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Judgment
Taken up through video conferencing.
This revision has been filed under Section 58(1)(b) of The Consumer Protection Act, 2019 in challenge to the Order dated 31.08.2021 of The State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, Haryana in appeal no. 180 of 2021 arising out of the Order dated 24.02.2021 of The District Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, Karnal in complaint no. 261 of 2020.
We heard the learned counsel at admission, and perused the material on record including the District Commission's Order dated 24.02.2021, the State Commission's impugned Order dated 31.08.2021 and the petition.
The revision has been preferred against an interlocutory Order of the State Commission. For reference the said Order is being reproduced below.
F.A. No. 180 of 2021
Present : Shri Sandeep Suri, counsel for the appellant.
(The matter has been heard through virtual hearing)
Notice of the appeal as well as of the application for staying the operation of the impugned order be issued against the respondent through registered post/A.D. returnable for 04.10.2021.
Dasti (by hand), may be given, if so desired.
Record of the learned District Commission be called for.
In the meantime, implementation of impugned order dated 24.02.2021 passed by learned District Commission, Karnal would remain stayed till further orders subject to the condition that the appellant would deposit the entire awarded amount before learned District Commission, Karnal within four weeks from the passing of this order and learned District Commission is at liberty to release that amount in favour of the complainant after furnishing adequate surety to the satisfaction of learned District Commission.
It is further made clear that in case of non compliance of this order, stay granted in favour of appellant would deemed to be withdrawn automatically.
The condition attached with the grant of stay on the operation of the lower forum's Order is being agitated by way of this revision. The statutory amount which is required to be deposited at the time of filing an appeal is inter alia central to the issues raised. Accordingly, for reference, Section 15 of the old Act i.e. The Consumer Protection Act, 1986, since repealed, and Section 41 of the new Act i.e. The Consumer Protection Act, 2019, presently in force (w.e.f. 20.07.2020), which deal with the statutory amount, are being reproduced below.
Section 15 of The Consumer Protection Act, 1986
Appeal. - Any person aggrieved by an order made by the District Forum may prefer an appeal against such order to the State Commission within a period of thirty days from the date of the order, in such form and manner as may be prescribed:
Provided that the State Commission may entertain an appeal after the expiry of the said period of thirty days if it is satisfied that there was sufficient cause for not filing it within that period.
Provided further that no appeal by a person, who is required to pay any amount in terms of an order of the District Forum, shall be entertained by the State Commission unless the appellant has deposited in the prescribed manner fifty per cent. of that amount or twenty-five thousand rupees, whichever is less.
Section 41 of The Consumer Protection Act, 2019
Appeal against order of District Commission.- Any person aggrieved by an order made by the District Commission may prefer an appeal against such order to the State Commission on the grounds of facts or law within a period of forty-five days from the date of the order, in such form and manner, as may be prescribed:
Provided that the State Commission may entertain an appeal after the expiry of the said period of forty-five days, if it is satisfied that there was sufficient cause for not filing it within that period:
Provided further that no appeal by a person, who is required to pay any amount in terms of an order of the District Commission, shall be entertained by the State Commission unless the appellant has deposited fifty per cent. of that amount in the manner as may be prescribed:
Provided also that no appeal shall lie from any order passed under sub-section (1) of section 81 by the District Commission pursuant to a settlement by mediation under section 80.
Under the old Act, it was provided that "no appeal by a person, who is required to pay any amount in terms of an order of the District Forum, shall be entertained by the State Commission unless the appellant has deposited in the prescribed manner fifty per cent. of that amount or twenty-five thousand rupees, whichever is less. " As such, a monetary cap of Rs. 25,000/- was earlier fixed on the statutory amount to be deposited for filing an appeal.
Under the new Act, it is provided that "no appeal by a person, who is required to pay any amount in terms of an order of the District Commission, shall be entertained by the State Commission unless the appellant has deposited fifty per cent. of that amount in the manner as may be prescribed." As such, there is now no fixed monetary cap on the statutory amount to be deposited for filing an appeal.
It may be observed at this stage that the statutory amount would differ materially from case to case. For example, if the order made by the District Commission is, say, to deliver a housing unit or a vehicle etc. along with some monetary compensation, the statutory amount would be significantly less than in a case where, say, the order is to refund the amount deposited for a housing unit or for a vehicle etc.
Each order of the District Commission would have its own specificities, and the statutory amount would depend on the way and manner the relief is moulded in a particular case.
In the case at hand, the order made by the District Commission is in monetary terms alone, and accordingly the statutory amount is equal to 50% of the awarded amount.
