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Judgment
Tek Chand, J.—By my order dated 27th March, 1962, this case was referred to a Division Bench as I thought that the question involved in this case was of considerable importance and no guidance was forthcoming from any decided case cited at the bar.
The facts giving rise to this writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution are that the Petitioner was a sovereign Ruler of Nabha State prior to 15th August, 1947. With the consent of the sovereign Rulers of the Punjab State, a Union was formed with the concurrence of the Government of India known as the Patiala and East Punjab States Union. Before the formation of this Union, a Covenant was entered into between all the sovereign Rulers and the Government of India. Under Article 12(1) of the Covenant, "the Ruler of each Covenanting State shall be entitled to the full ownership, use and enjoyment of all private properties (as distinct from State properties) belonging to him on the date of his making over the administration of that State to the Rajpramukh". Accordingly, land measuring 254 Bighas and 4 Biswas in village Alhoran, tahsil Nabha, district Patiala, besides some other property, was declared to be the private and (personal property of the Petitioner by the Government of Pepsu (vide annexure ''A''). The Petitioner states that he has throughout been in possession of this area as owner. The Pepsu Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act (Pepsu Act 13 of 1955) became law on 4th March, 1955. This Act was passed to amend and consolidate the law relating to tenancies of agricultural lands and to provide for certain measures of land reforms and for the security of land tenures. The purpose of the Act was said to protect the tenants against unjust and abrupt termination of tenancies. The object of the Act was expressed in these words-
Relationship between the landlords and tenants in Pepsu are strained resulting in an explosive situation. Legislation to amend and consolidate the existing law in the State relating to tenancies of agricultural lands and to provide for certain measures of land reforms on the lines undertaken by the adjoining State of Punjab is not only necessary but also urgent. The Bill also seeks to give effect to some of the recommendations made by the Pepsu Agrarian Reforms Committee appointed to examine the system of land tenure in the State.
This Act has been amended from time to time. Chapter 4-A, containing Sections 32A to 32N was inserted by Pepsu Act 15 of 1956, which came into force on 30th October, 1956. A new Section 32NN was added later on. Chapter 4-B which was also inserted by Pepsu Act 15 of 1956, consists of one section, Section 32P, which deals with the constitution, functions and powers of the Land Commission. The Pepsu Land Commission is established by the State and one of its duties is to advise the State Government with regard to the exemption of Lands from the ceiling in accordance with the provisions of Section 32K. The advice given by the Commission shall be binding on the State Government and. no final statement shall, in a case in which exemption is claimed u/s 32-K, be published unless, such advice is included therein. The other duties of the Land Commission are to determine fair rents for the purposes of Section 32G, and the market value of any building, structure, tubewell or crop under Sub-section (4) of Section 32G.
Before dealing with the allegations and the prayer of the Petitioner, it is desirable to give a brief resume of the relevant provisions of the Pepsu Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, hereinafter referred to as the Pepsu Act.
Section 3 of the Act define the permissible limit which means 30 standard acres of land. There is a proviso in the case of an allottee where the permissible limit varies.
Section 4, lays down that the provisions of the Act shall have effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in any other law for the time being in force or any usage, agreement, settlement, grant, Sanad or any decree or order of any Court or other authority. These provisions of the Act override inconsistent provisions contained in any other law or instrument, agreement, etc.
Section 5 enables, the land owner owing land exceeding 30 standard acres to select for personal cultivation from the land held by him in the State any parcel or parcels of land not exceeding in aggregate area the permissible limit. He may reserve such land for personal cultivation by intimating his selection in the prescribed form and manner to the Collector. The , right to reserve land for personal cultivation shall cease if it is not exercised by the land owner, inter alia within a period of six months from the commencement of the President''s Act (Act 8 of 1953). The land thus reserved for personal cultivation is to be notified by the Collector (vide Section 6).
