High CourtsSingle Bench(2026) 07 KL CK 1566

I. Bindhu vs Thiruvananthapuram Service Co-Operative Bank Limited & Anr.

High Court Of Kerala · Decided on 30 July 2026

HON’BLE JUDGES
Gopinath P., J
CASE NUMBER
WP(C) NO. 25229 OF 2024

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Judgment

34 paragraphs · 2,672 words

The principal question raised in this writ petition is whether the Labour Court/Tribunal could extend the time for completing disciplinary proceedings once its award becomes enforceable 30 days after publication. The primary contention was that the Labour Court/Tribunal becomes functus officio on the award becoming enforceable and thereafter cannot extend the time fixed in the award for completing the disciplinary proceedings.

2.

This Court, through judgment dated 18-02-2026 (in this writ petition), rejected the contention of the petitioner and held that the Labour Court retains jurisdiction to extend the time fixed by it. The petitioner filed a writ appeal (W.A.769 of 2026) against the judgment of this Court. By judgment dated 02-06-2026 in W.A No.769 of 2026, the Division Bench approved the finding of this Court that the Labour Court retains the power to extend the time, but directed that the question as to whether there was justification for such extension of time be considered by this Court. It is accordingly that the writ petition has again been listed before this Court.

3.

Ext.P3 is the application filed by the respondent-management seeking an extension of time. The reasons that compelled the management to seek such extension are stated as follows:

“6.

It is submitted that, upon pronouncement of the Award, the management on 06/10/2023 itself has filed application for the certified copy of the award. Later, the management served with the copy on 19/12/2023. But, unfortunately due to administrative reasons, especially due to the fact that the newly elected Managing Committee assumed office only on 20/05/2023 coupled with the fact that the Managing Committee decided to seek fresh legal opinion from our lawyer at Ernakulam, in the light of the fact that the dictum laid down in the Kodancherry Bank's case has been overruled by that time and as such the Bank probed possibility for challenging the Award itself, before the Hon’ble High Court of Kerala. But unfortunately, the certified copy of the afore mentioned Award got misplaced during transit and in spite of earnest effort the same was unable to be retrieved. Further, the President of the management bank was exposed to serious illness, which factors clubbed together resulted in non-initiation as well as completion of disciplinary action against the worker within the time stipulated in the Award. Thereafter, a fresh application was filed on 03/02/2024 and certified copy of Award was received on 08/02/2024.

7.

Immediately, the Managing Committee held on 20/02/2024, decision was taken to initiate disciplinary proceedings by availing the afore mentioned opportunity extended by this Hon’ble Labour Court and as such charge memo dated 24/02/2024, supported by statement of allegations, was issued to the worker and she was called upon to submit her written statement of defense within 7 days from the receipt of the same.

8.

The worker, even though provided with a total time frame of 14 days have not cared to submit her statement of defense and on the contrary opted to submit an undated letter alleging that the action of the management in issuing charge sheet after more than 5 months is irregular, illegal and unsustainable and sought for reinstatement.

9.

As such, the management bank in its Managing Committee meeting held on 15/03/2024, constituted a three member Disciplinary Action Sub Committee under the Chairmanship of Sri.K.R. Vijayakumar, as per Rule 198 (2A) of the Kerala Co-operative Societies Rules, 1969. Thereafter, on 16/03/2024, the said Committee appointed Advocate R. Harikumar as Enquiry Officer as per Rule 198 (2B) so as to enquire into the charges leveled against the worker. On even date, the said fact has been duly informed to the worker by the Disciplinary Action Sub Committee.

10.

It is humbly submitted that, if the period of three months is reckoned from the date of Award, the certified copy, at the first instance against application dated 06/10/2023, was issued to the management only on 19/12/2023, i.e., after a lapse of 2 months and 20 days. At the same time, if the time frame is calculated from the date of issuance of Award, the management has initiated disciplinay proceedings by issuing charge memo to the worker followed by constitution of Disciplinary Action Sub Committee and appointment of Advocate Commissioner by the Sub Committee.”

Ext.P4 is the objection filed by the petitioner to Ext.P3 application. The objections, to the extent they are relevant, are contained in paragraphs 6, 7, and 8 of Ext.P4, and read as follows:

“6.

The averments and allegations in Para 6 of the affidavit filed in support of the petition is false and hence denied. It is submitted that the award was pronounced on 29/9/2023. It is submitted that the certified copy of the award used to be disbursed at the earliest. The workman received the copy of the award on 17/10/2023. It is submitted that the management intentionally refrained from receiving the award. The callous attitude of the management is evident from this pleading itself. On knowing that there is a time limit, the management intentionally refrained from collecting the order. It is submitted that all other pleadings in the para 6 of the affidavit is to be proved by the management. The management is trying to create a story for covering up the latches on their part. It is submitted that if the pleading ought have been correct, the management ought have filed this petition much earlier.

