AI Structured Summary
Not yet generated for this judgment
Judgment
Radhakrishnan S., J.—By this appeal, the appellant is challenging the judgment and order of the learned Single Judge dated 20th April, 2007 in the above notice of motion. The respondents (petitioners in the Contempt petition) formed a Co-operative Housing Society named ''Swarupanand Coop. Housing Society in respect of a certain property, for which they had appointed the Developers M/s. S.B. Brothers Developers, a partnership firm, of which appellant is a partner.
The respondents had filed a writ petition in this Court, which had been disposed of by an Order dated 18/6/2002, perusal of which shows that;
On 3/5/2002, the appellant being a partner of the Developer firm had filed an undertaking that the construction of the building for accommodating the respondent-Slum-dwellers would be completed and that they would be given possession of their respective premises within the period of 24 months from the date of the order.
An affidavit to that effect was filed by the appellant in this Court, the Court accepted the said undertaking and consequently disposed of the petition .
However, the appellant had failed to abide by his undertaking within the stipulated period of 24 months which expired on 18/6/2004.
The respondents have submitted that as the appellant had failed to comply with the aforementioned undertaking, the respondents had;
i) approached the Statutory Authority, viz. the Slum Rehabilitation Authority, and filed several representations for taking appropriate action against the appellant.
ii) addressed a letter dated 13/12/2005 to the appellant directing him to abide by his undertaking.
iii) issued letters to the Slum Rehabilitation Authority, but to no avail.
iv In view of the above, the respondents being left with no other remedy, filed the above Contempt Petition No. 128/2006 on 6/11/2006 against the appellant, stating that he has committed a breach of the undertaking given to this Court and further praying for directions be given to the Slum Rehabilitation Authority to forthwith change the Developer and for directions to be given to the C.E.O. of the Slum Rehabilitation Authority to complete the Project as expeditiously as possible.
The appellant took out a Notice of Motion No. 721/2006 on 7/12/2006 praying for an extension of time to allow him to rehabilitate the tenants and to comply with the order dated 18/6/2002 in the above writ petition.
In his Affidavit in support of the abovementioned notice of motion, the appellant has stated that he has already constructed the A and B wings of the Rehab building. The S.R.A. has issued its Part Occupation Certificate on 25/8/2006 and that the tenements had been allotted to the eligible slum-dwellers, with the appellant submitting that he would complete the construction and allot the remaining rehab tenements within a short period of time.
The respondent Nos. 1 to 6 herein took out Notice of Motion No. 186/2007 on 30/3/2007 in Contempt Petition No. 128/2006 praying for condonation of delay of 2 years and 5 months in filing the above contempt petition. The said Notice of Motion was taken out by the respondent Nos. 1-6 since the appellant in his Affidavit in reply to the Contempt petition had stated that the Contempt petition of respondent Nos. 1-6 is barred by the law of limitation.
In the above Notice of Motion No. 721/2006, the learned Single Judge had directed the appellant to file an undertaking that he would complete the remaining internal finishing work, plumbing, water and drainage lines of B Wing within an additional period of four months. The appellant gave the abovementioned undertaking on 9/3/2007, and also gave an undertaking to file a Bank Guarantee of Rs. 1 crore to carry out the said work.
Thereupon, the learned Single Judge, on 13/3/2007 had directed Notice of Motion No. 721 of 2006 to be heard with Contempt Petition No. 128/2006. The abovementioned Notice of Motion was placed along with Notice of Motion No. 186/2006 for hearing.
The learned Single Judge, by his judgment and order dated 20/4/2007 allowed the above Notice of Motion No. 186/2007, and condoned the delay of 2 years and 5 months in filing the contempt petition and issued a show cause notice to the appellant as to why contempt action should not be taken against him. The present appeal arises out of the aforesaid order.
