the Purchase Agreement containing the arbitration agreement. The Applicant relies upon this clause and says that Mumbai was agreed to be the seat and venue of arbitration. The Respondent has admitted in its reply that there is an arbitration clause in the agreement. Therefore, the existence of the arbitration agreement is not in dispute. Even from the Statement of Defence filed by the Applicant before the Council, it can be seen that from the beginning the Respondent had accepted that the disputes between the parties were covered by the arbitration agreement contained in Clause 6.9 and that Mumbai was agreed as the seat and venue of arbitration.

Therefore, the question is whether this Court can now appoint an arbitrator under Section 11 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 when the Respondent has invoked the statutory procedure under Section 18 of the MSMED Act and the MSEFC has taken the dispute for arbitration under Section 18(3). The other question is whether the earlier proceedings before the Commercial Court at Saket and the statement made by the Managing Director of the Respondent before that Court have any effect on the present proceedings.

The order dated 24 September 2025 passed by the Learned Commercial Court is an important document. The said order shows that the matter was fixed for hearing of the Applicant’s application under Section 8 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act. It was submitted on behalf of the Defendant that under Clause 6.9 of the Purchase Agreement the disputes between the parties were required to be referred to arbitration. The order records the statement of the authorised representative of the Plaintiff, who is the Respondent herein. The Learned Commercial Court recorded that “today the AR of the Plaintiff Sh. S.K. Mahajan, present in Court fairly submits that the Plaintiff is willing to go for arbitration and that the Plaintiff has no objection to the application filed by the Defendant Company u/s 8 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act.”

This statement was made before the Court by the authorised representative of the Respondent and was recorded by the Learned Commercial Court. Therefore, the Respondent cannot now say that it had not stated before the Court, at that time, that it was willing to go for arbitration and that it had no objection to the application under Section 8 of the Act. The operative part of the order dated 24 September 2025 shows what happened after the said statement was made. The Learned Commercial Court recorded, “Keeping in view the said statement, the application filed by the Defendant u/s 8 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act stands allowed. The Plaintiff is at liberty to refer its disputes to arbitration.” The order records, “This suit therefore will not be continued with and stands disposed of as referred to arbitration.” Therefore, to this limited extent, there is substance in the submission of the Applicant that there was an order of the Court by which the dispute was referred to arbitration. The application under Section 8 was in fact allowed. The suit was disposed of as referred to arbitration. It is an admitted position from the order that the Respondent had stated before the Court that it was willing to go for arbitration.

However, the effect of this order cannot be considered separately from what happened under the MSMED Act. The order dated 24 September 2025 did not appoint any particular arbitrator. It did not say that an Arbitral Tribunal had been constituted. In fact, the operative part of the order says, “The Plaintiff is at liberty to refer its disputes to arbitration.” Therefore, from the order, it cannot be said that an Arbitral Tribunal had come into existence pursuant to the Section 8 order. Thereafter, the Applicant issued notice under Section 21 and sought constitution of the Arbitral Tribunal. The Respondent did not agree to the same.

On 20 February 2026, the MSEFC, Meerut Division considered the matter pending before it. The Council recorded that it had given “sufficient opportunity to the buyer/respondent for the conciliation under the beneficial provision of section 18(2)”. It recorded that the authority having power to take financial decision for settlement did not come forward and that no documents or proposals for effective settlement were placed before the Council. The Council recorded that it had no occasion to hold conciliation because of “the non-cooperation/non-participation of the respondent buyer.” After this, the Council decided to proceed with the matter as arbitration. The order says, “This council decided to take up the matter by in accordance with section 18(3) of Micro, Small and Medium Enterprise Development Act, 2006. It is Statutory Arbitration in reference to Section 15,16,17 and 18 to be read with the provisions of section 2 Micro, Small and Medium Enterprise Development Act, 2006.” The order says, “A separate notice shall be issued.”

Thus, it is clear that after the order passed by the Learned Commercial Court, there was a development. The MSEFC did not remain only at the stage of conciliation. It proceeded to take up the dispute under Section 18(3). The present Application under Section 11 was filed after this order. The Applicant was aware of these proceedings and accepts that they were pending. In its Statement of Defence before the Council, the Applicant states that the Statement of Defence was filed “strictly and entirely without prejudice” to its objections regarding maintainability, jurisdiction, arbitrability and continuation of the proceedings. It has stated that the Statement of Defence was filed because of the directions given by the Council and that by filing the same it was not accepting the jurisdiction of the Council.

