Inder Singh and Others vs The Secretary to Government of Haryana, Agriculture Department and Others

G.R. Majithia and H.K. Sandhu, JJ.—The petitioner has challenged notification No. 116-JC(CH)-55/71, dated January 31, 1955, issued u/s 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (for short, the Act) by the Secretary to Government, Punjab, Development Department, acquiring the land mentioned therein for a public purpose, namely, for the development of a Mandi, township and factory area. It was followed by another notification No. 29-JC(CH)-56-281, dated January 19, 1956, issued u/s 6 of the Act declaring that the land described in the notification was required for the aforesaid purpose.

The principal ground of challenge to these notifications is that the land mentioned in the notifications was not used for the purpose for which it was acquired and was diverted to other purpose.

In response to the notice of motion issued by this Court, written statement has been filed on behalf of respondents 1 to 3 by the Deputy Commissioner, Sirsa. It is stated therein that the land was acquired by the Colonisation Department and the same vested in Haryana Urban Development Authority by way of notification of Government of Haryana dated September 11, 1987. The land situated on the Northern side of railway line has been developed by the Haryana Urban Development Authority. The land on the Southern side of the railway line is under process of development. A water works has already been constructed which is in working condition. Various Departments have demanded a part of the acquired land. Demand has been made for setting up judicial Complex, 132 K.V. Sub-Station by Haryana State Electricity Board, Housing Colony by Haryana Housing Board, Government College, Dharamshala, Telephone Exchange, Post Office etc. at Ellenabad. The land has already been allotted for S.D.M.''s office and Judicial Complex.

The writ petition was filed in this Court on October 21, 1993. The learned counsel for the petitioner made only one submission, viz, that the land cannot be allowed to be utilised for purpose other than that for which it was acquired. The submission is devoid of any merit. Once the proceedings for acquisition have been completed, the rights of the landlord get extinct. Acquired property vests in the Government after its possession has been taken by the Land Acquisition Collector. Vesting in the Government takes place only when (1) the Collector makes the award, and (2) the making of the award is followed up by his actually taking possession of the land u/s 16 of the Act. The second and the most important legal consequence that follows upon taking possession of the land by the Collector under the provisions of the Act is that it vests absolutely in the Government free from all encumbrances. The vesting in the Government takes place only when the making of the award by the Collector is followed up by his actual taking of possession of the land u/s 16 of the Act.

Indisputably, the award has been rendered and possession of the land acquired was taken by the Collector more than twenty years back. There is no prohibition in law that the Government cannot use the land for a purpose other than that mentioned in the notification u/s 4 of the Act. In Narinjan Singh and Anr. v. The State of Punjab and Anr. (1985) 87 P.L.R. 358 (F.B.), it was held by a Full Bench of this Court as under:-

"Once the Collector makes his award u/s 11 of the Act and takes possession of the land, two consequences follow, i.e. (i) the acquired land absolutely vests in the Government, and (ii) such vesting is free from all encumbrances. In other words, with the taking of the possession by the Government the title of the land acquired completely passes to the State. We find that in two other earlier cases, i.e. C.W.P. No. 3936 of 1984 (Ranjit Singh and Ors. v. State of Punjab and Anr.) decided on September 3, 1984 and C.W.P. No. 3960 of 1984 (Hari Chand and Ors. v. The State of Punjab and Anr.) decided on September 4, 1984, similar view was expressed by the Division Bench while dismissing the petitioners right at the threshold i.e, the motion hearing. We, therefore, find no justification to intervene at this stage in exercise of our jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution."

The writ petition is accordingly dismissed.