The contention of the learned counsel is that under the new scheme of law (the Act 2019), the upper ceiling of Rs. 25,000/- on the statutory amount which was there under the old scheme of law (the Act 1986) has been omitted. 50% of the amount which is required to be paid in terms of the District Commission's order is required to be deposited at the time of filing an appeal before the State Commission. In the present case the order made by the District Commission is purely in monetary terms and therefore 50% of the awarded amount was deposited with the State Commission at the time of filing the appeal. But the State Commission while admitting the appeal vide its impugned order of 31.08.2021 has directed that the entire awarded amount may further be deposited by the appellant (the petitioner herein) with the District Commission and also that the District Commission shall have the liberty to release the said amount in favour of the complainant on furnishing adequate surety to its satisfaction.
The contention of the learned counsel is two fronged.
Firstly, it has been submitted that as the statutory scheme provides for deposit of 50% of "any amount" required to be paid in terms of the lower forum's order, it should be taken as a compulsively guiding indication to deem the same as a sufficient amount to grant stay in all matters while admitting the appeal. Submission is that the statutory amount deposited at the time of filing the appeal ought to be taken as sacrosanct having the statutory imprimatur at its back and there is hardly any need or occasion for the State Commission to direct for depositing any additional amount as a condition for grant of stay .
Another limb of the argument in the alternative is that even if it is found that the direction to get any additional amount deposited as the condition attached with the grant of stay is not legally erroneous, in that contingency too the total amount now deposited in this present case becomes more than the awarded amount, as 50% of the awarded amount was deposited at the time of filing the appeal and so the subsequent direction to get the entire awarded amount again deposited with the District Commission as the condition attached with the grant of stay will make the total amount in all to be more than the awarded amount itself. The contention is that it does not appear to be a just exercise of discretion. It has also been contended that this aspect of the matter has escaped the State Commission's attention, as the same could not be brought to its notice specifically on the petitioner's behalf.
We have considered the submissions raised by learned counsel for the petitioner.
So far as the submission regarding taking the deposit of the statutory amount for filing the appeal to be sufficient in itself to grant the stay is concerned, we are of the view that the statutory condition precedent or a pre-requisite legal necessity to deposit certain amount at the time of filing an appeal (which was 50% of "any amount" required to be paid in terms of the District Forum's Order or Rs. 25,000/-, whichever was less, in the old scheme of law and has now been made 50% of "any amount" required to be paid in terms of the District Commission's Order, with no upper ceiling, in the new scheme of law) has scarcely any nexus with the merit of the matter or on the aspect of granting the stay in the case. Actually in the scheme of law the requirement to deposit the statutory amount is a sine qua non just for purposes of filing an appeal. It has nothing to do with and is not at all a condition precedent relevant for purposes of granting or not granting the stay in a given matter. In fact it has scarcely any nexus on the aspect of deciding whether an appeal should be admitted or not, or much less than deciding whether a stay ought to be granted or not, and if the same is to be granted what should the attached terms and conditions be.
If we accede to the arguments advanced at the bar, in consequence it shall flow from the same that if an appeal is filed under the new scheme (the Act 2019) then after deposit of the statutory amount, unconditionally granting a stay in appeal would be a legal imperative and then nothing is left for the State Commission to exercise its discretion on the point of granting or refusing stay or to determine the terms and conditions of admission or stay. In our view, when the State Commission is supposed to decide on the point of granting stay, it has an area of discretion reserved to itself which no doubt has to be judiciously exercised depending upon the facts and circumstances and specificities of each case. Whether an appeal deserves to be admitted or not and whether it is worthwhile to issue notice in it is again to be looked into by the State Commission. The terms and conditions of admission and stay shall necessarily have to be determined by the State Commission which takes cognizance of the matter.
In fact, there cannot be a cut and dried formula of universal application which may be provided in a straightjacketed manner as to when the stay is to be granted and when it ought not to be granted. There can also not be any fixed or inflexible guidelines as to on what conditions and terms the stay ought to be granted. The conditions may not always be strict or may appear to be stringent at times but if the State Commission finds that the facts and circumstances of that matter are such that in order to meet the ends of justice certain conditions are to be imposed and some further amount has to be deposited for granting the stay it does not commit any error of law while doing so. We may indeed come across cases where after the statutory amount has been deposited at the time of filing the appeal the State Commission may not feel the need to require any additional amount to be deposited while granting stay. Those are the matters where the State Commission might feel that the impugned order suffers from some manifest perversity or that some gross errors of law are vitiating such order which has been impugned or that while appreciating and adjudicating the matter the lower forum has entirely misdirected itself on facts or law and has misled itself to arrive at wholly unfounded conclusions. There may be many other reasons or circumstances in a case where it may feel that a call of justice requires that the operation of a particular order should be stayed without imposing any conditions at all. Obviously, it all depends upon the facts of each case. But certainly the condition precedent made to file the appeal i.e. the requirement to deposit the statutory amount and the question of granting the stay or determining the conditions for granting the stay are two independent issues and must not be confused or be confounded with each other. Where the cause of the respondent is palpably unfounded, and the bonafides of the appellant are writ large, where the award appears to be disproportionately uneven or lopsided, or where the respondent's case itself smacks of malice, it may not insist on depositing further amount at all while granting the stay. But we simply cannot accede to the learned counsel's contention that in all cases where appeal is filed, stay has to be granted as a necessary corollary, without asking for anything additional than what has already been deposited by the appellant at the time of filing the appeal in compliance of a statutory requirement.
