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Judgment
Janardan Sahai, J.—This revision arises out of an order passed under Section 3 of the Charitable and Religious Trust Act, 1920, hereinafter referred to as the Act. The respondent No.1 in the revision Pancham Das and one Prem Pujari had filed an application under Section 3 of the Act for certain directions seeking accounts from the revisioniststrustees. It also appears that a suit under Section 92 of the CPC was filed by Pancham Das and Prem Pujari in the Civil Court against the trustees praying for their removal and for framing a scheme. A compromise was entered into on 18.5.1977 in the aforesaid suit as well as in the proceedings under Section 3 of the Act. Under the compromise a committee was constituted to manage the trust. One of the newly added trustees is Ram Asrey Das. The compromise decree passed in the suit under Section 92 of the CPC has been challenged in the First Appeal No.243 of 1977. The compromise order in the proceeding under Section 3 of the Act has been challenged in the present revision which was filed by Smt. Ghanshyam Kunwar & Others the trustees. In the memorandum of revision the jurisdiction of the District Judge to pass a decree for removal of the trustees and appointment of new trustees has been challenged.
During the pendency of the appeal and the revision the original trustee Smt. Ghanshyam Kunwar & others who had filed this revision have also died. An application for impleadment as a revisionist has now been filed by one Rajendra Prasad Dixit claiming to be the Pujari of the temple. Sri S.K. Chaturvedi, counsel for applicant submitted that in the first appeal arising out of the suit under Section 92 the applicant has been impleaded as a party and that therefore he ought to be impleaded in the present revision too. The application has been opposed by Ram Ashrey Das, one of the trustees in the committee constituted under the compromise. He is represented by Sri Ajit Kumar. The contention of Sri Ajit Kumar is that the right to obtain directions under Section 3 of the Act against the trustee is of personal nature. He also sought to distinguish between the right of a person to be impleaded in a suit on the one hand and in the revision on the other. It is submitted that the right to file a revision can not be equated with the right to maintain a suit. He relied upon AIR 2003 Supreme Court 2434, Shiv Shakti Cooperative Housing Society v. M/s Swaraj Developers, in which it was held that the right to file a revision is not a substantive right and the applicant can not therefore claim impleadment as of right. Sri Ajit Kumar, counsel for the respondents has sought to draw out the distinction between a suit under Section 92 of the CPC and the proceedings under Section 3 of the Act and submitted that while a suit under Section 92 is filed in representative capacity the proceedings under Section 3 of the Act are of personal nature.
In the counter affidavit on behalf of Ram Ashrey Das it has been denied that the applicant Rajendra Pandit is a Pujari. Reliance is placed in the counter affidavit upon the decision in suit No.43 of 68 filed by one Bhagwan Das the grandfather of the applicant Rajendra Prasad Dixit for payment of salary in which it was held that Bhagwan Das was not a Pujari appointed by the trustees but was appointed by Maharani Rup Kunwar, the founder of the trust. The suit for payment of salary was decreed against Maharani Rup Kunwar and not against the trust. In the rejoinder affidavit it has been reiterated that the applicant is a Pujari. It has been stated in various paragraphs including para 41 of the rejoinder affidavit that the trust in question was a private trust of Maharani Rup Kunwar and not a public trust and that by the compromise the private trust is being sought to be converted into a public trust. Section 3 of the Act applies to trusts for public purpose. Section 3 contemplates only two kinds of persons who can be interested in the proceedings. A person can either come in as an applicant seeking directions or he can be a trustee arrayed as an opposite party against whom directions are to be issued. The person who seeks to file an application under Section 3 of the Act must therefore accept the position that the trust in question is a trust for public purpose. The case of the applicant himself being that the trust in question was not a public trust but was a private trust and that now by compromise it is sought to be converted into a public trust would show that the applicant is not interested in seeking directions. He cannot therefore be a person having any interest in the trust and therefore he has no locus standi to file an application under Section 3. The grounds in the memo of revision indicate that the revisionists had challenged their removal and appointment of new trustees. Rajendra Prasad does not claim to represent the removed trustees. He does not claim to be a trustee himself. He also does not allege that the trust is a public one and that therefore he is interested in the trust as a beneficiary. The right to challenge the removal of the trustees and their replacement by another set of trustees is personal to the removed trustees and a Pujari who is a mere servant can not take up the cause of the removed trustees on his own especially in a private turst. The applicant therefore has no interest to be impleaded as a revisionist or as a party to the revision.
In Thakur Govind Devjee Maharaj Birajman Mandir v. Radha Saran Dubey, 2002 (5) AWC 3492, the Court rejected the impleadment application of a party who was neither a necessary party nor whose presence was required for deciding the controversy involved. In 1992 (2) SCC 524, Ramesh Hirachand Kundan Mal v. Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay, it was held that a necessary party is one who has a direct or legal interest in the litigation. Sri S.K. Chaturvedi counsel for the applicant relied upon Ajai Prakash Singh v. Abhai Prakash Singh, 1984 AWC 289 in support of his contention that a representative suit does not abate and can be continued by any member of the public interested. The decision cited related to a public trust and the suit was one under Section 92. The case has no application because proceedings under Section 3 of the Act are not in the nature of a representative suit. The proceedings are of summary nature. That apart, the applicant denies that the trust is of public nature. The other case cited is Shitla v. Ram Shabda Misra, 1985 ALJ 562. That was a case under Section 18 of the Religious Indowments Act and it was held that on the death of the persons granted sanction to sue, the suit could be continued by any interested person. A suit under Section 18 is also a representative suit. There is another point of distinction. In both the cases cited by Sri Chaturvedi the right of persons interested to continue the suit was upheld. In the present case the applicant does not want to prosecute the application under Section 3 and is not claiming any relief under that provision. These decisions are therefore not applicable. The applicant is therefore not a necessary party nor is he a proper party in the revision.
The application is therefore rejected.
(Application rejected)