Chapter 3 commencing with Section 7 deals with rights of tenancy and other allied matters and Chapter 4 beginning with Section 20 deals with acquisition of proprietary rights by tenants. The provisions of these two chapters need not be noticed as their consideration does not arise in this case.
Chapter 4A was inserted by Pepsu Act 15 of 1956, which had come into force on 30th October, 1956.
Section 32A places ceiling on land and provides that no person shall be entitled to own or hold as land owner or tenant land under his personal cultivation within the State which exceeds in the aggregate the permissible limit.
Section 32B requires the filing of returns by persons having land in excess of the ceiling. This has to be done within a period of one month from the commencement of the Pepsu Tenancy and Agricultural Lands (Amendment) Ordinance, 1958. Thus the last date for furnishing return to the Collector is 30th August, 1958. The return has to be filed in the prescribed form and a selection of the parcel or parcels of the land not exceeding in the aggregate the permissible limit which the applicant desires to retain and also the lands in respect of which he claims exemption from the ceiling, is to be indicated.
Section 32BB requires the furnishing of a declaration supported by affidavits in the case of land situated in more than one Patwar circle in a from and manner as may be prescribed. Where this is not done, the prescribed authority may direct that the whole or part of the land of such land owner or tenant as the case may be in excess of ten standard acres shall be deemed to be surplus area.
Section 32C enables the Collector to obtain information through other agency.
Under Section 32D, the Collector is required to prepare a draft statement in the manner prescribed giving particulars of the total area of land owned and the specific parcels which the landowner may retain by way of his permissible limit or exemption from ceiling and also the surplus area. Sub-section (2) requires that the draft statement shall include the advice of the Pepsu Land Commission appointed u/s 32P regarding the exemption from ceiling, if claimed, by the land owner. It is also provided that a person aggrieved by an order of the Collector may prefer an appeal to the State Government. After the appeal is disposed of, the draft statement shall be made final in terms of the order of the Collector or the State Government, as the case may be, or in terms of the advice of the Pepsu Land Commission regarding exemption from the ceiling claimed by the land owner, if any, and published in the official gazette.
Section 32E, requires that after the publication in the official gazette of the final statement, the surplus area shall be vested in the State Government for a public purpose and all rights, title, interest, etc., of all persons in such land shall be extinguished, and all such rights shall vest in the State Government free from encumbrances created by any person.
Under Section 32F, the Collector is empowered after the vesting of the surplus area to direct the land owner or the tenant to deliver possession thereof.
Under Section 32FF, transfers or other dispositions of land effected after 21st August, 1956, shall not effect the right of the State Government to the surplus area to which it would be entitled but for such transfer or disposition save in cases specified in the section. It has to be noted that this provision relates to transfers or other dispositions.. A ''transfer'' is an act by which the owner of a thing delivers it to another person with the intent of passing the rights, which he has in it, to the latter. A ''disposition'' is the getting rid or making over of anything. It includes relinquishment, distribution, or alienation of something. A right to select or reserve an area under this Act for purposes of self-cultivation or other purposes which under the Act entitle the owner to exemption from ceiling on land, by no stretch of language can be treated as either ''transfer'' or ''other disposition of land.''
Section 32G refers to principles for payment of compensation and Section 32H to payment of compensation, which may be given in cash or in bonds or partly in either.
Section 32J provides that the surplus area acquired u/s 32E shall be at the disposal of the State Government.
Section 32K deals with exemption from ceiling on land. As the main arguments have centred round its interpretation, it is reproduced below in extenso-
32K. Exemption from ceiling on land.-
(1) The provisions of Section 32A shall not apply to-
(i) orchards where they constitute reasonably compact areas;
(ii) specialised farms engaged in cattle breeding, dairying or wool raising;
(iii) sugarcane farms operated by sugar factories;
(iv) efficiently managed farms which consist of compact blocks on which heavy investment or permanent structural improvements have been made and whose break-up is likely to lead to a fall in production;
(v) lands belonging to registered co-operative societies formed for the purpose of co-operative farming; provided the land owned by an individual member of the society does not exceed the permissible limit; and
(vi) where a landowner gives an under-taking in writing to the Collector that he shall, within a period of two years from the commencement of the Pepsu Tenancy and Agricultural Lands (Second Amendment) Act, 1956, plant an orchard in any area of his land not exceeding ten standard acres, such area of land.
