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Judgment
The matter has been taken up for consideration in the light of the media report titled ‘3 dead, 44 injured in flash fire at IOC’s Haldia refinery’https://energy.economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/oil-and-gas/3-dead-44-injured-in-flash-fire-at-iocsrefinery/88415782. According to the media report, the incident occurred in the Motor Spirit Quality (MSQ) unit of the refinery during shutdown and related works at around 2.50 pm on 21.12.2021.
The matter was earlier considered on 07.01.2022 in the light of response of the State PCB and the Indian Oil Company (IOC). The Tribunal found that the response did not deal with the issue of compliance of safety norms and measures to prevent such incidents in future. The Tribunal accordingly directed constitution of joint Committee comprising CPCB, State PCB and District Magistrate, Haldia to undertake visit to the site, interact with stakeholders and identify remedial measures including compensation to the victims and to prevent such incident in future. Operative part of the order is reproduced below:-
“1to3…xxx………………………..xxx………………………………….xxx
We have heard learned Counsel for the parties and considered the material available. We note that the response of the State PCB and the PP do not deal with the compliance of safety norms in terms of the Manufacture, Storage and Import of Hazardous Chemical Rules, 1989, under the EP Act, particularly preparation of onsite and offsite emergency plans and holding of mock drills. The Central, State and District Crisis Groups are also required to perform their statutory function under the Chemical Accidents (Emergency Planning, Preparedness and Response) Rules, 1996. The statutory authorities under the Disasters Management Act, 2005 are also required to take remedial action. In the light of the causes of incident, it is necessary to prepare a plan to ensure that such incidents do not occur. We are informed that ex-gratia payment of Rs. 10 lakhs each has been paid to the heirs of the deceased. The same may not be adequate. Injured may also have to be compensated.
Though learned Counsel present seek time to remedy the above aspects but we find no justification for doing so. Instead, it will be in the interest of justice to direct the statutory authorities to take remedial action for ensuring due compensation to the victims and compliance of environmental and safety norms so as to ensure that such incidents do not recur.
Accordingly, we direct constitution of a joint Committee comprising CPCB, State PCB and District Magistrate. The joint Committee may meet within two weeks and undertake visit to the site and interact with the stake holders. It may identify measures required to be taken for compliance of law, including compensation for the victims and for damage to environment, if any and to identify measures for preventing such incident in future. The Committee may also consider reports of industrial accidents in recent past on directions of this Tribunal which are available on the website of CPCB. The State PCB will be the Nodal Agency for coordination and compliance. A report in the matter be filed within two months with the Registrar General of this Tribunal with copies thereof to the Chief Secretary, West Bengal and other statutory authorities for further action. The report may inter-alia include laying down protocol for process safety management and the monitoring for leak detection carried out at permanent ongoing Leak Detection and Repair Programme (LDAR). If found necessary, the Registrar General of this Tribunal may place the matter before the Bench, for any directions which may become necessary.”
In pursuance of above, report of the joint Committee dated 07.02.2023 has been filed after undertaking visit to the site and interaction with the concerned. Recommendations have been made for remedial measures to prevent such incidents in future and recommendation has also been made to compensate the victims. Relevant extracts from the report of the Committee are:
“The committee inspected the site of the said industry on 25th February 2022 and observed that the Motor Spirit Quality (MSQ) unit, where the incident took place, was not in operation. The committee requested the M/s IOCL to provide necessary documents of compensation paid to the victims, fugitive analyses reports and process safety management for scrutiny as per direction of the Hon'ble NGT.
