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Judgment
Though there may be certain Calcutta decisions confining rather strictly the powers of magistrates in respect of orders directing u/s 144, Clause
(1) of the Criminal Procedure Code "" any person to abstain from a certain act "" the Madras cases (See Ramanadhan Chetti v. Murugappa Chetti
ILR (1900) M. 45 and Queen Empress v. Abdulla Sait ILR (1900) M. 262 have not taken such a restricted view of the section.
In the present case, the Magistrate has merely restrained the 2nd party (petitioners before me) from trying to exercise any acts as melvaramdar
or to assist first petitioner to exercise such right.
I do not think this order would exceed his powers u/s 144 of the Criminal Procedure Code. In his attempt to define those melvaram rights the
Magistrate may have included rights which do not really pertain to the melvaram proprietor, and this may be prejudicial to the tenants, but the
order against the counterpetitioners has not been made against them as tenants. It could not affect the petitioners who are only prohibited from
exercising the melvaramdar''s right and not from exercising the rights which may belong to them or any of them as tenants.
Of course, if the Magistracy tries to use Section 144 as a means of granting a perpetual injunction in favor of one of two opposing parties
instead of as an order to meet a temporary urgency, the High Court has the power to interfere to prevent such abuse of powers.
The order now in question will expire in two days.
I therefore reject this Petition.