Hiralal Patni vs Chowthmal Sharma and Others

Thadani, C.J.—This is an application under the provisions of Sections 439 and 561A of the Code of Criminal Procedure for quashing a complaint brought in the Court of Mr. N. C. Sarma, Magistrate, 1st Class, Gauhati, on 4th April 1950, by one Chowthmal Sharma, describing himself as the Manager of Messrs. Krishna Chandra Muralidhar a firm doing business at 71, Cross Street, Calcutta, against three persons (a) Sir Bhag Chand Soni, son of Tikam Chand, Ajmir, (b) Joykumar Patni, son of Hiralal, and (c) Hiralal Patni--under Sections 417 and 420, Penal Code, and Sections 6 and 7, Merchandise Marks Act, (IV [4] of 1889). The complaint is in these terms:

The humble petition of the complainant above named most respectfully sheweth;

(1) That the complainant is the Manager of Messrs. Krishna Chandra Murlidhara partnership firm dealing, amongst other things, in cotton cloth and yarn and also acting as commission agents having their guddy at 71 Cross Street, Calcutta.

(2) That Messrs. Assam Stores at Fancy Bazar, Gauhati, is one of the agents of the complainant''s firm at Assam.

(3) That sometime in the month of March 1949 the complainant''s firm contracted with the Maharaja Kishangarh Mills Ltd., Kishangarh, Rajasthan, for supply by the said Mills of 475 bales of yarn, of which 373 bales were to be of 10s (10 counts) and the rest of higher counts according to the well-known standard of grey cotton yarn and the scheduled price fixed by the Government and the said yarn was to be sent to the aforesaid Assam Agents, e. g. Messrs. Assam Stores of Fancy Bazar, Gauhati.

(4) That Messrs. Tikkamchand Bhachand Ltd., were the Managing Agents of the said Maharaja Kishangarh Mills Ltd., hereinafter referred to as the Mills.

(5) That the accused 1 is the Managing Agent the accused 2 is the main executive in the Company, as Attorney Managing Agents, and the accused 3 is the Deputy Managing Director of the said Mills.

(6) That at the time of making the contract as aforesaid, it was stipulated that the accused persons would secure for the complainant''s firm the necessary permit from the Textile Commissioner of India for sale and despatch of the said bales of yarn contracted for.

(7) That in pursuance of the said contract, the complainant''s firm deposited with the accused persons a sum of Rs. 50 000 towards the price of the yarn which was to be adjusted against bills with Railway Receipt and Draft to be submitted by the accused persons through Banks after despatch of the goods contracted for.

(8) That the said Maharaja Kishangarh Mills Ltd., through their Agents, the abovenamed two accused, got the necessary permit No. CYC-10D/6/Prejan/1143 of 20th April 1949, in favour of the Assam Stores from the Textile Commissioner of India, the supreme authority in textile matters, and thereafter began despatching bales of yarn from Jane 1949 and the first consignment arrived at Gauhati in July 1949. Between July and September 1949, the petitioner''s firm made a total payment of, including the aforesaid deposit of Rs. 50,000, the sum of Rs. 2,51,412-5-6 through Banks against Railway Receipts, Invoices and Drafts cleared through the Banks covering 412 bales only of grey yarn out of the contracted quantity of 475 bales, in four consignments, and the accused persons did not despatch the remaining 63 bales.

(9) That according to rules then prevalent due to Assam Government Control of Cotton Yarn, the said bales on arrival at Gauhati, were freezed by the Assam Government and the same could only be sold on a Release and Distribution Order by the Textile Commissioner of the Assam Government.

(10) That on 31st August 1949, the Provincial Textile Commissioner of Assam passed the Release Order covering the bales by his Memo No. TCP 72/49/204 of 31-8-49, but the Deputy Commissioner of Kamrus ordered the Assam Stores to sell 100 bales of 10s (10 counts) yarn out of those goods to Gauhati Central Trading Co-operative Society Ltd., by his letter No. DKGTX 37/49/13 of 13-9 1949.