M/s IOCL engaged a private laboratory to conduct fugitive analyses at different equipments. Most of the fugitive analyses were carried out at pump's suction & discharge valves, their flanges, pressure gauges and seals. In 99.9% cases, values of analyses showed 0 ppm. Very few fugitive analyses were performed at some heat exchangers. Results show that analyses were carried out at suction
& discharge valves, their flanges, pressure gauges and seals of heat exchangers and in all cases, results were reported to be 0 ppm. But suction point, discharge point and seal of a heat exchanger are meaningless. However, fugitive emission monitoring was not performed to any other equipment in the industry. The above mentioned fugitive emissions were carried out on yearly basis employing same private laboratory year after year. As per the Ministry of Environment and Forests notification vide G.S.R. 186(E) dt. 18.03.2008, fugitive emission as well as LDAR are to be checked at:
Block valve, control valve, compressor seals, pressure relief valves, pipe flanges and pipe connections along with the above mentioned points which the industry was monitoring.
The industry was not able to show LDAR test data. The industry is reluctant about measuring of fugitive emission of different equipments.
During investigation of major fire incident to the unit on 21.12.21, Oil Industry Safety Directorate (OISD) pointed out that there was blockage at inlet flange of stabilizer reboiler of MSQ section of the unit. Opening of inlet flange of stabilizer reboiler caused naphtha to come out along with flushing water results fire by source of ignition of gas cutting job in the vicinity. In this case, hydrocarbon sensors were either not installed or were non-functional there during such operation.
When process operation of the unit was running, blockage of any line or equipment was being reflected through DCS as well as field sensors for improper level or temperature or flow rate of that part of the equipment. During shut down job of the unit, the said blockage portion of the equipment is to be supervised properly through DCS monitoring as well as through field monitoring during water flushing.
A series of fire incidents occurred during December 2021 such as (i) on 15.12.21 at Fluidized Catalytic Cracking (FCC) unit, (ii) on 19.12.21 between MSQ and FCC units and (iii) on 20.12.21 for naphtha dripping from Stabilizer column. All these incidents occurred just before the major fire incident happened on 21.12.21 indicating the reluctance of the industry about hazard and consequence of fire incident leading to casualties.
During inspection of the committee on 25th February, 2022, two nos. Effluent Treatment Plant (ETP) of the industry were found running with wastewater treatment of 450-500 m3/hr (plant capacity 600 m3/hr) and 600-620 m3/hr (plant capacity 650 m3/hr). Surface drain lines at four sides surrounding MSQ section, was found to carry water with traces of oil floating. The industry has 2 nos. guard pond where oil contaminated storm water was being collected for treatment at ETP. One guard pond was found empty and the other one contained wastewater for treatment. WBPCB collected wastewater samples from individual outlet of two ETPs and final industry outlet for analyses on 10th February, 2022 and results in the three cases show compliance for BOD, COD and 0 & G as per environmental discharge standard of oil refinery industry. Analyses results of ambient air quality monitoring stations of WBPCB installed at different locations of Haldia show no remarkable increase in concentrations of PMio, PM2.s, S02 and NO2 during the period from 21st December, 2021 to 31st December, 2021. Therefore, no damage to environment for the fire incident of the industry on 21st December, 2021, was observed during inspection.
M/s IOCL confirms that the industry follows process safety management as per OISD standards and guidelines for petroleum refinery.
M/s IOCL awarded the work order to M/s Shilpi Engg. Pvt. Ltd. for maintenance work of the MSQ Section during its shut down period. During visit, committee also interacted with M/s Shilpi Engg. Pvt. Ltd. and as informed, all the laborer engaged in the maintenance work were having minimum 4-10 yrs of experience in similar field. They were given proper training for safe field work. M/s IOCL also organizes the training on regular basis for Permanent & Contract Workers.
Due to flash fire incident, total 5 nos. causalities occurred from Contract Labor. Following may be considered as compensation amount to their Dependent family members for satisfactory living:
Name of deceased
Age (yrs.)
