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Judgment
Dr. Sanjeeb K Panigrahi, J.
The present Writ Petition has been filed challenging the order dated 29.01.2026 passed in OHRC Case No.2080 of 2024 by the learned Member, Odisha Human Rights Commission under Annexure-9.
I. FACTUAL MATRIX OF THE CASE:
On 12.06.2024, SI Smruti Ranjan Swain of Tangi Police Station lodged a complaint stating that he, along with other police personnel, proceeded to village Kanpur under Tangi P.S. during the early hours of the morning to execute NBWs against four warrant absconders, including Bijay Routray. Upon reaching Bijay Routray's house at about 2:15 A.M., the police identified themselves and asked him to accompany them. However, Dipanjali Routray allegedly raised an alarm, attracting other family members and neighbours, namely Jitendra Routray, Diptimayee Routray, Papina Biswal, Sukanta Routray, Prasant Routray, and others. It was alleged that they abused the police in obscene language, obstructed them from discharging their official duties, assaulted them, and attacked them with kitchen knives, cudgels, and a mortar, causing injuries to the police personnel. Taking advantage of the commotion, the warrant absconders allegedly escaped from the spot. Based on the complaint, Tangi P.S. Case No. 137 dated 12.06.2024 was registered for offences under Sections 341, 294, 323, 353, 307, 506, and 34 IPC against the named accused persons and others.
II. SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER:
Learned counsel for the petitioner earnestly made the following submissions in support of his contentions.
After registration of the FIR in Tangi P.S. Case No. 137 of 2024, the Inspector-in-Charge of Tangi Police Station entrusted the investigation of the case to the present petitioner as the Investigating Officer. Upon taking over the investigation, the petitioner proceeded with the same in accordance with law by examining the witnesses and recording their statements under Section 161 of the Cr.P.C. During the course of investigation, the petitioner apprehended the accused persons, namely Diptimayee Routray, Deepanjali Routray and Papina Biswal, on 12.06.2024 and produced them before the learned J.M.F.C.-II (Cognizance Taking), Cuttack. Since their applications for bail were rejected by the learned Magistrate, they were remanded to judicial custody. Subsequently, however, the said accused persons were enlarged on bail by the learned Additional Sessions Judge (LR & LTV), Cuttack, vide order dated 27.06.2024 passed in Bail Application No. 741 of 2024.
After completion of the investigation, the Investigating Officer (the present petitioner) submitted the charge sheet dated 31.07.2024 against the accused persons, namely Bijay Routray, Jitendra Routray, Diptimayee Routray, Dipanjali Routray, Papina Biswal, Sukanta Routray, and Prasant Routray, for commission of offences punishable under Sections 341, 294, 323, 332, 353, 307, 506, and 34 of the Indian Penal Code.
It is respectfully submitted that Opposite Party No.4, namely Smt. Kanchanabala Routray, who is the mother-in-law of the accused persons Smt. Diptimayee Routray and Smt. Dipanjali Swain @ Dipanjali Routray, and the aunt-in-law of Smt. Papina Biswal, filed a complaint dated 29.07.2024 before the Odisha Human Rights Commission, Bhubaneswar. In the said complaint, she alleged that on 12.06.2024 at about 1:00 A.M., the police personnel of Tangi Police Station forcibly entered her house while allegedly being under the influence of intoxication. When her elder son enquired about the reason for such entry, the police personnel informed him that they had come to execute a warrant against one Bijay Kumar Behera, son of Sanjib Kumar Behera, of Village Kanpur. Although her elder son categorically informed the police that Bijay Kumar Routray, son of Sanjay Kumar Routray, was residing in the house and that no person by the name of Bijay Kumar Behera was residing there, the police personnel allegedly persisted in their attempt to arrest Bijay Kumar Routray. It was further alleged that despite repeated demands, the police personnel failed to produce a copy of the warrant authorising the arrest. Thereafter, the police personnel allegedly left the premises after abusing the family members in filthy language.
