HARYANA AGRO INDUSTRIES CORP. LTD. vs VIRENDER PAL SINGH

THIS appeal must necessarily fail against the preliminary bar of limitation. It is, therefore, wasteful to delve deeply into the merits of the case, and it would suffice to notice the salient facts pertaining to the question of limitation.

WHAT first meets the eye is the somewhat unusual feature that the appellant - Haryana Agro Industries Corporation Limited (hereinafter called ''the Corporation'') was not even remotely a party to the proceedings before the District Forum, Hisar. Therein the complainant-respondent Sh. Virender Pal Singh had preferred a complaint against the Saffidon Primary Co-operative & Land Development Bank, Saffidon (respondent No. 2). His primal grievance was that the aforesaid Bank was trying to indulge in an unfair practice by compelling him to purchase an electric motor to be installed in his tubewell, from the appellant-Corporation only and he sought the relief that the Bank be directed to release the balance amount of Rs. 9,000/- of the sanctioned loan for the purchase of a motor from a dealer or trader of his own choice. Despite the issuance of the notice, the respondent-Bank did not choose to put in appearance before the District Forum, and, consequently, the proceedings against it were ordered to be taken ex - parte. Relying upon the evidence of the complainant, the District Forum directed the respondent-Bank to release the balance amount of the loan to the complainant unconditionally with liberty to purchase an I.S.I. mark electric motor from the open market. The order of the District Forum was passed way back on the 13th of August, 1990. The present appeal has been presented before this Commission on the 2nd January, 1991. The appellant has, thus, to explain satisfactorily a delay of nearly four months beyond the prescribed period of 30 days for preferring the appeal under Section of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 (hereinafter referred to as ''the Act''). It may perhaps be said at the very outset that the appellant has singularly failed to do so.

In First Appeal No. 16 of 1990 (Haryana State Electricity Board through Executive Engineer, Operation Divn. No.1, Hisar v. Dinesh Kumar son of Sh. Bishan Sarup, Hisar), this Commission has already categorically held that the terminus a quo for the period of limitation under Section 15 runs from the date of the order and not from any supposed date of the receipt of the copy thereof under Rule 4(10) of the Haryana Consumer Protection Rules, 1988 (hereinafter referred to as ''the Rules'').

NOW apart from the above, there are clear mandatory procedural requirements whenever the appeal is being presented beyond the period of limitation. It may be pointedly mentioned that on the appellant''s own showing from the very first instance, they were well aware that the appeal was barred by time and a fragmentary prayer to condone the delay in the filing therein was made in the heading of the appeal itself. However, Rule 8(4) of the Rules provides as under: - "(4) When the appeal is presented after the expiry of the period of limitation as specified in the Act, the memorandum shall be accompanied by an application supported by an affidavit setting forth the fact on which appellant relies to satisfy the State Commission that he has sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal within the period of limitation."

It is somewhat manifest from the plain language of the above-quoted sub-rule that herein there has been a frontal violation of the said provision. Even though the appellants were fully aware that the appeal was being presented after the expiry of the period of limitation, yet no separate application for condoning the delay was annexed thereto. What is more, admittedly, no affidavit as required by setting forth specifically the facts on which the appellant-Corporation wished to rely, to satisfy this Commission, that there was sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal within the period of limitation, was attached either. In fairness to the appellants, it may be noticed that they belatedly attempted to comply with the statutory requirements by presenting an application more than 21 days after the filing of the appeal, by preferring Civil Misc. Application No. 1 of 1991 of the 23rd January, 1991, accompanied by the affidavit of Mr. P.K. Chaudhary, I.A.S. Obviously enough, this afterthought does not in any way comply with the strict requirements of law in afore-quoted Sub-rule (4). There is, thus, a patent and flagrant violation of the statutory requirements at the very threshold, which cannot possibly be glossed over. Yet again, the primal ground for the condonation of the delay by the appellants was that they being not a party to the proceedings below, were not aware of the order of the District Forum. However, even pitching their case at the highest, it is the appellants'' own averment that they fully came to know of the orders of the Forum on the 30th November, 1990 when a copy thereof was sent by the Haryana State Co-operative Development Bank Ltd. to them. Even from the said date, the appellants are again beyond the prescribed time. It would appear that though the appeal bears the date of the 27th December, 1990, it was not till a week later that it was presented before the Commission on the 2nd January, 1991. Neither in the grounds of appeal nor in the Civil Misc. Application, belatedly presented on the 23rd January, 1991, and its accompanying affidavit, is there a hint of explanation for this delay beyond the period of limitation, even from the admitted date of knowledge of the order on 30th November, 1990. Mr. Rajesh Garg, learned Counsel appearing for the appellants, faced with these admittedly uphill facts, which were strongly pressed on behalf of respondent No. 1 by Mr. D.D. Gupta, had indeed nothing to say by way of explanation. It has, consequently, to be held that even on the supposed stance of knowledge, taken by the appellants themselves, the present appeal is barred by limitation without anything remotely suggesting a sufficient cause for the condonation thereof.

IN view of the above there is no option, but to hold that both on the point of violation of the statutory rule, as also because of the absence of any sufficient cause, the present appeal must fail on the bar of limitation. Before parting with this order we must in fairness to Mr. D.D. Gupta, learned Counsel for respondent No. 1, notice that in view of the above it becomes unnecessary to opine on two other objections, which also appear to be prima facie against the appellants. Firstly, it is the common case that the appellant-Corporation was not even remotely a party to the proceedings before the District Forum. Whether in such a situation a person, who was not implcaded in the original proceedings (and consequently may not be bound by the order) is competent to prefer an appeal is a somewhat moot proposition on which no final opinion need now be expressed. Even assuming that the appellant-Corporation was competent to prefer the appeal, the other hurdle facing them was whether they are in any way aggrieved by the order under appeal. This is the more so, in view of the admitted stand taken before us by the learned Counsel for respondent No. 2 (Saffidon Primary Co-operative & Land Development Bank, Saffidon) that in the loan agreement between the Bank and the complainant there was no stipulation, whatsoever, requiring that the electric motor was to be purchased from the appellants. In the absence of any such clause how the complainant could be bound down to purchase the same from the appellant Corporation, appears on the face of it to be somewhat difficult if not impossible. Any unilateral decisions by the appellant Corporation or even the State Government of Haryana could not possibly bind the complainant. Again in what manner the appellant-Corporation is now aggrieved by the order of the District Forum is a question which prima facie seems to be deeply tilted against it. However, to repeat, we are not finally opining on this issue either.

AS a necessary consequence of the conclusive finding in Para 7 against the appellant, both on the point of violation of the statutory rule as also on the issue of limitation, this appeal is hereby dismissed. Appeal dismissed.