Salary per month
Salary after deduction
Future prospect
Loss of month income to the dependents
Annual income
Loss of future income
Expenses for shifting mortal remains and loss of funeral expenses
Loss of love and affection
Hon’ble Supreme Court judgement in Civil appeal no. 6339 of 2019
and civil appeal no. 3483 of
2008
Compensation (in INR)
A
B
C
DT=50% of (B+C)
E=DX12
F#ExM
G
H
I=F+G+H
Late Pargat
Singh
38
22490
22490
8996
15743
188916
2833740
100000
200000
3133740
Late Shamsad Ali
33
22490
22490
8996
15743
188916
3022656
100000
200000
3322656
Late Sarabjit Singh
28
22490
22490
8996
15743
188916
3211572
100000
200000
3511572
Late Lal Babu Mahato
37
22490
22490
8996
15743
188916
2833740
100000
200000
3133740
Late Kulfeep Singh
37
22490
22490
8996
15743
188916
2833740
100000
200000
3133740
# - depending on the age, the factor (M) is fixed. 17 for age group 25-30, 16 for age group 31-35, 15 for age group 36-40 and 14 for age group 41-45.
Status of regulatory compliances:
SI No.
Particular
Status
1
Consent to Operate - CTO
Valid till: 31.05.2024
2
Hazardous Waste Authorization
Valid till: 31.12.2025
3
Public Liability Insurance
Valid till: 31.03.2022
Recommendation:
Fugitive emissions of the industry were carried out on yearly basis employing same private laboratory year after year. Most of the fugitive analyses were monitored at pump's suction & discharge valves, their flanges, pressure gauges and seals and in some cases heat exchanger's suction & discharge valves, their flanges, pressure gauges and seals. In 99.9% cases, values of analyses showed 0 ppm. But suction point, discharge point and seal of a heat exchanger are meaningless.
As per the Ministry of Environment and Forests notification vide G.S.R. 186(E) dt. 18.03.2008, fugitive emission as well as LDAR are to be checked at:
Block valve, control valve, compressor seals, pressure relief valves, pipe flanges and pipe connections along with the above mentioned points which the industry was monitoring.
The industry was not able to show LDAR test data. The industry is reluctant about measuring of fugitive emission of different equipments.
When process operation of the unit was running, blockage of any line or equipment was being reflected through DCS as well as field sensors for improper level or temperature or flow rate of that part of the equipment. During shut down job of the unit, the said blockage portion of the equipment is to be supervised properly through DCS monitoring as well as through field monitoring during water flushing.
Hydrocarbon sensors already installed at different locations of the industry probably were not able to sense the leakage of hydrocarbon. Hence, modernized sensors may be installed after proper checking so as to ensure such incidents do not occur in future.
After occurrence of a series of fire incidents (i) on 15.12.21 at Fluidized Catalytic Cracking (FCC) unit, (ii) on 19.12.21 between MSQ and FCC units and (iii) on 20.12.21 for naphtha dripping from Stabilizer column just before the major fire incident happened on 21.12.21 indicating the reluctance of the industry about hazard and consequence of fire incident leading to casualties.
No damage to environment for the fire incident of the industry on 21st December, 2021, was observed during inspection.
The industry was following process safety management as per OISD standards and guidelines for petroleum refinery.
For 5 Nos. of causalities in total for fire incident on 21st December, 2021, compensation amount to their Dependent family members for satisfactory living is recommended through calculation.
Different process sections of the industry was installed in close proximity to each other, therefore any small fire incident of one section may spread out rapidly within its surrounding sections resulting a massive disaster to the locality.
As per recommendation of OIDS, MSQ block units comprising Prime-g unit, isomerization unit, naphtha hydro treating unit and vacuum distillation unit -II, were not meeting the inter distance requirement and their shut down are to be taken simultaneously as single block.”
Learned counsel for the State PCB suggests that the report be accepted and directions be issued in terms of the recommendations.
We find no reason not to accept the report and the suggestion of the learned counsel for the State PCB.
Accordingly, we direct that further action be taken in terms of the recommendations in the report, including payment of compensation to the victims. This may be ensured by the State PCB in coordination with any other concerned authority.
The application is disposed of.
A copy of this order be forwarded to the Chief Secretary, West Bengal, IOCL, CPCB, State PCB and District Magistrate, Haldia by email for compliance.