Hindustan Unilever Limited vs Kwick Living (I) Private Limited

“XIV. CAUSE OF ACTION

152.

The cause of action for instituting the present suit first arose on 14th August 2026, when the Defendant commenced telecasting and disseminating the impugned comparative advertisements, which denigrate and disparage the Plaintiff’s products sold under the well-known marks VIM and SURF EXCEL, across various social media platforms such as YouTube and Instagram and their webpage. The cause of action further arose when the Defendant caused the impugned comparative advertisements to be displayed on hoardings and banners installed at strategic locations and crowded public places, thereby further denigrating and disparaging the Plaintiff’s goods. The cause of action also arose when the Defendant uploaded and published the impugned comparative advertisements on its website, together with four test reports purportedly relied upon by it, thereby continuing to denigrate and disparage the Plaintiff’s goods. The cause of action is continuous and recurring and continues to subsist for so long as the Defendant continues to publish, telecast, disseminate or display the impugned comparative advertisements and related materials.

153.

The cause of action also arose on 15 August 2026, when the Plaintiff caused a letter to be issued, through its media agency, to media platforms and other parties associated with the dissemination of the Impugned Campaign, placing them on notice of the Plaintiff's objections to the Impugned Campaign on grounds of trademark infringement and disparagement, and requesting that they review the Impugned Campaign and voluntarily suspend its further telecast, streaming, hosting, or promotion pending such review.”

154.

The cause of action is continuing and recurring in nature, arising afresh with each dissemination of the Impugned Advertisements and the Impugned Webpage across YouTube, Instagram, hoardings, and the Defendant's own commercial platform.

“XV. JURISDICTION

“155.

The Plaintiff submits that this Hon'ble Court has the necessary territorial jurisdiction to entertain and try the present suit by virtue of Section 20(c) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, inasmuch as part of the cause of action has arisen within the territorial jurisdiction of this Hon'ble Court, as set out hereinbelow.

“156.

The Impugned Campaign is being systematically disseminated and are accessible within the territorial jurisdiction of this Hon'ble Court through digital platforms, including YouTube and Instagram, which are freely accessible to consumers and members of the public within Delhi and the Defendant's own commercial webpage, which is accessible within Delhi and offers the Defendant's competing products for sale within Delhi. The Defendant's campaign is, accordingly purposefully directed at, and has had real commercial effect within, the jurisdiction of this Hon’ble Court.

“157.

This Hon'ble Court further possesses jurisdiction to adjudicate the present dispute by virtue of Section 134(2) of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, and Section 62(2) of the Copyright Act, 1957. The Plaintiff carries on business within Delhi, and this Hon'ble Court accordingly has jurisdiction to entertain the present suit on this independent ground as well.”

PRELIMINARY SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE DEFENDANT ON TERRITORIAL JURISDICTION

“ 75. The Plaintiff has, to date, been able to confirm the instance of the Impugned Hoardings in Mumbai photographed on or around 16.08.2026, and reserves the right to plead further particulars of additional hoardings upon disclosure.”

“15.

The learned author Mulla in Code of Civil Procedure, 18th Edn., has observed that under clauses (a) to (c) of Section 20, the plaintiff has a choice of forum to institute a suit. The intendment of the Explanation to Section 20 of the Code of Civil Procedure is that once the corporation has a subordinate office in the place where the cause of action arises wholly or in part, it cannot be heard to say that it cannot be sued there because it did not carry on business at that place. The linking of the place with the cause of action in the Explanation where subordinate office of the corporation is situated is reflective of the intention of the legislature and such a place has to be the place of the filing of the suit and not the principal place of business. Ordinarily the suit has to be filed at the place where there is principal place of business of the corporation.

* * * * *

“18.

