High CourtsSingle Bench(1960) 07 AP CK 0022

In Re: Panduranga Rao alias V.P. Naidu and Another

Andhra Pradesh High Court · Decided on 20 July 1960 · Citation: AIR 1962 AP 257

HON’BLE JUDGES
Narasimham, J
CASE NUMBER
Criminal Revision Case No. 235 of 1959 and Criminal Revision Petition No''s. 211 and 239 of 1959

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Judgment

182 paragraphs · 2,037 words

These two revision cases relate to the conviction of the

petitioners for an attempt to cheat the Oriental Government Security

Life insurance Co., with its head-quarters at Bombay inrespect of the

life insurance policy taken by one Jai Narayana Chogalal Joshi of

Hyderabad for Rs. 3000/ by laying a false claim that the insured had

died u/s 420 read with Section 511, L. P. C. by the 4th City

Magistrate, Hyderabad City in CC 150/4 of 1958. The conviction was

confirmed in appeal by the Additional Sessions Judge, Hyderabad City.

Each of the petitioners has been sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for

an year and a fine of Rs. 50/ or in default to rigorous imprisoment

for two months.

(2) The facts of the case are that the said Jai Narayana Chogalal

Joshi had taken a policy on his life Rs. 3000/ The policy was accepted

on 26 -2 1955. The nominee under the policy was one Niranjanlal, the

son of his brother, Sri Lal the second accused in the case. A premium

of Rs. 226-2-0 was payable yearly. The first premium was paid in

advance. It was in respect of this policy that the two accused, Pandu

Ranga Rao, alias V. P. Naidu (A-1) and Sri Lal (A-2) were found guilty of

having comnitted the offences alleged of which they were convicted. In

short, the attempt to cheat the insurance Company consisted in making a

false claim for the policy amount on the fraudulent misrepresentation

that the insured had died on 1-6-1955 supported by false documents to

wit a death certificate, a cremation certificate, the last medical

attendance certificate, an identification certificate etc.

(3) It is the prosecution case that the two petitioners who will be

referred to here after as the accused acted jointly in the commission of

the alleged offences.

(4) The prosecution led evidence to show that the two accused had

secured the necessary certificates from the 7th City Magistrate and the

District Magistrate, Hyderabad City that the A-2 had also sworn to the

death of Jai Narayan Chogalal Joshi is still alive and he was examined

as P.W. 1 in the case.

(5-8) (After referring to the prosecution evidence His Lordship

proceeded). All this evidence which is credible and unimpeachable

showed that A-1 and A-2 jointly acted in securing the false

certificates for the purpose of sending up a false claim. As indicated,

it was A-1 who had secured the policy when Jai Narayan had consulted

him as ti the steps hes hould take for payment of the premium which he

had not paid in time. It is the statement on oath or Jai Narayan (P W.

1) that after he placed the policy in the hands of A-1 he did not see

it that it was missing and that he had reported to the insurance

Company that he had lost the policy. Thus, it would appear that the

accused had made fraudulent misrepresentation for obtaining the

necessary certificates and that the claim was there after made supported

by the false documents.

(9) The accused denied the commission of the offences. The evidence to

the contrary was accepted by both the Courts, the trial Court and the

appellate Court.

(10) Sir Munwar Ali Baig contended before me that the 4th City

Magistrate had no jurisdication to try the case because the claim

supported by the necessary documents was addressed to the oriental

Government Security Life Assurance Co. Bombay. He argued that the

attempt to cheat could only have taken place after the letters were

received by the addressee, Life Assurance Company. In other words he

urges that by posting the claim at Hyderabad, no offence could have

been committed within the jurisdiction of Hyderabad City. He has cited

M.A. Kaleek alias James Cooper Vs. Emperor, as supporting him in this contention.

(11) In the case cited, the accused had sent from Madras a value-

payable parcel to the complainant at Hyderabad pursuant to an order by

the complainant for 4 boxes of tea. The complainant got delivery at

Hyderabad on payment of the value of Rs.168/. When he opened the boxes

he found that they contained saw-dust. The question of jurisdication was

raised before the High Court, the contention being that the Madras Court

had no jurisdiction. The learned judge accepted this contention

observing that the offence was completely committed in Hyderabad and

that the Madras Court had therefore no jurisdiction and that Section

179 of the Cr. P.C.did not apply to the case. The learned judge

expressed the view that Section 415, L.P.C. contemplated delivery to

any person and that was wide enough to include even an agent for the

purpose of delivery and that the post office could be deemed to be such

an agent. It was clearly indicated that the learned Judge ruled out the

application of Section 179 Cr. P. C. to the facts of that case and

addressed him self to the factum of delivery of the money to the Post

Office at Hyderabad.

(12) But the instant case is by all odds different. This is a case of

false claim supported by false certificates having been posted at

Hyderabad addressed to the Head quarters office of the Assurance Co.

The neccesary claim and the certificates were received; but, on a mere

suspiction arising on a perusal of the last medical attendance

certificate, an inquiry was instituted and the man, who was reported

dead, was found alive. No money was paid on this claim. Obviously the

vigilance of scrutiny had borne fruit.

