Hem Shikha vs State Of Uttarakhand & Anr.

Per: Hon’ble Mr. Alok Mahra, J.

The present criminal writ petitions have been filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, challenging the judgment and order dated 18.07.2026 passed by the learned Commissioner, Garhwal Region, Camp Dehradun, in proceedings under Section 6 of the Uttar Pradesh Control of Goondas Act, 1970 (hereinafter referred to as “the Act, 1970”). In Criminal Writ Petition No.1602 of 2026, the petitioner seeks issuance of a writ, order or direction in the nature of certiorari quashing the impugned judgment and order dated 18.07.2026. The petitioner further seeks a writ, order or direction in the nature of mandamus commanding respondent no.1 to give effect to and enforce the order dated 14.05.2026 passed by the learned District Magistrate, Dehradun, whereby respondent no.2 was declared a ‘Goonda’ under Section 3(3) of the Act, 1970, and was directed to remove himself from the territorial limits of District Dehradun for the period specified in the said order.

In Criminal Writ Petition No.1912 of 2026, the petitioner has also challenged the judgment and order dated 18.07.2026, but to the limited extent that the learned Commissioner remanded the matter to the learned District Magistrate for reconsideration and passing of a fresh order.

Learned counsel for the petitioner appearing in Criminal Writ Petition No.1602 of 2026 would submit that the petitioner and her husband are Scientists working with the Institute of Defence Research and Development Organisation (IRDE), Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO), Government of India. He would further submit that respondent no.2 has been continuously indulging in criminal, violent and anti-social activities, including repeated acts of assault, criminal intimidation, molestation and attempts to commit serious offences against the petitioner, her family members and other residents of the locality. It is submitted that, in view of the aforesaid conduct of respondent no.2, the petitioner submitted a detailed complaint dated 25.04.2026 before the learned District Magistrate, Dehradun, seeking initiation of proceedings against respondent no.2 under the provisions of the Act, 1970; that, upon receipt of the complaint, the learned District Magistrate initiated proceedings under Section 3(2) of the Act, 1970 and directed an enquiry through the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Mussoorie; that, the enquiry report recorded that respondent no.2 had been threatening the residents of the locality, particularly women, senior citizens and children, and had created an atmosphere of fear and insecurity; that, the report further indicated that respondent no.2 was involved in several criminal cases and that his activities were prejudicial to the maintenance of public peace and tranquility; that, five First Information Reports had been registered against respondent no.2 in the State of Uttarakhand, copies whereof were available on the record before the learned District Magistrate; that, in addition, several First Information Reports had allegedly been lodged against him in District Bijnor.

Learned counsel would further submit that, upon consideration of the enquiry report and the material collected during the enquiry, the learned District Magistrate formed a prima facie opinion that respondent no.2 habitually terrorised the residents of the locality, particularly women, children and senior citizens, and that his continued presence within the district was prejudicial to the maintenance of public order; that, consequently, a notice under Section 3(1) of the Act, 1970, was issued to respondent no.2, calling upon him to show cause as to why appropriate action should not be taken against him under the said Act; that, respondent no.2 appeared before the learned District Magistrate and submitted his written objections, denying the allegations levelled against him. He would further submit that on 13.05.2026, the petitioner filed an additional application before the learned District Magistrate, bringing subsequent events to his notice, including the alleged admission made by respondent no.2 before the Uttarakhand State Commission for Women regarding his aggressive behaviour, his alleged physical assault upon the petitioner's husband, and his threat to raise an illegal construction over the land of Golden Forest.

