In Re: Mohideen Pakkiri Marakkayar

We are asked in this revision case to interfere with an order passed by the 1st class Sub Divisional Magistrate of Devakottai Division,

disallowing the objection of the petitioner in a criminal case.

The case was instituted on a complaint by the Income Tax Assistant Tahsildar of Devakottai. In that complaint the accused was charged u/s

177, Indian Penal Code, within the meaning of Section 40 of the Incometax Act, VII of 1918. The facts set out are that the accused verified a

petition, which he afterwards presented to the Revenue Divisional Officer u/s 21 of the Income Tax Act. That verification was made at

Kottaipatnam in the Tanjore District. But the last sentence of the complaint states that the offence was committed at the place where the return was

received by the Revenue Divisional Officer, Devakottai, within the lower court''s jurisdiction.

It must be borne in mind that the complaint is statedly of an offence, punishable u/s 177 I.P.C. within the meaning of Section 40 of the Income

Tax Act. We are therefore concerned with the wording of the latter section and have to deal with it as it stands, Section 40 of the Income Tax Act

says: that, if a person makes a statement in a verification mentioned in Section 17 or Section 21(3), which is false and which he either knows or

believes to be false or does not believe to be true, he shall be deemed to have committed the offence described in Section 177 of the Indian Penal

Code. Where then did the petitioner make the statement in his verification? According to the complaint he made it in Devakottah. The learned

Public Prosecutor however has argued that with reference to Section 179, Criminal Procedure Code, the offence constituted by the verification will

be triable, not only where the verification was effected, but also where any consequence thereof ensued, and that some sort of consequence must

be held to have ensued, where the verified petition was received by the authorities. We have not been able to understand from the learned Public

Prosecutor what is the exact consequence, to which he refers. For the receipt of the petition would in no sense be the consequence of its

verification; since the verification would go no way towards putting the petition in transit from one place to the other. In in re Rambilas ILR (1912)

Mad. 639 it was held in effect that the consequence contemplated in Section 179 must be an essential part of the offence charged. That

requirement is not fulfilled in the case before us. It has been suggested that an absurdity will, be entailed by the petitioner''s construction of Section

For on the construction any person who verified a petition would be punishable, even though no use of the petition were made and it never left

his possession. We think that any such anomaly is sufficiently excluded by the reference to Sections 17 and 21(3) in Section 40, Taking this view

we must hold that the charge can legally be tried only by the court having jurisdiction over Kottaipatnam, Tanjore District, the place where the

verification of the petition took place.

We therefore direct the lower court to return the complaint to the complainant for presentation to the court having jurisdiction.