(11) That on opening of soma of the bales of yarn and on examination, the complainant''s Gauhati Agents found that the yarn was not all up to the standard and quality of toe yarn contracted for. Thereafter, on 27-9-49, the Assam Stores applied to the Head Teacher of the Government Weaving Institute of Gauhati for a teat and report of the samples of yarn. The said Head Teacher s report of 3 11 49 revealed that out of the six samples tested by him, not one was of the standard 10s (10 counts) and the count number as well as the breaking strength of the yarn supplied marked as 10s (10 counts) ware much under the average allowed under the law.

(12) That the complainant after the report of the Head Teacher of Government Weaving Institute got suspicious that the accused had cheated him by passing of old, unsaleable low count yarn, but charging the scheduled price for 10s, sent samples of four bales to the Textile Commissioner of India (Bombay) whose report showed that the accused had committed whole-sale cheasing and that they had sent to the complainant yams not ordered and below the average standard. Complainant had a further test made of four samples by the Technological Laboratory of the Government sponsored Indian Central Cotton Committee whose report showed the same state of affairs.

(13) That learning of this state of affairs, the Textile Commissioner of the Government of India had ordered that the Mills should refund Rs. 1 14-0 per 10 lb. of yarn from the price charged and that the bales should be re-stamped in the presence of the Mills'' representative, but the Mills'' representative refused to be present.

(14) That the accused persons applied false trade descriptions of the bundles of grey yarn by making them 10s (10 counts) when, in fast, they were not so. The accused persons also deliberately cheated the complainant''s firm by invoicing and by permit the goods at 10s(10 counts) etc., knowing fully well that they were not so and thereby inducing the complainants'' firm to accept the said goods under a belief that they were, in fact, of the standard counts as represented and to pay for them which they would never have done had they been not so deceived and the complainants'' firm suffered heavy loss as they had to sell the goods at a much lower price. The accused have thus committed offences under Sections 417 and 420, Penal Code, and also under Sections 6 and 7, Merchandise Marks Act. The accused have also cheated the complainants'' firm in respect of 68 bales of yarn alleging them to be 22s and 26 (counts) and they were found by the Government Weaving Institute, Gauhati, to be of inferior count.

The complainant, therefore, charges the accused persons under Sections 417 and 420, Penal Code and Sections 6 and 7, Merchandise Marks Act (IV [4] of 1889) and prays that your honour would be graciously pleased to Issue process against them.

It is further prayed that warrants of arrest may be Issued against the accused.

Sd/Chothmal Sharma.

4-4-1950.

The learned Magistrate examined Chowthmall Sharma upon this complaint and the examination recorded by the Magistrate is:

I complain against Hiralal Patni, Joykumar, and Bhagchand. They are partners of the firm of a Kishangarh Mills Ltd., and accused Bhagohand is the Managing Agent. Joykumar Patni is the main executive of the Managing Agency. Hiralal Patni is the Deputy Managing Director. The Assam Stores of Fancy Bazar is our Agent in Assam. I belong to the firm of Krishna Chandra Muralidhar and I am the Manager of that firm. We obtained a permit for 475 bales of yarn of various counts to be supplied at Gauhati. We arranged with the three accused for supply of the yarn according to specifications and deposited Rs. 50,000 with them as advance, After that we made payment and the total amount paid was Rs. 2,51,412 and odds. They supplied 412 bales, and on the bales there were specification marks showing the trade description, that is to say, the counts of yarns contained in the bales. We bad these yarns examined, but the yarn did not agree with the descriptions given in the bales and the yarns were mixed and of low counts and breaking strength. The yarn was tested by the Head Teacher of the Gauhati Weaving School and was also sent to the Textile Commissioner of India in Bombay and the result was as I have stated. I would not have paid the money if I had known that they would not supply according to the permit. We have thus been cheated and the accused have also committed an offence under Sections 6 and 7, Merchandise Marks Act. Bhabani Saha, the Head Teacher of the Government Weaving School, Gauhati, and others are my witnesses. Their names are given in the petition.

