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Judgment
Mrs. Sujata Manohar, J.—The petitioner is an Advocate and Solicitor practising in this High Court and the Supreme Court of India. She edits a monthly magazine called ''The Lawyers'' Collective". She is also the Secretary of an organisation known as ''The Lawyers'' Collective" which conducts legal literacy campaigns and provides legal aid. The petitioner has been invited to address meetings. She has presented papers and articles at seminars and fought cases challenging discrimination against women.
In the last week of February 1986 the petitioner was invited to give an interview on Television in a programme called "Sach Ki Parchaian" to be telecast over the national network. The topic which was to be discussed in this programme was "Laws relating to Women". The petitioner accepted the invitation. Her interview was recorded in the studios of the Bombay Doordarshan on 1st March 1986. The petitioner was informed at the studio that she could speak on any aspect of laws relating to women. In the interview, the petitioner, apart from dealing with some aspects of laws pertaining to women, also commented on the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Bill 1986 which was then pending before Parliament. The Bill had given rise to a major controversy in the country. The petitioner commented on the Bill and said that it was unconstitutional and violative of women''s right to equality before the law and equal protection of laws. She also said that the Bill would deprive women of their rights as interpreted by the Supreme Court in the Shah Bano case. She said that the Bill dealt a severe blow to women''s right to claim maintenance. Since the petitioner held strong views on the Bill she considered it not only her right but also her duty to express her firmly-held belief that the Bill was unconstitutional and violative of Articles 14 and 15.
The petitioner was interviewed for six minutes. Apart from the petitioner several other persons were also interviewed for this programme. These included the then Chief Justice of India as also Ved Marwah, Sheela Barse, Pandita Haskar and others. Women victims of harassment were also interviewed. All these interviews were collated and edited for the purpose of the programme.
On 3rd March 1986 this programme was telecast. The petitioner was surprised to find that though her views on other aspects of laws relating to women were telecast, her opinion on the Muslim Women''s (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Bill were completely deleted. It is the petitioner''s case that her views on the Bill were censored by Television authorities because her views were against the views of the Ruling party.
The petitioner came to know about the deletion of her views on the Bill from the programme only when she saw the telecast on 3rd March 1986. She sent a letter of protest dated 6th March 1986 to Delhi Doordarshan. In the letter she pointed out that not allowing her to express her views on Muslim Women''s (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Bill 1986 was a clear imposition of censorship on her views, and she felt that she had been manipulated to suit the interests of the producers of the programme as also of Doordarshan.
The Deputy Director of Doordarshan Kendra, New Delhi in his reply of 9/10th April 1986 accepted that initially they had planned to include in the programme the views of various persons on personal laws. He, however, said that as the duration of the programme was exceeding its stipulated time and also because of the discussions going on in Parliament the portion pertaining to Muslim Personal Law was not includ Doordarshan ed in that programme.
In his subsequent letter of 28th April 1986 the Deputy Director, Doordarshan has told the petitioner that it will not be possible for them to telecast the views already expressed by the petitioner on the proposed Bill but they will get in touch with her if they plan any programme on the subject in future.
In the present petition the petitioner has prayed for a determination of the basis on which programmes on Doorsarshan should be scheduled, edited and/or censored. She has also sought a declaration that by censoring and/or deleting her views on Muslim Women''s (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Bill, the respondents have violated her fundamental right to freedom of speech and expression guaranteed under Article 19(1)(a) without authority of law; a declaration that the respondents have acted arbitrarily in censoring her views thereby violating Article 14 of the Constitution and for other similar reliefs.
It is not the case of the petitioner that she had a right of any sort to be interviewed for a television programme. She was however, invited to express on the T.V. national network her views on laws relating to women by the authorities of Doordarshan. Her grievance relates to omission of her views on the Muslim Women''s (Right to Protection on Divorce) Bill 1986 from the programme which was telecast. Was this done by the Doordarshan authorities in exercise of their right to edit the programme or was it censorship - The respondents had interviewed a number of persons for this particular programme. These interviews had to be collated and properly presented. For this purpose editing was required. The respondents, therefore, claim that it is in exercise of their legitimate right of editing the programme that they deleted a portion of the interview given by the petitioner omitting her views on the Bill. The petitioner, on the other hand, contends that this deletion was not in exercise of any legitimate right of editing the programme but was censorship of her views since these views were not acceptable to Doordarshan authorities.
When various interviews taken for a programme are edited, it is necessary to ensure that in the process of editing, the views expressed are correctly conveyed on the programme which is telecast. A portion of the interview may, at times, have to be deleted while editing the programme. But in the process of such deletion there should not be any gross distortion or misrepresentation of what had been said. Nor should important points raised be completely omitted.
In the present case a portion of the interview which expressed views unpalatable to Doordarshan was deleted. The deleted portion was directly relevant to the subject of the programme. The respondents in their correspondence, have admitted that initially it was their intention to include in this programme views of various persons on personal laws. Hence the opinion expressed was relevant. Why was it deleted ?
