High CourtsDivision Bench(1933) 04 MAD CK 0010

In Re: Baluchami Pillai alias Kuthalalingam Pillai

Madras High Court · Decided on 20 April 1933 · Citation: (1933) 38 LW 760 : (1933) 65 MLJ 723

HON’BLE JUDGES
Pakenham Walsh, J

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Judgment

33 paragraphs · 761 words

Pakenham Walsh, J.—The accused is charged with causing grievous hurt to P.W. 1 and hurt to P.W. 2. The learned Sub-Divisional

Magistrate acquitted him of both these offences but without framing any fresh charge found him guilty of affray u/s 160, Indian Penal Code. It is

contended that this conviction is illegal both because there is no evidence to establish such a charge and secondly because the accused could not

be convicted on such a charge without a fresh charge being framed.

2.

With regard to the first point the prosecution case briefly was that the accused taxed P. W. 3 with saying that he suspected him of breaking an

idol and the accused said he would not let him go until he proved it. In the course of argument accused caught hold of P.W. 3 and threw him on to

the ground. Two friends of the accused, who have not been charged, assisted the accused and one of them beat P.W. 3 with his belt. P.W. 2

came from his house about 20 feet away and separated the accused and P.W. 3. The accused then asked him what right he had to separate them,

produced an aruval and cut P. W. 2 on the left side of the head. The accused then ran away and P.W. 1 tried to obstruct him by holding out his

hand. The accused then cut P.W. 1 on the left shoulder with the same aruval and made good his escape. On this prosecution evidence I. agree that

there is no material for a conviction of affray. For a charge u/s 159 there must be two or more persons concerned. There is no finding by the Court

as to who the second person concerned is. The statement which the learned Magistrate makes is rather an indefinite one:

I should not be surprised if there was some sort of general street fight.

3.

Moreover as to disturbing the public peace the learned Magistrate finds that

there is some discrepancy as to the number of people who collected at the spot and exactly at what stage they collected.

4.

He is correct, no doubt, in not attaching much importance to this; with regard to the charge of hurt, it is a matter of importance if the offence is

one u/s 159 as to how the public peace was disturbed.

5.

On the second point I consider the objection is good also. Begu v. The King-Emperor (1925) L.R. 52 IndAp 191 : ILR 6 Lah. 226 : 48 M.L.J.

643 (P.C.) is quoted by the learned Public Prosecutor where five persons were charged with murder and two of them were convicted of murder

and three with disposing of the body, an offence u/s 201. Their Lordships of the Privy Council held that this latter conviction was not illegal

because no separate charge was framed. There is, however, a connection between murder and the disposing of the Dody. Moreover it has been

laid down in Meher Sheikh v. Emperor ILR (1931) 59 Cal. 8 that if Section 237 is to be applied there must be no doubt about the facts but only

about the law applicable to those facts. The learned Judges do not find anything in Begu v. The King-Emperor (1925) L.R. 52 IndAp 191 : ILR 6

Lah. 226 : 48 M.L.J. 643 (P.C.) opposed to this. They say:

The true test is whether the facts charged give the accused notice of the offence for which he is going to be convicted though he was not charged

with it, so that he is not prejudiced by the mere absence of a specific charge. A case of no prejudice is met by Section 537, Criminal Procedure

Code.

6.

It is argued by the learned Public Prosecutor that the conviction can be upheld because there was no prejudice in this case. I am unable to

agree. Before being convicted of an affray the accused should have had clear notice as to the person or persons with whom he was fighting, that

the place was a public place and that the public peace was disturbed. On all these points he might have adduced defence evidence if a correct

charge had been framed against him, and it cannot in my opinion be said that he was not prejudiced by not having notice these facts which

constitute the necessary ingredients of the offence. In the result the conviction must be set aside and I consider it unnecessary to order a re-trial.

The accused is therefore acquitted. The fine, if paid, will be refunded.