Mr. Fakhruddin Ahmed for the complainant conceded that nothing that is stated in paras. 1-13 of the complaint constitutes an offence. He, however, relied upon para. 11 and contended that the accused named in the complaint deliberately supplied a false trade description to the bundles of grey yarn, in that, whereas the contract was for the sale of yarn of ten counts tensile strength, the yarn delivered, when tested, was discovered to be an average tensile strength of Section 75 counts, and thereby they cheated the complainant firm by obtaining from them a price for the yarn delivered to which they wore not entitled, and also committed an offence under Sections 6 and 7, Merchandise Marks Act.

The petitioner''s case is this; The contract which is the subject matter of the complaint, was made on 16th March 1949 by one Narsingdas Jain with the mill at Kishangarh, and was duly entered in the "Sowda" book of the mill and signed by Narsingdas Jain; on behalf of the mill it was signed by one Hiralal, a salesman of the mill; none of the three accused persons personally had anything to do with the making of the contract; the yarn was to be delivered ex-mill at the stipulated price; on 17th March 1949, Narsingdas Jain paid to the mill a sum of Rs. 26,000 and another sum of Rs. l,00,000 (one lac) on 14th March 1949 for which receipts ware given to Narsingdas; in due course Narsingdas gave instructions to the Mill to despatch 412 bales of yarn to Assam Stores at Gauhati instructions which were duly complied with by the mill in June 1949; the relevant Railway receipts and hundis were made over to the Central Bank of India Limited at Ajmer in the case of two consignments and to the Punjab National Bank Ltd., at Kishangarh in the case of the remaining two consignments; the amount of the bills paid by the banks was Rs. 2,01,412-16 6 and the balance of Rs. 40,498-2-0 was adjusted against the deposit of Rs. 1,28 000 held by the Mill. On 24th August 1949 the Mill called upon Narsingdas Jain for instructions in the matter of the despath of the remaining 63 bales of yarn and 969 bales of cloth the latter of which are not the subject matter of the complaint; Narsingdas failed to give instructions in this behalf, and the Mill sent reminder to him on 7th September 1949 followed by a registered notice on 13th September 1919 intimating Naraingdas that if he did not take delivery of the goods, the mill would sell the goods by public auction on his account; Narsingdas made no reply and the Mill advertised the sale of the goods, which were in due course sold by auction on 25th September 1949 and 28th September 1949, the mill intimated Narsingdas that after giving him credit for a sum of Rs. 5,92,207-10-0 being the sale-proceeds of the goods realised at the auction, the balance still due from him was Rs. 82,422-15-3; on 25th October 1949, the mill instituted a suit against Narsingdas in the Court of the District Judge, Kishangarh, being suit No. 1552 of Sambat 2006, for the recovery of a sum of Rs. 83,422-15 3 together with certain other amounts due from Naraingdas, amounting to a total sum of Rs. 1,92,516-6-3; on let December 1949, the District Judge issued a writ for attachment before judgment against Narsingdas : 4 months later on 4th April 1959 the present complaint was brought at Gauhati against the accused persons by one Chowthmall Sharma.

Now, it is significant that the contract which the complainant Chowthmall Sharma has alleged in the complaint is also purported to have been made in March 1949, but equally significant is the fact that the date of the contract has been omitted from the complaint. Moreover, the contract alleged by Chowthmall Sharma is not in writing. This was admitted by Mr. Fakhruddin for the complainant. Mr. Fakhruddin also admitted the price at which the complainant firm is alleged to have bought the yarn. Mr. Fakhruddin further admitted that no receipt was obtained by the complainant firm or anybody else for the payment of Rs. 60,000 alleged to have been made by the complainant firm to the mill.