In support of her allegations, the petitioner also produced a pen drive containing video recordings purportedly depicting the violent and unlawful conduct of respondent no.2; that, the electronic material demonstrated the threatening behaviour of respondent no.2 and was duly placed before the learned District Magistrate for consideration. He would furthers submit that after affording an opportunity of hearing to both parties and considering the material available on record, including the enquiry report, documentary material, electronic evidence and submissions advanced on behalf of the parties, the learned District Magistrate passed a reasoned order dated 14.05.2026; that, by the aforesaid order, the learned District Magistrate confirmed the proceedings initiated under Section 3(1) of the Act, 1970, declared respondent no.2 to be a ‘Goonda’ within the meaning of the Act, 1970, under Section 3(3) thereof, and directed his externment from the territorial limits of District Dehradun for the prescribed period. He would further submit that aggrieved by the aforesaid order, respondent no.2 preferred Appeal No.03 of 2026, titled Puneet Agarwal v. State of Uttarakhand and Another, under Section 6 of the Act, 1970, before the learned Commissioner, Garhwal Region, Camp Dehradun; that, by the impugned judgment and order dated 18.07.2026, the learned Commissioner exceeded the scope of the statutory appellate jurisdiction by remanding the matter to the learned District Magistrate with directions to reconsider the final reports submitted in certain criminal cases, judicial orders passed therein, pending civil proceedings and cross-cases.

Learned counsel for the petitioner would further submit that respondent no.2 had earlier challenged the show-cause notice dated 25.04.2026 before this Court by instituting Criminal Writ Petition No.762 of 2026, which was subsequently dismissed as infructuous vide order dated 24.08.2026, after the learned District Magistrate had passed the final order dated 14.05.2026. It is further submitted that, while entertaining the aforesaid writ petition, a coordinate Bench of this Court, vide order dated 30.04.2026, observed in paragraph 5 thereof that statements of approximately forty residents had been recorded, alleging that respondent no.2 had threatened them by displaying firearms and had misbehaved with minor girls; that, the observations made by the Coordinate Bench prima facie indicated the seriousness of the allegations and the necessity of appropriate action in accordance with law; that, vide order dated 17.06.2026, the Coordinate Bench directed that no coercive action be taken against respondent no.2 on the date fixed before the learned Commissioner for hearing of the statutory appeal. It is further contended that respondent no.2 lodged a First Information Report against the petitioner, in which investigation was stayed by this Court vide order dated 20.05.2026.

Learned counsel would contend that several residents had approached the competent authorities by submitting complaints against respondent no.2, but no effective action had been taken to address their grievances. He would further submit that the impugned appellate order is without jurisdiction, inasmuch as the power to remand the proceedings for fresh consideration is not expressly conferred upon the appellate authority under Section 6 of the Act, 1970; that, the jurisdiction of a statutory appellate authority is circumscribed by the provisions of the enactment conferring such jurisdiction and must be exercised within the limits prescribed by law, thus, according to learned counsel, in the absence of statutory authority for remanding the matter in the manner directed by the learned Commissioner, the impugned order cannot be sustained; that, proceedings under the Act, 1970, are preventive in nature and are intended to protect public order by restraining persons whose activities create fear, terror or insecurity among members of the public.

It is contended that the learned Commissioner failed to appreciate the preventive object of the legislation and proceeded as though the allegations against respondent no.2 were required to be established in the manner applicable to a criminal trial; that, while exercising appellate jurisdiction, the learned Commissioner was required to examine whether the satisfaction recorded by the learned District Magistrate was founded upon relevant material and whether the order suffered from any illegality, arbitrariness or procedural infirmity; that, instead, according to learned counsel, the learned Commissioner directed reconsideration of matters which were not determinative of the preventive proceedings under the Act, 1970, thereby exceeding the permissible scope of appellate scrutiny.

Learned counsel would further submit that the learned District Magistrate had recorded findings on the basis of the enquiry report submitted by the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, the criminal antecedents of respondent no.2, the statements of the residents of the locality, the documentary material, the electronic evidence produced by the petitioner and the conduct attributed to respondent no.2. It is contended that the learned Commissioner erred in directing the learned District Magistrate to reconsider the final reports submitted in certain criminal cases; that, the mere submission of a final report in a criminal case, according to learned counsel, does not automatically render the underlying material irrelevant for the purposes of preventive proceedings, provided such material is otherwise legally admissible or capable of consideration under the applicable statutory framework.

