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Judgment
Ram Chand Gupta, J.—The present regular second appeal has been filed against judgment and decree dated 9.3.2011, passed by learned Additional District Judge, Hisar, vide which appeal filed by present Appellants-Defendants against judgment and decree dated 26.8.2009 passed by learned Civil Judge, Senior Division, Hisar, decreeing the suit filed by Respondent-Plaintiff, was dismissed.
I have heard learned Counsel for the Appellants and have gone through the whole record carefully including both the judgments passed by learned Courts below.
Admitted facts are that Respondent-Plaintiff, i.e., Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited (hereinafter to be referred as `BSNL'') was allotted 2.18 acre of land in Sector 14, Part II, Sirsa Road, Hisar, for construction of dwelling unit for its staff, as per the terms and conditions of allotment letter dated 24.7.1996, Ex.P20. As per said letter, Respondent-Plaintiff was to deposit 16,22,570/-on or before 31.12.1996 as 10% of the total sale consideration, i.e., earnest money. There is no dispute that the said amount was deposited by Respondent-Plaintiff with Estate Officer, HUDA, Hisar on 7.10.1996, i.e., much before the stipulated date which was 31.12.1996. Further as per terms and conditions of Ex.P20, after deposit of 10% of the sale consideration, letter of intent was to be issued by present Appellants for depositing the remaining amount. However, the same was never issued. Rather letter Ex.P11 dated 30.5.1997 was issued modifying the terms and conditions of letter Ex.P20 informing the Respondent-Plaintiff that Appellants would charge from them the rate prevalent in calendar year 1997 qua the allotted land. Hence, both the Courts came to the conclusion that the demand of Appellants-Defendants for charging the rate prevalent in calendar year 1997 for the allotted land to Respondent-Plaintiff is not legal and rather they are entitled to charge the price as mentioned in original letter of allotment, Ex.P20.
Only point argued by learned Counsel for the Appellants is that it was for Respondent-Plaintiff to inform the Chief Administrator, HUDA, about deposit of 10% of the earnest money with Estate Officer, HUDA, Hisar. Though plea was taken by Respondent-Plaintiff that even Chief Administrator, HUDA, was informed of this fact, however, it has been rightly observed by learned Courts below that it was the duty of officials of the office of Estate Officer, HUDA, Hisar, as well to inform Appellant No. 2 with regard to timely receipt of payment in their office and for issuance of letter of intent. If there is any fault at the level of Estate Officer, HUDA, Hisar, in not informing the Chief Administrator about deposit of Rs. 16,22,570/-from Respondent-Plaintiff on account of which letter of intent could not be issued by the Chief Administrator, HUDA, Respondent-Plaintiff cannot be held liable to pay extra price.
Another point argued by learned Counsel for the Appellants is that Respondent-Plaintiff consented to pay the price prevalent in year 1997 by depositing the said amount. However, merely on the ground that the amount as demanded by Appellants-Defendants has been deposited by Respondent-Plaintiff, just to seek allotment, it cannot be said that it has consented for the same. Appellants are entitled for the amount from Respondent-Plaintiff regarding price of allotted land as per letter Ex.P20 at the rate prevalent at the time of issuing letter of allotment. They cannot charge enhanced price at the rate prevalent in the year 1997, as has been done in this case.
Hence, in view of these facts, it cannot be said that any illegality has been committed by the Courts below in passing the impugned judgments and decrees. Finding recorded by the Courts below is fully justified by the evidence on record and is supported by cogent reasons. The said finding is not shown to be perverse or illegal nor it is based on misreading or misappreciation of the evidence. Hence, the said finding does not warrant interference in this second appeal. No question of law, much less substantial question of law, arises for determination in this second appeal. Accordingly the appeal is dismissed in limine.