The respondents in their correspondence have given two reasons : (1) Paucity of time and (2) the subject was being debated in Parliament. The second reason clearly indicates the reluctance of Doordarshan authorities to telecast opinions on a controversial Bill then being debated in Parliament. The deletion, therefore, was in effect, by way of censorship. Paucity of time cannot justify a wholesale omission of the subject.
Under Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution all citizens have a right to freedom of speech and expression. This right protects freedom of speech on television as much as anywhere else. It was contended by Mr. Nilkanth, learned advocate for the respondents that there is no right of free speech on T.V.: He said that Article 19 does not apply to television programmes. Mr. Nilkanth has not cited any authority of law in support of this somewhat alarming proposition. The right to freedom of speech and expression has been considered by our courts as including freedom of the press. The right equally covers freedom of other media. A citizen cannot enjoy freedom of speech and expression if he is not permitted to express his views freely through mass media even when he is invited to use these media. Freedom to propagate one''s views is an important ingredient of the right of free speech. A citizen who is interviewed over television by invitation of the television authorities is entitled to express his or her views freely. Censorship or deliberate distortion of these views would violate Article 19. Any restriction of this right must be within the ambit of Article 19(2) and by law.
In the case of Romesh Thappar Vs. The State of Madras, the Supreme Court considered an order banning the entry and circulation of a journal in the State of Madras as violative of Article 19(1)(a). The Supreme Court said, "There can be no doubt that freedom of speech and expression includes freedom of propagation of ideas and that freedom is ensured by the freedom of circulation". In the case of Sakal Papers (P) Ltd. and Others Vs. The Union of India (UOI), the Supreme Court reiterated that the right to freedom of speech and expression carries with it the right to publish and circulate one''s ideas, opinions and views with complete freedom and by resorting to any available means of publication subject to such restrictions as could be legitimately imposed under clause (2) of Article 19. Our Constitution does not expressly provide for the freedom of the press but this freedom is included in freedom of speech and expression guaranteed by clause (1)(a) of Article 19.
By preventing circulation of the petitioner''s views on Muslim Women''s (Right to Protection on Divorce) Bill the respondents have abridged her fundamental freedom of speech and expression. Undoubtedly, under Article 19(2), reasonable restrictions can be imposed on the exercise of this right in the interest of the sovereignty and integrity of India, the security of the State, etc. These restrictions however, have to be within the ambit of Article 19(2) and be imposed by law. The petitioner''s right was not abridged on any of the grounds mentioned in Article 19(2). That is not the respondents'' case. Nor is it their case that they have framed any law under Article 19(2) restricting the right of free speech on television. The respondents have restricted the petitioner''s right under Article 19(1)(a) arbitrarily by an executive fiat. Even guidelines are not framed for censorship of views expressed over television. Executive action restraining exercise of a right under Article 19(1)(a) cannot be taken without any legislative authority. (See in this connection Bennett Coleman and Co. and Others Vs. Union of India (UOI) and Others, ; Kharak Singh Vs. The State of U.P. and Others, and The Edward Mills Co. Ltd., Beawar and Others Vs. The State of Ajmer and Another, ).
In the case of Red Lion Broadcasting Co. vs. Federal Communications Commission (395 U.S. 367) the Supreme Court of the United States has emphasised the right of the listeners of radio and T.V. programmes to hear differing views on various topics of public interest. It has said, "It is the purpose of the first amendment to preserve an uninhibited market place of ideas in which truth will ultimately prevail rather than to countenance monopolization of that market; whether it be by the Government itself or a private licensee". It is even more essential to preserve such uninhibited market place of ideas when a medium like Television is a State monopoly. Hence there is all the more reasons why, in the light of Article 19(1)(a), persons who are invited to express their views on T.V. are allowed to express them openly and freely, subject of course, to such reasonable restrictions as may be made by law under Article 19(2). No such restrictions on telecasts have been laid down by law. The views of the petitioner, therefore, on Muslim Women''s (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Bill have been wrongfully deleted from the programme in question. Her views on the said Bill should have formed a part of her interview as telecast though possibly, in an edited and abridged form.
It is, therefore, declared that by deleting the petitioner''s views on the Muslim Women''s (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Bill in their entirety the respondents have violated her fundamental right to freedom of speech and expression guaranteed under Article 19(1)(a) without any authority of law.
The respondents do not now have a tape of her full interview. In their letter of 28th April 1986, however, the respondents while regretting their inability to telecast the views already expressed by the petitioner on the said Bill, have said that if they telecast a programme on the subject in future, they will invite her to express her views. Learned advocate for the petitioner has stated that he will be satisfied if directions in terms of this offer are given. It is therefore, directed that respondents 2 to 5 will invite the petitioner to express her views on the Bill (now an Act) if they decide in future to telecast a programme on such a subject. Looking to the fact that the interview of the petitioner was one of several interviews and was of a short duration Respondents 2 to 5 may grant to the petitioner such comparable time to express her views as may be proper and reasonable in these circumstances. This direction is given because of the very fair offer made by the respondents themselves in the interest of justice.
The rule is made absolute accordingly.
In the circumstances there will be no order as to costs.
