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Judgment
K. Chandru, J.—""Large-scale theft of electricity is a very alarming problem faced by all the State Electricity Boards in our country, which is
causing loss to the State revenue running in hundreds of crores of rupees every year. In our considered view, after proper adjudication of the cases
of all those who are found to be guilty of the offence of committing theft of electricity; apart from the sentence of conviction, the court should
invariably impose heavy fine making theft of electricity a wholly non-profitable venture. The most effective step to curb this tendency perhaps could
be to discontinue the supply of electricity to those consumers temporarily or permanently who have been caught abstracting electricity in a
clandestine manner on more than one occasion. The legislature may consider incorporating this suggestion as a form of punishment by amending
Section 39 of the Electricity Act, 1910."" These observations made by the Supreme Court in Jagmodhan Mehatabsing Gujaral and Others Vs.
State of Maharashtra, will set the tone for deciding the issues raised in these writ petitions questioning the vires of the amendment made to the
Electricity Act, 2003 and the Regulations made there under.
These matters were grouped together and posted before this Court by the order of the Hon''ble Chief Justice, dated 29.08.2009 and were
finally heard on 14.09.2009.
Heard Mr. AR. L. Sundaresan, learned Senior Counsel representing for Mr. K. Seshadri and Mr. S. Parthasarathy, learned Senior Counsel
representing for Mr. C.S. Krishnamoorthy appearing for petitioners and Mr. P.S. Raman, learned Advocate General assisted by Mr. A.
Selvendhiran and Mr. J. Ravindran, learned Government Advocates.
In W.P. Nos. 6968 and 6969 of 2008, the petitioner is one and the same person. The petitioner is a private limited company. Both the writ
petitions is for a declaration that Section 135(1A) of the Electricity Act 2003 introduced by the Electricity (Amendment) Act 2007 as well as
Regulation 1(C) under which Regulations 19 and 23 were amended on 13.6.2007 and 12.09.2007 by the Tamil Nadu Electricity Supply
(Amendment) Code 2007 and Tamil Nadu Electricity Supply (Second Amendment) Code 2007 and the proceedings of the third Executive
Engineer, Salem Electricity Distribution Circle, dated 10.03.2008 as arbitrary, illegal, ultravires and unconstitutional.
Both the writ petitions were admitted on 20.3.2008. The first writ petition related to the HT service connection No. 128 and the second writ
petition related to HT Service connection No. 248 availed by the petitioner company. Pending those writ petitions, in both the writ petitions, this
Court granted a direction to restore the supply of electricity on the petitioner depositing 25% of demand and balance 25% shall be deposited
within a period of eight weeks, failing which disconnection of service connections may be made, by an order, dated 20.03.2008. Subsequently,
applications were taken up in M.P. Nos. 3 and 3 of 2008, seeking to modify the order, dated 20.3.2008. This Court granted time extension for
paying the second installment.
In W.P. No. 6940 of 2006, the challenge of the petitioner is to set aside the order, dated 2.3.2006 passed by the Executive Engineer (O&M),
Mylapore, where the petitioner was a lessee of a premise in No. 7, Ramakrishna Mutt Road, Mylapore, Chennai-4. By the impugned order, the
petitioner''s premises was found to commit energy theft and the petitioner compounded the offence by paying Rs. 70,000/-. Subsequently, an
assessment was made u/s 135 of the Electricity Act, 2003. Therefore, a penal levy was also made, which was directed to be paid in five
installments. The first installment is at the rate of Rs. 43,699/- and the other four installments is at the rate of Rs. 43,698/- each.
Pending the writ petition, this Court granted an interim stay in WPMP No. 7536 of 2006, dated 14.6.2006 to pay a sum of Rs. 50000/- as a
condition for the grant of stay. While attacking the order passed by the second respondent, the ground raised by the petitioner was that since he
had already paid the compounding charge u/s 152 of the Electricity Act and hence, there cannot be any further demand from the respondents.
Since the offence of energy theft is punishable u/s 135 of the Act, no assessment order u/s 154 is permissible.
W.P. No. 11585 of 2009 was filed by the petitioner, who was a lessee of the premises at No. 2, Kamaraj Street, Rajaji Nagar, Tiruvottiyur,
Chennai-19, challenging the order, dated 18.05.2009 passed by the Assistant Executive Engineer (O&M), Manali as the same being violative of
provisions of the Electricity Act, 2000 as well as the Regulations of the Supply Code 2004.
Pending the writ petition, the petitioner was directed to pay Rs. 15 lakhs out of total demand of Rs. 59,42,790.90. The said amount was
directed to be paid in two installments and a direction to restore the power supply was also made by this Court.
W.P. Nos. 23287 and 24478 of 2008 were filed by the same person, who is the Manager of a Carbide factory functioning in the name and
style of A.V. Industries, Thoothukudi District. In the first writ petition, the challenge is to the notification issued under the Tamil Nadu Electricity
Supply (Amendment) Code 2007, dated 13.06.2007 as unconstitutional and ultravires of Electricity Act. In the second writ petition, the prayer is
to set aside the order dated 30.8.2008 passed by the second respondent the Executive Engineer, Tamil Nadu Electricity Board.
The first writ petition was admitted on 22.10.2008. The second writ petition was admitted on 07.10.2008. In the first writ petition, in an
application for an interim relief, only notice was ordered. In the second writ petition, this Court granted an interim stay on condition that the
petitioner pays Rs. 5 lakhs within a period of four weeks. When the respondent Board filed a vacate stay application, this Court recorded that the
petitioner had paid altogether a sum of Rs. 10 lakhs including his earlier payment and the interim stay was made absolute on condition that the
petitioner pays a further lumpsum of Rs. 7.5 lakhs within four weeks.
In W.P. No. 2078 of 2004, the petitioner was a private limited company and they have challenged the order, dated 23.12.2003 issued by the
Superintending Engineer, Gobi Electricity Distribution Circle as illegal and violative of principles of natural justice. The ground raised by the
petitioner was that the respondents cannot presume theft of energy and they cannot decide such a dispute. No enquiry was conducted in terms of
terms and conditions of Supply. The writ petition was admitted on 6.2.2004. Pending the writ petition, this Court granted an interim stay on
condition that the petitioner pays Rs. 10 lakhs within six weeks. The stay was made absolute and the subsequent attempt to vacate the interim
order was rejected by this Court. Two applications for fixing an early date was filed by the Board, but still the matter was not taken up.
