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Judgment
K.N. Basha, J
This matter is posted today before this Bench for extension of time and condoning the delay for filing the counter statement by the first respondent herein. This Bench is usually granting the extension of time on the basis of circulation of the matter before the Bench. However, in view of the conduct of first respondent herein for not filing the counter statement even after the extended period till 15/05/2014 coupled with the fact that the applicant herein has raised objection for extension of time, the matter is posted today before us.
2 . Mr. Niranjan Vaghela, the learned counsel for the condone delay petitioner/first respondent and Mr. Rajesh Ramanathan, the learned counsel for the respondent/applicant are present today.
The learned counsel for the petitioner herein would submit that the delay occurred only due to the negotiation that took place between the parties with a view to resolve the matter amicably and the same failed and the counter statement was made ready but awaited the sanction of the respondent's company which resulted in the delay of 180 days. It is contended that the delay is not willful but only due to the above said circumstances.
Mr. Rajesh Ramanathan, the learned counsel appearing for the respondent/applicant would vehemently contend that the petitioner has not assigned any valid reason and also not shown sufficient cause to condone the delay. It is submitted that the negotiation took place between the parties was over within the extended period upto 15/05/2014 and as such there is no justification to assign the said reason for not filing the counter statement. It is contended that the condone delay petition is vague and bald statement not satisfying the basic requirements showing sufficient cause to condone the delay. Therefore, it is contended that the petition is liable to be dismissed.
We have given our careful consideration to the rival contentions and also perused the petition and objection raised by the respondent/applicant.
6 . At the outset it is to be stated that the first respondent/petitioner herein has not utilized the liberty of filing the counterstatement within the extended period upto 15/05/2014 and further the petition also does not contain any fundamental and basic details or reasons resulting the delay in filing the counter statement. However, it is the specific stand of the petitioner/respondent to the effect that the delay was mainly due to the negotiation and conciliation that took place between the parties and same continued even after the extended period of 15/05/2014. The said factor was disputed by Mr. Rajesh Ramanathan, the learned counsel for the respondent/applicant. The petitioner had to file affidavit by specifically mentioning the reasons and in the case, we are not inclined to further delay the matter by giving some more time to the petitioner to file better affidavit as we have already pointed out the petitioner has mainly placed reliance on the negotiation that took place between the parties for the delay.
It is well settled by a Catena of decisions of Hon'ble High Court and Hon'ble Apex Court that the word "sufficient cause" should be given a liberal construction. It is worthwhile to mention the following decisions:--
"13. The Hon'ble Division Bench of the Madras High Court in a decision rendered on 08/12/2011 in W.P. No. 28033 of 2011 in Schering-Plough Ltd. v. Intellectual Property Appellate Board held hereunder:--
"5. Prima facie we are of the view that the Appellate Board has not correctly appreciated he reasons for delay disclosed in the affidavit accompanying the delay petition. It was categorically stated in the affidavit filed in support of the delay petition that upon receipt of the order of the 2nd respondent the petitioner-company had to receive technical support from its experts. Further, the petitioner-company is a foreign company situated in Switzerland and requires time to brief their advocate in India on the technical information. It was further stated that the petitioner-company had done everything in their control to file the appeal against the order of the 2nd respondent, but because of the intervening circumstances the delay occurred, which was beyond their control. It was also stated that the petitioner company has a good case on merit and the interest of justice and fairness requires that the delay in filing the appeal be condoned and the appeal be heard on merits.
6 . Although the Appellate Board noticed the ratio decided by the Supreme Court in N. Balakrishnan v. M. Krishnamurthy, (1998) 7 SCC 123 yet it has not correctly appreciated the law in favour of the appellant/writ petitioner while considering the application for condonation of delay.
7 . It is well settled by the Supreme Court that there cannot be any hard and fast rule to laid down as to what constitutes sufficient cause. The expression "sufficient cause" should receive liberal construction. In the case of O.P. Kathpalia v. Lakhmir Singh, AIR 1984 SC 1744 a three-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court held that if the refusal to condone the delay result in grave mis-carriage of justice, it would be a ground to condone delay.
8 . In another decision in the case of Collector, Land Acquisition v. Mst. Katiji, AIR 1987 SC 306 'their Lordships observed:--
"The legislature has conferred the power to condone delay by enacting Section 5 of the imitation Act of 1963 in order to enable the Courts to do substantial justice to parties by disposing of matters on 'merits'. The expression 'sufficient cause' employed by the legislature is adequately elastic to enable the Courts to apply the law in a meaningful manner which subserves the ends of justice that being the life-purpose of the existence of the institution of Courts. It is common knowledge that this Court has been making a justifiably liberal approach in matters instituted in this Court. But the message does not appear to have percolated down to all the other Courts in the hierarchy."
9 . Similar view has been taken by the Supreme Court in a catena of decisions holding that t expression "sufficient cause" should be liberally construed. In the instant case, the Appellate Board has not correctly appreciated the law laid down by the Supreme Court. Hence, the impugned order needs interference."
