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Judgment
Shivdayal, J.—This is a reference by Shri S.R. Sharma, Additional District Magistrate, Raipur, for taking action against Amboo Bhai Patel and Shri R.V. Shukla, for contempt of his Court. Mr. Sharma has invited attention of this Court to paragraph 8 of a notice u/s 80, CPC Code, sent to him by registered post by Amboo Bhai Patel. That paragraph reads as under:
That the conduct of Shri S.P. Mishra in seizing detaining the vehicle and goods and producing the same before the Magistrate was utterly dishonest and contrary to and in breach of every provision of law so also the act of the said Additional District Magistrate Shri S.R. Sharma in not releasing the Vehicle or the goods immediately was wrongful, dishonest and malicious and calculated to cause harm and loss to the Plaintiff in utter disregard of powers and duties conferred on them by law and whereby the Plaintiff has suffered a damage and claims Rs. 250 per day as damages for wrongful detention of the vehicle from 17-11-61 to 14-12-61 total amount comes to Rs. 7.000. They are also liable to pay Rs. 2,000 for expenses incurred by the Plaintiff. The total amount which the Plaintiffthus claims is Rs. 9,000 which amount both Shri S.P. Mishra and Shri S.R. Sharma are liable to pay.
It appears from the averments made in the notice u/s 80, CPC Code, that Amboo Bhai Patel asserts that he owns a motor truck bearing No. MPJ 8712 and registered as "Private". This truck was seized by the Sub-Inspector of Police, S.P. Mishra, "maliciously, dishonestly, without any reason or cause". Certain other goods were also seized from the truck. The driver of the truck was also arrested "maliciously and dishonestly and with ulterior motive". It is then asserted that the entire conduct of the Sub-Inspector in the aforesaid seizure and arrest was "prompted by illegal motive and the said conduct was dishonest and wrongful". The Sub-Inspector then produced the driver and the vehicle in the Court of Mr. S.R. Sharma, Additional District Magistrate, Raipur on 20-11-1961, and Mr. Sharma without applying his mind malcously acted illegally in registering a criminal case. An application was made to the Court for release of the motor vehicle. Mr. Sharma "without any cause and wrongfully and maliciously did not pass an order releasing the said articles and the said vehicle and postponed the passing of order without any justification and acted in breach of Section 130 of the M.V. Act and released the said articles and vehicle on 14-12-61 under the Supratnama of one Manubhai Patel, agent of the Plaintiff". A decree for Rs. 14,000 has been claimed; Rs. 7.000 as damages for wrongful detention of the vehicle from 17-11-1961 to 14-12-1961 at Rs. 250 per day; Rs. 2,000 for expenses incurred; and Rs. 5,000 as damages for loss of reputation and harm to his prestige.
This notice was received by Mr. Sharma in a registered, acknowledgment due, cover addressed to Mr. Sharma by name. The notice is signed by Mr. R.V. Shukla, Advocate, Raipur.
The learned Magistrate has also sent the record of the criminal case before him. It appears that on 20-11-1961 a challan was put up before him. He ordered the truck to remain under seizure at Reserve Lines. He fixed 27-11-1961 on which date an application was made before him for release of the truck, P.P. prayed for time which was granted and 29-11-1961 was fixed. Thereafter 7-12-1961 was fixed. Then 8-12-1961 was fixed. Then 11-12-1961 was fixed. Then 12-12-1961 was fixed. Then 14-12-1961 was fixed; and it was on the last mentioned date that an order for release of the truck was passed.
If Amboo Bhai Patel is advised to institute a suit under the law of torts against Mr. Sharma and others on the grounds that he has stated in the notice and if, to enable him to institute that suit, he has to serve a notice u/s 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure, he has necessarily to say all that he would say in the plaint. If he does not state the cause of action, which means all the necessary facts which Would entitle him to succeed in the suit, his notice would be ineffective and that would entail the dismissal of his suit. That being so the statement in the notice, which is necessarily required to be given before a suit is instituted, will not be punished as contempt.
By virtue of their office Judges are protected from scandalisation. It is in the interest of administration of justice that Judges must be protected against libellous attacks on them, if such attacks are likely or tend in any way to interfere with the due administration of justice. I he principle on which the Court proceeds in taking notice of contempt by scandalising the Court, is based on the interest of the public and not on the interest of a particular Court or Judge so attacked- It is in the public interest that confidence should exist in Courts of justice and if an attack is made upon a Judge who is not in a position to answer the attack, the authority and prestige of the Judge tends to be lowered in the estimation of the public and that is contrary to the interests of the public.
As has been laid down by their Lordships in Brahma Prakash Sharma and Others Vs. The State of Uttar Pradesh, , there are two primary consideration which should weigh with the Court when it is called upon to exercise the summary powers in cases of contempt committed by scandalising the Court itself Firstly, the reflection on the conduct or character of a Judge in reference to the discharge of his judicial duties would not be contempt if such reflection is made in the exercise of the right of fair and reasonable criticism which every citizen possesses in respect of public acts done in the seat of justice. Secondly, when attacks or comments are made on a Judge, disparaging in character and derogatory to his dignity, care should be taken to distinguish between what is a libel on the Judge and what aments rently to contempt of Court. The fact that a statement is defamatory so far as the Judge is concerned does not necessarily make it a contempt. A defamatory attach on a judge may be a libel so far as the Judge is concerned and it would be open to him to proceed against the libeller in a proper action, if he so chooses. If, however, the publication of the disperaging statement is calculated to interfere with the due course of justice or proper administration of law by such Court it can be punished summarily as a contempt. One is a wrong, done to the Judge personally, while the other is a wrong done to the public. See also Bathina Ramakrishna Reddy Vs. The State of Madras, .
In arriving at its conclusion as to the nature, tendency and likely effect of the statement made, the Court shall take into consideration all the surrounding facts, such as the material in possession of the accused on the strength of which the statement is made, the capacity in which be was acting, the persons to whom the statement was published, the circumstances in which it was published, and finally whether the degree of publicity given was or was not beyond what was necessary. In other words, what the Court has to consider is the nature and extent of the publication and has to determine whether or not it was likely to have injurious effect on the mind of the public or the Judge, which alone is the basis of the charge.
It must be clearly made out that the publication complained of is either clearly in tended, or at least calculated, to prejudice a pending trial. [See 8 Halsbury (Simonds) 11]. The power to punish contempt of Court has to be sparingly exercised. It cannot be used to indicate private wrongs.
In the present circumstances we are no cause for taking action in contempt.
The reference is rejected.
