Hussain Somjee vs Assets Care And Reconstruction Enterprise Limited

(Hybrid Mode)

[ORAL JUDGMENT: Justice Sharad Kumar Sharma, Member (Judicial)]

These are two company appeals, and at the stage when we are considering these company appeals, we have been called upon to consider the accompanying Condone Delay Applications, which had been filed in support of the respective Company Appeals.

The Company Appeal (AT) (CH) (Ins) No.597/2025 has been preferred by the Appellant by invoking the provisions contained under Section 61 of I & B Code, 2016, being aggrieved against the impugned order of 01.08.2025 that was passed on IA No. 323/2025, as preferred in CP (IB) No. 15/BB/2023, passed by the Ld. NCLT Bengaluru Bench, which had dismissed the said application filed by the Appellant. The said order was delivered in 2 parts, the substantive part of which, as per the Appellant, was uploaded on 26.09.2025.

The application thus preferred under Section 35 (1) (n) of the I & B Code, 2016, had sought for a direction to Respondent No. 1 or to any other person claiming through or under them to desist from, in any manner, dealing with the secured assets as detailed in the schedule of properties accompanying the application and to preserve the "status quo" in relation to the property. The Ld. Tribunal, after considering the said application on merits, has observed that the application thus preferred, being IA No. 323/2025, doesn't merit consideration.

Similarly, in Company Appeal (AT) (CH) (Ins) No.598/2025, the Appellant challenges the order passed on 01.08.2025 on IA No. 324/2025 in CP (IB) No.15/BB/2023, dismissing the said application. The application, being IA No. 324/2025, contained a prayer, which was identical to the subject matter of consideration of IA No. 323/2025, which is under challenge in Company Appeal (AT) (CH) (Ins) No.597/2025. The Ld. Tribunal, almost for the akin reason, had proceeded to dismiss the said application by the impugned order under challenge. Be that as it may.

At this stage, we are not concerned with regards to the merits of the matter, but rather we have been called upon to deal with an issue on the subject of limitation. The Company Appeal (AT) (CH) (Ins) No.597/2025 is accompanied with a Condone Delay Application, being IA No. 1685/2025. The Condone Delay Application, thus preferred by the Appellant, has sought condonation of 12 days of delay. However, the total number of delay as reported by the Registry is 67 days. On the ground that the impugned order was passed on 01.08.2025 and the company appeal was e-filed only on 06.11.2025.

The Appellant disputes the computation of the Registry and has contended that, as a matter of fact, there happens to be only 12 days of delay for the reason being that, the impugned order that was passed, was pronounced on 01.08.2025 by the Ld. NCLT, but it was uploaded by the Ld. NCLT on its website only on 26.09.2025. Further, the Appellant had applied for certified copy of the impugned order on 29.09.2025, which was delivered on 06.10.2025. Accordingly, the statutory period of 30 days for filing the appeal as argued by the Ld. Counsel for the Appellant will have to be computed from 26.09.2025, and it will only expire on 26.10.2025. But since 26.10.2025 happens to be a Sunday, the limitation would be deemed to have been extended under Section 4 of the Limitation Act, and therefore the limitation period would be expiring on 27.10.2025. And thus, he has contended that, since the appeal was e-filed on 06.11.2025, the delay of 10 days from 27.10.2025 is within the 15 day condonable period and hence the interlocutory application for seeking condonation of delay deserved to be allowed.

Almost similar ground, has been taken by the Appellant in his prayer for Condonation of Delay in the connected company appeal, where too the delay has been reported by the Registry to be a delay of 67 days. The grounds which have been taken therein, since being similar, are not being reiterated. The prime issue, which would be the subject matter of consideration in respect of Condonation of Delay in both the company appeals, would be, as to what would be the actual date of publication of the order, which Appellant contends to have been done on 26.09.2025, and whether the period of limitation will be computed from the date of pronouncement of the order or from the date of its uploading.

When the instant company appeals was taken up, the Respondent No. 1 were represented by the respective counsels and notice was issued to Respondent No. 2 on the Condone Delay Application. The applications seeking condonation of delay has been objected by the Ld. Counsel for the Respondents by filing an objection, which has been argued otherwise by the Ld. Counsel for the Appellant based upon the additional documents, which has been filed by the Appellant in support of the Condone Delay Application.

The arguments of the Appellant made on the basis of the additional documents which have been filed along with the memo dated 21.01.2026 is that, as a matter of fact the impugned order of 01.08.2025 was never uploaded by the Ld. Tribunal on 01.08.2025 and it was actually uploaded on 26.09.2025, and as such the delay in filing the appeals ought to be determined from 26.09.2025, being the date when the copy of the order was uploaded on public website.