On a due and anxious consideration of the provisions contained in Section 20 CPC, Section 62 of the Copyright Act and Section 134 of the Trade Marks Act, and the object with which the latter provisions have been enacted, it is clear that if a cause of action has arisen wholly or in part, where the plaintiff is residing or having its principal office/carries on business or personally works for gain, the suit can be filed at such place(s). The plaintiff(s) can also institute a suit at a place where he is residing, carrying on business or personally works for gain dehors the fact that the cause of action has not arisen at a place where he/they are residing or any one of them is residing, carries on business or personally works for gain. However, this right to institute suit at such a place has to be read subject to certain restrictions, such as in case the plaintiff is residing or carrying on business at a particular place/having its head office and at such place cause of action has also arisen wholly or in part, the plaintiff cannot ignore such a place under the guise that he is carrying on business at other far-flung places also. The very intendment of the insertion of provision in the Copyright Act and the Trade Marks Act is the convenience of the plaintiff. The rule of convenience of the parties has been given a statutory expression in Section 20 CPC as well. The interpretation of provisions has to be such which prevents the mischief of causing inconvenience to the parties.

“19.

The intendment of the aforesaid provisions inserted in the Copyright Act and the Trade Marks Act is to provide a forum to the plaintiff where he is residing, carrying on business or personally works for gain. The object is to ensure that the plaintiff is not deterred from instituting infringement proceedings “because the court in which proceedings are to be instituted is at a considerable distance from the place of their ordinary residence”. The impediment created to the plaintiff by Section 20 CPC of going to a place where it was not having ordinary residence or principal place of business was sought to be removed by virtue of the aforesaid provisions of the Copyright Act and the Trade Marks Act. Where the corporation is having ordinary residence/principal place of business and cause of action has also arisen at that place, it has to institute a suit at the said place and not at other places. The provisions of Section 62 of the Copyright Act and Section 134 of the Trade Marks Act never intended to operate in the field where the plaintiff is having its principal place of business at a particular place and the cause of action has also arisen at that place so as to enable it to file a suit at a distant place where its subordinate office is situated though at such place no cause of action has arisen. Such interpretation would cause great harm and would be juxtaposed to the very legislative intendment of the provisions so enacted.

“20.

In our opinion, in a case where the cause of action has arisen at a place where the plaintiff is residing or where there are more than one such persons, any of them actually or voluntarily resides or carries on business or personally works for gain would oust the jurisdiction of other place where the cause of action has not arisen though at such a place, by virtue of having subordinate office, the plaintiff instituting a suit or other proceedings might be carrying on business or personally works for gain.

“21.

At the same time, the provisions of Section 62 of the Copyright Act and Section 134 of the Trade Marks Act have removed the embargo of suing at place of accrual of cause of action wholly or in part, with regard to a place where the plaintiff or any of them ordinarily resides, carries on business or personally works for gain. We agree to the aforesaid extent that the impediment imposed under Section 20 CPC to a plaintiff to institute a suit in a court where the defendant resides or carries on business or where the cause of action wholly or in part arises, has been removed. But the right is subject to the rider in case the plaintiff resides or has its principal place of business/carries on business or personally works for gain at a place where cause of action has also arisen, suit should be filed at that place not at other places where the plaintiff is having branch offices, etc.

* * * * *

“25.

Considering the first aspect of the aforesaid principle, the common law which was existing before the provisions of law were passed was Section 20 CPC. It did not provide for the plaintiff to institute a suit except in accordance with the provisions contained in Section 20. The defect in existing law was inconvenience/deterrence caused to the authors suffering from financial constraints on account of having to vindicate their intellectual property rights at a place far away from their residence or the place of their business. The said mischief or defect in the existing law which did not provide for the plaintiff to sue at a place where he ordinarily resides or carries on business or personally works for gain, was sought to be removed. Hence, the remedy was provided by incorporating the provisions of Section 62 of the Copyright Act. The provisions enabled the plaintiff or any of them to file a suit at the aforesaid places. But if they were residing or carrying on business or personally worked for gain already at such place, where cause of action has arisen, wholly or in part, the said provisions have not provided additional remedy to them to file a suit at a different place. The said provisions never intended to operate in that field. The operation of the provisions was limited and their objective was clearly to enable the plaintiff to file a suit at the place where he is ordinarily residing or carrying on business, etc. as enumerated above, not to go away from such places. The legislature has never intended that the plaintiff should not institute the suit where he ordinarily resides or at its head office or registered office or where he otherwise carries on business or personally works for gain where the cause of action too has arisen and should drag the defendant to a subordinate office or other place of business which is at a far distant place under the guise of the fact that the plaintiff corporation is carrying on business through branch or otherwise at such other place also. If such an interpretation is permitted, as rightly submitted on behalf of the respondents, the abuse of the provision will take place. Corporations and big conglomerates, etc. might be having several subordinate offices throughout the country. Interpretation otherwise would permit them to institute infringement proceedings at a far-flung place and at an unconnected place as compared to a place where the plaintiff is carrying on their business, and at such place, cause of action too has arisen. In the instant cases, the principal place of business is, admittedly, in Mumbai and the cause of action has also arisen in Mumbai. Thus, the provisions of Section 62 of the Copyright Act and Section 134 of the Trade Marks Act cannot be interpreted in a manner so as to confer jurisdiction on the Delhi Court in the aforesaid circumstances to entertain such suits. The Delhi Court would have no territorial jurisdiction to entertain it.