(2) Where a landowner has, by an undertaking given to the Collector, retained any area of land with him for planting an orchard and fails to plant the orchard within a period of two years referred to in Clause (iv) of Sub-section (1), the land so retained by him shall, on the expiry of that period, vest in the State Government u/s 32E, and compensation therefor, shall be payable in accordance with the provisions of this chapter.
Section 32L places a ban on future acquisition of land in excess of permissible limit; and Section 32M places ceiling on future acquisition of inheritance.
Section 52 confers rule-making power on the State Government and in pursuance of that power the Pepsu Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Rules, 1958, were made by the Government of Punjab by notification No. 126-LR-57/1611, dated 21st March, 1958.
Rule 30 of the rules requires the Pepsu Land Commission to take into account certain specified factors while advising the State Government with regard to exemption of orchards constituting reasonable compact areas or specialised farms engaged in cattle breeding, dairying or wool raising or sugar-cane farms operated by sugar factories from the ceiling in accordance with the provisions of Section 32K.
The Petitioner, besides maintaining that the provisions of the Pepsu Act did not apply to him in view of the covenant entered into between him and the Union of India, also claimed exemption u/s 32K(i)(ii) of the Act contending that after furnishing particulars, as required u/s 32B, he had set up a dairy farm on a piece of land and had already spent a sum exceeding Rs. 2.00 lakhs. The Petitioner had made an application u/s 32B on 30th August, 1958, which was the last date claiming exemption u/s 32K, inter alia, on the ground that he had set apart the area for a specialised farm engaged in cattle breeding and dairying. It is not denied by the Petitioner that there was no dairy farm in existence when the return was filed u/s 32B. At that time he had only indicated his intention of establishing a dairy farm on the land which he had reserved for the purpose. The cattle were actually purchased according to one witness in 1959, and according to the other in 1960.
The Pepsu Land Commission inspected the spot on 2nd September, 1960, and sent their report on 17th October, 1960. At that time there existed proper dairy farm which was being maintained. According to the findings of the Commission, the dairy farm was started in December, 1958, and it began to function in March, 1960. It was conceded by the Petitioner''s counsel before the Land Commission that the dairy farm came into existence considerable time after the passing of the Act in 1955. The Commission felt that the exemption could be granted only if conditions justifying exemption existed at the time when Chapter 4-A was added, that is, on 30th October, 1956. In other words, exemption could be given for such a specialised farm if the same existed on 30th October. 1956, and not if it came into existence subsequently, and in this case it was several years after. The Commission concluded that the exemption u/s 32K(i)(ii) could not be given in this case and sent an advice to the State Government to that effect. The Petitioner, on the above facts, preferred a writ petition to this Court contending that the advice of the commission was illegal. So far, no final statement incorporating the advice has been published and the surplus area covered by the dairy farm has not yet vested in the State Government.
The arguments addressed by the learned Counsel for the Petitioner may be considered under two heads. It is contended that Article 12 of the Covenant entered into between the Petitioner and the Union of India gave him complete immunity against the Pepsu Act and he cannot be deprived of any part of his property. The second contention is that his title u/s 32E of the Act can be extinguished by vestment in the State Government only on the date when the final statement is published in the official gazette u/s 32D of the Act and till then he continues to be an absolute owner and is entitled to exemption enumerated in Section 32K; in other words, the contention under this head is that it is not a requisite of the law that the specialised farms engaged in cattle breeding and dairying should be in existence on 30th October, 1956, when Chapter 4-A, was inserted by Pepsu Act 15 of 1956, but that exemption could be earned by making such a farm at any time before the date of vestment of surplus area in the State Government u/s 32E.