We have set out the rival versions of the complainant and the accused, not with a view to indicating our preference for the one to the other, but with a view to indicating how undesirable it is, on the facts of this case, to permit a criminal Court to decide questions which a civil Court is best suited to decide. It is obvious that if the present complaint were to be tried and decided by a Magistrate, he would have to decide such complicated questions as the formation of the disputed contract, including the parties thereto, the terms of the contract, its breach, whether the alleged breach of the terms as to countage amounts to a breach of the contract, or a breach of warranty and other allied questions. We do not think these questions can properly be decided by a criminal Court.

On the other hand, there is a suit instituted by the mill in Rajasthan against Narsingdas Jain for the recovery of nearly two lacs of rupees arising out of the contract for the sale of 475 bales of yarn and some bales of cloth. The suit was instituted before the present complaint, It is true that in the suit filed by the mill in the Rajasthan Court, the complainant firm is not a party. But there is nothing to prevent the complainant firm from instituting a suit to enforce their rights, if any, arising from the breach of the contract as alleged in their complaint.

Apart from the fact that the issues involved in the complaint are more appropriate to adjudication by a civil Court, we have come to the conclusion that, on the face of the complaint, no criminal offence has been made out. There is no allegation in the complaint that the complainant firm paid monies to the mill as a result of any deception practised by the accused personally. It is not the of the complainant firm that the tensile strength of the yarn was personally tested by the accused persons and found to be below 10 counts, nor is it the case of the complainant firm that the accused persons stamped the yarn with their own hands as of 10 counts, knowing it to be untrue. The stamping of the yarn was an act done apparently by the employees of the mill, and not by any of the accused personally. In the absence of any allegation by the complainant firm that the mill had deliberately delivered yarn stamped as of 10 counts tensile strength, knowing it to be untrue, we do not think any question of deception arises within the meaning of Section 415, Penal Code. The essence of cheating is first, deception, and then inducing the person so deceived, to deliver property. The fact that on testing the yarn it was found to be below 10 counts, is not necessarily evidence of deception. Moreover, the report, the only evidence in the case upon which Mr. Fakhruddin has relied, says that the average tensile strength of the yarn marked 10 counts was Section 75 counts. Mr. Fakhruddin conceded that an allowance of 5% is ordinarily made to provide variations in tensile strength of yarn owing to climatic and other conditions. The average tensile strength of the yarn delivered to the complainant firm should then have been 95. According to the report, the average strength of the specimens tested was Section 75. But the report also shows that certain specimens were of higher tensile strength, namely, over 10 counts, and some 12 counts. The presence of higher counts in the yarn stamped as ten counts negatives the suggestion of deception or intention to deceive. It is also to be observed that the specimens were tested some 4 months after the goods had been delivered -- not at a place where under the contract, the yarn was to be delivered, but at Gauhati, which is notorious for the humidity, a circumstance which might easily account for a further deterioration of 75% in the tensile strength of the yarn delivered.

It was next contended that even if the complaint does not show a prima facie case of cheating, it shows a prima facie case under Sections (sic) and 7, Merchandise Marks Act of 1889. Section 6 contemplates applying a false trade description. Assuming the description of the tensile strength of yarn amounts to trade description, which, in my opinion, it does not from the fact that on testing certain specimens of the yarn described as 10 counts, they were found to be under 10 counts, it does not follow that a false trade description had been applied to the yarn. Nowhere is it stated in the complaint that when the yarn emerged from the mill in a manufactured state, the accused knew that it was below 10 counts. and that in spite of this knowledge, they applied a false trade description. For the same reason, it cannot be said that the complaint falls within the purview of Section 7, Merchandise Marks Act.

We are satisfied that the complaint discloses no criminal offence, and that the proceedings taken upon the complaint must be set aside,

We accordingly quash the complaint and the process issued against the accused named in the complaint. The bail bonds if executed by any of the accused will stand cancelled. The rule is made absolute.

In conclusion, I wish to observe that the Magistrate who entertained this complaint has not exercised that care and caution which was expected of him when he decided to issue bailable warrants against each of the accused in the sum of Rs. 20,000, on the facts of this case.