The Opposite Party No.4, namely Smt. Kanchanabala Routray, filed a complaint before the learned Odisha Human Rights Commission on 29.07.2024 alleging misconduct on the part of the present petitioner. The learned Odisha Human Rights Commission, vide order dated 06.08.2024, took cognizance of the complaint and issued notice to the Superintendent of Police, Cuttack, directing him to conduct an inquiry into the allegations and submit a detailed factual report. Pursuant to the said direction, an inquiry was conducted by the Sub-Divisional Police Officer (SDPO), who submitted his inquiry report to the Superintendent of Police, Cuttack on 05.11.2024. The inquiry report categorically found no fault or misconduct on the part of the present petitioner. However, despite the said finding, the learned Member of the Odisha Human Rights Commission, vide order dated 22.04.2025, directed the Investigating Wing of the Commission to conduct a fresh inquiry into the matter and submit its report before the Commission.
On 29.01.2026, the learned Member, Odisha Human Rights Commission (OHRC), without properly considering the objection filed by the present Petitioner, was pleased to pass an order holding that each of the family members of Opposite Party No.4, namely Smt. Diptimayee Routray, Smt. Dipanjali Swain and Smt. Papina Biswal, is entitled to compensation of Rs.25,000/- each, aggregating to Rs.75,000/. The learned Member further directed that the said amount of compensation shall be paid personally by the present Petitioner. It was further observed that, in the event of failure to pay the aforesaid compensation, Opposite Party No.4 would be at liberty to intimate the said fact to the Director General of Police, Odisha, who was directed to recover the said amount from the salary of the present Petitioner.
The learned Odisha Human Rights Commission entrusted the matter to its Investigating Wing, namely the Additional Superintendent of Police, OHRC, Bhubaneswar, Shri S.N. Pradhan, OPS-I, for conducting an independent inquiry into the allegations. Upon completion of the inquiry, the Investigating Wing submitted its report before the learned OHRC on 09.01.2026, categorically observing that the present Petitioner had not committed any illegality, misconduct, or irregularity during the course of investigation in Tangi P.S. Case No.137 of 2024. The Investigating Wing did not attribute any lapse or fault to the Petitioner nor did it recommend any action against him.
It is further submitted that the earlier inquiry report submitted by the S.D.P.O., Choudwar had also exonerated the Petitioner from all allegations. Thus, both the inquiry reports, one submitted by the S.D.P.O., Choudwar and the other by the Investigating Wing of the OHRC headed by an officer of the rank of Additional Superintendent of Police, OPS-I, unequivocally found no negligence, misconduct, or irregularity on the part of the Petitioner in the discharge of his official duties while investigating Tangi P.S. Case No.137 of 2024.
The learned Member, OHRC, has acted beyond the scope of his jurisdiction in holding the present Petitioner guilty and directing payment of compensation without appreciating that the criminal trial arising out of the case is still pending before the competent Trial Court. The case has not yet been finally adjudicated, and the accused persons have neither been discharged nor acquitted of the charges framed against them. Until the conclusion of the trial, it cannot be held that the offences alleged are not made out, are vitiated in law, or lack prima facie materials.
The learned Member, OHRC, had no jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the merits of the criminal case or to record findings that the offences alleged against the accused persons were not made out. Such findings fall exclusively within the domain of the competent Criminal Court. By virtually pronouncing upon the merits of the pending criminal proceedings and holding that the investigation, arrest of the accused persons, and actions taken by the investigating agency amounted to a misuse of law, the learned Member, OHRC, has exceeded the jurisdiction vested in the Commission. Consequently, the finding holding the present Petitioner guilty is wholly without jurisdiction, contrary to settled principles of law, and liable to be set aside.
In the aforesaid facts and circumstances of the case, the impugned order dated 29.01.2026 passed by the learned Odisha Human Rights Commission, Bhubaneswar, directing the present Petitioner to pay compensation of Rs.25,000/- each (totalling Rs.75,000/-) to the family members of the complainant (Opposite Party No.4), with a further direction that the said amount shall be recovered from the Petitioner's salary in the event of non-payment, is wholly illegal, arbitrary, without jurisdiction and unsustainable in law. The impugned order has been passed without proper appreciation of the facts, evidence, and the applicable legal provisions, and is therefore liable to be set aside.