The view expressed by the Pepsu Land Commission to the effect that Section 32FF was applicable and that the user of the land for purposes of this specialised farm amounted, if not to transfer, at least to ''other disposition of land'' was erroneous. This view of the Commission is obviously untenable. It is not any dealing with the land by the land owner himself which can be termed ''other disposition of land.'' A ''disposition'' as, for example, in a will, is the expression of an intention on the part of the owner as to the manner of disposal or distribution of his property. A ''disposition'' may also be in the form of a settlement or a family arrangement. A person who changes the use of his land from one purpose to another as in this case from agricultural purpose to utilisation as a dairy farm, is not making a disposition of the land. The view of the Land Commission to the contrary cannot be supported either by reference to any lexicon or to the context.
Neither in the etymological sense nor in any derivative sense can the phrase ''other disposition of land'' be applied to a change in the use to which the land is being put by the landowner. The word ''disposition'' is derived from latin word dis-ponere. The prefix ''dis'' means ''away or aside'' and ''ponere'' means ''to place.'' When a person makes over or conveys something to another, he is said to make a disposition, The Legislature could not have used the word ''disposition'' in any other sense, as, no person when making use of his property in a different manner than formerly can be said to subject it to a ''disposition'' in the legal sense.
The next question is whether exemption from ceiling on land as expressed in Section 32-K applies to orchards, specialised farms, sugarcane farms, efficiently managed farms, etc., which were in existence when Chapter 4-A was inserted, that is, on 30th October, 1956, or they could come into existence later on; in other words, whether this provision relates to orchards, specialised farms, etc., in esse or also to those in posse. From the perusal of the relevant provisions, I am inclined to the view that Section 32K(l)(i) to (iv) refers to orchards, specialised farms, etc., which were in actual existence and not to those which can possibly come into existence in future. The above provisions construed in their ordinary grammatical meaning refer to things in actual existence and not to those which are capable of coming into existence later on. The purpose and the intention of the Act also suggest that the Legislature desired to place a ceiling on the land in one''s personal cultivation. Section 32-A provides the rule and Section 32K creates exceptions. On the exempted land, no limits are placed. Thus a specialised farm engaged in cattle breeding, dairying or wool raising may cover an area of land to any extent provided it is in consonance with the requirements of the prescribed rules as to the number and quality of animals. There is nothing either in Section 32-K or in any other provision of the Act or in Rule 30 of the prescribed rules which places any limits on the extent of the area which may be used for cattle breeding, dairying, etc. While it was being provided that personally cultivated land should not exceed in the aggregate the permissible limit and the surplus area of a particular owner was to vest in the State Government as required by Section 32-E, it cannot reasonably be said that the State Government while enacting Section 32-K was intending to allow the landowners and others to evade the basic purpose of the Act by allowing the owners to convert the surplus area, between 30th October, 1956, and the revestment in the State Government, into exempted area. Not only thereby the real purpose of the statute would be defeated but, further, an uncertainty would be introduced regarding the time for earning exemption. The date of vestment of the surplus area in the State Government is not pre-determined. In a particular case, a party may delay the vestment by raising objections and by filing appeals and utilise this interval for qualifying himself for earning exemption u/s 32K; and yet in another case the interval may be so short that conversion of agricultural land into an orchard or a dairy farm may be wholly insufficient. The introduction of such a flexibility would introduce an element of uncertainty which will adversely affect the equities in different cases. Moreover, the Land Commission cannot inspect the various orchards, farms, etc., at the same time, and give advice to the Government in all cases contemporaneously. In the nature of things, this is not possible. The result would be that certain surplus areas would vest in the Government earlier and some other much later. The time for transferance of valuable rights of ownership will become uncertain and fortuitous. On these grounds also, the date of vestment in the State Government of the surplus lands u/s 32-E cannot be treated as a terminus ad quem up to which the person may qualify himself for obtaining exemption.
