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Judgment
These two revision cases relate to the conviction of the
petitioners for an attempt to cheat the Oriental Government Security
Life insurance Co., with its head-quarters at Bombay inrespect of the
life insurance policy taken by one Jai Narayana Chogalal Joshi of
Hyderabad for Rs. 3000/ by laying a false claim that the insured had
died u/s 420 read with Section 511, L. P. C. by the 4th City
Magistrate, Hyderabad City in CC 150/4 of 1958. The conviction was
confirmed in appeal by the Additional Sessions Judge, Hyderabad City.
Each of the petitioners has been sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for
an year and a fine of Rs. 50/ or in default to rigorous imprisoment
for two months.
(2) The facts of the case are that the said Jai Narayana Chogalal
Joshi had taken a policy on his life Rs. 3000/ The policy was accepted
on 26 -2 1955. The nominee under the policy was one Niranjanlal, the
son of his brother, Sri Lal the second accused in the case. A premium
of Rs. 226-2-0 was payable yearly. The first premium was paid in
advance. It was in respect of this policy that the two accused, Pandu
Ranga Rao, alias V. P. Naidu (A-1) and Sri Lal (A-2) were found guilty of
having comnitted the offences alleged of which they were convicted. In
short, the attempt to cheat the insurance Company consisted in making a
false claim for the policy amount on the fraudulent misrepresentation
that the insured had died on 1-6-1955 supported by false documents to
wit a death certificate, a cremation certificate, the last medical
attendance certificate, an identification certificate etc.
(3) It is the prosecution case that the two petitioners who will be
referred to here after as the accused acted jointly in the commission of
the alleged offences.
(4) The prosecution led evidence to show that the two accused had
secured the necessary certificates from the 7th City Magistrate and the
District Magistrate, Hyderabad City that the A-2 had also sworn to the
death of Jai Narayan Chogalal Joshi is still alive and he was examined
as P.W. 1 in the case.
(5-8) (After referring to the prosecution evidence His Lordship
proceeded). All this evidence which is credible and unimpeachable
showed that A-1 and A-2 jointly acted in securing the false
certificates for the purpose of sending up a false claim. As indicated,
it was A-1 who had secured the policy when Jai Narayan had consulted
him as ti the steps hes hould take for payment of the premium which he
had not paid in time. It is the statement on oath or Jai Narayan (P W.
1) that after he placed the policy in the hands of A-1 he did not see
it that it was missing and that he had reported to the insurance
Company that he had lost the policy. Thus, it would appear that the
accused had made fraudulent misrepresentation for obtaining the
necessary certificates and that the claim was there after made supported
by the false documents.
(9) The accused denied the commission of the offences. The evidence to
the contrary was accepted by both the Courts, the trial Court and the
appellate Court.
(10) Sir Munwar Ali Baig contended before me that the 4th City
Magistrate had no jurisdication to try the case because the claim
supported by the necessary documents was addressed to the oriental
Government Security Life Assurance Co. Bombay. He argued that the
attempt to cheat could only have taken place after the letters were
received by the addressee, Life Assurance Company. In other words he
urges that by posting the claim at Hyderabad, no offence could have
been committed within the jurisdiction of Hyderabad City. He has cited
M.A. Kaleek alias James Cooper Vs. Emperor, as supporting him in this contention.
(11) In the case cited, the accused had sent from Madras a value-
payable parcel to the complainant at Hyderabad pursuant to an order by
the complainant for 4 boxes of tea. The complainant got delivery at
Hyderabad on payment of the value of Rs.168/. When he opened the boxes
he found that they contained saw-dust. The question of jurisdication was
raised before the High Court, the contention being that the Madras Court
had no jurisdiction. The learned judge accepted this contention
observing that the offence was completely committed in Hyderabad and
that the Madras Court had therefore no jurisdiction and that Section
179 of the Cr. P.C.did not apply to the case. The learned judge
expressed the view that Section 415, L.P.C. contemplated delivery to
any person and that was wide enough to include even an agent for the
purpose of delivery and that the post office could be deemed to be such
an agent. It was clearly indicated that the learned Judge ruled out the
application of Section 179 Cr. P. C. to the facts of that case and
addressed him self to the factum of delivery of the money to the Post
Office at Hyderabad.
(12) But the instant case is by all odds different. This is a case of
false claim supported by false certificates having been posted at
Hyderabad addressed to the Head quarters office of the Assurance Co.
The neccesary claim and the certificates were received; but, on a mere
suspiction arising on a perusal of the last medical attendance
certificate, an inquiry was instituted and the man, who was reported
dead, was found alive. No money was paid on this claim. Obviously the
vigilance of scrutiny had borne fruit.
(13) The short question would be whether the posting of a false claim
with all the necessary documents in support thereof would be an act in
the commission of the offence of cheating, and whether the Criminal
Courts here have no jurisdiction to try such an attempt. The marked
distinction is that is an attempt where as the case, which was citied
was completed act. Further Section 179 Cr. P. C. which was excluded
from application in the case cited seems to be very much in point with
reference to the facts of this case.
