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Judgment
Charles Arnold White. Kt., C.J.—In this case a notice was sent to Mr. Venkat Rao, Pleader, calling upon him to show cause why he should
not he dealt with by this Court for contempt of court in sending to the District Munsif of Bellary, during the pendency of an inquiry by him into a
charge against Mr. Venkat Rao of disobedience to an injunction order, a certain letter charging the Munsif with malicious and improper conduct in
connection with the inquiry and giving notice to him of a suit for damages on that account. The proceedings raise the very important question
whether this Court has jurisdiction to deal with contempt of an inferior court. The case, as I have said, is of great importance and it is one of first
impression, but as we have made up our minds with regard to it we do not think any useful purpose will be served by further consideration. Now
Dr. Swaminathan, who appeared for the Pleader, not only refrained from raising the question of jurisdiction on behalf of his client, but he expressly
declined to argue it as counsel for Mr. Venkata Rao. He expressed his readiness, however, to show cause against the rule, on the ground of want
of jurisdiction as amicus curiae. We have accordingly had the benefit of his argument as well as that of the Advocate-General. It seems to me that
there are two questions for us to consider : First, have we inherent Common Law jurisdiction in the matter? And, secondly, have we statutory
jurisdiction under the powers conferred on this Court by Section 15 of the High Courts Act? I take the first point. There can, I think, be no
question that as regards contempts of court committed before this Court we have the jurisdiction of the old Court of King''s Bench. In
Surendranath Banerjee''s case ILR (1883) C. 109 the law is thus enunciated by Sir Barnes Peacock. He says, p. 131 : ""Such an offence - that is,
libel published out of court when the court, was not sitting - is something more than mere defamation and is of a different character. It is an offence
which by the Common Law of England is punishable by the High Court in a summary manner with fine, or imprisonment, or both. That part of the
Common Law of England was introduced in the Presidency towns when the late Supreme Courts were respectively established by the Charters of
Justice. The High Courts in the Presidencies are Superior Courts of Records and the offence of contempt and the powers of the High Court for
punishing it are the same there (that is in India) as in this country (that is in England), not by virtue of the Penal Code for British India and the Code
of Criminal Procedure, but by virtue of the Common Law of England.
The next question is what is the Common Law of England with regard to the power of the King''s Bench Division of the High Court in England,
with reference to contempts committed before an inferior court? Curiously enough, this question does not seem to have been considered fully until
a comparatively recent date. But we have two recent cases, one decided in 1903 and the other in 1906, in which there are two very interesting and
instructive judgments delivered by Mr. Justice Wills on behalf of the Division Court. In King v. Parke (1903) I.K.B. 432 a person was charged at
Petty Sessions with an indictable offence triable only at Assizes. Matter was published in a newspaper tending to interfere with a fair trial. It was
held that the High Court had jurisdiction to deal with the publisher for contempt of court, notwithstanding that at the time of the publication the
person charged had not yet been committed for trial. In that case the question which we have to consider today did not arise, although there are
some observations of the learned Judge with reference to it. On page 436 the Judges observe : ""It may be conceded that the jurisdiction to commit
for contempt of court is confined to contempt of the court exercising the jurisdiction. Upon the wider and more general question whether this Court
will treat in this fashion inroads upon the independence of inferior courts we propose to say a few words towards the close of this judgment.
In the later case, to which I shall have to refer in a moment, the case of King v. Davies (1906) I.K.B. 34, their Lordships apparently did not
consider whether contempt of an inferior court should be regarded as contempt of the court which exercises jurisdiction in dealing with the
contempt. This, really, is only a matter of academical interest. It there is jurisdiction in this Court to deal with contempt of an inferior court, it does
not much matter if the jurisdiction is exercised on the ground that the contempt of the inferior court amounts to a contempt of the court exercising
the jurisdiction, In the judgment in King v. Parke (1903) I.K.B. 432 we find (page 442) : ""This Court exercises a vigilant watch over the
proceedings of inferior courts, and successfully prevents them from usurping powers which they do not possess of otherwise acting contrary to
law. It would seem almost a natural corollary that it should possess correlative powers of guarding them against unlawful attacks and interferences
with their independence oh the part others."" The judgment in King v. Parke (1903) I.K.B. 432 proceeded on the ground that the court of a
Commissioner of Assizes was a branch of the High Court and the actual question we have to decide was not expressly dealt with by the learned
Judges in that case. In the later case of King v. Davies (1906) I.K.B. 32 a person was charged at Petty Sessions with an indictable offence which
was triable either at Quarter Sessions or at Assizes. Matter was published in a newspaper tending to interfere with the fair trial of the charge. It
was held that the King''s Bench Division had jurisdiction to attach the publisher of the matter which constituted the contempt of court,
notwithstanding that at the time of the publication it was uncertain whether the per. son charged, if committed at all, would be committed to the;
Assizes or to the Quarter Sessions. The learned Judges, in dealing with the case, and for the purpose of adjudicating upon the question of
jurisdiction, treated the case as if a committal had actually taken place to the Quarter Sessions, i.e. to a tribunal which is not a branch of the High
Court. The learned Judges deal with this question on p. 37. They point out that ""the present King''s Bench Division of the High Court stands in the