The basic rule of interpretation of a statute is that it has to be expounded ''according to the intent of them that made if [vide Sussex Peerage case 8. E.R, 1034 (H. Lr.)], where the words of the statute admit of no ambiguity and by themselves are precise and clear, their natural and ordinary meanings have to be ascertained in order to discover the intention of the Legislature. Another well-known rule of interpretation is that the words of a statute, when there is doubt about their meanings, they are to be understood in the sense in which they best harmonise with the subject of the enactment and the object which the Legislature has in view, (vide Maxwell, 11th Ed. P. 51). Where a text is susceptible of more than one meanings, the effects or consequences which would ensue, if a particular meaning is adopted rather than the other, may aid in pointing the real intention of the Legislature. If one of the inferences shows that that was not the intention of the Legislature, then that construction should be avoided. The Courts, where they find it absolutely necessary, may even go to the extent of departing from the ordinary meaning and grammatical construction if the apparent purpose of the enactment is defeated thereby or leads to unintended hardship or absurdity. The office, of the Judge is, "to make such construction as will suppress the mischief, and advance the remedy, and to suppress all evasions for the continuance of the mischief (Magdalen College case (1616) 11 Rep. 71b : 77 E.R. 1235 (1242). As remarked by Maxwell, "to carry out effectually the object of a statute, it must be so construed as to defeat all attempts to do, or avoid doing, in an indirect or circuitous manner that which it is prohibited or enjoined", (P. 109, 11th Ed.).
Having regard to the above principles, the provisions of the Act cannot be construed so as to enable a party to qualify himself to continue to earn exemptions till he is divested. Where the Legislature intended to give time to an owner after the coming into force of Chapter 4-A, to qualify himself for the exemptions, it has so expressed itself in clear language. Section 32K(l) (vi) provides "where a landowner gives an undertaking in writing to the Collector that he shall, within a period of two years from the commencement of the Pepsu Tenancy and Agricultural Lands (Second Amendment) Act, 1956, plant an orchard in any area of his land not exceeding ten standard acres, such area of land." This provision takes account of an orchard not yet planted, but which a landowner intends to plant within a period of two years. If the Legislature had desired to give a similar opportunity to landowners of other areas as mentioned in sub Clauses (i) to (v) of Section 32K(l), a similar language would have been used. The reading of Section 32B also helps in arriving at the same conclusion. A period ending with 30th August, 1958, is given to a person for submitting return showing, besides his selection of the parcel of land for self-cultivation not exceeding in the aggregate the permissible limit which he desires to retain, other lands in respect of which he claims exemption from the ceiling under Chapter 4A. This means that a person who does not possess a specialised farm engaged in cattle breeding, dairying or wool raising, on the date when he submits his return cannot claim exemption. No exemption can be claimed for what is non-est. If there is no such farm in existence on the last day when a return in this behalf is to be submitted, the question of obtaining exemption does not arise. What the law requires is that there be an existing area confirmable to the requirements of Section 32K(l) when the return is made. This return has to be scrutinised by the Collector and also by the Land Commission. That being so, a mere expression of an intention to utilise some area in future for purposes for which exemption in law is available, is not enough within the contemplation of Section 32K. On the basis of what the landowner intends to do in future no return can be based, no enquiry can be made by the Collector and no advice can be submitted by the Land Commission. It is not the intention of the law to give exemption to orchards and specialised farms mentioned in Section 32K(l) (i) to (iv) while they are in an embryonic stage. In this case there was no specialised farm engaged in cattle breeding and dairying when the return was submitted u/s 32B.
