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Judgment
This is an appeal against a decree on a mortgage executed by the 1st defendant, father of defendants 2 to 5. The mortgage was executed in
order to discharge a prior mortgage deed executed by the 1st defendant in 1906, Ex. B, the suit mortgage being (Ex. A), dated 10th October,
1915. The Subordinate Judge has given a decree holding that the mortgage, having been executed to discharge an antecedent debt of the father, is
binding upon the sons'' shares, and he relies on the Full Bench decision of this Court in Arumugam Chatty v. Muthu Goundan ILR (1919) M. 711.
For the appellants it is contended that the decision is not applicable, because in the present case a portion of the previous debt could only be
enforced as a mortgage debt and not as a personal debt of the father. This question has not been considered in the Lower Court and it is not at all
clear whether the personal liability is barred or not in respect of the first three instalments. Whether it is barred or not, however, the case can be
disposed of on another ground. It has definitely been held in Gauri Skankar Singh v. Sheonandan Misra ILR (1924) All 384 that a mortgage debt,
whether the personal liability is barred or not, is an antecedent debt binding on the sons'' shares. This same principle has been adopted in
Arumugam Chetty v. Muthu Goundan ILR (1919) M. 166, and although it may be said that in that case the personal liability had not been barred
and that therefore the decision is not strictly in point, yet in view of the form of the questions propounded by the Referring Bench it is clear from the
judgment that the first of the questions was dealt with as a general question, and in effect the decision of the Full Bench is that any prior mortgage
debt due by the father is valid as an antecedent debt, and this ""decision is not qualified by an expression of opinion that the mortgage debt must
also be enforceable as a personal liability.
We therefore follow these two cases and dismiss the appeal with costs.
Time for redemption is extended to three months from this date.