Ram Labhaya, J.

I entirely agree with my Lord the Chief Justice that the proceedings in this case be quashed, but I wish to add a few words. (After stating the facts his Lordship continued :)

The version given above suffers from some obvious defects. The date of the contract, from which the complaint arises was not given. The name of the person who entered into the contract on behalf of the complainant''s firm is not disclosed. In the complaint and the statement of the complainant that followed it was not stated distinctly who represented the Mills when the order for the supply of yarn was placed. It was said in a vague way that the sum of Rs. 50,000 was deposited with the accused. In the counter affidavit put in on behalf of the complainant in this Court a clearer statement was made on this point. It was stated that at the time of the contract the three accused persons were present (vide Para. 6 of the counter-affidavit). The statement necessarily implies that there was some other person representing the Mills at the time of the contract. His name has not been disclosed. These defects may not be fatal to the complaint. They, however, raise doubts as to the bona fide nature of the complaint. The transaction related to 475 bales of yarn. The price of 412 bales came to about Rs. 2,50,000. The bargain is alleged to be oral and not supported by a receipt for a huge sum of Rs. 50,000 that was alleged to have been paid at the time of the contract. This fact seen in the light of omissions stated above make the alleged transaction extremely unusual and strange. Added to these, there is another serious omission in the complaint which goes to the root of the matter. As stated above, all that is said about the three accused against whom the complaint has been lodged is that they were present at the time the order for the supply of yarn was placed. There is no allegation contained in the complaint or in the statement of the complainant made on 4th April 1933 that the accused personally entered into the contract or that they had any criminal intent to cheat or defraud at that time. They are proceeded against as they happen to be Managing Agents of the Mills (vide Paras 4 and 5 the complaint). The element of criminality which is alleged to exist in the case is brought out in Para. 14 of the complaint. It is alleged in this para that the accused persons applied false trade descriptions to the bundles of grey yarn by making them appear as containing 10 counts yarn when in fact they did not contain such yarn. The accused persons also, it was alleged, deliberately cheated the complainant''s firm by invoicing the goods of 10 counts knowing full well that they were not so and thereby induced the complainant''s firm to accept the said goods. It would be noticed that acts attributed to the accused are not stated as their personal acts. Paragraph 16 of the counter-affidavit from the complainant''s side brings this aspect of the matter into clear relief. It is stated in this para that in the case of the yarns under dispute, the usual formalities were observed:

The Maharaja Kishangarh Mills, the Managing Agents of which are admittedly the three accused persons, obtained the permit from the Textile Commissioner of Government of India and began despatching the yarns to Assam Stores, Gauhati, marking the packages with the quality of the yarn and the price fixed by them and realising the price of the goods through Banks from the complainant''s Firm Krishnachandra Muralidhar of Calcutta.

In plain words it was stated that the Mills obtained the permit and sent the goods. In para, 12, the responsibility for marking the goods was fixed on the Mill''s Executives. Their names were not mentioned. A direct statement that the three accused were personally liable for applying false marks was, to say the least, avoided. The accused were described as the Managing Agents. They were thus made responsible for every thing done in the Mills in connection with the consignments in question and have been sought to be made liable in their capacities as Directors of the Managing Agency. That, this was the idea underlying the complaint is also indicated by the fact that learned Counsel for the complainant-respondent relied on Emperor Vs. The Dhanraj Mills, Ltd., for showing that a Corporation can be guilty u/s 6, Merchandise Marks Act. This case, however, does not help him. In that case the complaint was not against any of the Directors concerned with the management of the Company but it was against the Company itself. Assuming that a Company can be prosecuted under the Merchandise Marks Act, the complaint ought to be against the Company. This is intelligible as it would not be possible in most cases to fix responsibility for giving false description on individual employee of the Company who may have been responsible for it. If it could be established that the description on the bales or on the yarn was false, a prima facie case may be made out against the Company but not necessarily against individuals who constitute the managing agency of the Company. The liability for false description, if any, would be of the Mills and it would be for the Company to show that if there is any false description, it was not with intent to defraud. The existence or proof of false description by itself would not make out a case against the Directors of a Company, who are acting as Managing Agents of the Manufacturing Mills. In these circumstances it is fairly obvious that no basis for criminal liability has been disclosed against the three accused personally.