The petitioner also filed WPMP No. 18873 of 2006 seeking to raise additional grounds. In the additional grounds, the petitioner has taken a
stand that the Special Court constituted u/s 153 of the Act alone is competent to decide the civil liability and the officials of the Board cannot
assume the power to fix the liability. The Codes framed u/s 50 of the Electricity Act, 2003 are binding on them.
On behalf of the Board, various counter affidavits have been filed justifying the provisions impugned in the writ petitions including the notices
issued by them. The Electricity Regulatory Commission has also filed a counter affidavit, dated 9.6.2008, justifying the amendment made to the
regulations.
Mr. AR. L. Sundaresan, learned Senior Counsel appearing for some of the petitioners submitted that original Section 135 of the Electricity
Act, 2003 was substituted by the Electricity Amendment Act, 2007 (Central Act, 26/07). The said provision dealt with the theft of electricity. By
the amendment, Section 135(1-A) was introduced. The said provision reads as follows:
Section 135(1-A) Without prejudice to the provisions of this Act, the licensee or supplier, as the case may be, may, upon detection of such theft of
electricity, immediately disconnect the supply of electricity:
Provided that only such officer of the licensee or supplier, as authorised for the purpose by the Appropriate Commission or any other officer of the
licensee or supplier, as the case may be, of the rank higher than the rank so authorised shall disconnect the supply line of electricity:
Provided further that such officer of the licensee or supplier, as the case may be, shall lodge a complaint in writing relating to the commission of
such offence in police station having jurisdiction within twenty-four hours from the time of such disconnection:
Provided also that the licensee or supplier, as the case may be, on deposit or payment of the assessed amount or electricity charges in accordance
with the provisions of this Act, shall, without prejudice to the obligation to lodge the complaint as referred to in the second proviso to this clause,
restore the supply line of electricity within forty-eight hours of such deposit or payment.
The power granted to the officials under the amended provision that in case of detection of theft of electricity, the immediate disconnection of
supply of electricity was highly arbitrary and such a provision is unconstitutional and violative of Article 14. Under the amended provision, the
decision that there was theft of electricity was to be arrived at by the authorities is likely to be misused. It is only after the disconnection, a
complaint will be lodged in a police station within 24 hours. It is only when the licensee or the supplier deposits the assessed amount, then without
prejudice to the criminal case, the supply will be restored within 48 hours. This draconian power is not contemplated under the scheme of the Act.
The learned Senior Counsel also submitted that Section 151 of the Electricity Act, 2003 provides for cognizable offences and Part XV of the
Act provides for the constitution of the Special Courts. Section 154 provides for procedure and power of the Special Court. A combined reading
of Section 154(4), (5) and (6) will show that the Special Court has been empowered to decide the matter on obtaining evidence and also can
determine the civil liability against the consumer or person in terms of money for theft of energy and no amount can be charged less than the amount
equivalent to 2 times of tariff rate applicable for a period of 12 months preceding the date of detection of theft of energy or exactly the period of
theft is determined whichever is less. The amount of civil liability so determined shall be recovered as if it was a decree of a civil court. In the said
provision, it was also stated that if the civil liability determined by the Special Court is less than the amount deposited by the consumer, the excess
amount deposited by the consumer shall be refunded by the Board within a fortnight from the date of communication of the order of the Special
Court together with prevailing interest fixed by the Reserve Bank of India from the date of deposit till the date of payment.
The said Section 154 also has an explanation defining as to what it means by the term ""civil liability"" and it reads as follows:
Explanation. - For the purposes of this section, ''civil liability'' means loss or damage incurred by the Board or licensee or the concerned person, as
the case may be, due to the commission of an offence referred to in [Sections 135 - 140 and Section 150].
The learned Senior Counsel also submitted that pursuant to the amendment made to the Act, the State Government has issued G.O.Ms. No.
118, Energy Department, dated 27.11.2006, authorizing some of the officers to deal with the theft of energy and unauthorised use of electricity.
The said notification has come into force on 27.11.2006. In respect of Low Tension Services including temporary services, the Executive Engineer
of Transmission Utility/Wing and in case of High Tension and Extra High Tension services including temporary services, the Superintending
Engineer of the State Transmission Utility/Wing had been appointed as assessment officers for compensation of theft of energy as required under
Sections 126, 135, 151 and 152(1) of the Electricity Act, 2003.
The learned Senior Counsel also pointed out that the Tamil Nadu Electricity Regulatory Commission, Chennai had issued an amendment to
Tamil Nadu Electricity Supply Code by exercising power u/s 50 of the Electricity Act, 2003, providing for recovery of electricity charges. While
the amended regulation was brought into effect from the date on which it was published in the Gazette on 13.6.2007, Regulations 14 and 16 have
been brought into force with retrospective effect from 1.9.2004. It was considered by the Commissioner that there was necessity to amend the
regulations so as to remove the difficulties and misconception. The power was exercised to amend the regulations in terms of Section 181 read
with Section 50 of the Electricity Act.
Section 50 of the Electricity Act authorises the State Commission to specify the Electricity Supply Code providing for certain functions to be
discharged by the licensee or supplier. The said section reads as follows:
The Electricity Supply Code. - The State Commission shall specify an Electricity Supply Code to provide for recovery of electricity charges,
intervals for billing of electricity charges, disconnection of supply of electricity for non-payment thereof, restoration of supply of electricity,
measures for preventing tampering, distress or damage to electrical plant or electrical line or meter, entry of distribution licensee or any person
acting on his behalf for disconnecting supply and removing the matter, entry for replacing, altering or maintaining electric lines or electrical plants or
meter and such other matters.
u/s 181, the State Commission is empowered to make regulations as set out in the said provision. In the amended regulation, the petitioner''s
grievance is with reference to the introduction of Regulation 23AA. The said Regulation 23AA provides for procedure for assessment of electricity
charges, disconnecting of supply of electricity and removing meter, electric line, electric plant and other apparatus in case of theft of electricity as
set out therein.
According to the learned Senior Counsel, such power of delegation is not contemplated either under the Act or under the Rules. The learned
Senior counsel submitted that such a sweeping delegation given to the authorities of the Board is highly unjust. It is an excessive delegation done by
the Central Government by virtue of Section 50 of the Electricity Act. In the guise of such delegation, the delegate cannot expand his power. On
the contrary, Section 50 r/w Section 181 do not permit this power to be delegated. The Code framed by the Electricity Regulatory Commission
must be consistent with the provisions of the Act and Rules. By such delegation, the power of the Court cannot be taken away and the Act do not
contemplate conferring of such draconian power on the Electricity Board.