Learned counsel for the petitioner would also submit that the proceedings under the Act, 1970, are distinct from criminal prosecution and that the competent authority is required to consider the overall conduct of the person concerned, together with the material bearing upon the statutory requirements for taking preventive action; that, the learned Commissioner committed a manifest error in directing reconsideration of cross-FIRs and pending civil disputes without properly appreciating the nature and object of the proceedings under the Act, 1970. It is contended that the existence of cross-cases or civil litigation cannot, by itself, negate otherwise relevant material concerning the alleged habitual conduct of a person or its impact upon public order; that, the learned Commissioner, according to learned counsel, failed to appreciate that the jurisdiction under the Act, 1970, depends upon the satisfaction of the competent authority, founded upon relevant material, regarding the activities of the person concerned and their bearing upon public order; that, in the absence of any demonstrated perversity, arbitrariness, mala fides or reliance upon irrelevant considerations, the appellate authority ought not to substitute its own assessment for that of the competent authority merely because another view of the material may be possible.

It is further contended that, by remanding the matter for fresh consideration despite the availability of material on record and the passing of a detailed order by the learned District Magistrate, the learned Commissioner has unnecessarily prolonged the proceedings and thereby caused prejudice to the petitioner and other residents of the locality. He would further submit that the impugned order suffers from perversity, as relevant material has allegedly been disregarded and irrelevant considerations have been taken into account; that, the standard of proof applicable to a criminal trial, according to learned counsel, cannot be mechanically imported into preventive proceedings under the Act, 1970. He would contend that the learned District Magistrate was required to assess the material in the context of the statutory requirements governing preventive action and to determine whether the continued presence of respondent no.2 within the district warranted the action contemplated under the Act. He also referred to Section 6 of the Act, 1970, and the judgment of the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad in Criminal Miscellaneous Writ Petition No.2700 of 2026, in support of his submissions. He has further relied upon Sections 2(b), 3(1)(c) and 8 of the Act, 1970, contending that the nature of the material to be considered by the competent authority and the scope of the preventive proceedings must be determined in accordance with the statutory scheme.

It is submitted that the order dated 14.05.2026 was passed not merely on the basis of the registration of five First Information Reports in the State of Uttarakhand, but also upon consideration of the confidential report submitted by the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, the video recordings, and other material pertaining to the alleged activities of respondent no. 2, some of which had been widely circulated on social media. Learned counsel would, therefore, submit that the learned Commissioner, without properly appreciating the aforesaid material and the findings recorded by the learned District Magistrate, erred in remanding the matter for fresh consideration. On the aforesaid grounds, learned counsel prays that Criminal Writ Petition No. 1602 of 2026 be allowed, the impugned appellate order be set aside, and WPCRL No. 1912 of 2026, preferred by respondent no. 2, be dismissed.

Per contra, learned senior counsel appearing for respondent no.2 would submit that the learned Commissioner correctly found the externment order dated 14.05.2026 passed by the learned District Magistrate to be illegal and contrary to the principles of natural justice, although the consequential direction remanding the matter for fresh consideration was, according to him, unnecessary and legally unsustainable. He would further submit that the power of remand may, in an appropriate case, be regarded as an ancillary power of an appellate authority, even where such power is not expressly mentioned in the relevant statutory provision. However, it is contended that the exercise of such power in the present case was improper, since the proceedings initiated against respondent no.2 were defective from their inception. He would further submit that the alleged illegality in the order dated 14.05.2026 had already been noticed by the learned Commissioner while passing the impugned appellate order dated 18.07.2026; that, the show-cause notice dated 25.04.2026 had also been challenged before this Court in Criminal Writ Petition No.762 of 2026. However, before the said writ petition could be finally decided, the learned District Magistrate proceeded to pass the final order dated 14.05.2026, as a result whereof the writ petition was dismissed as infructuous vide order dated 24.08.2026.