Accused 2, the petitioner before us, has given his version in the petition of revision which is supported by an affidavit. His case is that there was a contract between one Nursingdas Jain and the Mills at Kishangarh for the supply of 476 bales of yarn. It was entered in "Sowda" book of the Mills. It was signed by Narsingdas Jain, who placed the order with the Mills. The order was not limited to 475 bales of yarn; 1322 bales of cloth had also to be supplied. The Mills were represented by their salesman and none of the accused was present at the time of this transaction which came on 16th March 1949.

On 17th March, a sum of Rs. 26,000 and on filth March another sum of rupees one lakh were paid as deposits towards the price of the goods required to be supplied later. It was alleged that this money which Nursingdas Jain paid was obtained by him from Kishanchand Muralidhar''s Indore Firm whose account at Kishangarh he used to operate. Permits were obtained from the Textile authorities by the Mills in the name of various parties under instructions, written and verbal, from Nursingdas Jain. The permit for despatch of 475 bales of yarn was obtained in the name of Assam Stores, Gauhati, and 412 bales of yarn were sent to Assam Stores, Gauhati, in June 1949 and the amount recovered against railway receipts and hundis was shown as Rs. 2,01,413-16.6. The balance of the price, viz., Rs. 40,498-2-0 was adjusted from the initial deposit of Rs. 1,26,000, As no instruction was received from Nursingdas Jain for the balance of 63 bales of yarn and 969 bales of cloth, notices were sent to him. No reply was received to the registered notice of 33th September 1949. The Mills after publishing a notice on 19th September 1949 for auction of the goods, sold them in open auction on 25th and 26th September 1949. The difference payable by Nursingdas Jain on the transaction came to Rs. 82,422-15 3. He had other transactions with the Mills. His total liability on all the transactions came to Rs. l,92,516-6 3, and a suit was instituted against him on 26th October 1949 for the recovery of this sum.

The points which arise for determination from the two conflicting versions are:

(1) Whether the complainants'' firm entered into an oral contract with the Mills directly without the intervention of Nursingdas Jain and if so, when and by whom were the parties to the contract represented ? (2) What sum, if any, was paid on behalf of the complainants'' firm on the date of the contract ? (3) What were the terms of the contract? (4) Was any breach of the contract committed by the Mills ? (5) Whether the yarn supplied did not answer the quality and the standard stipulated for and was a false description marked on them ? (6) Were the three accused responsible for false description of the goods personally or was it with their knowledge or under their directions that the false description was applied and was the false description applied with intent to defraud ? (7) Could all the accused be hold responsible for false description by virtue of their position as Managing Agents, even if they had no personal knowledge that a false description within the meaning of the Merchandise Marks Act had been applied to the consignments ?

A mere statement of the questions which arise for decision shows clearly that complicated questions of fact and law arise for decision in the case and that a criminal Court is not the proper forum for the decision of such cases.