Section 135(1-A) is oppressive as the disconnection of power is given to an executive authority without judicial approval. The authorities
cannot be empowered to disconnect the supply of electricity only on the premise that there was theft of energy. Further, only by deposit of an
amount as computed by them, it will be restored for which 48 hours'' time has been given, during which period the Industry will suffer. The officers
cannot adjudicate the factum of theft. Since maximum amount to be recovered is also prescribed under the Act, the civil liability of the consumer
can also be determined by the Special Court. Any disconnection or collection of determined amount can be done only after orders were passed by
the Special court, which is also empowered to adjudicate not only the criminal case, but also the civil liability of the consumer. Therefore, the
learned Senior Counsel submitted that the amendment made is unwarranted and will defeat the very purpose of the liberal object behind enacting
the Electricity Act, 2003.
Mr. S. Parthasarathy, learned Senior Counsel appearing for some of the petitioners, after referring to facts of the case in which he is appearing,
referred to certain unreported decisions of this Court and stated that in the method of arriving final assessment, reasons are not expected to be
given, and proper opportunity is to be given. The grant of seven days is not sufficient. By the guise of delegating power to the Regulatory
Commission, the legislative functions cannot be given to them. He attacked the regulation of being excessive delegation. He further stated that a
delegate cannot further delegate. He also stated that it is a colourable legislation. The word assessment has got multifaceted meaning and the power
cannot be given to the authorities to make an assessment. Since the power of the criminal court has been expanded to decide the civil liability, the
respondents should be made to await the final adjudication by the criminal court.
In reply to these contentions, Mr. P.S. Raman, learned Advocate General submitted that the impugned provisions are intra vires of the Act and
there is no unconstitutionality. The Government of India has issued notification u/s 183 of the Act, by which the Central Government by a
notification can remove the difficulties. Such a notification, if it is necessary for removing the difficulties and without being inconsistent provisions of
the Act, can be validly issued. By the exercise of power u/s 183, the Central Government had issued the Electricity (Removal of Difficulties)
Order, 2005 on 8.6.2005.
Section 2 of the said Electricity (Removal of Difficulties) Order, 2005 reads as follows:
Inclusions of measures to control theft in Electricity Supply Code.-
(1)The Electricity Supply Code as specified by the State Commission u/s 50 of the Act shall also include the following, namely:
(i) Method of assessment of the electricity charges payable in case of theft of electricity pending adjudication by the appropriate court;
(ii) Disconnection of supply of electricity and removing the meter, electric line, electric plant and other apparatus in case of theft or unauthorized
use of electricity; and
(iii) Measures to prevent diversion of electricity, theft or unauthorized use of electricity or tampering, distress or damage to electrical plant, electric
lines or meter.
(2) The above provisions in the Electricity Supply Code shall be without prejudice to other rights of the licensee under the Act or any other
applicable laws to recover the sum due and to protect the assets and interests of the licensee.
He stated that between 2003 and 2005, which period the new Act had come into force, the old Act will not apply and there appears to be
some vacuum. In this context, he referred to an unreported judgment of this Court in M. Senthil Kumar and Anr. v. The Superintending Engineer,
TNEB (South), Coimbatore Electrical Distribution Circle and Ors. in W.P. No. 23188 of 2006, dated 9.10.2006. When this pointed out, in an
attack on the complaint lodged for a energy theft, in paragraph 4, this Court observed as follows:
In these circumstances, the impugned orders dated 23.5.2006 and 19.6.2006 are quashed. It is open to the respondents to proceed in
accordance with law upon the complaint, if this Court is not inclined to quash the complaint in exercise of its powers u/s 482 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure in Crl. O.P. No. 13688 of 2006. It is also open to the respondents to proceed in accordance with law once the provisions as
contemplated under the Electricity (Removal of Difficulties) Order, 2005, are included. Since the Act as it now stands and since the Electricity
(Removal of Difficulties) Order, 2005 seem to indicate that when proceedings u/s 135 is initiated, recourse cannot be had to assessment u/s 126,
the writ petition will necessarily have to be allowed. If the method of assessment of electricity charges in case of theft of electricity pending
adjudication by the Criminal Court, is laid down, then also, the orders passed in this writ petition would not stand in the way of the respondents to
take such action as is necessary and in accordance with law.
The notification issued on 13.6.2007 in its preamble, it was noted that since the Electricity Board expressed difficulties in implementing the
provisions of Regulations with regard to assessment and disconnection of supply in case of theft of electricity, the Commission was made to amend
the regulation by taking advantage of the Electricity (Removal of Difficulties) Order, 2005.
In fact, the need to curb such theft need not be elaborated. He also referred to the judgment of the Division Bench of this Court in The
Executive Engineer (Distribution), Tamil Nadu Electricity Board Vs. S.J. Gayas and The Secretary, Energy Department, Government of Tamil
Nadu, presided by Elipe Dharma Rao, J. In paragraph 27 of the said judgment, it has been observed as follows:
A careful study of the entire materials placed on record would establish, in more than one way, the sole intention of the consumers in these
cases to avoid the payment of the amounts claimed under the assessment orders, passed by the Department, on having found them to have
committed electricity theft, which is a very serious offence. The Electricity energy generated and distributed is a ''material source of the
community''. There can be no doubt that such electricity theft would paralyse the entire system, besides putting the Electricity Board and
consequently the State in a pathetic situation, leading to chaos and shortage in supplies to the genuine consumers also, which should be avoided by
strict adherence of the laws and none should be allowed to resort to collapse the entire system impairing very purpose of such laws and such
menace should be curbed with an iron hand for the betterment of the Society at large.
The learned Advocate General also pointed out that under Regulation 23(AA)(7), the method to fix the assessment has been prescribed.
Ultimately, with a view not to drive the consumer to different forums, the same Criminal court in which the complaint is lodged was also given the
power like that of civil court to determine the civil liability. The Act also provides for an obligation on the Board to refund the amount basing upon
the order of the Special Judge together with prevailing rate of interest fixed by the Reserve Bank of India. Therefore, those persons who indulge in
unauthorized utilization of electricity or theft of energy, cannot address argument about arbitrariness both by the amended Act and the Regulations.
Only such class of person who are involved in energy thefts or misuse the energy have been dealt with and it cannot be open to them to allege that
the Act is arbitrary.