(14) Section 179 Cr. P. C. may be perued. It is in the sewords:-
"When a person is accused of the commission of any offence by
reason of anything which has been done, and of any consequence which
has ensued, such offence may be inquired into or tried by a Court
within the local limits of whose jurisdiction any such thing has been
done, or any such consequences has ensued."
(15) The securing of the policy and the false certificates for the
false claim done in the Hyderabad. The false claim was put in the
course of transmission by post. If this succeeded, the consequences
would have ensued. The amount due under the policy would have
been paid. It is apparent therefore, that the accused had done what
all they could have done to cheat the company. After putting the claim
in the course of transmission by post, they had absolutely no control
over the false documents and the false claim. So, I am inclined to the
view that Section 179 Cr. P. C. does apply and that the Court at
Hyderabad has jurisdiction.
(16) This view receives support from Gafur Karimbax v. Emperor, AIR1930 Bom 358.
(17) That was a case where the accused styling himself as the
"The Director of Mesmerism" posted three V. P. Parcles containing a
piece of paper purporting to convey the first lesson in mesmerism. The
parcles were received by the addressees and value paid too the post
office. On an objection being raised as to other jurisdiction of the
Court at Panvel, from where the parcels we resent, the following is the
reasoning repelling that contention:-
" The offence of cheating, as defined in S. 415 IPC consists in
deceiving a person and dishonestly including the person deceived to
deliver properly. In a case such as the present it appears to us to be
reasonable to hold that the act of deceiving and the act of including
delivery of properly are compposite acts which begin with the delivery
of the parcels to the post office for posting. It may, therefore, be
properly said that the accused in this case is accused of the
commission of the offence of cheating by reason of the delivery of
these parcles to the post office in Panvel. That posting is in fact an
essential part of the offence. Even if the parcels had not reached the
adressees, or if the addressees had declined to pay, the posting of the
parcels with the dishonest intention of getting payment on them would
seem to amount to an attempt to commit the offence. In our opinion,
therefore, S. 179 clearly applies."
(18) For the said reasons, I am unable to accede to the contention
that the City Criminal Court had no jurisdiction to try the case.
(19) The next contention which the learned Counsel has advanced, is
that this was not an attempt but only a preparation. This conotention
also does not fit in with the acts of the accused unfolded in this
case, which were accepted by both the Courts below. By putting the
insurance policy and the false documents in the course of transmission
by post, there is no escaping the fact that the attempt had been made.
The accused definitely went beyond preparation. An at leads inevitably
to the commsission of he offence, unless something, which the doer of
the act neither fore saw nor intended, happens to prevent this. In this
case, I narrated in sufficient detail the reasons for my conclusion
that there was nothing more that the accused could have done further to
posting a false claim with false documents. The inquiry started at the
other end on Scrutiny. But for that, the offence would have been
committed. It is, therefore, fallacious to contend that the acts of
the accused did not go beyond preparation.
(20) In Raman Chettiar v. Emperor, AIR 1927 Mad 77 referring to an
attempt to cheat, the learned Judge, after a review of the law on the
subject expressed himself thus:-
"It seems clear from these pronouncements that in the offence of
cheating the autual transaction must have begun, and an act to bear
upon the mind of the victim must have been done before a preparation
can be an attempt."
The learned Judge extracted the opinion of the learned Judges in
the said decision to the effect that
"If the actual transaction has commenced, which would have ended
in the crime if nor interrupted, there is clearly an attempt to commit
the crime."
I need not repeat the reasons for my conclusion that in the
present case there was a clear attempt to cheat the Assurance Company.
(21) The next contention advanced is that the accused should have
been specially charged as having committed the offence read with
Section 34, I. P. C.
(22) The facts accepted by the courts below showing the complicity
of the two accused irreststibly raise a legitimate inference that the
two accused had acted in furtherance of a common intention to cheat the
Life Assurance Company. Their acts in concert indicate that they has a
pre-arranged plan for securing the false documents.
(23) The complaint of the learned counsel seems to be that there
was no specific reference to Sec. 34, I.P. C. in the charge. Section
34 does not create any specifi coffence. It is a principle of
constructive liablity. A person could be convicted of an offence read
with Section 34 if the facts of the case jusitfy and if the accused had
understood the evidence led against him, of such facts irrespective of
the fact whether the Section was expressly mentioned in the charge or
not. There a recent rulings of the Supreme COurt to that effect:
Willie (William) Slaney Vs. The State of Madhya Pradesh,
and Rawalpenda venkalu v. State of Hyderabad, (S) AIR 1956 SC 171.
(24) I find, therefore, no substance in these contentions. The
acts which have been proved by credible evidence have been rightly
accepted as an attempt to cheat the Assurance Co. The sentences
are not excessive. The Revision cases are dismissed.
AF/K.S.B. Revision dismissed.