7.

The averments and allegation in Para 7 to 9 of the affidavit filed in support of the petition are false and hence denied. The management have no right to issue charge memo on 24/2/2024 as the same ought to have issued before 29/12/2023. The management has no right to initiate disciplinary action on the basis of the award issued by this court. The workman have rightly submitted a letter intimating the management that the charge sheet is not legally sustainable. The workman have requested for reinstatement as well. The management has now issued a charge sheet dated 24/2/2024 and constituted a subcommittee and the same are done only for creating an image that management intends to take disciplinary action against the workman.

8.

The averments and allegations in Para 10 to 12 of the affidavit filed in support of the petition are false and hence denied. The management also is aware that the time limit starts from the date of order and not from the date of receipt of the award. Hence the averment that if the time limit period was considered from the date of receipt of the order i.e. 19/12/2023, the management had initiated disciplinary action within time is not legally sustainable. It is very much specific in the award that the time limit for completing the disciplinary action, if any, shall be three months from the date of order. It is submitted that mere initiation of disciplinary action is not enough for denying reinstatement. It is submitted that the management will not be put to any irreparable loss, injury and damages. The management refrained from taking steps as per the award and hence have no right to file this petition. If this petition is allowed, workman will be put to loss, injury and damages. The workman remains unemployed from 2012 as a part of victimization.”

By Ext.P5 order, the Labour Court extended the time by only 1½ months. The reasons that compelled the Labour Court to grant the extension, as contained therein, are as follows:

“Now the rival contentions raised by both sides are to be scrutinized in the light of the materials on records. In this case the worker filed an application under Section 2A (2) of the Industrial Disputes Act and an award passed by this court dated 29/9/2023. The workman filed the application mainly for the reinstatement and also challenged the dismissal. As per the award this court remanded the matter for initiating fresh disciplinary proceedings including the charge memo. The enquiry report also set aside. Again this court make time limit and directing the management to initiate the disciplinary proceedings and conclude the same within the period of three months. Now the point to be considered is whether the court can enlarge the time as stipulated as per the award dated 29/9/2023. Section 17 (A) of Industrial Disputes Act is applicable with respect to the publication under Section 17 of the said Act. If there is any time limit as per the award stipulated by the court, in such circumstances the court can enlarge the time in the interest of justice and also considering the new circumstances arose. In this case as per the averments in the petition the management clearly averred that new management committee assumed charge only on 20/5/2023. Again the certified copy of the award got misplaced during transit. So the management ought to have applied a fresh application and a certified copy was received on 8/2/2024. Anyway the managing committee take a decision on 20/2/2024 to initiate disciplinary proceedings and thereby issued a charge memo dated 24/2/2024. It is true that it is not within the stipulated time as per the award. But any how the changed circumstances can be taken in to account. The newly elected committee assumed the charge on 20/5/2023 is also not disputed by the worker/respondent. So considering the entire aspects I am of the view that in the interest of justice time can be enlarged for a further period of one and half (1 ½ ) months for completion of already initiated disciplinary proceedings against the worker. With the above observation, this petition can be allowed. The point is found accordingly.”

On a perusal of Ext.P3 application, Ext.P4 objection, and Ext.P5 order of the Labour Court, I find no ground to hold that the reasons that weighed with the Labour Court in extending the time for completing the enquiry are perverse. Further, I find that even if this Court is to conclude that another view could have been taken by the Labour Court, this Court will not substitute its view for the view of the Labour Court, as that is not the role of this Court in Judicial Review. In other words, when this Court has concluded that the Labour Court has the authority to extend time fixed by it for completing the disciplinary proceedings, even assuming that the Labour Court has misdirected itself in granting extension of time (on merits), this Court will not, in the exercise of jurisdiction under Art.226 of the Constitution of India, attempt a correction of the same, as such errors are clearly errors within jurisdiction. Therefore, I find no reason to hold that there was no material before the Labour Court to justify the grant of extension.

4.

Before I part with this case, I deem it appropriate to observe that a Division Bench, while considering an intra-court Writ Appeal under Section 5 of the Kerala High Court Act, 1958, does not normally remand a matter for fresh consideration by the Single Judge. This is on account of the fact that the authority exercised by the Division Bench while hearing a Writ Appeal and the authority exercised by the Single Judge are under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, and a Single Judge is not a Court subordinate to the Division Bench. This is settled by the Constitution Bench Judgment in Ladli Prashad Jaiswal v. The Karnal Distillery Co. Ltd., and ors, AIR 1963 SC 1279. The specific question as to whether such remand is contemplated came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in Roma Sonkar v. M.P. State Public Service Commission, (2018) 17 SCC 106. It was held:-

“3.