I do not find any cogency in the argument that till the Petitioner''s ownership rights are extinguished by vestment in the State Government, he is at liberty to utilise his land in any manner he likes and, therefore, he can by making an orchard or specialised farm as the case may be qualify himself for the exemption by the date of vestment. It is true that the ownership rights of the Petitioner to a restricted extent continue, even after the passing of the Act, in the surplus area till they are extinguished by vestment u/s 32-E. It cannot, however, follow that during the transitional period during which surplus area is being ascertained and the right to the exemption is being examined, the owner is at liberty by converting his land into orchard or specialised farm, etc., to earn exemption from ceiling on land. According to the scheme of the Act no person shall be entitled to own or hold as landowner or tenant land under his personal cultivation which exceeds in the aggregate the permissible limit. But in so far as the provisions of the Act do not permit him to get exemption from ceiling on land he cannot on the mere ground, that his title has not yet been extinguished, claim exemption. It is for the Legislature to determine the date by which the exemption from ceiling can be claimed. In this case the exemption must be claimed latest within one month from the commencement of the Pepsu Tenancy and Agricultural Lands (Amendment) Ordinance, 1958. The last date for furnishing to the Collector the return giving the particulars of selection and for claiming exemption from the ceiling is the 30th August, 1958. The time by which the exemption is to be claimed depends upon the terms of Section 32K and not on the continuance of title in the owner. For the same reasons, it will be fallacious to hold that though u/s 32-FF no transfer or other disposition of land effected after 21st August, 1956, shall affect the right of the State Government under this Act, the owner so long as his rights of ownership are not extinguished by vestment in the State Government may make valid transfers or dispositions. From the mere continued existence of ownership rights it cannot be postulated that all conceivable rights of ownership including right of alienation remain inviolate. If that were so the avowed object of the Act can easily be frustrated either by transfers or dispositions, or by conversion of the land into specialised farm, etc. I am not aware of any ambiguity or doubt so far as the statutory language is concerned and where the language of the statute is clear and unambiguous on its face it must be given effect to. The first duty of the Court is to ascertain the legislative intention from the expressed words of the enactment. It is only in the case of doubt arising from any imprecise language used that resort has to be made to statutory interpretation. In such an eventuality, in the words of Lord Coke, "the office of all the judges is always to make such construction as shall suppress the mischief, advance the remedy, and to suppress subtle invention and evasions for continuance of the mischief, and pro privato commotio, and to add force and life to the cure and remedy, according to the true intent of the makers of the act pro bono publico" Heydon''s case Company Rep. 72 : 76 E.R. 637. It is not necessary to go to numerous subsidiary cannons of construction where the intention of the legislature can clearly be ascertained from the language used. Section 32K took effect as law on 30th October, 1956, when Chapter 4A, was inserted by Act 15 of 1956. The intention of Section 32K(l)(i) to (iv) as can be gathered from the plain language is that it refers to the state of matters as existing on the date of the enforcement of the provision.
When construing a statute, the Courts have to bear in mind the reason for its enactment with reference to its intended scope and purpose. It is the endeavour of the Courts to carry out this purpose rather than to frustrate it. The legislative intent in this case would be defeated if Section 32K is meant to be read in the manner contended for by the Petitioner. The legislative purpose was to allow the owner to put under his personal cultivation land not in excess of the permissible limit and to place the surplus area at the disposal of the State Government for being utilised according to scheme framed by the State Government. This purpose will not be served if owners are permitted to retain land exceeding the permissible limit by converting their lands into orchards, specialised farms, etc., after coming into force of the provisions and during the period awaiting extinction of their title in the surplus area. This is not a case in which the statute contemplates the granting of a period within which the use of the land may be divested for the purpose of obtaining exemption. There is in this case no scope for putting strict or liberal construction on the statute, as the language used does not admit of flexibility. The Courts will refrain from straining the language of the Act or from placing forced or unnatural meaning on the expressions used, if that would defeat the effectuation of the real purpose of the Act.