On the contrary, the Act with amended notification clearly spells out a procedure. The procedure that is contemplated is first the detection of
theft by a notified officer and thereafter, disconnecting the power supply forthwith by the said authorities. Lodging of complaint within 24 hours and
on payment of assessed amount, the restoration of electricity within 48 hours. Thereafter, the trial before the criminal court on the complaint. Apart
from conviction if any there is also provision for the Special Court to fix the civil liability. In case the amounts to be paid by the consumer is less
than the amount deposited, the refund of the balance amount together with prevailing rate of interest as fixed by the Reserve Bank of India will be
done. These are the sufficient guidelines in tune with Articles 14, 19(1)(g) read with Article 21 of the Constitution. Therefore, there is no scope for
entertaining the writ petitions attacking these amendments.
He also submitted that the order made u/s 183 by the Central Government is not under challenge in any of the writ petitions. He also submitted
that in law, a legislation covering a particular, is permissible. The learned Advocate General also brought to the notice of this Court another
Division Bench judgment of this Court in W.A. Nos. 343 and 344 of 1998, etc. dated 12.01.2009 in The Superintending Engineer, TNEB, Salem
Electricity Distribution Circle, Salem v. Annamalai Cotton Mills P. Ltd. The said case arose out of a challenge made to the provisions relating to
disconnection of electricity in case of theft under the Electricity Supply Act, 1948. He referred to the observations made in paragraphs 82 to 86,
wherein the terms and conditions of Supply of Electricity found in Chapter 37 of Schedule Part I and Appendix VI and VII in Chapter 38 of
Schedule Part II were held to be statutory and they sufficiently prescribed the power of the Board.
In reply to these submissions, Mr. AR. L. Sundaresan, learned Senior Counsel replied that the amendment had changed the face of the Act by
giving unbridled power. The power given to the Commission cannot expand the width of the power entrusted to it.
Mr. S. Parthasarathy, learned Senior Counsel reiterated his earlier contentions that there were no guidelines prescribed for the authorities to
follow and there was also no safeguard. He further submitted that the well known maxim that a delegate cannot further delegate will apply to the
facts on hand.
Mr. AR. L. Sundaresan, learned Senior Counsel placed reliance upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in K.I. Shephard and Others Vs.
Union of India (UOI) and Others, . The learned Senior Counsel by referring to paragraph 13 submitted that the rules of natural justice will apply to
administrative action and any decision to exclude a section from application of the said principle will be bad. In that case, the allegation was that a
scheme framed under the Banking Regulations Act excluded some of employees on the amalgamation of a bank in the transferee bank while
retaining others. In such circumstance, it was held to be violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. Such a contingency does not arise in the present
case.
Learned Senior Counsel also placed reliance upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in State of Kerala and Others Vs. M/s. Travancore
Chemicals and Manufacturing Co. and Another, . In that case, the challenge was to Section 59A of Kerala General Sales Tax Act, wherein when
a doubt arise over the rate of tax leviable, the matter can be referred to the State Government for its decision and notwithstanding any other
provisions of the Act, the decision of the Government was binding. This was considered to be highly arbitrary. Since the said law gave absolute
power to Government to decide any question and as the section cannot be read down to make it constitutional, the provision was held to be ultra
vires.
The Senior Counsel also placed reliance upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in Distt. Registrar and Collector, Hyderabad and Another
Vs. Canara Bank Etc., . In that case, Section 73 of the Stamps Act as amended by A.P. Act 17 of 1986 was held to be suffering from the vice of
excessive delegation. It was particularly pointed out that there was no guideline for the person authorized and the reasons are not to be recorded
when a search is made and the power of impounding the document can be exercised without giving notice. Therefore, since an unstamped
instrument cannot be received in evidence and it cannot be acted upon by a public officer, the penalty provided was held to be a sufficient
safeguard. On detection of unstamped instrument, the authority has power to impound the document and collect duty including penalty. In case of
criminal fraud, necessary criminal proceedings can also be initiated. Therefore, if it is considered in this context the draconian power given to the
authorities without guidelines was frowned upon by the Supreme Court.
The Senior Counsel thereafter placed reliance upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in Mardia Chemicals Ltd. Vs. Union of India (UOI)
and Others Etc. Etc., . In construing the provisions of the SARFAESI Act in paragraph 34, the Supreme Court held that law should not be in
derogation of the rights which are guaranteed to the people under the Constitution. The procedure should be fair, reasonable and valid.
The Senior counsel in the very same judgment also referred to the findings recorded in paragraphs 55 to 64, wherein the Supreme Court has
held that the proceedings u/s 17 of the Act are not appellate proceedings. As it is an initial proceedings like filing of a suit in a civil court, the
requirement of prior deposit even for filing initial proceedings was held to be invalid. This was on the basis of one sided claim that too without an
adjudication of a dispute. The supreme Court has held that merely giving power to Tribunal to waive or reduce the amount will not cure the
inherent infirmity leaning one-sidedly in favour of the party, which alone is entitled to decide the amount without participation of the borrower in the
process. Such a condition of pre deposit was held to be onerous and oppressive.
The learned Senior Counsel also placed reliance upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in Bidhannagar (Salt Lake) Welfare Association Vs.
Central Valuation Board and Others, . In that case, the review committee constituted by the State Government to review the decision of the
Municipality was considered as not independent of the municipality or the Board. Each one of them were in one way or other interested in making
a decision. Such conferment of power on interested persons is akin to the doctrine of Caesar to Caesar. Though it provides for a judicial review by
the Courts, it was held that cannot be a ground to constitute a review committee by interested persons.
The learned Senior Counsel also placed reliance upon the decision of the Supreme Court in Agricultural Market Committee Vs. Shalimar
Chemical Works Ltd., . It was laid therein that delegate while making subsidiary rules or regulations cannot widen or restrict the scope of the Act
or the policy or principle. The bye-laws framed under the State enactment was held to be ultra vires. Therefore, he submitted that the State
Regulatory Commission making regulations is contrary to the provisions of the Act.
Mr. S. Parthasarathy, learned Senior Counsel relied upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in State of Uttaranchal and Others Vs. Kharak
Singh, , wherein the Supreme Court disapproved the enquiry officer himself acting as an Investigator, Prosecutor and a Judge and such a
procedures is opposed to the principles of natural justice and has been frowned upon by the Supreme Court. Therefore, he contended that the
authorities who are supposed to detect the energy theft, themselves are lodging a complaint and also imposing provisional assessment and
disconnecting the power supply. This cannot be allowed.