Learned senior counsel would further submit that, out of the five First Information Reports referred to in the externment order, final reports had been submitted in two cases, interim orders had been passed in favour of respondent no.2 in two other cases, and respondent no.2 was not even named in the fifth First Information Report. It is contended that the learned District Magistrate failed to properly appreciate the status and nature of the aforesaid criminal cases before arriving at the conclusion that respondent no.2 was liable to be externed from District Dehradun; that, the externment order was passed without a proper assessment of the material and without due consideration of the objections raised by respondent no.2.

Learned senior counsel would place reliance upon the judgment rendered by the High Court of Kerala in N.K. Dharmadas v. State Transport Appellate Tribunal of Kerala and Others, reported in 1962 SCC OnLine Ker 136, to contend that an appellate authority, in the absence of an express statutory provision, may exercise the power of remand as an ancillary or incidental power necessary for the effective exercise of its appellate jurisdiction; that, the aforesaid decision was rendered in the context of Section 64 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, wherein the power of remand was recognised as incidental to the proper exercise of appellate jurisdiction.

Learned senior counsel would further submit that the notice issued under Section 3(1) of the Uttar Pradesh Control of Goondas Act, 1970 (hereinafter referred to as “the Act, 1970”), was legally defective, inasmuch as the proceedings were allegedly initiated without compliance with the requisite statutory requirements concerning the supporting affidavits and material forming the basis of the proposed action. He would contend that the complaint or application giving rise to the proceedings was not accompanied by the requisite material and that the proceedings were initiated at the instance of persons harbouring personal animosity against respondent no. 2; that, according to learned senior counsel, such circumstances cast serious doubt upon the bona fides of the proceedings and the legality of the action taken against respondent no. 2.

In support of his submissions concerning the procedural safeguards governing proceedings under the Act, 1970, learned senior counsel would also place reliance upon the decision of the Allahabad High Court in Bhim Sain Tyagi v. State of U.P. and Others, reported in 1999 SCC OnLine All 1403, to emphasise the necessity of strict compliance with the statutory procedure and the principles of natural justice while exercising preventive powers that affect an individual's liberty and movement. He would submit that an externment order cannot be sustained where the competent authority fails to adhere to the prescribed procedural safeguards or deprives the person concerned of a meaningful opportunity to defend himself. He further rely upon the judgment of the Allahabad High Court in Ramji Pandey v. State of Uttar Pradesh, reported in 1981 SCC OnLine All 305, in support of his contention that a notice issued under Section 3(1) of the Act, 1970, must disclose the general nature of the material allegations against the person proceeded against; that, a mere recital of past First Information Reports, pending criminal cases, convictions or acquittals, without adequate disclosure of the substance of the allegations and the material relied upon, may not satisfy the statutory requirement; that, the notice must contain sufficient particulars to enable the noticee to understand the case he is required to meet and to submit an effective explanation in response thereto. Reliance has also been placed upon the judgment of the Uttarakhand High Court in Rakesh Kaintura v. State of Uttarakhand and Others, reported in 2026 SCC OnLine Utt 21019, in support of the submissions advanced on behalf of respondent no. 2.

On the strength of the aforesaid decisions, learned senior counsel would contend that the externment order dated 14.05.2026, having allegedly been passed without due compliance with the statutory requirements and the principles of natural justice, was not sustainable in law. He would, therefore, submit that the impugned appellate order dated 18.07.2026, insofar as it interferes with the externment order, does not warrant interference at the instance of the petitioner in Criminal Writ Petition No. 1602 of 2026, and that the challenge raised in the writ petition is liable to be considered in the light of the statutory framework and the legal principles enunciated in the aforesaid decisions.

In reply, learned counsel for the petitioner would submit that as many as eight complaints had been received against respondent no.2 and that affidavits of eight persons had also been placed on record in support thereof. He would, therefore, contend that the objection regarding the alleged absence of supporting affidavits is contrary to the material available on record.

Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the material available on record.

The principal questions for consideration are whether the learned Commissioner, while exercising appellate jurisdiction under Section 6 of the Uttar Pradesh Control of Goondas Act, 1970 (hereinafter referred to as “the Act, 1970”), was competent to remand the matter to the learned District Magistrate and whether interference with the externment order dated 14.05.2026 was otherwise justified.

