H.G. Mahadevappa vs G. Basavarajappa

Shivashankar Bhat, J.—Defendant''s application to reject the plaint unde Order VII Rule 11(a) of the CPC was dismissed by the lower Court. Hence this revision petition.

According to the petitioner (defendant), the plaint does not disclose any cause of action and hence the same should have been rejected.

Parties are brothers. The suit was "for a permanent injunction restraining the defendant from interfering with the plaintiff''s right to make use of his back-yard as shown in the sketch GHIJ, without prejudice to the right of the defendant for passage". Cause of action, is stated as having arisen from June 1987 when the defendant served a caveat petition on the plaintiff, wherein, defendant anticipated filing of a suit by the plaintiff in respect of the subject matter. According to the plaint averments, a portion of the back-yard to the house was In the possession of the plaintiff in which he made preparation to have a Gobar Gas Plant, on seeing which, the defendant filed a caveat stating that he had a right for movement in the said backyard portion and that no Gobar Gas Plant should be erected. After issuing a suitable reply, the plaintiff filed the suit. In the written statement, the defendant, again, asserted his earlier stand and questioned the plaintiff''s right to erect the Gobar Gas Plant and thus deprive the defendant of the only access to the backyard of his house, etc. At para-7, of the written statement, a general plea was raised that there was no cause of action for the suit. Defendant also filed an I.A. under Order VII Rule 11(a) CPC seeking the rejection of the plaint, alleging that the plaint did not disclose any cause of action. According to the defendant, filing of a caveat cannot create a cause of action for the suit. Since that is the only incident asserted as giving the cause of action, plaint had to be rejected.

The trial Court did not accept the defendant''s contention. Hence this revision petition.

Sri. T.R. Subbanna, the learned Counsel for the petitioner, contended that, an injunction to restrain the defendant from interfering with the possession of the plaintiff can be issued only on proof of actual Interference or threat of interference by the defendant and when the plaint does not aver any such interference or threat of interference by the defendant, there cannot be any cause for the suit at all. The filing of a caveat by the defendant in anticipation of a suit is only to safeguard his Interest and against a possible interim order being obtained by the plaintiff from the Court without notice to the defendant; such a conduct of filing the caveat is not an interference with the plaintiff''s possession or any threat to it.

The contention of the learned Counsel, no doubt, is quite attractive at the outset. However, a close scrutiny of the question raised by the learned Counsel does not lead to the answer given by the learned Counsel.

"Cause of action" is a phrase of wide "connotation. It means a bundle of essential facts, which it is necessary for the party seeking relief to prove if traversed by the opposite party, in order to secure the relief prayed for - [See: DR. P.S. RAO v. UNION GOVERNMENT] 1972(2) Mys.L.J. 302 - para 8.

Everything which if not proved by the plaintiff would give the defendant a right to an immediate Judgment is part of the cause of action. It refers entirely to the grounds set forth in the plaint as the cause of action, or in other words, to the media upon which the plaintiff asks the Court to arrive at a conclusion in his favour, as observed by the Privy Council ir CHAND KOER v. PRATAP SINGH ILR 16 Cal 98 (PC).

The plaint states, here, that the caveat served on the plaintiff as the cause of action in the sense, that, it indicated or reflected the attitude of the defendant towards the alleged right of the plaintiff in respect of the subject matter of the suit. The caveat is an open expression of the defendants'' knowledge, that a dispute existed between himself and the plaintiff and that the defendant anticipated filing of a suit by the plaintiff. However, in the earlier parts of the plaint, plaintiff relied upon several facts from which he Infers in him a right to put up the Gobar Gas Plant in the plaint schedule property. These facts are to be proved by the plaintiff, if denied and traversed by the defendant, so as to succeed In the suit. These facts averred in the plaint constitute the "cause of action", as explained above. The media through which the plaintiff has to reach for his relief has been disclosed in the plaint. Therefore, the petitioner is not right in contending that the plaint does not disclose any cause of action.

British Airways Vs. Art Works Export Ltd. and Another, . referred by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, in no way advances his case. The relevant passage reads:

"....The plea of the petitioner that there is no cause of action for the suit is not same as to say the plaint does not disclose any cause of action, which is a ground for the rejection of the plaint. Indeed, the plaint discloses a cause of action. The correctness or otherwise of the allegations constituting the cause of action is beyond the purview of Clause (a) of Order 7, Rule 11."

It has been noted already that the plaint, in this case, discloses the cause of action, in the sense the said phrase is generally understood.

GOPAL M. HEGDE AND ORS. v. U.F.M. NARA-SIMHA GANAP BHAT AND ORS ILR 1978 Kar 1560. in effect again goes against the petitioner''s contention. At para-4 (page 1561) it is stated -

"In all cases, before granting an injunction, the Court will consider whether the plaintiff''s right has been infringed. Even if the right of the plaintiff is threatened or if the intention on the par t of the defendants to deny the right of the plaintiff is proved, the Court will ordinarily grant an injunction to protect the threatened injury. But the mere prospect or apprehension of injury is not sufficient. The law in this regard has been succinctly stated by Woodroffe in ''Law Relating to Injunction'', 1964 Edition, page 108, as follows:

"The mere prospect or apprehension of injury, or the mere belief that the act complained of may or will be done, is not sufficient; but if an intention to do the act complained of can be shown to exist, or if a man insists on his right to do, or begins to do, or threatens to do or gives notice of his intention to do an act which must, in the opinion of the Court, if completed, give a ground of action, there is a foundation for the exercise of jurisdiction. But the Court will not interfere where there are not sufficient data to prove such intention or act...."

Thereafter Court proceeded to examine the defence pleaded by the defendant in the said case, which clearly established that the claim of the plaintiff for the relief was denied by the defendant; therefore, Court held that plaintiff was entitled to the injunctive relief, on proof of his right to the subject matter. Even though this was not a case under Order VII Rule 11(a), the principle stated therein may be applied to the facts of this case while considering the petitioner''s contention.

Another decision cited is reported in R.G. Janthakal Vs. Bharat Parikh and Co., The following observation at para-10 was referred:

"It is well settled principle of law now that injunction can be issued only on proof of actual interference or threat of interference and not in the absence of it."

A reading of the subsequent passage in the same para shows that this Court directed the lower Appellate Court to frame the necessary issues arising out of the pleading and permit the leading of additional evidence. That was not a case where the plaint failed to disclose any cause of action. The observations referred by the learned Counsel are not relevant at this stage of the suit.

Consequently, it Is not possible to uphold the contentions of the petitioner. Hence this petition is liable to be rejected.

In the result, for the reasons stated above, this petition fails and is dismissed, without any order as to costs.