The learned Senior Counsel further relied upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in State of Karnataka and Another Vs. H. Ganesh Kamath
and Others, . In that judgment, the Supreme Court held that conferment of rule making power by an Act does not enable the rule making authority
to make rule which travelled beyond the scope of the enabling Act or which is inconsistent therewith or repugnant thereto.
The learned Senior Counsel further relied upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in Jalan Trading Co. (Private Ltd.) Vs. Mill Mazdoor
Union, . The Senior counsel referred to paragraph 21 of the said judgment, wherein the Supreme Court dealt with the scope of Section 37 of the
Payment of Bonus Act, where the Central Government has been given power for removal of doubts or difficulties in giving effect to the provisions
of the Act. In that context, the Supreme Court held that the delegation of legislative power is not permissible and the power to remove the doubt or
difficulty by altering the provisions of the Act would in substance amount to exercise of legislative authority and that cannot be delegated to an
executive authority.
The learned Senior Counsel also referred to the judgment of the Supreme Court in Devi Das Gopal Krishnan and Others Vs. State of Punjab
and Others, for the very same proposition.
The learned Senior Counsel further placed reliance upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in State of Rajasthan and Others Vs. Basant
Nahata, . In that case, Section 22A as amended by Rajasthan Amendment Act 16 of 1976 in the Registration Act was held to be ultra vires as the
power given to the State Government is unauthorized jurisdiction to deal with the direction to the Registrars in registering the documents.
The learned Senior Counsel also relied upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in Hamdard Dawakhana and Another, Kalipada Deb and
Another, Lakshman Shripati Itpure @ Lakshman Shripati Impore and A.B. Choudhri and Another Vs. The Union of India (UOI) and Others, ,
wherein it was stated that if a delegate is given power of making rules and regulations in order to fill in the details to carry out and sub-serve the
purpose of legislation the manner in which the requirements of the statute are to be met and the rights therein created to be enjoyed it is an exercise
of delegated legislation. If any uncanalised and uncontrolled power is given to the executive and no criteria is prescribed, then the said provision
will be ultra vires.
The learned Senior Counsel also placed reliance upon the Division Bench judgment of this Court in Anglo French Textiles Ltd. Vs. Income
Tax Officer and Another, and referred to paragraph 21 of the said judgment, wherein it was observed that in the guise of removing a difficulty the
Central Government cannot change the scheme and the essential provisions of the Act.
He also referred that the authorities notified under the Act are incapable of making assessment and the term of ''assessment'' has got wider
connotation and for this purpose, he referred to the Law Lexicon by Ramanathan Iyer, wherein it is stated that the assessment is the official
determination of liability of a person to pay a particular tax and this power cannot be given to the decision making process of lower level officials of
the Board.
Mr. P.S. Raman, learned Advocate General referred to the judgment of the Supreme Court in Greater Bombay Co-op. Bank Ltd. Vs. United
Yarn Tex. Pvt. Ltd. and Others, and referred to paragraph 82 of the said judgment, which is as follows:
The constitutional validity of an Act can be challenged only on two grounds viz. (i) lack of legislative competence; and (ii) violation of any of the
fundamental rights guaranteed in Part III of the Constitution or of any other constitutional provision. In State of Andhra Pradesh and others, etc.
Vs. McDowell and Co. and others, etc., this Court has opined that except the above two grounds, there is no third ground on the basis of which
the law made by the competent legislature can be invalidated and that the ground of invalidation must necessarily fall within the four corners of the
aforementioned two grounds.
In the light of the above submissions, five questions arise for consideration, which are as follows:
a) Whether regulations framed by the State Electricity Regulatory Commission suffers from excessive delegation?
b) Whether Section 135(1-A) confers arbitrary and unbridled power to the authority in the matter of energy theft?
c) Whether the State Electricity Regulatory Commission was legally competent to frame the impugned regulations?
d) Whether the authorities should await for the verdict of the Special Court before effecting the liability on the consumer?
e) Whether the amended regulations are oppressive and unreasonable, which cannot stand the scrutiny of law?
Though the counsel for both sides cited decisions in support of their contentions, there was no reference to any decisions of the Supreme Court
dealing with the provisions of the Electricity Act. Therefore, it is necessary to refer to those decisions which may have bearing on this issue.
The Electricity Act, 2003 was enacted with the following object as found in the preamble, and it reads as follows:
An Act to consolidate the laws relating to generation, transmission, distribution, trading and use of electricity and generally for taking measures
conducive to development of electricity industry, promoting competition therein, protecting interest of consumers and supply of electricity to all
areas, rationalisation of electricity tariff, ensuring transparent policies regarding subsidies, promotion of efficient and environmentally benign policies,
constitution of Central Electricity Authority, Regulatory Commissions and establishment of Appellate Tribunal and for matters connected therewith
or incidental thereto.
While dealing with 2003 Act, the Supreme Court in Southern Petrochemical Industries Co. Ltd. Vs. Electricity Inspector and E.T.I.O. and
Others, observed in paragraphs 77 to 79 of is judgment, which is as follows:
We are not unmindful of the fact that the 2003 Act was enacted not only to consolidate but also to rationalise the Act. Mr Nariman takes us to
various authorities in regard to the construction of a consolidating statute including IRC v. Hinchy, Beswick v. Beswick, Director of Public
Prosecutions v. Schildkamp, Maunsell v. Olins and Farrell v. Alexander, to suggest that a consolidating statute is not meant to alter the law. But, in
these decisions, it has also been suggested that a consolidating statute may also be an amending Act.
It is one thing to say that where the words or expressions in a statute are plainly taken from an earlier statute in pari materia, which have
received judicial interpretation, it must be presumed that Parliament was aware thereof and intended it to be followed in the latter enactment. But, it
is another thing to say that it is necessary or proper to resort to or consider the earlier legislations on the subject only because the consolidating Act
re-enacts in an orderly form the various statutes embodying the law on the subject. (See Williams v. Permanent Trustee Co. of New South Wales,
AC at p.252 and N.S. Bindra''s Interpretation of Statutes, 10th Edn., pp.1071-72.)
The words ''consolidate and amend'' furthermore often occur in a statute in repealing provision. Such a statute is not intended to alter the law.