place of the three ancient Superior Courts of Common Law, and, besides representing the powers and exercising the authority of the Court of
Common Pleas and Exchequer, inherits ell the jurisdiction and powers of the Court of King''s Bench."" The learned Judges also point out that from
the most ancient times that court exercised functions which belonged to no other court in the kingdom. Later on in the judgment I find, after citing a
passage from ""Willmot''s Opinions"", at p. 42 : ""If it (that is, the independence of inferior courts) is to be secured at all in the case of the inferior
courts, it can only be secured by the action of this court, for they have not the power to protect themselves; and if it be true that the King''s Bench
is in any sense the custos morum of the kingdom, that it must be its function to apply with the necessary adaptations to the altered circumstances of
the present day the same great principles which if has always upheld."" Then the learned Judges cite the words of Lord Coleridge : ""Though the
principles of law remain unchanged, yet (and it is one of the advantages of the Common Law) their application is to be changed with the changing
circumstances of the time."" Then the learned judges proceed to consider the authorities bearing on the subject, and the conclusion; At which they
arrive is that ""the state of the authorities, such as they, are, is such as to leave the question entirely open for our decision."" At the end of the
judgment we find this passage : ""The reason why the Court of King''s Bench did not concern itself with contempts of the other superior courts was
that they possessed ample means and occasions for protecting themselves. Inferior courts have not such powers, although some of them, Quarter
Sessions for example, try many more cases than are tried at Assizes, and have a very extended and important jurisdiction. The danger is perhaps
greater to them than it is to the superior courts of having their efficiency impaired by publications, such as those which have given rise to the present
proceedings. Thinking as we do that the application now before us asks for nothing more than the legitimate application to the new circumstances
of the old principles of the Common Law, we have come to the conclusion that we ought to grant the remedy invoked."" This is a pronouncement
on the Common Law of England with regard to the power of the King''s Bench Division to punish for contempt of an inferior court.
The decision of the Privy Council is a decision to the effect that we have the inherent Common Law powers in connection with matters of
contempt which were exercised by the old Court of King''s Bench and now by the King''s Bench Division.
It occurred to me in the course of the argument, there might possibly be some distinction between civil and criminal courts. No doubt the English
cases were cases in which the contempt of court was the contempt of an inferior criminal court. But I do not find any suggestion in either of these
judgments that such a distinction can be made, At page 37, King v. Davies (1906) I.K.B. 34 Dr. Swaminathan pointed out that the court treated
the case as one where a committal had actually taken place to the Quarter Sessions. But that observation was with reference to the argument that
there would be jurisdiction if the contempt of court was a contempt of a court which was a branch of the High Court, but not otherwise. On
principle there seems no reason why there should be a distinction between cases of contempt of an inferior civil court and con tempt of an inferior
criminal court. Dr. Swaminathau called our attention to a passage in Oswald''s book, at p. 13, which contains the learned author''s comment on the
recent cases. The King''s Bench Division has general superintendence over all crimes whatsoever, to watch the proceedings of inferior criminal
courts, to prevent them from acting contrary to law, and also to prevent persons from interfering with the course of such justice in such courts. I
think the word ""crimes"" is used with reference to criminal offence of contempt of court. Dr. Swaminathan called our attention to an observation
made by Mr. Justice West in the case Hassanbhoy v. Cowasjee Jehanghir, Jassarwallah ILR (1881) B. 1. In that case it was held that ""as regards
the Indian High Courts the remedies provided by Section 136 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1877 (corresponding to Order XI, Rule 21, of the
present Code) in cases of disobedience to an order of court were cumulative and that they subjected the offender to particular liabilities for his
contumacy, but did not extinguish the court''s power of constraining him to obedience."" On page 4 there is this passage : ""Such a power,"" the
learned judge says, ""must indeed exist somewhere in order to secure the administration of the law, and it can be safely restricted in the case of the
lower courts only because it is held and exercised by those to which they are subordinate."" It may be the learned judge had not the question in his
mind, but the observation suggests that it did not matter if the powers of the lower courts were restricted by statute since the High Court had
jurisdiction in the matter.
I am not prepared to hold we have jurisdiction u/s 15 of the Indian High Courts Act which gives us powers of superintendence with regard to
subordinate courts, As regards this question of jurisdiction, I confess, when I first had occasion to consider the matter, I was inclined to take the
view that we had no jurisdiction.
On further consideration, however, and having had the benefit of hearing the point argued, I have come to the conclusion that we have. I
indicated on Friday what would be the order we should be prepared to make if we had jurisdiction. I think it is very much to be regretted that a
pleader of Mr. Venkat Rao''s experience should have written the letter which he wrote.
In the circumstances of the case, his counsel, I think, adopted a wise course in declining to argue the question of jurisdiction. Mr. Venkat Rao,
both in his affidavit and by the mouth of his counsel, offered an unqualified apology. We have no doubt that a serious contempt of court was
committed, but having regard to the unqualified apology which has been tendered, we do not think it necessary to take further action.
Munro, J.
I concur.
Sankaran Nair J.
I concur.