Parties should not be encouraged to resort to the criminal Courts in oases in which the points at issue between them are such that they can more appropriately be decided by a civil Court. Any tendency on the part of the litigants to take a short cut by instituting a complaint where a suit is the proper remedy should be checked by criminal Courts and they should be on their guard against lending aid to such procedure. The correctness of this view has not been questioned. Its application to the facts of this case seems equally unquestionable. The question whether there was a false description of the goods would admittedly depend on expert testimony. According to the complaint, about 14 samples presumably from 14 bales were examined. These samples were taken out by the agents of the complainants'' firm. No less than 412 bales of yarn were received at Gauhati. The bulk of the yarn has not been tested. It is pointed out that experts may differ, and climatic condition in Assam may possibly have affected the quality of a part of the yarn to some extent. These are all possibilities. The very foundation of the complaint, viz., the alleged oral contract and its items, is in dispute. The question whether there has been any breach and whether that breach amounts to an offence on the part of the parsons proceeded against is another substantial issue in the matter. It is not disputed that difficult questions of law and fact do arise. The learned Counsel realising this urged in the alternative that the complaint could at least be proceeded with so far as too case under the Indian Merchandise Marks Act is concerned. He urged that the allegations in the complaint do make out a case under this Act. It is alleged that a substantial quantity of yarn was falsely described, and it is contended that this is all that the complainant need prove for making out a prima facie case under the Indian Merchandise Marks Act. The learned Counsel, however, ignores the fact that where description of the goods is proved to be false, it is open to the accused to show that there was no intention to cheat or defraud. The question of intention, therefore, does arise. Even in the Bombay case that was relied on by him, Emperor Vs. The Dhanraj Mills, Ltd., it was remarked by the learned Chief Justice in relation to the case before him that

some pieces were correctly stamped and some were even longer than the figure with which they were stamped; which facts suggest insufficient checking rather than a fraudulent design.

The question of criminal intent, therefore would arise and will have to be decided on a careful expert examination of the entire quantity of yarn supplied. Besides this, the proof of false description alone may make out a prima facie case against the company but not necessarily against the Managing Agent personally So, a case under the Indian Merchandise Marka Act would involve substantially the same questions as would arise if the complaint were under Sections 417 and 420, Penal Code, alone.

Another factor which has an important bearing on the question whether the complaint is bona fide is the obvious delay in instituting the complaint. The complainants'' firm had received all the reports from experts by 7th January 1960. This complaint was not lodged till 4th April 1950. The suit against Narsingdas Jain with whom the contract for the supply of 475 bales of yarn along with cloth was made (according to the petitioner) was instituted on 25th October 1949. Narsingdas Jain was said to have received Rs. 26,000 that he had paid as deposit in March to the Mills from the account of the Indore Firm of Kishenchand Muralidhar (complainants firm). He was also described as a partner of a firm in some transactions at Kishangarh. These allegations about Nursingdas Jain contained in Para. 5 of the petition to this. Court are not all denied. All that was said in answer to Para. 5 of the petition was that the correctness of the statement was not admitted and the deponent was not aware of the fact that Nursingdas Jain made any payment in connection with the contract in question by obtaining money from the Indore Firm (sic) not correct to say that Nursingdas Jain was a partner in the transaction out of which this case arises. There is an implied admission that he was a partner in other transactions. As regards the alleged withdrawal of the money by Nursingdas Jain from the account of the Indore Firm of the complainants, ignorance was pleaded. The petitioner''s version of the claim does substantially form the subject-matter of the suit instituted against Nursingdas Jain. He is said to have denied the existence of a valid contract with the Mills. The complaint. it is pointed out, is really a counterblast to the suit and has been instituted with a view to obtaining a settlement of the dispute by putting pressure on the Mills. It is not easy to avoid this impression. From the facts as stated above it is safe to conclude that the complaint is an attempt to obtain from the criminal Courts in Assam a decision on matters which are pre-eminently fit for determination by a civil Court. It is apparent that the case is of an exceptional nature and a bare statement of the facts is enough to show that the ease is fit for interference at this stage. The dispute is of a civil nature and can more appropriately be decided in a civil Court, Both parties have claims against the other. They arise out of a contract. Some complicated questions are also involved and a decision on these questions involves an elaborate and a very prolonged enquiry.

The learned Counsel for the respondent has drawn our attention to AIR 1943 327 (Nagpur) The broad proposition laid down in this case is that proceedings can only be quashed when no offence whatever is disclosed or when the prosecution is bound, on the face of it, to fail, or for some other cause equally powerful. We agree with this statement of law. But on the peculiar facts of this case and for reasons given above, we hold that interference is fully justified. I, therefore, agree that the proceedings be quashed.