It has thus been argued by the Appellants Counsel, that the order was uploaded on NCLT website only on 26.09.2025, and not on 01.08.2025 and since the order was not uploaded on 01.08.2025, they were constrained to file a representation on 08.08.2025 before the Registry of the Ld. Tribunal, contending thereof, that the order of 01.08.2025 has not been uploaded, and thereafter they had no other option except to wait for the order to be uploaded and they were able to take action to prepare the appeal for filing the same before this Appellate Tribunal, only after uploading of the said order on 26.09.2025.

In a judicial proceeding, carrying out of any proceedings by filing of a representation before the Registry is an aspect which is alien to the judicial processes, for the reason being that no regulations have been framed for filing of such representation before the executive side. It is settled law that any representation that is preferred on an executive side and which is not a process provided under law, cannot be taken as to be the basis for the purposes of determining of judicial rights of a party to the proceedings.

The Ld. Counsel for the Appellant, in support of his contention to prove that, the order was actually uploaded by the Ld. Tribunal on 26.09.2025, has not placed any document such as the official online report of the Ld. NCLT on record. He has not also given any document to show that he had applied for the copy of the impugned order within 30 days of the date of pronouncement of the order. Rather to the contrary, the certified copy which has been placed on record, shows that the Appellant had applied for the certified copy of the order only on 29.09.2025, and received the same on 06.10.2025. However, the Appellant has contended that because of the aforesaid reasons, the appeal could be filed on 06.11.2025 and that the said appeal has been filed within the limitation period.

The Ld. Counsel for the Respondent, has vehemently opposed the application contending that, the representation dated 08.08.2025, which the Appellant claims to have filed before the Ld. NCLT, for getting the certified copy of the order, in fact is nothing but a representation which was preferred in connivance, in order to circumvent the aspect of limitation which in the instant case commenced from 02.08.2025 the day immediately after the date of pronouncement. He has stated that as per the particulars as it has been supplied and made available to them from the Registry of the Ld. Tribunal, the order was actually shown to have been uploaded on 07.08.2025, and in relation thereto, the Ld. Counsel for the Respondent had placed reliance on the "Case History" which is available in the official website of the Registry of the Ld. Tribunal.

Based upon the said 'Case History', he submits that, the date of the order happens to be of 01.08.2025, and that the limitation for all practical purposes would commence from 02.08.2025, which would expire after 30 days, on 31.08.2025, and that the condonable period of 15 days prescribed under the proviso to Section 31 (2) of the I & B Code, 2016, would also expire on 15.09.2025. He further submits that, if the certified copy of the order as annexed with the appeal itself clearly shows that the Appellant had applied for the certified copy of the order on 29.09.2025, after expiry of 59 days from the date of the pronouncement of order, which is beyond the expiry of the prescribed period of limitation as well as the condonable period which shows his lack of diligence is pursuing the appeal and therefore the delay should not be condoned.

In elaboration to his argument, the Ld. Counsel for the Respondent had submitted, that his contention stands fortified by the authorities rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court, as well as, the Principal Bench dealing with the issue as to what would be the parameters, that would be required to be adhered to for the purposes of considering Condonation of delay in those matters where the party who had effectively been participating in the proceedings, fails to apply for the certified copy of the order within the period of limitation as prescribed under the statute.

The first judgment, which has been referred to by the Ld. Counsel for the Respondent, being that as reported in 2025, Volume 6, SCC, page 618, A. Rajendra v. Gonugunta Madhusudhan Rao and others, and particularly, he has referred to the contents of para 24 and 25, which is extracted hereunder: -

What he intends to argue from the principles propounded by the said paragraphs as extracted above, is that in those cases where the order is pronounced in the open court, the limitation triggers from that date, even if the order has been uploaded at a later stage and that, it will be always the date of the pronouncement, which will be taken as to be the basis for the determination of limitation.

Taking its logic from the judgment of Sanjay Pandurang Kalate vs Vistra Itcl (India) Limited, the Ld. Counsel for the Respondent had argued that, the order was pronounced on a particular date in the proceedings participated in which the Appellant and since the Appellant did not apply for getting the certified copy of the order within the prescribed period of limitation, the limitation has to commence from the date of the pronouncement of the order, and no exclusion under Section 12 of Limitation Act can be granted to him. He places the present case under the backdrop of the ratio laid down in Para 24, 25 & 26 in the matter of A. Rajendra (Supra) on the ground that, since the order was pronounced on 01.08.2025 and it was uploaded on 07.08.2025, (as it was ascertained from the details provided by website of the Ld. NCLT) and since the copy of order was applied for by the Appellant only on 29.09.2025, this would disentitle the Appellant to get any benefit of limitation, on account of the order being uploaded at the date later than the date of pronouncement.