The Supreme Court while dealing with the scope of power of the Electricity Inspector under the Indian Electricity Act, 1910 vide its judgment
in Sub-Divisional Officer (P) v. Dharam Pal reported in (2006) 12 SCC 222. It dealt with the scope of Section 26(6) of the Indian Electricity Act,
1910. The Sub-section 6 of Section 26 reads as follows:
26(6) Where any difference or dispute arises as to whether any meter referred to in Sub-section (1) is or is not correct, the matter shall be
decided, upon the application of either party, by an Electrical Inspector; and where the meter has, in the opinion of such Inspector ceased to be
correct, such Inspector shall estimate the amount of the energy supplied to the consumer or the electrical quantity contained in the supply, during
such time, not exceeding six months, as the meter shall not, in the opinion of such Inspector, have been correct; but save as aforesaid, the register
of the meter shall, in the absence of fraud, be conclusive proof of such amount or quantity:
Provided that before either a licensee or a consumer applies to the Electrical Inspector under this Sub-section, he shall give to the other party not
less than seven days'' notice of his intention so to do.
While dealing with the said provision, the Supreme Court referred to the earlier decision of the Supreme Court and extracted the same from
the judgment in Bombay Electric Supply and Transport Undertaking Vs. Laffans (India) Pvt. Ltd. and Another, and the relevant passages reads as
follows:
The abovesaid provisions have been the subject-matter of consideration by this Court in three cases which have been brought to our notice.
They are M.P. Electricity Board v. Basantibai, Belwal Spg. Mills Ltd. v. U.P. SEB and J.M.D. Alloys Ltd. v. Bihar SEB. The first and the last of
the cases are decisions by three learned Judges and the second one is a decision by two learned Judges. We have carefully perused the three
decisions and we find ourselves in entire agreement with the view of the law taken in these cases. In particular, in Belwal Spg. Mills case this Court
has examined the provisions of Section 26, specially Sub-section (6) thereof, in very many details, also taking into consideration the legislative
intention and the object sought to be achieved by substituting Sub-section (6) by Act 32 of 1959 in its present form over the predecessor
provision. We would be referring to the relevant findings of law recorded in these cases. However, at the outset and here itself, we would like to
mention that the applicability of Sub-section (6) of Section 26 is attracted only when the meter is not correct. Section 26(6) will have no
applicability (i) if the consumer is found to have committed a fraud with the licensee and thereby illegally extracted the supply of energy preventing
or avoiding its recording, or (ii) has resorted to a trick or device whereby also the electricity is consumed by the consumer without being recorded
by the meter. In effect the latter class of cases would also be one of fraud. Tampering with the meter or manipulating the supply line or breaking the
body seal of the meter resulting in non-registering of the amount of energy supplied to the consumer or the electrical quantity contained in the
supply'' are the cases which were held to be not covered by Section 26(6) in the case of Basantibai while the provision was held applicable to any
case of meter being faulty due to some defect and not registering the actual consumption of electrical energy. Similar is the view taken in the case of
J.M.D. Alloys Ltd.
What is a correct meter? The language of Sub-section (6) of Section 26 starts with'' ''where any difference or dispute arises as to whether any
meter referred to in Sub-section (1) is or is not correct''.... The dictionary meaning of the word ''correct'' is: adhering or conforming to an approved
or conventional standard; conforming to or agreeing with fact; accurate.
As to what would be a ''correct'' meter, there is sufficient indication in the Act and the Electricity Rules, 1956 in the Explanation given at the end
of Sub-section (7) of Section 26 of the Act and sub-rules (1) and (2) of Rule 57, quoted hereinabove. Where the meter is completely non-
functional on account of any fault or having been burnt, it will not register the supply of energy at all. Since a burnt meter does not record any
supply of energy, it virtually means ''no meter''.
What is contemplated by Section 26(6) is a running meter, but which on account of some technical defect registers the amount of energy
supplied or the electrical quantity contained in the supply beyond the prescribed limits of error. It contemplates a meter which is either running slow
or fast with the result that it does not register the correct amount of energy supplied. There is an additional reason for coming to such a conclusion.
Section 26(6) confers power upon the Electrical Inspector to estimate the amount of energy supplied to the consumer or the electrical quantity
contained in the supply, during such time, not exceeding six months, as the meter shall not, in the opinion of such Inspector, have been correct.
Where the meter is running slow or fast, it will be possible for the Electrical Inspector to estimate the amount of energy supplied to the consumer
by determining the extent or percentage of error in recording the supply, whether plus or minus. However, where the meter is burnt or is
completely non-functional, such an exercise is not at all possible. Therefore, Section 26(6) can have no application in a case where a meter has
become completely non-functional on account of any reason whatsoever.
Further, the Supreme Court in paragraph 9 observed as follows:
In State of W.B. v. Rupa Ice Factory (P) Ltd. it was observed as follows: (SCC p.637, para 5)
As regards the second claim, namely, the claim for the period from December 1993 to December 1995, the finding of the High Court is that the
Vigilance Squad had found that Respondent 1 had tapped the electric energy directly from the transformer to the LT distribution board bypassing
the meter circuit. If that is so, we do not know as to why the High Court would go on to advert to Section 26 of the Electricity Act and direct
reference to the Electrical Inspector for decision u/s 26(6). In two decisions of this Court in M.P Electricity Board v. Basantibai and J.M.D. Alloys
Ltd. v. Bihar SEB it has been held that in cases of tampering or theft or pilferage of electricity, the demand raised falls outside the scope of Section
26 of the Electricity Act. If that is so, neither the limitation period mentioned in Section 26 of the Electricity Act nor the procedure for raising
demand for electricity consumed would arise at all. In this view of the matter, that part of the order of the Division Bench of the High Court,
directing that there should be a reference to the Electrical Inspector, shall stand set aside. In other respects the order of the High Court shall remain
undisturbed. The appeal is allowed accordingly.
If the above decision is analyzed, it will show that a reference to the Electrical Inspector under the 1910 Act will not be available when a
consumer found to have committed fraud and illegally extracted supply of energy or the electricity was consumed without being recorded in the
meter. Such a case has been considered as a case of fraud. This clearly makes that the persons who are involved in the theft of energy or
consuming unauthorized electricity are found to have committed fraud will constitute a separate class.