The Hon'ble Apex Court in 1987 SCR (2) 387 in Collector Land Acquisition, Anantnag & Anr. v. Mst. Katiji & Ors. held hereunder:--
"2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and use of justice being defeated. As against this when delay is condoned the highest that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties.
3 . "Every day's delay must be explained" does not mean that a pedantic approach should be made. Why not every hour's delay, every second's delay? The doctrine must be applied in a rational common sense pragmatic manner.
4 . When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay.
5 . There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact he runs a serious risk.
It must be grasped that judiciary is respected not on account of its power to legalize injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so."
The Hon'ble Apex Court in AIR 1998 SC 3222 in N. Balakrishnan v. M. Krishnamurthy held as under:--
"9. It is axiomatic that condonation of delay is a matter of discretion of the court. Section 5 of the Limitation Act does not say that such discretion can be exercised only if the delay is within a certain limit. Length of delay is no matter; acceptability of the explanation is the only criterion. sometimes delay of the shortest range may be uncontainable due to want of acceptable explanation whereas in certain other cases delay of very long range can be condoned as the explanation thereof is satisfactory. Once the court accepts the explanation as sufficient it is the result of positive exercise of discretion and normally the superior court should not disturb such finding, much less in regional jurisdiction, unless the exercise of discretion was on wholly untenable grounds or arbitrary or perverse. But it is a different matter when the first court refuses to condone the delay. In such cases, the superior court would be free to consider the cause shown for the delay afresh and it is open to such superior court to come to its own finding even untrammeled by the conclusion of the lower court.
1 0 . The reason for such a different stance is thus: The primary function of a court is to adjudicate the dispute between the parties and to advance substantial justice. Time limit fixed for approaching the court in different situations is not because on the expiry of such time a bad cause would transform into a good cause.
Rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the right of parties. They are meant to see that parties do not resort to dilatory tactics, but seek their remedy promptly. The object of providing a legal remedy is to repair the damage caused by reason of legal injury. Law of limitation fixes a life span for such legal remedy for the redress of the legal injury so suffered. Time is precious and the wasted time would never revisit. During efflux of time newer causes would sprout up necessitating newer persons to seek legal remedy by approaching the courts. So a life span must be fixed for each remedy. Unending period for launching the remedy may lead to unending uncertainty and consequential anarchy. Law of limitation is thus founded on public policy. It is enshrined in the maxim Interest reipublicae up sit finis Mum (it is for the general welfare that a period be put to litigation). Rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the right of the parties. They are meant to see that parties do not resort to dilatory tactics but seek their remedy promptly. The idea is that every legal remedy must be kept alive for a legislatively fixed period of time.
1 2 . A Court knows that refusal to condone delay would result in foreclosing a suitor from putting forth his cause. There is no presumption that delay in approaching the court is always deliberate.
This Court has held that the words "sufficient cause" Under Section 5 of the Limitation Act should receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice vide Shakuntala Devi Jain v. Kuntal Kumari, [1969] 1 SCR 1006 and State of West Bengal v. The Administrator, Howrah Municipality, [1972] 2 SCR 874 a.
It must be remembered that in every case of delay there can be some lapse on the part of e litigant concerned. That alone is not enough to turn down his plea and to shut the door against him. If the explanation does not smack of mala fides or it is not put forth as part of a dilatory strategy the court must show utmost consideration to the suitor. But when there is reasonable ground to think that the delay was occasioned by the party deliberately to gain time when the court should lean against acceptance of the explanation. While condoning delay the Court should nor forget the opposite party altogether. It must be borne in mind that he is a loser and he too would have incurred quite a large litigation expenses. It would be a salutary guideline that when courts condone the delay due to laches on the part of the applicant the court shall compensate the opposite party for his loss."
The principles laid down by the Hon'ble Delhi High Court, Hon'ble Madras High Court and the Hon'ble Apex Court in the decisions cited Supra are squarely applicable to the issue involved in the instant case. It is now well settled that in a matter of condoning delay, "sufficient cause" should be construed liberally and the matters are to be decided on merits with the object to render substantial justice. We are of the considered view in the instant matter that the petitioner has not only assigned valid reasons but also shown sufficient cause to condone the delay."
In view of the settled principles of law as laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court and Hon'ble High Court of Madras in the decisions stated supra we are of the considered view that no prejudice would be caused to the respondent/applicant by condoning the delay of 180 days in filing the counter statement by imposing a cost of Rs. 10,000/-(Rupees then thousand only). The said cost of Rs. 10,000/- should be payable by the petitioner herein/the 1st respondent in the main application to Udavam Karangal, a charitable trust by way of Demand Draft drawn in favour of "Udavam Karangal", Chennai. The Demand Draft shall be handed over to the Registry of this Bench in a period of one week from the date of receipt of copy of order, and the Board, in turn, will hand over the same to the Udavam Karangal. Counsel for both parties are agreeing for this. Accordingly, the petition is allowed. The Registry is directed to take the counter statement on record. It is open to the respondent/applicant to file the rejoinder within a period of two months.