(13) The short question would be whether the posting of a false claim

with all the necessary documents in support thereof would be an act in

the commission of the offence of cheating, and whether the Criminal

Courts here have no jurisdiction to try such an attempt. The marked

distinction is that is an attempt where as the case, which was citied

was completed act. Further Section 179 Cr. P. C. which was excluded

from application in the case cited seems to be very much in point with

reference to the facts of this case.

(14) Section 179 Cr. P. C. may be perued. It is in the sewords:-

"When a person is accused of the commission of any offence by

reason of anything which has been done, and of any consequence which

has ensued, such offence may be inquired into or tried by a Court

within the local limits of whose jurisdiction any such thing has been

done, or any such consequences has ensued."

(15) The securing of the policy and the false certificates for the

false claim done in the Hyderabad. The false claim was put in the

course of transmission by post. If this succeeded, the consequences

would have ensued. The amount due under the policy would have

been paid. It is apparent therefore, that the accused had done what

all they could have done to cheat the company. After putting the claim

in the course of transmission by post, they had absolutely no control

over the false documents and the false claim. So, I am inclined to the

view that Section 179 Cr. P. C. does apply and that the Court at

Hyderabad has jurisdiction.

(16) This view receives support from Gafur Karimbax v. Emperor, AIR1930 Bom 358.

(17) That was a case where the accused styling himself as the

"The Director of Mesmerism" posted three V. P. Parcles containing a

piece of paper purporting to convey the first lesson in mesmerism. The

parcles were received by the addressees and value paid too the post

office. On an objection being raised as to other jurisdiction of the

Court at Panvel, from where the parcels we resent, the following is the

reasoning repelling that contention:-

" The offence of cheating, as defined in S. 415 IPC consists in

deceiving a person and dishonestly including the person deceived to

deliver properly. In a case such as the present it appears to us to be

reasonable to hold that the act of deceiving and the act of including

delivery of properly are compposite acts which begin with the delivery

of the parcels to the post office for posting. It may, therefore, be

properly said that the accused in this case is accused of the

commission of the offence of cheating by reason of the delivery of

these parcles to the post office in Panvel. That posting is in fact an

essential part of the offence. Even if the parcels had not reached the

adressees, or if the addressees had declined to pay, the posting of the

parcels with the dishonest intention of getting payment on them would

seem to amount to an attempt to commit the offence. In our opinion,

therefore, S. 179 clearly applies."

(18) For the said reasons, I am unable to accede to the contention

that the City Criminal Court had no jurisdiction to try the case.

(19) The next contention which the learned Counsel has advanced, is

that this was not an attempt but only a preparation. This conotention

also does not fit in with the acts of the accused unfolded in this

case, which were accepted by both the Courts below. By putting the

insurance policy and the false documents in the course of transmission

by post, there is no escaping the fact that the attempt had been made.

The accused definitely went beyond preparation. An at leads inevitably

to the commsission of he offence, unless something, which the doer of

the act neither fore saw nor intended, happens to prevent this. In this

case, I narrated in sufficient detail the reasons for my conclusion

that there was nothing more that the accused could have done further to

posting a false claim with false documents. The inquiry started at the

other end on Scrutiny. But for that, the offence would have been

committed. It is, therefore, fallacious to contend that the acts of

the accused did not go beyond preparation.

(20) In Raman Chettiar v. Emperor, AIR 1927 Mad 77 referring to an

attempt to cheat, the learned Judge, after a review of the law on the

subject expressed himself thus:-

"It seems clear from these pronouncements that in the offence of

cheating the autual transaction must have begun, and an act to bear

upon the mind of the victim must have been done before a preparation

can be an attempt."

The learned Judge extracted the opinion of the learned Judges in

the said decision to the effect that

"If the actual transaction has commenced, which would have ended

in the crime if nor interrupted, there is clearly an attempt to commit

the crime."

I need not repeat the reasons for my conclusion that in the

present case there was a clear attempt to cheat the Assurance Company.

(21) The next contention advanced is that the accused should have

been specially charged as having committed the offence read with

Section 34, I. P. C.

(22) The facts accepted by the courts below showing the complicity

of the two accused irreststibly raise a legitimate inference that the

two accused had acted in furtherance of a common intention to cheat the

Life Assurance Company. Their acts in concert indicate that they has a

pre-arranged plan for securing the false documents.

(23) The complaint of the learned counsel seems to be that there

was no specific reference to Sec. 34, I.P. C. in the charge. Section

34 does not create any specifi coffence. It is a principle of

constructive liablity. A person could be convicted of an offence read

with Section 34 if the facts of the case jusitfy and if the accused had

understood the evidence led against him, of such facts irrespective of

the fact whether the Section was expressly mentioned in the charge or

not. There a recent rulings of the Supreme COurt to that effect:

Willie (William) Slaney Vs. The State of Madhya Pradesh,

and Rawalpenda venkalu v. State of Hyderabad, (S) AIR 1956 SC 171.

(24) I find, therefore, no substance in these contentions. The

acts which have been proved by credible evidence have been rightly

accepted as an attempt to cheat the Assurance Co. The sentences

are not excessive. The Revision cases are dismissed.

AF/K.S.B. Revision dismissed.