He has argued that, the matter was conclusively heard on the same day when it was pronounced and even though the order was uploaded on the website on some other day, since the order was pronounced on 01.08.2025 in presence of the Appellant, the limitation period for filing an appeal under Section 61 of the I & B Code, 2016, would commence from the date of pronouncement of order by the Ld. NCLT. He has stated that date of uploading of the order becomes relevant only when the order is not pronounced on the date of conclusion of hearing and in that case, limitation will trigger from the date of uploading on the official website of the Tribunal/Court as per the ratio laid down in the judgment of A. Rajendra (Supra).

He has further stated that in the instant case, the pronouncement was made on 01.08.2025, and that would be the point from where the limitation would be determined and not from the date of the uploading of the order, which is 07.08.2025, by the Ld. Counsel for the Appellant, as per his contention and which is claimed to be 26.09.2025.

The Ld. Counsel for the Appellant, has also referred to the judgment of V Nagarajan vs Sks Ispat and Power Limited, as reported in (2022) 2 SCC 244 and especially to para 30 and 31 of the said judgment. The said paragraphs, are extracted hereunder: -

And if we look into the ratio provided by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the said judgment, it was observed therein that an appeal under Section 61 of IBC is expected to be preferred before the expiry of period of limitation, from which the 'time requisite' for obtaining the certified copy is to be excluded. But, the said facility of excluding the period spent in obtaining the certified copy of the order cannot be extended if no application for a certified copy has been made before the expiry of the statutory period of limitation. Thus, in other words, it could be said that the time period, which is taken by the court to prepare a decree (or) an order, cannot be sought to be excluded by invoking Section 12, in the light of its explanation, unless the application to obtain the copy is actually made, within 30 days of the date of pronouncement of the order.

It was further observed in the said judgment that a right to receive a free copy under Section 420 (3) of the Companies Act, 2016, will not obviate the obligation on part of the Appellant to seek a certified copy of the order by filing of an application before the expiry of the limitation period, which, as a matter of fact, in the instant case, the Appellant has failed to do. In the present case, he has failed to apply for certified copy within 36 days from the date of the pronouncement of the order, i.e., 01.08.2025. Rather, he had finally applied for the certified copy only on 29.09.2025, and received the same on 06.10.2025. Hence, the period in between 29.09.2025 and 06.10.2025 cannot be excluded from the limitation period under Section 12 of Limitation Act.

The principal bench too in the matter of Mr. Brijinder Singh versus Bank of Baroda in CA(AT)(INS)/180/2025, as decided by the bench on 22.01.2026, has almost reiterated the similar view, as expressed in Para 7 and 8 of the said judgment, which is extracted hereunder: -

When we look at the facts of the present case, we notice that the impugned order was passed on 03.02.2025. We also notice that the Appellant has admitted that the NCLT Registry had informed the Appellant about the impugned order on 04.02.2025. It is well settled that for the purpose of computation of limitation, the date of e-filing of the Appeal is to be treated as the date of filing and we notice that the present appeal was e-filed on 29.03.2025. For counting the statutory period of 30 days for filing the appeal, the same is to be counted from the day after the date of pronouncement of the impugned order. Calculated accordingly, the statutory period of 30 days for filing the appeal in the present case stood expired on 05.03.2025. The further extendable period of 15 days in terms of proviso to Section 60 (2) ended on 20.03.2025. However, since the present appeal has been e-filed on 29.03.2025, it clearly lies beyond the outer limit of thirty plus fifteen days provided under Section 61(2) of the IBC."

The counsel for the Appellant tried to justify the delay on the ground of time taken in obtaining the certified copy of the impugned order. When an order is passed by the Adjudicating Authority, it casts an obligation upon the aggrieved party to apply for a certified copy within the period of limitation if the benefit under Section 12 of the Limitation Act, 1963 is sought to be claimed. It is well settled law that an application for certified copy made after the expiry of the prescribed limitation period cannot be relied upon for exclusion of time for which reliance is placed on the judgment of this Tribunal in Gaurav Agarwal Vs CA Devang P Sampat Liquidator of Maa Mahamaya Steels Pvt. Ltd in CA (AT) (Ins) No. 916 of 2022 which is reproduced below:

It is an admitted fact that the Appellant had applied for the certified copy of the impugned order on 06.03.2025. In the present case since the certified copy of the impugned order was sought by the Appellant on 06.03.2025 which date was clearly after the expiry of the 30 days limitation period, the benefit under Section 12 of the Limitation Act does not accrue to the Appellant in the present case."