When a challenge is made to condition No. 39 of the terms and conditions of supply of electricity as ultra vires of provisions of the Indian
Electricity Act, 1910, it came to be considered by the Supreme Court in M/s. Hyderabad Vanaspathi Limited Vs. Andhra Pradesh State
Electricity Board and Others, . The challenge was whether Clause 39 was violative of Article 14 of the Constitution, wherein the officers of the
Electricity Board were empowered to disconnect the supply of electricity on suspicion of malpractice and the consumers were directed to pay
50% of provisional assessment before getting it restored. Repelling the contention that such a provision was violative of Article 14, in paragraphs
41 to 42, the Supreme Court had observed as follows:
What remains to be considered is whether Clause 39 is violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. Under this head, the argument of
learned Counsel for the consumers is that the provisions in the clause are wholly unreasonable and against the principles of natural justice.
According to them, the clause enables the officers to disconnect the service on a suspicion of malpractice and the consumer has to pay 50% of the
provisional assessment amount before getting it restored. It is also contended that the officials of the Board are enabled to judge its own cause and
the doctrine of bias will apply. In support of these contentions, our attention is drawn to:
J. Mohapatra and Co. v. State of Orissa.
State of Karnataka v. Shree Rameshwara Rice Mills.
Krishna Bus Service (P) Ltd. v. State of Haryana.
Rattan Lal Sharma v. Managing Committee, Dr Hari Ram (Co-Education) Higher Secondary School.
LIC of India v. Consumer Education & Research Centre.
None of the rulings will apply in this case. We have already referred to the judgment of this Court in M.P. Electricity Board v. Harsh Wood
Products case wherein it was held that when power theft was found by the officials, immediate disconnection of the supply was not violative of
Article 14 of the Constitution and principles of natural justice would not apply.
In Patel Parshottamadas Vanmalidas v. Gujarat Electricity Board a Division Bench of the Gujarat High Court considered similar conditions and
upheld their validity. The Bench said:
Thus, it is clear that the Board has formulated such a condition in order to safeguard its interest. Such a condition is there for the purpose of
checking, apart from other things, the theft of electricity. It is not a case of any defective meter, but it is a case of theft of electricity by the
consumer concerned. As a matter of fact, in this case it is alleged that the petitioner, by inserting a plastic strip, was able to stop the running of the
meter and thereby, committed theft of electricity. The condition clearly states as to the procedure that has to be adopted for the purpose of
questioning the departmental action in levying penal charges. It has also been made clear in the condition as to the limit to which the Department
can go for the purpose of assessing the theft of electricity. In no case the Department can go beyond a period of six months, according to this
condition. In Condition No. 34, we are able to see that manner of assessment also has been specified. If all these steps are taken by the
Department, the condition itself states that the consumer has a remedy by filing an appeal to the appropriate authority within a specified time. Thus,
a conjoint reading of this condition and the purpose for which it is intended, clearly makes out that such a condition is not arbitrary or
unreasonable, but within the powers of the Board and, in our opinion, it does not offend any of the articles of the Constitution. The argument as if
the imposition of penal assessment before filing an appeal is harsh and makes the appeal illusory cannot be appreciated. The penal assessment, as
we have stated already, is restricted to a limited period. Such an assessment was made after the Department itself was satisfied with regard to the
theft of electricity committed by the consumer concerned. Hence, it cannot be said that the appeal provided under Condition No. 34 is an illusory
one.
We agree with the above opinion.
That the officers of the Board will also be biased was also repelled by the Supreme Court and the following passage found in paragraph 43
from the said judgment will make the position clear. It is as follows:
The principle ''nemo judex in causa sua'' will not apply in this case as the officers have no personal lis with the consumers. As pointed out by
learned Senior Counsel for the Board, they are similar to income tax or sales tax officials....
As to how the provisions and the terms and conditions are imposed by the Electricity Regulatory Commission also came to be considered by
the Supreme Court in T.N. SEB v. Central Electricity Regulatory Commission reported in (2007) 7 SCC 636. In paragraphs 20 to 2, the
Supreme Court observed as follows:
The rule of literal interpretation has been explained by this Court time and again. In Ombalika Das v. Hulisa Shaw this Court unequivocally
declared as under: (SCC p.541)
Resort can be had to the legislative intent for the purpose of interpreting a provision of law, when the language employed by the legislature is
doubtful or susceptible of meanings more than one. However, when the language is plain and explicit and does not admit of any doubtful
interpretation, the Supreme Court cannot, by reference to an assumed legislative intent, expand the meaning of an expression employed by the
legislature and therein include such category of persons as the legislature has not chosen to do.
Similar note was struck by this Court in Keshavji Ravji & Co. v. CIT where three-Judge Bench went on to observe: (SCC p.242, para 11)
As long as there is no ambiguity in the statutory language, resort to any interpretative process to unfold the legislative intent become impermissible.
The supposed intention of the legislature cannot then be appealed to whittle down the statutory language which is otherwise unambiguous. If the
intendment is not in the words used it is nowhere else. The need for interpretation arises when the words used in the statute are, on their own
terms, ambivalent and do not manifest the intention of the legislature.
Without burdening with the authorities we may only refer to the verdict by the Privy Council in Pakala Narayana Swami v. Emperor where
Lord Atkin had declared that (IA p.78) ''when the meaning of words is plain, it is not the duty of courts to busy themselves with supposed
intentions''. The law has been consistent ever since then in more than half a dozen decisions.
The power of the Electricity Regulatory Commission including the State Electricity Regulatory Commission also came to be considered by the
Supreme Court in Maharashtra Electricity Regulatory Commission Vs. Reliance Energy Ltd. and Others, . It is necessary to refer to the following
passages found in paragraphs 16 and 17 of the said judgment, which is as follows:
A comprehensive reading of all these provisions leaves no manner of doubt that the Commission is empowered with all powers right from
granting licence and laying down the conditions of licence and to frame regulations and to see that the same are properly enforced and also power
to enforce the conditions of licence under Sub-section (6) of Section 128.
Thus, insofar as the first contention of the learned Counsel for the respondents that the Commission has no power is concerned, we are of the
view that the same is wrong. In this behalf the provisions of the Electricity Act, 2003 are quite clear and categoric and Section 128(6) empowers
the Commission to get the conditions of licence enforced....