I find substance in the submission of the Applicant that merely filing the Statement of Defence before the Council cannot by mean that the Applicant had given up its objection. The Applicant has placed its objection on record. It has stated in the Statement of Defence that the same was filed without prejudice to its rights and objections. The document refers to the pending Section 11 proceedings and the challenge before the Allahabad High Court. Therefore, I do not accept the submission that merely because the Applicant filed its Statement of Defence, it surrendered or gave up its objection to the jurisdiction of the Council. However, the question of the substantive jurisdiction of the MSEFC stands on a different footing. On this issue, the judgment of the Supreme Court in Mahakali Foods is relevant. The Supreme Court has held in paragraph 52.1:

The Supreme Court has stated in paragraph 52.2, which is important for the present dispute:

The effect of these two findings of the Supreme Court is that merely because there is an arbitration clause in a private agreement, it does not prevent a supplier covered by the MSMED Act from approaching the Facilitation Council. The statutory procedure under Chapter V of the MSMED Act has been given overriding effect. Therefore, the Applicant cannot succeed only by saying that Clause 6.9 was present in the Purchase Agreement and, because of that, the Respondent could not have approached the MSEFC.

According to the Applicant, the Respondent had gone before the Commercial Court. The Respondent did not oppose the application under Section 8. Its authorised representative had stated before the Court that the Plaintiff was willing to go for arbitration. On the basis of that statement, the Court allowed the Section 8 application and disposed of the suit. According to the Applicant, after taking such a position before a Court, the Respondent could not take a different course and invoke the proceedings before the MSEFC. If the conduct of the Respondent is looked at from the point of consistency, there is some substance in this submission. On the relevant date, the Respondent had stated before the Commercial Court that it was willing to go for arbitration and that it had no objection to the Section 8 application. The statement was recorded by the Learned Commercial Court and the Section 8 application was allowed. The Respondent subsequently invoked the statutory procedure under the MSMED Act. These two steps do not appear to be consistent with each other. But the question before this Court is not only whether the later conduct of the Respondent was consistent with its earlier statement. The question is whether this Court can exercise its power under Section 11 and appoint an arbitrator under the contractual arbitration clause when the MSEFC has taken up the same dispute and has proceeded under Section 18(3) of the MSMED Act.

On this question, the finding in paragraph 52.2 of Mahakali Foods cannot be ignored. The Supreme Court has used the words “No party” and has held that in a dispute concerning an amount due under Section 17, a party is not prevented from making a reference to the MSEFC merely because an independent arbitration agreement exists. Therefore, the existence of Clause 6.9, by, cannot be treated as a bar to the statutory reference before the MSEFC.

The Applicant relies upon the earlier order of the Commercial Court and submits that the Respondent had elected to proceed with arbitration. On the material before me, I am unable to hold that the statement made before the Commercial Court had the effect of permanently taking away the statutory procedure available under Chapter V of the MSMED Act. The Supreme Court has held that the statutory procedure under Chapter V overrides the contractual arbitration agreement. There is no finding in Mahakali Foods that the statutory jurisdiction of the MSEFC comes to an end merely because, at an earlier stage, a party had stated that it was willing to proceed with arbitration under the contract.

It is necessary to keep in mind that the proceedings before the MSEFC are not merely negotiation proceedings. The Council has gone beyond the stage of conciliation and has recorded its decision to proceed under Section 18(3). The order dated 20 February 2026 uses the words “Statutory Arbitration”. Therefore, the MSEFC has taken up the dispute in its statutory arbitral capacity. The Supreme Court has held in paragraph 52.3:

This finding is important in the present matter because the same sequence has taken place here. The Council first considered the matter at the stage of conciliation. When conciliation did not take place, it proceeded to take up the matter under Section 18(3). The order dated 20 February 2026 shows this position. The Supreme Court has explained the nature of the proceedings under Section 18(3) in paragraph 52.4 as follows:

Therefore, merely because the present proceedings before the MSEFC are described as statutory arbitration, it cannot be said that the Arbitration and Conciliation Act has no application. The authority for such arbitration comes from the MSMED Act, whereas the arbitral proceedings are governed by the Arbitration Act in the manner stated by the Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court has held in paragraph 52.5:

This finding is relevant in the present case because the Applicant says that the MSEFC has no jurisdiction and has challenged the continuation of the proceedings before the Allahabad High Court. Therefore, merely because the Council has proceeded, it cannot be said that the Applicant has given up its objection regarding jurisdiction. At the same time, the existence of such objection cannot become a reason for this Court to appoint another Arbitral Tribunal for the same dispute when the statutory Tribunal has taken up the matter. The question regarding its own jurisdiction can be considered by the Council in accordance with the principle stated in paragraph 52.5, subject to the remedies available to the Applicant in law.