III. SUBMISSIONS OF THE OPPOSITE PARTIES:
Per contra, the learned counsel for the Opposite Party No.4 earnestly made the following submissions:
On 10/11.06.2024, the police had gone to the house of the Opposite Party No.4 to execute the warrant issued from the court of the learned J.M.F.C.(II), Cuttack against Sri Bijay Kumar Routray, Smt. Dharitri Routray and Surendra Routray in connection with G.R. Case No.551/2020. When the police has visited the house there opposition from the lady members of the house.
It is further submitted that the arrest and detention of the complainants were wholly unwarranted, particularly when they had already remained in police custody for 16 days. Such prolonged custody rendered the arrest arbitrary and unjustified. Hence, the learned Odisha Human Rights Commission was fully justified in passing the impugned order.
The Opposite Party No.4 vehemently opposes the reliefs sought for by the Petitioner. It is, therefore, humbly prayed that the Writ Petition, being devoid of any merit, be dismissed.
IV. COURT’S ANALYSIS AND REASONING
Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the materials placed on record. Shorn of detail, this petition raises a single question of institutional authority that is what may a State Human Rights Commission do when it concludes that a police officer has violated the human rights of a citizen? Three subsidiary issues centred around it. Could the Commission direct the petitioner to pay compensation out of his own pocket and order its recovery from his salary? Could it pronounce upon the merits of an investigation which has ripened into a charge-sheet now pending trial? And does the impugned order satisfy the requirements of a hearing and of reasons?
Before turning to these questions, this Court records the limits of its own enquiry. Sitting under Article 226, it does not weigh the material afresh or substitute its appreciation of the evidence of the Commission. The Commission is a quasi-judicial body and its assessment of facts deserves respect. What this Court seeks to examine is the legality of the decision itself that is whether the authority had possessed the power it exercised, whether it followed the procedure the statute prescribed, whether it gave reasons for what it decided, and whether it heard the person it condemned.
The Odisha Human Rights Commission owes its existence to Section 21 of the Protection of Human Rights Act, 1993. It has no inherent jurisdiction and no reserve of plenary authority to fall back upon. Section 29 applies Sections 9, 10 and 12 to 18 of the Act to a State Commission with specified modifications, and the Commission's competence begins and ends with what those provisions confer.
The scheme is compact yet elaborative. Section 12(a) furnishes the entry point, permitting the Commission to inquire into a complaint of violation of human rights, or of negligence in the prevention of such violation, by a public servant. Section 13 arms it for that inquiry with the powers of a civil court. Section 14 allows it to use the services of an investigating agency and by sub-section (5), obliges it to satisfy itself about the correctness of the facts stated and the conclusions reached in any report so obtained. Section 16 requires it to hear any person into whose conduct it proposes to inquire or whose reputation is likely to be prejudicially affected. Section 18 then tells the Commission what it may do at the end of the exercise.
Section 18(a) is the provision under which the impugned order must be justified, if it can be justified at all. Where the inquiry discloses a violation of human rights, or negligence in preventing one, or abetment of one, by a public servant, the Commission may recommend to the concerned Government or authority the payment of compensation or damages to the complainant or the victim, the initiation of proceedings for prosecution or such other suitable action against the person concerned and such further action as it thinks fit.
Two features of that language decide this case. The operative verb is recommended, and it governs each of the three clauses that follow. The addressee is the concerned Government or authority and never the individual public servant. Parliament did not leave the recommendation to gather dust. Clause (e) requires the Commission to send its report and recommendations to the Government, which must forward its comments and the action taken or proposed within one month. Clause (f) requires the Commission to publish the report together with those comments. Section 28(2) carries the same design further by placing the Commission's reports before the State Legislature along with a memorandum of the action taken and the reasons for any non-acceptance. Where persuasion fails, clause (b) permits the Commission to approach this Court or the Supreme Court for such directions as the Court may deem necessary. The Act therefore equips the Commission with independence, investigative power, publicity, a duty of governmental response and access to the constitutional courts. The one instrument it withholds is an executable decree of the Commission's own making.
Measured against that scheme, the impugned order departs at two distinct points. It converts a recommendation into a direction and it directs that recommendation at the wrong person, fastening the liability upon the investigating officer personally and instructing the Director General of Police to realise the amount from his salary in the event of default. Neither step is traceable to Section 18 or to any other provision of the Act.