* * * * *

“52.

In our opinion, the provisions of Section 62 of the Copyright Act and Section 134 of the Trade Marks Act have to be interpreted in the purposive manner. No doubt about it that a suit can be filed by the plaintiff at a place where he is residing or carrying on business or personally works for gain. He need not travel to file a suit to a place where the defendant is residing or cause of action wholly or in part arises. However, if the plaintiff is residing or carrying on business, etc. at a place where the cause of action, wholly or in part, has also arisen, he has to file a suit at that place, as discussed above.

“14.

It is evident from the above observations that the interpretation given to the expression “carries on business” in the context of a defendant under section 20 of the Code has also been employed in the context of a plaintiff under the said sections 134(2) and 62(2). Thus, in addition to the places where suits could be filed under section 20 of the Code, the plaintiff can also institute a suit under the Trade Marks Act, 1999 and the Copyright Act, 1957, as the case may be, by taking advantage of the provisions of section 134(2) or section 62(2), respectively. Both the latter provisions are in pari materia. Under these provisions four situations can be contemplated in the context of the plaintiff being a corporation (which includes a company). First of all, is the case where the plaintiff has a sole office. In such a case, even if the cause of action has arisen at a different place, the plaintiff can institute a suit at the place of the sole office. Next is the case where the plaintiff has a principal office at one place and a subordinate or branch office at another place and the cause of action has arisen at the place of the principal office. In such a case, the plaintiff may sue at the place of the principal office but cannot sue at the place of the subordinate office. The third case is where the plaintiff has a principal office at one place and the cause of action has arisen at the place where its subordinate office is located. In this eventuality, the plaintiff would be deemed to carry on business at the place of his subordinate office and not at the place of the principal office. Thus, the plaintiff could sue at the place of the subordinate office and cannot sue (under the scheme of the provisions of section 134(2) and 62(2)) at the place of the principal office. The fourth case is where the cause of action neither arises at the place of the principal office nor at the place of the subordinate office but at some other place. In this case, the plaintiff would be deemed to carry on business at the place of its principal office and not at the place of the subordinate office. And, consequently, it could institute a suit at the place of its principal office but not at the place of its subordinate office. All these four cases are set out in the table below for greater clarity:

S.No.	Place of Plaintiff’s Principal Office (Sole office in s.no.1)	Place of Plaintiff’s Subordinate/Branch Office	Place where cause of action arose	Place where Plaintiff can additionally sue under section 134(2) and section 62(2)
1	A	--	C	A
2	A	B	A	A
3	A	B	B	B
4	A	B	C	A

“15.

The present case falls under S. No. 3 in the above table. The appellant/plaintiff has its principal office in Delhi (place A). Its subordinate office is at Deogarh, Jharkhand (place B) where it runs one of its hotels (Amrapali Clarks Inn), albeit in collaboration with Clarks Inn hotels. The alleged cause of action has accrued at Deogarh, Jharkhand (place B). Therefore, the appellant/plaintiff could, in respect of the alleged cause of action in this suit, institute a suit against the defendants at Deogarh, Jharkhand (place B) but not in Delhi. Thus, the conclusion arrived at by the learned single judge that this court did not have the territorial jurisdiction to entertain the suit cannot be faulted.”