The arguments therefore do not appear to be sustainable. While exercising our revisional jurisdiction, we may at this very stage also like to observe that granting stay in a particular matter or not granting is actually within the arena of the discretion of the court or tribunal concerned, judicial or quasi judicial as it may be, and in what manner it shall like to exercise this discretion cannot be lightly meddled with as a matter of course. In fact, we may come across cases where it is possible to have another view of the matter but just for the reason that two views are possible, the higher forum is not well advised to substitute the lower forum's discretion by its own for that reason alone. Of course, we have to interfere, and we do not shirk to do so, when we see some apparent illegality or perversity in the order or where we feel that the cause of justice itself is likely to suffer a miscarriage. But without some substantial or impelling reason, the higher forums are ordinarily loath to interfere in the discretionary arena of the lower forums. We are also conscious of the fact that we are exercising revisional jurisdiction and its scope and ambit has certain self imposed judicial discipline and, unless we see some gross error of law or fact or some absurdity or element of perversity of approach in appreciating the evidence capable to abort the cause of justice, we do not rush to interfere in such orders especially when they are in the nature of exercise of judicial or quasi judicial discretion. We also see and keep in perspective whether the order has been passed at an interlocutory stage of admission or is in the nature of final order.
In the present matter, though we are not privy to the complete record placed before the State Commission, and we also do not intend to enter into the thinking process of the State Commission, but it appears that the State Commission was conscious about the larger objectives of the Consumer Protection Act and also that the same is beneficial in nature meant to provide justice to every consumer. It also appears to have remained conscious about the prolixity of period that often gets consumed till such matters get finally adjudicated and the justice often stands denied if not for any other reason then at least for the reason of it having been inordinately delayed, that appears to be at the back of the mind while the State Commission passed the impugned order whereby it provided that the awarded amount ought to be better released to the consumer itself. Of course, we see from the order that abundant precaution has been taken by the State Commission to ensure the security of the amount so that in case the appeal succeeds the same may be taken back from the complainant. For this purpose, the direction to release the amount to the complainant only after taking adequate surety to the satisfaction of the District Commission has been expressly provided for.
That being so, we do not propose to interfere with the order in this regard.
Another submission as has been pressed forth before us was that while passing the impugned order one aspect of the matter could not be specifically put before the State Commission nor its attention towards the same be drawn by the counsel that as 50% of the awarded amount had already been deposited as the pre-condition while filing the appeal the direction to deposit the entire awarded amount as the condition attached with the grant of the stay makes the total amount in all more than the awarded amount itself. Submission is that it appears that this aspect could not be adverted to by the State Commission while directing to deposit the entire awarded amount with the District Commission. The contention is that had this aspect been placed before this Commission and considered by it, the terms of its order would have been or could have been substantially different.
Be that as it may, we feel that this aspect should have been placed before the State Commission at the relevant time, that is, at the time of the hearing on admission and grant of stay. Having not partaken of the opportunity at the due relevant time, we do not think that the whole gamut of the statutory scheme and its various nuances relating to the purpose behind fixing a statutory amount as a condition precedent for filing an appeal, and the different natures of the orders that may be passed by the District Commission from case to case, and of the matrix of facts and law to be considered in judicious exercise of the discretion for grant of stay, and the conditions and terms on which the stay ought to be granted from case to case, etc., should now be asked to be espoused in prodigious detail by invoking the revisional jurisdiction of this Commission. For the brief reasons recorded, we have already expressed our disinclination to interfere with the interlocutory order of the State Commission impugned before us in the instant case, any further dissertation in this regard appears to be uncalled for in the present context.
We may but explicitly add that the petitioner must not and shall not be put to prejudice if its appeal succeeds. In case it deposits the awarded amount with the District Commission, and if the District Commission releases it to the complainant on furnishing adequate surety, and the appeal succeeds, the complainant shall be liable to forthwith pay back such released amount to the petitioner; failure or omission shall inter alia also attract execution by the District Commission as per the law. Also, after its appeal is adjudicated, the petitioner shall be well within its rights to pray for refund of the statutory amount which it deposited at the time of filing its appeal, and the State Commission shall pass appropriate order as per the law in this regard also.
With the concomitant observations as contained in para 19 above, the revision petition stands disposed.
The Registry is requested to send a copy each of this Order to all parties in the petition as well as to the State Commission and the District Commission immediately. The stenographer is also requested to upload this Order on the website of this Commission immediately.