It was argued by the learned Counsel for the Petitioner that strict interpretation put on Section 32K(l)(i) to (iv) will make this provision inconsistent with Section 32M. There is no merit in this contention. The argument is that u/s 32M, a ceiling is placed on future acquisition by inheritance. Thus if any person acquires by inheritance or by bequest or gift from a person to whom he is an heir, any land, which with or without the lands already owned or held by him. exceeds in the aggregate the permissible limit, then he shall within the period prescribed, furnish to the Collector, a return in the manner specified in Section 32-B giving the particulars of all lands and selecting the land he desires to retain; and if the land of such person is situated in more than one Patwar circle, he shall also furnish a declaration required by Sub-section (1) of Section 32BB. It is contended that Section 32M contemplates a right in a person who has acquired land by inheritance to give particulars of all the lands in the manner specified in Section 32BB and selecting the land he desires to retain. The argument is raised on the premise that in so far as Section 32B contemplates both the selection of the land within permissible limit which the person desires to retain, and also the land in respect of which he claims exemption from the ceiling therefor, Section 32M also is deemed to refer not merely to the retention of the land within the permissible limit but also to land in respect of which he claims exemption. Section 32M refers to only a portion of Section 32B, which relates to the giving of the particulars of all the lands and selecting the area desired to be retained but not to the lands in respect of which he claims exemption from the ceiling. No doubt Section 32B deals with both the matters relating to selection of land for the purpose of retention up to the permissible limits and also to the land in respect of which exemption is being claimed. The language of Section 32M is confined to the former class of land which is selected, that is desired to be retained within the permissible limits for personal cultivation, but not to the second category of land mentioned in Section 32B, i.e., lands in respect of which exemption is being claimed. It cannot, therefore, be urged with any degree of plausibility that Section 32M contemplates a subsequent claim in Section 32K regarding the land which is the subject matter of future acquisition by inheritance. The language of Section 32M does not warrant such an inference. Alternatively, even if it were so, Section 32M confines itself to an entirely different class of land which is subject matter of future acquisition by inheritance. The provisions of Section 32M in no way conflict with those of Section 32K. Another argument which should be taken notice of on behalf of the Petitioner is that the return giving requisite particulars in Section 32B is to be submitted in a prescribed form. The statutory rules giving the form were published on 21st March, 1958, and, therefore, a person could claim exemption for land at least up to the date of the publication of rules. This again is a pointless contention.
The qualifying date for the purposes of the exemption is to be ascertained from the Act. If that date is the date when Chapter 4A was inserted, the period for earning the qualification cannot be deemed to have been extended because it took some time before the prescribed rules were framed and published. The rules lay down the form of the application containing the returns. These rules cannot govern the provisions of the Act which indicate that the date for earning exemption is the date when Chapter 4A, becomes law.
Taking into consideration all the arguments urged in this behalf by the learned Counsel for the Petitioner, I am of the view that Section 32K(l)(i)i to (iv) refers to existing orchards, specialised farms, sugarcane farms, etc., and not to those which are brought into being after 30th of October, 1956, and prior to the vestment of the surplus area in the State Government.
After arguments had been concluded in this case and the judgment had been reserved, a recent decision of the Supreme Court in petitions Nos. 261 and 365 of 1961, decided on 27th July, 1962 Shivdev Singh v. State of Punjab in petition No. 261 of 1961, and Krishan Kumar Khosla v. State of Punjab in petition No. 365 of 1961, under Article 32 of the Constitution, has been brought to our notice. One. of the questions that came up for decision before their Lordships of the Supreme Court was the date when benefit u/s 32K(l)(iv) of the Act could be availed of in respect of "efficiently managed farms which consist of compact blocks on which heavy investment or permanent structural improvements have been made and whose breakup is likely to lead to a fall in production." Wanchoo, J., said-
Therefore, before any farm can claim that the ceiling as contained in Section 32-A shall not apply to it, it has to comply with the conditions in Clause (iv). These conditions, which may be deduced from Clause (iv) are-
(i) that the farm should be efficiently managed;
(ii) that it should consist of compact blocks;
(iii) that heavy investment or permanent structural improvements must have been made on the farm; and
(iv) the break-up of the farm is likely to lead to a fall in production.