Where a statute confers a power and prescribes the manner of its exercise, the power may be exercised in that manner and in no other. In N.C. Dhoundial v. Union of India1, the Supreme Court, while acknowledging the standing of the National Human Rights Commission as a body of a special character, held that it must nonetheless function within the four corners of the Act which created it and cannot travel beyond the jurisdiction the statute. A State Commission stands in no different position.
The Commission's authority is more moral before it is legal. It rests upon the independence of its members, the quality of its reasoning, and the obligation the statute places upon the executive to answer its recommendations in public. An order that reaches past the statute forfeits precisely that advantage. It invites a writ petition, it postpones whatever redress the complainant was to receive, and it converts a serious question about how three women were treated in the early hours of the morning into a question about the Commission's own competence. Two years have passed since the complaint was filed and the record is no nearer to disclosing what happened at village Kanpur.
Assuming for the sake of argument, that the Commission could award rather than recommend. Even on that assumption it could not have made this officer pay. Compensation for the infringement of the right to life and personal liberty is a remedy in public law, distinct in principle from damages in tort. In Nilabati Behera v. State of Orissa2 , the Supreme Court held that such compensation is awarded on the footing of the State's liability for contravention of a fundamental right, to which the defence of sovereign immunity has no application, the object being to make the guarantee under Article 21 real rather than declaratory. The line runs from Rudul Sah v. State of Bihar3 through Nilabati Behera(supra) to Chairman, Railway Board v. Chandrima Da4s. In every case the liability is that of the State, for the sufficient reason that the State acts through its servants and must answer for what they do in its name.
Where an individual officer is at fault, the State is not left without recourse. D.K. Basu v. State of West Bengal5 proceeds on the footing that the State meets the claim and may thereafter take such action as is open to it against the wrongdoer. The victim is compensated first, and by the State, because a citizen whose rights have been violated should not be made to pursue the personal solvency of a constable. Recovery from the officer comes afterwards, in separate proceedings, in which he is told what he is said to have done and is heard upon it.
Personal liability of that kind also requires a finding of a particular character. An officer who exercises a statutory power erroneously, or unsuccessfully, does not thereby become personally answerable in damages. Liability of that order attaches to malice, in fact, to corruption, or to conduct so far removed from the scope of office that it can no longer be described as an exercise of official duty at all. The enquiry under Section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure states the same idea from the opposite direction, and in State of Orissa v. Ganesh Chandra Jew6 the Supreme Court held that what matters is the reasonable connection between the act and the discharge of official duty, and not whether the act was ultimately proper. The impugned order records no finding of mala fides against the petitioner. It identifies no material from which such a finding could be drawn. Without it, the direction that he pay from his own salary rests on nothing.
One feature of the record puts the direction beyond rescue. The detention of which Opposite Party No.4 complains, said to have run to sixteen days, was not detention at the hands of the petitioner. The three women were produced before the learned J.M.F.C.-II (Cognizance Taking), Cuttack on 12.06.2024, as Section 57 of the Code read with Article 22(2) of the Constitution required the petitioner to do. That court declined bail and remanded them to judicial custody. They were enlarged on bail on 27.06.2024 by the learned Additional Sessions Judge (LR & LTV), Cuttack in Bail Application No.741 of 2024. A remand is a judicial act. Its correctness may be tested in a bail application, in revision, or under Article 226. It cannot be reopened collaterally before the Commission, and its consequences cannot be laid at the door of the officer who produced the accused before the Magistrate because the law obliged him to. To make the petitioner pay for a custody the Magistrate ordered is to penalise him for compliance with the Code.
The Commission recorded that the investigation, the arrest of the accused persons and the actions of the investigating agency amounted to a misuse of law, and that the offences alleged were not made out. It recorded those findings while the charge-sheet dated 31.07.2024 was, and remained, pending before the competent criminal court.