Section 6(3) of the Act, 1970 empowers the Commissioner to confirm the impugned order, with or without modification, or to set it aside. The provision does not expressly confer any power of remand. Although learned senior counsel for respondent no. 2 has relied upon N.K. Dharmadas v. State Transport Appellate Tribunal of Kerala and Others, reported in 1962 SCC OnLine Ker 136, in support of the proposition that remand may be an incidental power of an appellate authority, such power cannot be exercised contrary to the express statutory scheme. The decision in Anil Chaudhary v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Others, reported in 2026 LiveLaw (AB) 377, which specifically examines Section 6 of the Act, 1970, also supports the view that the Commissioner cannot remand the matter for fresh adjudication on merits.

Learned senior counsel for respondent no. 2 has further relied upon Bhim Sain Tyagi v. State of U.P. and Others, reported in 1999 SCC OnLine All 1403, Ramji Pandey v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Others, reported in 1981 SCC OnLine All 305, and Rakesh Kaintura v. State of Uttarakhand and Others, reported in 2026 SCC OnLine Utt 21019, to emphasise the necessity of strict compliance with the statutory safeguards governing externment proceedings. In particular, Ramji Pandey underscores that a notice under Section 3(1) must disclose the general nature of the material allegations so as to afford the person concerned a meaningful opportunity to defend himself.

The sufficiency of the notice and the legality of the proceedings must, therefore, be assessed with reference to the statutory requirements and the material on record. The petitioner contends that the externment order was based not merely on five criminal cases but also on the report of the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, complaints and statements of local residents, affidavits, video recordings and the objections submitted by respondent no. 2. Conversely, respondent no. 2 disputes the sufficiency of the material and alleges personal animosity. Neither the existence of criminal cases nor the submission of a confidential report, by itself, conclusively establishes the statutory grounds for externment. The competent authority must arrive at the requisite satisfaction on relevant material and in accordance with law. Equally, the registration of criminal cases, the pendency of cross-cases or the absence of a conviction cannot, by themselves, determine the validity of preventive proceedings.

The appellate authority was competent to examine the legality of the externment order and to set it aside if the statutory requirements were not satisfied. However, it could not, in the absence of statutory authority, direct the learned District Magistrate to undertake a fresh adjudication. The direction of remand, therefore, exceeds the jurisdiction conferred by Section 6(3) of the Act, 1970. By the impugned appellate order, the learned Commissioner set aside the order dated 14.05.2026 passed by the District Magistrate, primarily on the ground that the District Magistrate had failed to take into consideration the pendency of civil litigations between the applicant and the complainant/respondent. The learned Appellate Authority further observed that, out of the five FIRs relied upon, final reports had been submitted in two cases, stay orders were operating in two cases, and the applicant had not been named in the remaining one FIR. However, while recording these findings, the learned Appellate Authority overlooked the fact that the order of externment passed by the District Magistrate was also based upon the confidential report submitted by the Sub-Divisional Magistrate (SDM), the assessments and statements of several complainants, and the electronic evidence collected against the applicant. Further, Section 8 of the Uttar Pradesh Control of Goondas Act, 1970, provides for consideration of the nature and probative value of the evidence in the proceedings under the Act. The District Magistrate, being the competent authority, had passed the order of externment after considering the past and present conduct and behaviour of the applicant, along with the material available on record. However, the learned Appellate Authority, without recording any findings on these relevant aspects or examining the material forming the basis of the externment order, set aside the order dated 14.05.2026 and remanded the matter. In view of the aforesaid, the impugned appellate order dated 18.07.2026 cannot be sustained in law and the same is hereby set aside.

Consequently, Criminal Writ Petition No. 1602 of 2026 is allowed. Criminal Writ Petition No. 1912 of 2026, insofar as it challenges the impugned appellate order on the ground of the remand direction for fresh consideration, is dismissed.

No order as to costs.

Pending applications, if any, stand disposed of.