We have very serious reservations whether the Division Bench in an intra-court appeal could have remitted a writ petition in the matter of moulding the relief. It is the exercise of jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The learned Single Judge as well as the Division Bench exercised the same jurisdiction. Only to avoid inconvenience to the litigants, another tier of screening by the Division Bench is provided in terms of the power of the High Court but that does not mean that the Single Judge is subordinate to the Division Bench. Being a writ proceeding, the Division Bench was called upon, in the intra-court appeal, primarily and mostly to consider the correctness or otherwise of the view taken by the learned Single Judge. Hence, in our view, the Division Bench needs to consider the appeal(s) on merits by deciding on the correctness of the judgment of the learned Single Judge, instead of remitting the matter to the learned Single Judge.”

The question was elaborately considered by the Karnataka High Court recently in Sharadha L. Dodmani v. State of Karnataka, MANU/KA/4122/2023. In the said judgment, the learned judge referred to and followed Roma Sonkar (supra) and also the judgment of a Full Bench of the Karnataka High Court in Town House Building Co-operative Society Limited v. Special Deputy Commissioner, Manu/KA/098/1988. In Town House Building Co-operative Society Limited (supra), a Full Bench of the Karnataka High Court held:-

“As a result of the aforesaid discussion, the answers to the questions referred to us may be stated as follows:-

“(i)

That there is an inherent power in the Division Bench hearing writ appeal against an order of a learned single Judge, to remand the case to be decided afresh by a learned single Judge;

(ii)

That a remand order may be passed in cases where a Writ Petition has been dismissed for non-prosecution or in limine or on the ground of delay or maintainability or on some question of law without going into merits, etc. However, it is best in these matters to be neither dogmatic nor exhaustive, yet the aforesaid categories are the ones in which the Appellate Bench may exercise its power of remand; and

(iii)

That where a Writ Petition has been disposed of on merits by an order made by a learned single Judge, a Division Bench on Appeal would have no jurisdiction to remand such a case to a learned single Judge for fresh decision on merits and the appeal has to be disposed of on merits by the Division Bench itself.”

In the facts of this case, the question as to whether there were sufficient grounds to allow the application for extension of time was not even argued before the Court when the Writ Petition was heard on 18-02-2026. This was possibly because the time granted (or extended) by the Labour Court was only one and a half months from 28-06-2024. It was the specific case of the petitioner that her normal age of retirement was on 30-05-2025. At the instance of the petitioner, the order of the Labour Court extending time was stayed by this Court for the period from 12-07-2024 till the date of disposal of the Writ Petition on 18-02-2026.

For all the aforesaid reasons, the writ petition will stand dismissed, reiterating the findings in the judgment dated 18-02-2026 (in this writ petition) regarding the power of the Labour Court to extend the time fixed by it and holding that there were sufficient grounds made out for such extension of time.

APPENDIX OF WP(C) NO. 25229 OF 2024

PETITIONER’S EXHIBITS

Exhibit P1 TRUE COPY OF THE PRELIMINARY ORDER DATED 24.03.2023 PASSED BY THE 2ND RESPONDENT IN I.D NO. 9/2019.

Exhibit P2 TRUE COPY OF THE AWARD DATED 29.09.2023 PASSED BY THE 2ND RESPONDENT IN I.D NO. 9/2019.

Exhibit P3 TRUE COPY OF THE AFFIDAVIT AND PETITION DATED 18.03.2024 IN I.A NO. 21/2024 IN I.D NO. 9/2019 FILED BEFORE THE 2ND RESPONDENT.

Exhibit P4 TRUE COPY OF THE OBJECTION PETITION DATED 13.06.2024 IN I.A NO. 21/2024 IN I.D NO. 9/2019 FILED BEFORE THE 2ND RESPONDENT.

Exhibit P5 TRUE COPY OF THE ORDER DATED 28.06.2024 IN I.A NO. 21/2024 IN I.D NO. 9/2019 PASSED BY THE 2ND RESPONDENT.

RESPONDENT’S EXHIBITS

Exhibit R1(a) A TRUE COPY OF THE CHARGE MEMO DATED 24.02.2024 ISSUED BY RESPONDENT NO.1 TO THE PETITIONER.

Exhibit R1(b) A TRUE COPY OF THE UNDATED COMMUNICATION ISSUED BY THE PETITIONER TO RESPONDENT NO.1.