“7.

Having considered the submissions of Mr Praveen Anand, learned counsel for the Plaintiff, we consider it appropriate to reframe the questions referred to us for our opinion as under:

(i)

For the purposes of a passing off action, or an infringement action where the Plaintiff is not carrying on business within the jurisdiction of a court, in what circumstances can it be said that the hosting of a universally accessible website by the defendants lends jurisdiction to such Court where such suit is filed (“the forum court”)?

(ii)

In a passing off or infringement action, where the defendant is sought to be sued on the basis that its website is accessible in the forum state, what is the extent of the burden on the Plaintiff to prima facie establish that the forum court has jurisdiction to entertain the suit?

(iii)

Is it permissible for the Plaintiff to establish such prima facie case through “trap orders” or “trap transactions”

“8.

At the outset it needs to be noted that the present suit is not one for infringement by the defendants of the Plaintiff's trademark and the Plaintiff carries on business within the jurisdiction of the court. If it were, then in terms of Section 134(2) of the Trademarks Act 1999 (TM Act) this court would have jurisdiction to entertain the suit although the defendants do not reside or carry on business within its jurisdiction. Section 134(2) of the TM Act (like and Section 62 (2) of the Copyright Act 1957) is therefore a “long arm” provision in a limited sense, confined to infringement actions by Plaintiffs carrying on business within the jurisdiction of the forum court. The present suit is an action for passing off in which neither the Plaintiff nor any of the defendants voluntarily resides or carries on business within the local limits of Delhi. Consequently, neither Section 20 (a) nor Section 20(b) CPC applies. The Plaintiff seeks to find the territorial jurisdiction of this Court in terms of Section 20(c) CPC. In other words, according to the Plaintiff the cause of action, wholly or in part, arises within the jurisdiction of this Court. This, according to the Plaintiff is on account of two factors. One, that the website of the defendants is accessible in Delhi; it is not a passive website but used for soliciting business in Delhi. Second, that there was at least one instance of the defendant’s brochure being sent to a Delhi resident for the purposes of sale of property.

* * * * *

“28.

To summarise the position in the US, in order to establish the jurisdiction of the forum court, even when a long arm statute exists, the Plaintiff would have to show that the defendant “purposefully availed” of jurisdiction of the forum state by “specifically targeting” customers within the forum state. A mere hosting of an interactive web-page without any commercial activity being shown as having been conducted within the forum state, would not enable the forum court to assume jurisdiction. Even if one were to apply the “effects” test, it would have to be shown that the defendant specifically directed its activities towards the forum state and intended to produce the injurious effects on the Plaintiff within the forum state. We now take a brief look at the decisions in other common law jurisdictions. … …

* * * * *

“38.

Having surveyed the law as it has developed in different jurisdictions, this Court is of the view that the essential principles developed as part of the common law can be adopted without difficulty by our courts in determining whether the forum court has jurisdiction where the alleged breach is related to an activity on the internet. At the outset, this court does not subscribe to the view that the mere accessibility of the defendant’s website in Delhi would enable this Court to exercise jurisdiction. A passive website, with no intention to specifically target audiences outside the State where the host of the website is located, cannot vest the forum court with jurisdiction. This court is therefore unable to agree with the proposition laid down in Casio. The said decision cannot be held to be good law and to that extent is overruled.

* * * * *

“41.

This court is not able to accept the submission of the learned counsel for the Plaintiff that the test of “purposeful availment” must be replaced by the test of “purposeful avoidance” While the defendant may in his defence show how he avoided the forum state, the initial burden is on the Plaintiff to show that the defendant “purposefully availed” itself of the jurisdiction of the forum court. The issue of incorporating filters to block access to the website by viewers located outside the forum state will have to be considered while deciding if the defendant had “purposefully avoided” the forum state. However, that question will arise only if the Plaintiff has been able to show that the website of the defendant is interactive and permits commercial transactions to be concluded by the defendant with a user of the website.

“42.