Before, therefore, a person owning or holding a farm can claim exemption from the ceiling provided in Section 32-A, he has to show that his farm complies with all the four conditions mentioned above. * * * * * There can be no doubt, therefore, that in order that a farm may get the benefit of Section 32K((l)(iv), it must satisfy the four conditions set out above.
Further on it was observed-
Section 32K came into force on October 30, 1956, and it is obvious that it is as on that date that the Commission will have to decide whether a particular farm complies with the requirements of Section 32K(l)(iv) and should, therefore, be exempted from the operation of the ceiling provided in Section 32A. The statistics that have been provided to us, however, are of a later period. We propose to consider them but it will always have to be kept in mind that the decision of the Commission has to be on the facts as they stood on October 30, 1956, so far as Section 32K(l)(iv) is concerned.
The above observations further fortify the conclusion that the date on which benefit of exemption u/s 32K(l)(i) to (iv) can be claimed is 30th October, 1956.
I may now deal with the second contention of the Petitioner. It is contended on his behalf that being the Ruler of a Covenanting State, his proprietary rights have been safeguarded under the Covenant and cannot, therefore, be adversely affected by the provisions of the Act so far as he is concerned. Article 12 of the Covenant reads as under:
(1) The Ruler of each Convenanting State shall be entitled to the full ownership, use and enjoyment of all private properties (as distinct from State properties) belonging to him on the date of his making over the administration of that State to the Rajparmukh.
(2) He shall furnish to the Rajparmukh before the 20th day of September, 1948, an inventory of all the immovable properties, securities and cash balances held by him as such private property.
(3) If any dispute arises as to whether any item of property is the private property of the Ruler or State property, it shall be referred to such person as the Government of India may nominate in consultation with the Rajparmukh and the decision of that person shall be final and binding on all parties concerned.
Article 362 of the Constitution of India, provides that in the exercise of the power of Parliament or of the Legislature of a State to make laws or in the exercise of the executive power of the Union or of a State, due regard shall be had to the guarantee or assurance given under any such Covenant or agreement as is referred to in Article 291, with respect to personal rights, privileges and dignities of the Ruler of an Indian State.
The term "due regard" means, the consideration in a degree appropriate to the demand of the particular matter. It indicates exercise of sound discretion after balancing the pros and cons. Article 362 casts an obligation upon the State Legislature to take into consideration while passing any legislation affecting the covenanted rights of the Ruler of an Indian State, the undertaking given therein. These rules are not sacrosant and may be disregarded by the competent State Legislature. They do not override the powers of the Legislature to pass legislation affecting the guarantees given. The guarantee or assurance given to a Ruler under the terms of the Covenant is not infringed by the passing of an Act adversely affecting such a guarantee and there is nothing on the record that the Act is not conformable to Article 362 or in other words due regard was not given to the guarantee or the assurance. The Covenant is subject to a new legislation. After due consideration is paid to the guarantee given to him, the Petitioner like an ordinary citizen enjoys no other immunity from the applicability of this provision to him. Reference in this connection may be made to the observations of the Supreme Court in Jagannath Behera and Others Vs. Raja Harihar Singh Mardaraj Bhramarbara Roy, I, therefore, do not find any merit in the contention urged on the basis of the breach of Covenant. The Covenant is not infringed in the absence of any proof that due regard was not paid by the Legislature to the guarantee contained in Clause 12 of the Covenant entered into by the Union of India with the Petitioner.
I would, therefore, dismiss the petition, but leave the parties to bear their own costs.
P.D. Sharma, J.
I agree.