Investigation is the statutory province of the police. Half a century before the Constitution, the Judicial Committee stated the relationship in terms which have not since been improved upon, holding in King-Emperor v. Khwaja Nazir Ahmad7 that the functions of the judiciary and of the police are complementary and not overlapping, and that the court's function begins when a charge is preferred. The Supreme Court has later restated the said proposition in so many cases. If a court exercising criminal jurisdiction may not ordinarily supervise the course of an investigation, a Commission whose statutory instrument is a recommendation certainly may not declare that investigation a misuse of law.
Whether the offences under Sections 307, 332 and 353 of the Penal Code are made out is a question for the trial court, at the stage of framing charge and again at the close of evidence. A determination of that question by any other body either usurps the criminal court's function or embarrasses it. The prejudice runs in both directions and neither side is served by it. The prosecution enters trial with an adverse finding from a statutory body attached to its investigation. The accused hold a finding in their favour upon which the criminal court cannot act, and which will therefore disappoint them.
This restraint does not empty the Commission's jurisdiction. A line separates the merits of the accusation from the manner in which state power was exercised, and the second lies squarely within the Commission's field. Whether the warrant answered the person the police sought to arrest; whether a copy was shown when it was demanded; whether the grounds of arrest were communicated; whether women were arrested during the hours of darkness and, if so, whether the safeguards attending such an arrest were observed. Each of these questions concerns the conduct of the state, and every one of them can be answered without deciding whether an offence was committed by anybody. Confined to that field, the Commission does its own work fully and leaves the criminal court to do its own.
Two inquiries preceded the impugned order. The Sub-Divisional Police Officer, Choudwar reported to the Superintendent of Police, Cuttack on 05.11.2024 and found no fault on the part of the petitioner. Not satisfied with that report, the Commission invoked Section 14 and entrusted the matter to its own Investigating Wing. The Additional Superintendent of Police, OHRC reported on 09.01.2026 that the petitioner had committed no illegality, misconduct or irregularity in the course of the investigation, and recommended no action against him.
The Commission was bound by neither report. Section 14(5) requires it to satisfy itself about the correctness of the facts stated and the conclusions reached in a report submitted to it, and permits it to make such further inquiry as it thinks fit, including the examination of the very officers who conducted the investigation. The Commission may therefore differ from its own investigating officer, and there will be cases where it must. What Section 14(5) does not permit is disagreement by silence. To satisfy oneself about the correctness of a report is to apply a mind to it and to say what is wrong with it.
Section 16 of the Act is not a matter of grace. If, at any stage of the inquiry, the Commission considers it necessary to inquire into the conduct of any person, or is of opinion that the reputation of any person is likely to be prejudicially affected by the inquiry, it shall give that person a reasonable opportunity of being heard and of producing evidence in his defence. Section 29 applies that provision to a State Commission. The language is mandatory and the Legislature took the trouble to enact it because a Commission inquiring into the conduct of a public servant will, by the nature of the exercise, be dealing with a person whose livelihood and standing are at stake.
What the Commission herein went well beyond affecting the petitioner's reputation. It found him responsible for a violation of human rights, imposed a monetary liability upon him personally, and directed the head of the State police force to recover that amount from his salary. A public servant facing consequences of that order is entitled to be told in specific terms what he is alleged to have done, to see the material relied upon against him, to answer it, and to have his answer considered. The petitioner states that he filed an objection and that the impugned order was passed without considering it. An objection received but not considered satisfies neither Section 16 nor the common law rule of which Section 16 is the statutory expression.
The point is reinforced by the character of the finding. As the Supreme Court observed in Institute of Chartered Accountants of India v. L.K. Ratna8, a finding of guilt carries consequences of its own the moment it is recorded, and the hearing must therefore precede the finding rather than follow it. The Court has cautioned with equal consistency against adverse findings recorded against officials who were never confronted with the allegation. A recorded finding that a named police officer violated the human rights of citizens will follow him through his service record for the rest of his career. It cannot be arrived at on the papers
Nothing in this judgment approves what took place at village Kanpur in the early hours of 12.06.2024. This Court quashes the impugned order because of how it was made and what it directed, and not because the underlying grievance has been found to be false. Several questions remain open on this record and they are of substantive nature.