This Court holds that jurisdiction of the forum court does not get attracted merely on the basis of interactivity of the website which is accessible in the forum state. The degree of the interactivity apart, the nature of the activity permissible and whether it results in a commercial transaction has to be examined. For the “effects” test to apply, the Plaintiff must necessarily plead and show prima facie that the specific targeting of the forum state by the defendant resulted in an injury or harm to the Plaintiff within the forum state. For the purposes of a passing off or an infringement action (where the plaintiff is not located within the jurisdiction of the court), the injurious effect on the Plaintiff's business, goodwill or reputation within the forum state as a result of the defendant's website being accessed in the forum state would have to be shown. Naturally therefore, this would require the presence of the Plaintiff in the forum state and not merely the possibility of such presence in the future. Secondly, to show that an injurious effect has been felt by the Plaintiff it would have to be shown that viewers in the forum state were specifically targeted. Therefore the “effects” test would have to be applied in conjunction with the “sliding scale” test to determine if the forum court has jurisdiction to try a suit concerning internet based disputes.”

“31.

The plaintiff herein, being a corporation, its person is deemed to be resident of and/or carrying on business within the jurisdiction of the Court within whose territorial jurisdiction the registered office of the plaintiff is and which is at Faridabad and not within the jurisdiction of this Court. Ordinarily a wrong to the reputation of a company would be done at its registered office. However, in todays day and age, with businesses of a company spreading across countries and at least within the country, the company may have a reputation not only at the place of its residence i.e. its registered office but at each of such places where the company carries on business and/or where the goods and services are sold/provided by the plaintiff and wrong may be done to the reputation of the plaintiff at such places also.

“32.

The plaintiff herein also claims that wrong to the plaintiff has been done by the defamatory tweets of defendant, wherever the said tweets can be accessed across the globe.

“33.

I have wondered, that if such is the plea, whether a plaintiff in a suit for compensation for defamation by publication on internet, has an option under Section 19 of the CPC to sue the defendant anywhere in India.

“34.

In my opinion, no. Section 19, while vesting an option in plaintiff, only envisages, wrong done in jurisdiction of one Court and defendant residing in jurisdiction of another Court. Merely because, with the advent of trade and commerce, wrong done to the plaintiff can be across the country, cannot expand/widen the option vested under Section 19 in the plaintiff. Reading Section 19 so, would render it arbitrary, vesting an unguided option, capable of misuse in one of the parties to the lis i.e. the plaintiff and lead to “court shopping” and “libel tourism”. There is thus a need to construe/apply Section 19, in such situations, reasonably, so as not to put a plaintiff in such a suit, in a position disadvantageous to the defendant.”

PRELIMINARY SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE PLAINTIFF ON TERRITORIAL JURISDICTION

“18.

Thus, the provisions of Section 134 of the TM Act and Section 62 of the Copyright Act are in addition to and not in exclusion of Section 20 CPC. If the plaintiff can make out a cause of action within the territorial jurisdiction of this court under Section 20, no reference needs to be made to Section 134.

“19.

What constitutes cause of action in the context of a suit alleging violation of rights in a trade mark, would therefore be the question. In a case involving trade mark infringement, infringement happens when a person “uses in the course of trade” any mark without the owner’s consent. Thus, use of a mark is the cause of action in an infringement as also in a passing off action. If use takes place in a territory where the suit is filed, that court has the jurisdiction to entertain the suit. When there is use of a mark, there is a cause of action to sue, where the use takes place. it is relevant to point out that “use” of a trade mark as per Section 2(2)(c) of the TM Act is as under ……

* * * * *

“21.

Thus, jurisdiction of a court in a trade mark action, could be invoked where there is use upon or in relation to goods. The phrase “in relation to” has been interpreted to include advertising, promotion, publicity, etc. ……

* * * * *

“23.

Thus, when Section 20 CPC provides that a suit could be filed in any place where the cause of action arises, in a suit involving rights in a trade mark, cause of action arises in each and every place where there is any form of use of the said mark. Principles which apply to infringement, actions to determine “use” would equally apply to passing off actions.”