Similarly, the Supreme Court in its decision in Suresh Jindal Vs. BSES Rajdhani Power Limited and Others, while dealing with the power of
Section 20 under the 1910 Act and also dealt with the scope of conferring power of entry on the licensee and the scope of Electricity Regulatory
Commission, in issuing directions which includes making of tariff and for that purpose, certain checks and balance will be required to be made. In
paragraph 41, it was observed as follows:
If Section 20 of the 1910 Act conferred a power which is not otherwise controlled by Section 26 thereof, the question of the respondent
acting wholly without jurisdiction or arbitrarily would not arise. Indisputably, after the Electricity Regulatory Commission came into being, it issued
certain directions. It had to make tariff. For the purpose of making tariff, certain checks and balances were required to be made. The loopholes
then existing in the matter of transmission of electrical energy which resulted in a huge transmission loss were to be taken care of. Therefore, a
direction was issued by the Commission that all the existing meters should be replaced by electronic meters. We do not see any illegality therein.
While dealing with the scope of interpretation of such provisions in paragraph 45 of the same judgment, the Supreme Court observed as
follows:
Section 20 operates in one field, namely, conferring a power of entry on the licensee. The said provision empowers the licensee inter alia to
alter a meter which would include replacement of a meter. It is an independent general provision. In absence of any statutory provision, we do not
see any reason to put a restrictive meaning thereto. Even under the General Clauses Act, a statutory authority while exercising statutory power may
do all things which are necessary for giving effect thereto. There does not exist any provision in any of the statutes referred to hereinbefore which
precludes or prohibits the licensee to replace one set of meter by another. If such a provision is read into the statute, the same would come in the
way of giving effect to the benefits of new technological development. Creative interpretation of the provisions of the statute demands that with the
advance in science and technology, the Court should read the provisions of a statute in such a manner so as to give effect thereto. (See State of
Maharashtra v. Dr. Praful B. Desai.)
If it is seen in the light of the object of 2003 Act and the need to check the energy theft cases due to which revenue is syphoned off and the
regulations having been made in a lawful manner, the attempt by the petitioners to attack the Act and the Regulations as ultra vires of the Act
cannot be countenanced. On the contrary, a person who indulges in fraud has to be kept as a separate class. A person who is accused of an
energy theft has stand apart from the other consumers who are law abiding. Therefore, the enactment can deal with them in a special way.
In the present case, when the authority, who is statutorily notified to detect the energy theft or tampering of the power supply, arrives at a
satisfaction that theft had taken place, can disconnect the power supply forthwith. At the stage of commission of offence, no accused can ask for
notice or pre-hearing, which will make the purpose of legislation meaningless. There is obligation for them to lodge a complaint within 24 hours in a
police station and also to make an assessment of the amounts to be paid by the consumer. There is further direction to restore the power supply if
the amounts are deposited.
When the matter will be heard by a Special Court, the consumer will be entitled to have a full-fledged trial. Apart from the outcome of the trial
for the criminal offence, the very same court is also empowered to fix the civil liability of the consumer, who is accused of offence of energy theft.
Therefore, the consumer need not run to some other court for the determination of his civil liability. If the court comes to a conclusion that there is
no civil liability or civil liability is less than the amount already paid, then the Board is under obligation to refund the excess amount together with
interest at the prevailing rate fixed from time to time by the Reserve Bank of India from the date of deposit till date of payment. Therefore, an
innocent consumer is fully safeguarded by the mechanism provided under the Act.
An attempt to state that there are no guidelines has to be repelled because the Act itself indicates as to how to arrive at a penalty. Secondly,
the officers who are notified are high level officers and are expected to function in a responsible manner. After an action is taken by the officers,
virtually there is judicial review both on criminal and civil liability of consumer. Therefore, the consumers are fully protected by these provisions.
Their attempt for a pre-trial enquiry or postponement of their liability till completion of the criminal case will make the system unworkable, besides
it is unwarranted under the circumstances of the case.
In the present case, the consumers are only getting electricity supply from the licensees. Therefore, it is only subject to terms and conditions of
such supply. As held by the Supreme court in the passage cited at the beginning of the judgment, the need of the hour is to prevent the loss of
energy of which a very big component is the theft of energy. The amendment to the Act, and the Regulations are only to fill up the said need and no
exception can be taken to the same. The decisions relied upon by the counsel for the petitioners has no application to the facts of the case. There is
neither any excessive delegation nor the provisions can be termed as oppressive. The attack on the lack of power or that a delegate was expanding
his power or that an essential legislative power was delegated illegally or that the regulations are ultra vires of the Act cannot be countenanced by
this Court.
In fact, while dealing with the provisions of the Act regarding the licensing regulations, the Supreme Court had an occasion to consider the
same in Global Energy Ltd. and Anr. v. Central Electricity Regulatory Commission reported in JT 2009 (11) SC 167. The Supreme Court after
analyzing the provisions and referring to various judgments including some of the judgments cited by the petitioners, finally in paragraph 43 ended
the judgment with an Epilogue, which can be usefully quoted as an Epilogue for this judgment also:
EPILOGUE
The law sometimes can be written in such subjective manner that it affects efficiency and transparent function of the government. If the statute
provides for point-less discretion to agency, it is in essence demolishing the accountability strand within the administrative process as the agency is
not under obligation from an objective norm, which can enforce accountability in decision-making process. All law making, be it in the context of
delegated legislation or primary legislation, have to conform to the fundamental tenets of transparency and openness on one hand and
responsiveness and accountability on the other. These are fundamental tenets flowing from Due Process requirement under Article 21, Equal
Protection clause embodied in Article 14 and Fundamental Freedoms clause ingrained under Article 19. A modern deliberative democracy can not
function without these attributes. The constitutive understanding of aforementioned guarantees under the Fundamental Rights chapter in the
Constitution does not give rise to a mere rhetoric and symbolic value inhered by the polity but has to be reflected in minute functioning of all the
three wings of state-executive, legislature and judiciary. When we talk of state action, devil lies in the detail. The approach to writing of laws, rules,
notifications etc. has to showcase these concerns. The image of law which flows from this framework is its neutrality and objectivity: the ability of
law to put sphere of general decision-making outside the discretionary power of those wielding governmental power. Law has to provide a basic
level of ""legal security"" by assuring that law is knowable, dependable and shielded from excessive manipulation. In the context of rule making,
delegated legislation should establish the structural conditions within which those processes can function effectively. The question which needs to be
asked is whether delegated legislation promotes rational and accountable policy implementation.
If seen in the light of the Epilogue, the delegated legislation promotes rational and accountable policy implementation.
In the light of the above, all the writ petitions will stand dismissed. However, there will be no order as to costs. Consequently, the connected
miscellaneous petitions also stand dismissed.