Section 46(4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure forbids the arrest of a woman after sunset and before sunrise save in exceptional circumstances, and where such circumstances exist it requires a woman police officer to obtain the prior permission of the Judicial Magistrate of the first class by a written report. Three women were taken into custody in connection with an incident placed by the prosecution at about 2:15 a.m. Whether they were arrested during the hours of darkness, and if so whether that permission was sought and obtained, does not appear from the material placed before this Court.
The requirements of Sections 41B, 41D, 50 and 50A of the Code, and the safeguards laid down in D.K. Basu(supra), provisions are conditions upon the power of arrest and not formalities attending it. They exist because the entry of armed men into a household at night is the moment at which the power of the state is least visible and most easily abused, and the Commission is entitled, indeed obliged, to examine whether they were obeyed.
The complainant's case is not free from difficulty either. The complaint dated 29.07.2024 rests upon the assertion that the warrant named Bijay Kumar Behera, son of Sanjib Kumar Behera, whereas the person the police sought to arrest was Bijay Kumar Routray, son of Sanjay Kumar Routray. The submission advanced at the Bar on behalf of Opposite Party No.4, however, is that the warrant issued by the learned J.M.F.C.(II), Cuttack in G.R. Case No.551 of 2020 named Bijay Kumar Routray along with two others. The complaint places the incident at about 1:00 a.m. on 12.06.2024; counsel places the police visit on the night of 10/11.06.2024. The identity of the person named in the warrant is the foundation of the allegation that the police came to arrest a man they had no authority to arrest, and a foundation in that condition will not bear the weight placed upon it.
In Sube Singh v. State of Haryana9 the Supreme Court cautioned that compensation in the exercise of writ jurisdiction is appropriate where the violation is established by clear and satisfactory material, and that where the facts are genuinely in dispute the forum must find them before it awards anything. Two irreconcilable accounts of a night-time altercation, the one supported by an FIR and a charge-sheet and the other by a complaint made some six weeks after the event and two days before the charge-sheet was filed, cannot be resolved by preferring one to the other. They must be tested.
V. CONCLUSION:
For the reasons recorded above, the order dated 29.01.2026 passed by the learned Member, Odisha Human Rights Commission in OHRC Case No.2080 of 2024, at Annexure-9, is quashed. The Commission acted without jurisdiction in directing the petitioner to pay compensation personally and in directing its recovery from his salary; it exceeded its jurisdiction in pronouncing upon the merits of a criminal case pending trial, it departed from the two inquiry reports before it without reasons and it recorded a finding against the petitioner without the hearing under Section 16 of the Act.
The complaint of Opposite Party No.4 is remitted to the Commission for fresh consideration in accordance with law. In taking it up afresh, the Commission will bear the following in mind.
it shall issue notice under Section 16 to the petitioner, and to any other officer into whose conduct it proposes to inquire, furnish him the material proposed to be relied upon, and consider his response before recording any finding
it shall confine its inquiry to the manner in which the powers of entry, arrest, and investigation were exercised, and shall not record any finding upon whether the offences alleged in Tangi P.S. Case No.137 of 2024 are or are not made out
if it proposes to differ from the reports dated 05.11.2024 and 09.01.2026, it shall record its reasons for doing so, as Section 14(5) requires, and may examine the officers who prepared them;
if it finds that a violation of human rights has occurred, it shall proceed under Section 18(a) by way of recommendation to the State Government, which shall consider the recommendation and respond in the manner Section 18(e) prescribes; and any question of recovering the amount from an officer personally shall be for the State Government to consider thereafter, in separate proceedings held in accordance with law;
The fresh consideration shall be completed as expeditiously as possible and preferably within six months of the receipt of a copy of this judgment.
No amount shall be recovered from the salary of the petitioner in pursuance of the impugned order. If any amount has already been recovered, it shall be refunded to him within eight weeks.
Nothing in this judgment, and nothing in the impugned order which has been quashed, shall be treated as an expression of opinion upon the merits of Tangi P.S. Case No.137 of 2024. The learned trial court shall proceed with the trial uninfluenced by either, and shall decide the case on the evidence placed before it.
The Writ Petition is allowed to the extent indicated above. There shall be no order as to costs.
The interim order, if any, passed earlier stands vacated.