“19.4.6

The learned Single Judge is, therefore, correct in his view that, as per the law declared in Banyan Tree Holding, the mere existence of an interactive website of the defendant, accessible within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court, would not be sufficient for the suit to be maintainable here. It would additionally have to be shown that some commercial transaction was concluded within the jurisdiction of this Court.

* * * * *

“19.5.1

Banyan Tree Holding was, however, subsequently diluted to an extent by the judgment of the Division Bench of this Court in World Wrestling Entertainment.

* * * * *

“19.5.4

The existence of a website of the plaintiff, over which a commercial transaction could be concluded was, therefore, regarded by the Division Bench in World Wrestling Entertainment as sufficient to amount to “carrying on a business” by WWE within the jurisdiction of this Court. The actual conclusion of a transaction was, therefore, no longer indispensable, after World Wrestling Entertainment.

“19.5.5

World Wrestling Entertainment undoubtedly is not an authority for understanding the expression “cause of action” as contained in Section 20(c) of the CPC. However, it is an authority for the understanding of the expression “carries on business” in an era in which business is considerably carried on over e-commerce websites. The Division Bench has held, in World Wrestling Entertainment, that, even if the website of the plaintiff was interactive and one over which a commercial transaction could be concluded, that would suffice to constitute “carrying on of business by the plaintiff”, as, in the e-commerce universe, every place where the website of an entity would be accessible for the purpose of concluding a commercial transaction would amount to a place where the entity has a market place. If, therefore, WWE had a website over which commercial transactions could be concluded at Delhi, it was equivalent to WWE having a brick and mortar store in Delhi, resulting in this Court having territorial jurisdiction in the matter. Thus, the requirement of actual concluding of a commercial transaction over the website stands diluted in World Wrestling Entertainment.

“19.6

Section 20(a) of the CPC permit a plaintiff to sue a defendant wherever the defendant carries on business. The law declared by this Court in World Wrestling Entertainment with respect to the carrying on business by the plaintiff, in an e-commerce regime, for the purpose of Section 134(2) of the Trade Marks Act, would equally apply to carrying on a business by the defendant for the purpose of Section 20(a) of the CPC. Wherever, therefore, the defendant would have an interactive website, over which a commercial transaction could be concluded, any Court having jurisdiction over every place where this could be done would have jurisdiction to entertain the suit.”

“15.

I have re-read Sanjay Dalia supra including with reference to the paragraphs aforesaid which were highlighted by senior counsel for applicant/defendant and am unable to agree with the contention of the senior counsel for the applicant/defendant. A reading of the judgment does not indicate that the territorial jurisdiction of the Courts under Section 20 of the CPC in respect to suits under the Copyright Act and Trademarks Act was for consideration. What was for consideration was only the conferment of territorial jurisdiction in addition to Section 20 of the CPC, by Sections 62 and 134 supra. It is for this reason only that repeatedly the expression “additional remedy”, “additional jurisdiction” and “additional forum” find mention in the judgment including in the paragraphs which are highlighted.

“16.

Thus, in my view, what has been held in Sanjay Dalia supra is applicable only if territorial jurisdiction is invoked by invoking Sections 62 or 134 supra and not if the territorial jurisdiction of the Court is invoked under Section 20 of the CPC, as the plaintiffs are doing in the present case and territorial jurisdiction of this Court whereunder is not in dispute.”

Rukhmani Keshwani :

“48.

The doctrine enunciated in IPRS (supra) is principally attracted where the chosen forum bears no real nexus to the underlying cause of action, and where the plaintiff seeks to abandon the place where both the principal office is situated and where the substantive cause of action arose. The decision was never intended to foreclose jurisdiction in every forum other than the place of principal business, particularly where the independent and substantive elements of the cause of action arise within such forum, or where the special provisions under Sections 134 and 62 override Section 20 of CPC.

* * * * *

“58.

The ratio emerging from Kohinoor Seed Fields India Pvt. Ltd (supra) is that the Court must examine the substance of the commercial targeting and the purposeful availment of the forum, rather than mechanically confining itself to the existence or absence of completed transactions. Thus, where online listings are intended to solicit business, display commercial contact details, facilitate customer interaction, and expand market reach into multiple jurisdictions, the territorial nexus is sufficiently established.”

