Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. vs Mahendrabhai R. Patel and Another

P.R. Gokulakrishnan, C.J.—This Special Civil Application is to quash the order of the Labour Court, Baroda, wherein the Labour Court has held that the subsequent notification changing the ''appropriate Government'' in relation to a certain industry will not invalidate the reference made by the appropriate Government at the time the dispute was referred. Mr. Bhatt, the Learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner, submitted that by virtue of the notification dated 21-6-1985 the Central Government was specified as ''appropriate Government'' for oil industry. At the time of the reference u/s 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, the appropriate Government was the State Government in respect of this particular industry. In as much as there is a change in the appropriate Government subsequent to the matter having been referred to the Labour Court under the powers conferred u/s 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, Mr. Bhatt, the Learned Counsel for the petitioner, submitted that the Labour Court ceased to have jurisdiction. This he wanted to fortify by submitting that as per Section 17 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, the appropriate Government has to publish the award that will be passed by the Labour Court. Since at the time of passing the award the appropriate Government will not be the State Government, the difficulty will arise for publication of the award concerned.

We issued notice on this petition and Mr. N. J. Mehta entered appearance on behalf of the first respondent and Mr. S.D. Shah entered appearance on behalf of the second respondent. Both of them contended that the appropriate Government is that Government which has referred the dispute to the Labour Court u/s 10, that it continues to be the appropriate Government and that when any award is passed by the Labour Court, the said appropriate Government ''which referred the matter'' will publish it u/s 17 of the Industrial Disputes Act. It is unnecessary for us to site any decision for the clear proposition that it is only that appropriate Government which referred the matter will be the "appropriate Government" for publishing the report or award u/s 17 even though the "appropriate Government" is changed during the pendency of the award proceedings by virtue of any notification by the Government on the strength of Section 2 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.

In any way, we make reference to one decision cited by Mr. N.J. Mehta, the Learned Counsel appearing for the first respondent, in the case of The Workmen of Firestone Tyre and Rubber Co. of India (Pvt.) Ltd. Vs. The Management and Others, . No doubt, this is with reference to Section 11-A of the Industrial Disputes Act regarding the applicability of the said section in respect of the pendency of the proceedings. The Supreme Court in paragraphs 53 and 58 has observed as follows:

The words ''has been referred'' in Section 11A are no doubt capable of being interpreted as making the section applicable to references made even prior to 15-12-1971. But is the section so expressed as to plainly make it applicable to such references? In our opinion, there is no such indication in the section. In the first place, as we have already pointed out, the section itself has been brought into effect only some time after the Act had been passed. The proviso to Section 11A which is as much part of the section, refers to in any proceeding under this section". Those words are very significant. There cannot be a "proceeding under this section", before the section itself has come into force. A proceeding under that section can only be on or after 15-12-1971. That also gives indication that Section 11A applies only to disputes which are referred for adjudication after the section has come into force."

We have already expressed our view regarding the interpretation of Section 11A. We have held that the previous law, according to the decisions of this Court, in cases where a proper domestic enquiry had been held, was that the Tribunal had no jurisdiction to interfere with the finding of misconduct except under certain circumstances. The position further was that the Tribunal had no jurisdiction to interfere with the punishment imposed by an employer both in cases where the misconduct is established in a proper domestic enquiry as also in cases where the Tribunal finds such misconduct proved on the basis of evidence adduced before it. These limitations on the powers of the Tribunals were recognised by this Court mainly on the basis that the power to take disciplinary action and impose punishment was part of the managerial functions. That means that the law, as laid down by this Court over a period of years, had recognised certain managerial rights in an employer. We have pointed out that this position has now been changed by Section 11 A. The section has the effect of altering the law by abridging the rights of the employer inasmuch as it gives power to the Tribunal for the first time to differ both on a finding of misconduct arrived at by an employer as well as the punishment imposed by him. Hence in order to make the section applicable even to disputes, which had been referred prior to the coming into force of the section, there should be such a clear, express and manifest indication in the section. There is no such express indication. An inference that the section applies to proceedings, which are already pending, can also be gathered by necessary intendment. In the case on hand, no such inference can be drawn as the indications are to the contrary. We have already referred to the proviso to Section 11A which states ''in any proceeding under this section''. A proceeding under the section can only be after the section has come into force. Further, the section itself was brought into force some time after the Amendment Act was passed. These circumstances as well as the scheme of the section and particularly the wording of the proviso indicate that Section 11A does not apply to disputes which had been referred prior to 15-12-1971. The section applies only to disputes which are referred for adjudication on or after 15-12-1971. To conclude, in our opinion, Section 11A has no application to disputes referred prior to 15-12-1971. Such disputes have to be dealt with according to the decisions of this Court already referre to.

Thus, from the above said decision, it is clear that the disputes referred to prior to the coming into force of Section 11A of the Industrial Disputes Act will not be governed by the provisions of Section 11 A. Likewise, the subsequent notification changing the appropriate Government in respect of the particular industry will not in any way affect the reference made by the appropriate Government at the time of making such reference and that the Government which made the reference alone will have the authority to publish the Award u/s 17 of the Industrial Disputes Act.

Section 2(a) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, clearly states that:

"appropriate Government" means-

(i) in relation to any Industrial Disputes concerning any industry carried on by or under the authority of this Central Government or by a railway company....

Thus, it is clear that the "appropriate Government" will be the Government ''which makes the reference of an industrial dispute for adjudication''. The subsequent consequence that follows by such reference is relatable to the said "appropriate Government" which has referred the matter u/s 10. The proceeding that is continued by virtue of such reference will have its logical end by passing an award and such an award to be published u/s 17 has to be so published by the "appropriate Government" which referred the matter for adjudication.

We entirely agree with the reasoning and finding of the Labour Court and as such, we do not find any merits in this Special Civil Application. Accordingly, the Special Civil Application is dismissed. Notice discharged. Interim relief vacated. No costs.