The aforesaid principles, will apply to the instant case for the purposes of determining the aspect of limitation. The argument extended by the Ld. Counsel for the Appellant that the order was uploaded only on 26.09.2025, by the Registry because of the orders being passed by the Hon’ble Apex Court cannot be accepted by this Appellate Tribunal, because whatsoever be the circumstances involved in the instant case, the facts which we have already dealt with elaborately, show that, the Appellant didn't apply for the certified copy within the period of limitation of 30 days commencing from 02.08.2025, he applied for the certified copy on 29.09.2025 only and hence supply of the certified copy to him on 06.10.2025 will not entitle him to claim on exclusion of period from 01.08.2025 to 06.10.2025 under provisions of Sections 12 of Limitation Act.

The Ld. Counsel for the Appellant in his rejoinder argument has submitted that the limitation in the instant company appeals has to be construed from the date when the order was uploaded, i.e., 26.09.2025, and not from 01.05.2025 or from 07.08.2025. However, there is no proof on record, which could be acceptable by this Appellate Tribunal in the eyes of law, that the judgment was uploaded for the first time on the website of the Ld. Tribunal on 26.09.2025 as pleaded by the Ld. Counsel for the Appellant.

Rather to the contrary, the record as placed by the Ld. Counsel for the Respondent shows that, the judgment was actually uploaded on 07.08.2025. The response given by the Ld. Counsel for the Appellant to this has been that only the first part of the order of 01.08.2025 was uploaded on 07.08.2025, and the rest was uploaded on 26.09.2025. This, is not acceptable to this Appellate Tribunal for the reason being that, when uploading of the first part of the order, was admittedly done on 07.08.2025, the said uploading could not have been in a piecemeal manner. Particularly when the order of 01.08.2025 was a composite order deciding the proceedings before the Ld. NCLT, and, there was no occasion for the Ld. Tribunal to only upload part of the order dated 01.08.2025 on 07.08.2025, because as per the prevalent norms, the order will have to be uploaded as a whole.

The Ld. Counsel for the Appellant, while elaborating his argument, has submitted that when the order was uploaded on 07.08.2025, he found that the full order had not been uploaded and hence he filed the application on 08.08.2025 before the Registry and that submission of his application on 08.08.2025 may be taken as to be a proof that the order was not uploaded by the Ld. Tribunal on 07.08.2025 as pleaded by the Ld. Counsel for the Respondent. This argument of the Ld. Counsel for the Appellant, based upon his representation of 08.08.2025, cannot be accepted by this Appellate Tribunal for the purposes to construe, commencement of limitation from 26.09.2025 for the reason being that, such type of representation is not a concept which is available under law in a judicial proceeding, because in case, the Appellant found that the complete order was not uploaded on 07.08.2025, then he ought to have moved an application for certified copy within a reasonable time and at any rate, within 30 days on a judicial side, not on an administrative side, and that in any case since he was aware of the pronouncement of the order he should have applied for the certified copy of order straight away.

We are of the view that the gap between the date of pronouncement and the date of uploading represents the time taken by the Court/Tribunal to prepare the order within the meaning of explanation to Section 12, and therefore, the part of the said period prior to the date of application for a certified copy shall not be excluded in computing the limitation as per provision of Section 12 of Limitation Act. Even if the uploading of the order has been done on 26.09.2025, it will not result in exclusion of the period between 01.08.2025 to 26.09.2025 because the application for the certified copy of the order was made only on 29.09.2025, a date subsequent to 26.09.2025.

Further, we see no logic as to why the Appellant had waited till 29.09.2025 for applying for the certified copy of the order. The very fact that the copy of the order itself was applied for by the Appellant on 29.09.2025, which is beyond 30 days from 01.08.2025, will result in his company appeal being barred by limitation as per the ratios submitted by the Ld. Counsel for the Respondent, more particularly when the Ld. Counsel for the Appellant had admitted the said ratios. The aforesaid ratios lay down in very clear terms as to in what manner the limitation has to be construed in those circumstances where there is a controversy as to when the copy of order was made available. These ratios lay down that limitation period will commence from the date of pronouncement in case it is pronounced in open court in the presence of the party and from date of uploading in case it is not pronounced in open court and the party to the proceedings, has to be diligent enough to apply for the certified copy within the prescribed period of limitation of appeal to avail the benefit of exclusion of time spent in procuring the certified copy to file the appeal. In the instant case, as per the Appellant, the order was pronounced on 01.08.2025, was uploaded in part on 07.08.2025, the substantive part was reportedly uploaded on 26.09.2025, and he applied for the certified copy of the order on 29.09.2025, 59 days after the pronouncement of the order.

There is nothing placed by the Appellant on record to show that he had ever filed the application for getting the certified copy of the order within the 30 days limitation period from the date of pronouncement. In view of the aforesaid reasons, which we have already discussed in the body of the judgment, the company appeal is barred beyond the limitation as prescribed under the proviso to Section 61 (2) of the I & B Code, 2016, hence, the company appeals would stand dismissed. All the pending interlocutory applications would stand closed.