ITC Ltd. :

“116.

Clearly, the afore-extracted passages from IPRS forbid the filing of a suit where the cause of action has arisen at the place where the plaintiff has its principal place of business, but may also have arisen at some distant place where the plaintiff has a subordinate office. In such a case, the Supreme Court holds that the plaintiff cannot elect to file the suit at the distant place where it has its subordinate office, even though a part of the cause of action has arisen at the principal place of business of the plaintiff.

* * * * *

“118.

We cannot, therefore, agree with Mr Ramanujan in his submission that, as ITC has a subordinate office at Chennai, or as ITC has its head office at Kolkata, it would have to institute the suit either at Chennai or at Kolkata. Inasmuch as part - in fact the determinative part - of the cause of action has arisen at Delhi, where ITC's Dakshin restaurant is situated and where, therefore, the injury resulting from the use, by AGH, of the “Dakshin” Mark would be felt by ITC, we are of the opinion that ITC cannot be foreclosed from filing the present suit at Delhi.”

DEFENDANT’S SUBMISSIONS IN REJOINDER

DISCUSSION & CONCLUSION

Supreme Court Decision

“18.

On a due and anxious consideration of the provisions contained in Section 20 CPC, Section 62 of the Copyright Act and Section 134 of the Trade Marks Act, and the object with which the latter provisions have been enacted, it is clear that if a cause of action has arisen wholly or in part, where the plaintiff is residing or having its principal office/carries on business or personally works for gain, the suit can be filed at such place(s). The plaintiff(s) can also institute a suit at a place where he is residing, carrying on business or personally works for gain dehors the fact that the cause of action has not arisen at a place where he/they are residing or any one of them is residing, carries on business or personally works for gain. However, this right to institute suit at such a place has to be read subject to certain restrictions, such as in case the plaintiff is residing or carrying on business at a particular place/having its head office and at such place cause of action has also arisen wholly or in part, the plaintiff cannot ignore such a place under the guise that he is carrying on business at other far-flung places also. The very intendment of the insertion of provision in the Copyright Act and the Trade Marks Act is the convenience of the plaintiff. The rule of convenience of the parties has been given a statutory expression in Section 20 CPC as well. The interpretation of provisions has to be such which prevents the mischief of causing inconvenience to the parties.

“19.

The intendment of the aforesaid provisions inserted in the Copyright Act and the Trade Marks Act is to provide a forum to the plaintiff where he is residing, carrying on business or personally works for gain. The object is to ensure that the plaintiff is not deterred from instituting infringement proceedings “because the court in which proceedings are to be instituted is at a considerable distance from the place of their ordinary residence”. The impediment created to the plaintiff by Section 20 CPC of going to a place where it was not having ordinary residence or principal place of business was sought to be removed by virtue of the aforesaid provisions of the Copyright Act and the Trade Marks Act. Where the corporation is having ordinary residence/principal place of business and cause of action has also arisen at that place, it has to institute a suit at the said place and not at other places. The provisions of Section 62 of the Copyright Act and Section 134 of the Trade Marks Act never intended to operate in the field where the plaintiff is having its principal place of business at a particular place and the cause of action has also arisen at that place so as to enable it to file a suit at a distant place where its subordinate office is situated though at such place no cause of action has arisen. Such interpretation would cause great harm and would be juxtaposed to the very legislative intendment of the provisions so enacted.

* * * * *

“21.

At the same time, the provisions of Section 62 of the Copyright Act and Section 134 of the Trade Marks Act have removed the embargo of suing at place of accrual of cause of action wholly or in part, with regard to a place where the plaintiff or any of them ordinarily resides, carries on business or personally works for gain. We agree to the aforesaid extent that the impediment imposed under Section 20 CPC to a plaintiff to institute a suit in a court where the defendant resides or carries on business or where the cause of action wholly or in part arises, has been removed. But the right is subject to the rider in case the plaintiff resides or has its principal place of business/carries on business or personally works for gain at a place where cause of action has also arisen, suit should be filed at that place not at other places where the plaintiff is having branch offices, etc.”

Delhi High Court Decisions