Haryana Board of School Education vs Industrial Tribunal

G.R. Majithia, J.—The Board of School Education, Haryana, has challenged the award of the Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court, Hissar, passed in Reference No. 607 of 1990 on April 11, 1991, in this writ petition under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India.

On receipt of a demand notice from the workman, the Governor of Haryana referred the following question to the Labour Court for adjudication:

"Whether termination of services of Bal Kishan Sharma is justified and in order? If not, to what relief is he entitled?"

After recording evidence, the Labour Court found that the services of the workman were illegally terminated and ordered his reinstatement in service with full back wages. The workman was appointed as a clerk, vide order dated May 7, 1984, and his services were terminated in June, 1985, as no longer required. The order was quashed principally on the ground of non-compliance of the provisions of Section 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act.

The management pleaded in the writ petition that respondent No. 2 was appointed on daily wage basis for a fixed period of three months. He worked for the following periods:

May 7, 1984 to August 6, 1984, August 13, 1984 to November 12, 1984 November 23, 1984 to February 19, 1985.

The services of the workman automatically came to an end after expiry of the period for which he was offered appointment The appointment was of contingent nature. It would be useful to reproduce para No. 4 of the writ petition. The same reads thus:

"That Bal Kishan, respondent No. 2, was appointed on daily wages for a fixed period of ''three months. He worked as daily wages clerk for the following periods:

May 7, 1984 to August 6, 1984, August 13, 1984 to November 12, 1984 November 23, 1984 to February 19, 1985.

His services were not terminated by the Board, but automatically came to an end after expiry of the period mentioned in the appointment orders.

Respondent No. 2 accepted the appointments purely on daily wages for three months'' duration. The work for which he was appointed being of a contingent nature came to an end and he was not required any further nor is there any provision for continuous employment for such contingent work."

The workman was duly served and he put in appearance through his counsel, but he did not file any written statement controverting the pleas of the petitioner taken in para No. 4 of the writ petition. Every plea in the pleadings has to be specifically controverted and if a fact in the writ petition has not been controverted, an inference is deducible that the same was admitted to be correct. In the instant case, there is no escape from the conclusion that the plea taken in para No. 4 of the writ petition was not controverted. The irresistible conclusion is that the workman was appointed on daily wage basis and his services automatically came to an end on the expiry of the period for which he was appointed. This aspect of the matter was not examined by the Labour Court. If the workman, respondent No. 2, was appointed for a specific period and his appointment was of contingent nature, it cannot be remotely suggested that services of respondent No. 2 were illegally terminated. The award of the Labour Court cannot be sustained.

For the reasons stated above, we quash the award of the Labour Court and remit the case to it for fresh decision in accordance with law after permitting the parties to lead evidence in proof and disproof of their respective contentions.

The parties, through their counsel, are directed to appear before the Labour Court on October 21, 1993.