I therefore find substance in the submission of the Respondent that two separate arbitration proceedings concerning the same dispute should not proceed at the same time. Once the MSEFC has proceeded under Section 18(3), appointment of another arbitrator under Clause 6.9 would result in two different Arbitral Tribunals dealing with the same dispute. Such a situation should not be created by an order under Section 11 when the statutory arbitration is going on.

The submission of the Respondent that its earlier proceedings before the Commercial Court did not amount to an undertaking that it would proceed under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act requires consideration. The order dated 24 September 2025 records that the Plaintiff was willing to go for arbitration and had no objection to the Section 8 application. Therefore, I do not accept the submission of the Respondent that nothing definite was stated before the Commercial Court. A definite statement was made. However, as stated, the order did not constitute any particular Arbitral Tribunal. It allowed the Section 8 application and recorded that the Plaintiff was at liberty to refer its disputes to arbitration. Therefore, the later statutory reference cannot be treated as having no effect only because of the earlier statement.

The submission that there can be no estoppel against a statute needs to be understood in the facts of the present case. This principle cannot be used to ignore the conduct of a party before a Court. A statement made before a Court remains relevant when the conduct of the party is considered. At the same time, if a statutory mechanism has overriding effect, that statutory mechanism cannot be taken away merely by applying the principle of estoppel. The Supreme Court has held in paragraph 52.1 that Chapter V of the MSMED Act has an overriding effect. Therefore, the earlier statement made by the Respondent before the Commercial Court cannot nullify the statutory jurisdiction of the MSEFC.

The Respondent has submitted that the Applicant concealed the fact that the Council had proceeded to arbitration. This submission needs consideration. The present Section 11 Application was filed on 27 March 2026, whereas the order of the Council proceeding under Section 18(3) was passed on 20 February 2026. Thus, the order of the Council was earlier in time. The Applicant was aware of the proceedings. However, I cannot safely record a finding that the Applicant deliberately concealed the order or intentionally tried to mislead this Court. Such a finding cannot be made only on the basis of an allegation. I therefore do not accept the prayer of the Respondent for dismissal of the Application with costs on the ground of deliberate concealment. At the same time, the fact that the Applicant filed the present Application after the Council had passed the order dated 20 February 2026 cannot be ignored. By that time, the Applicant had objected to the proceedings before the Council and pursued the remedy under Section 11. The legal effect of this conduct has to be considered along with the judgment in Mahakali Foods and the fact that statutory arbitration had commenced.

The filing of the Statement of Defence by the Applicant before the Council does not create a right in favour of the Applicant for appointment of another arbitrator. The Applicant has stated that the Statement of Defence was filed “strictly and entirely without prejudice” and only because of the directions given by the Council. The Applicant has throughout maintained its objections. I accept this position to that extent. Therefore, I hold that merely by filing the Statement of Defence, the Applicant has not waived its objection to the jurisdiction of the Council. But the fact that there is no waiver does not give the Applicant a right to obtain another Arbitral Tribunal under Section 11.

The Applicant has relied upon the agreement that Mumbai was the seat and venue of arbitration and that the Courts at Mumbai were given exclusive supervisory jurisdiction under Clause 6.9. Such a contractual arrangement would normally have importance in an arbitration arising out of the Purchase Agreement. But the contractual arrangement cannot override the statutory procedure which, as held by the Supreme Court in Mahakali Foods, has overriding effect under Chapter V of the MSMED Act. Therefore, the agreement regarding Mumbai cannot be used to displace a statutory reference which otherwise falls within the scope of Section 18 of the MSMED Act.

The pendency of the Writ Petition before the Allahabad High Court is relevant. The Applicant has challenged the continuation of the proceedings before the MSEFC. The Statement of Defence filed before the Council refers to the said challenge and continues to maintain the Applicant's objections. However, while deciding the present Section 11 Application, this Court is not required to decide the entire dispute regarding the validity or continuation of the MSEFC proceedings, particularly when that issue is before the competent Court. The question here can be decided on the limited issue as to whether another arbitrator should be appointed when the statutory arbitral proceedings have commenced.

In view of the above findings, the objection of the Respondent regarding maintainability is upheld. The prayer of the Applicant for appointment of a Sole Arbitrator under Clause 6.9 is therefore not accepted.

It is made clear that dismissal of the present Application does not mean that every objection raised by the Applicant before the MSEFC is found to be without merit. The Applicant has challenged the jurisdiction and continuation of the proceedings before the MSEFC and has pursued its remedy before the Allahabad High Court. Those questions will be considered in the proceedings before the competent forum. The present order is confined to the prayer for appointment of an arbitrator under Section 11 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 in the situation where statutory arbitration under Section 18(3) of the MSMED Act has been undertaken.

The present Application is accordingly dismissed.