Mr. Thorat, the learned Senior Counsel for the appellant contended that there is an error of law apparent on the face of the record in passing the order and that the learned Single Judge had failed to exercise the jurisdiction vested in him. It is further submitted that the learned Single Judge has wrongly interpreted and applied the provisions of the Contempt of Courts Act and the Limitation Act, as well as the case law on the point, while passing the impugned order. Mr. Thorat, the learned Senior Counsel also contended that the learned Single Judge ought to have dismissed the respondent''s Notice of Motion No. 186/2007 for condonation of delay in filing Contempt Petition No. 128/2007 for the following reasons;
a) By virtue of the mandatory nature of Section 20 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, which requires the petition to be filed within one year from the date of cause of action, the appellant''s Contempt petition was clearly barred by the law of limitation. It must be noted that the bar of limitation does not allow the filing of an application for condonation of delay.
b) Respondent Nos. 1-6 have not given any particulars about limitation in the memo of their contempt petition. Further, the respondent Nos. 1-6 have not shown ''sufficient cause'' within the meaning of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 in their Affidavit in Support of Notice of Motion No. 186/2007, nor have they fully explained the cause for a delay of 2 years and 5 months in filing of the Contempt petition. Therefore, the learned Single Judge has exceeded his jurisdiction in allowing Notice of Motion No. 186/2007 and condoning the delay in filing the contempt petition.
c) Moreover, it must be noted that respondent No. 2 has already accepted allotment of the Rehab tenements from the appellant, has taken possession and been issued a Possession Receipt for the same. In the light of this fact, the appellant contends that respondent No. 2 cannot file a Contempt petition.
d) Without prejudice to the above submission, the appellant submits that he has complied with the Undertaking by allotting Rehab tenements to respondent Nos. 1-6 through allotment letters. Further, the issuance of Part Occupation Certificates by the S.R.A. and the application forms sent by the appellant for the installation of an electric meter, indicate that there was no necessity to entertain the contempt petition and issue a Show Cause Notice.
e) The appellant contends that the provisions for condonation of delay in Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, are not applicable to contempt petition. In any case, the learned Single Judge ought to have rejected the contempt petition, since it was not accompanied by an application for condonation of delay. Since the appellant raised the objection that the contempt petition was barred by limitation in his Affidavit in Reply, the appellant submits that the learned Single Judge ought not to have entertained and granted the said notice of motion, condoning the delay.
f) The appellant contends that the learned Single Judge has committed an error in overlooking the contentions of the appellant in his Affidavit in Reply to the contempt petition as well as his Affidavit in Reply to Notice of Motion No. 186/2007, besides failing to appreciate that there has been no wilful neglect on the part of the appellant in committing a breach of his undertaking. The failure on the part of the respondent Nos. 1-6 to prove wilful breach by the appellant, negates the necessity of entertaining the contempt petition and issuing a Show Cause Notice to the appellant. In fact, the appellant contends that it is the respondent Nos. 1-6, along with other slum dwellers who have been obstructing the appellant from completing the remaining work.
From the above, the following points arise for consideration;
a) Whether Notice of Motion No. 186/2007 for condonation of delay in filing Contempt Petition No. 128/2006 was maintainable in law; and as a corollary to the above, whether this Court can condone the delay in filing a contempt petition, in the light of the provisions of Section 20 of Contempt of Courts Act, 1970?
b) Whether respondent Nos. 1-6 have shown sufficient cause for the condonation of delay of 2 years and 5 months in filing the above contempt petition?
c) Whether the provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 are applicable to contempt petitions?
d) Whether it is a continuing wrong, and as such, there is no question of condonation of delay?
The learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellant, Mr. Thorat submitted that the provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963 are not attracted to the petitions filed under the provisions of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, as this area is fully covered by the latter Act and rules framed by the High Court under the Act. The learned Senior Counsel also relied on the following cases in support of his arguments;
a) (Dineshbhai A. Parikh v. Kirpalu Co-Operative Housing Society) AIR 1980 Guj. 194, wherein Gujarat High Court took the view that;
i) Section 20 of the Contempt of Courts Act places an absolute fetter on the power of the Court to initiate proceedings for contempt after the expiry of 1 year from the day on which contempt is alleged to have been committed. The contention advanced by the Counsel for the petitioner, that once contempt is committed, unless it is purged, it continues to be committed everyday is misconceived, as accepting such a view, would render Section 20 redundant.
ii) Although in cases of Criminal Contempt the Advocate General or any other person with the consent of the Advocate General has been given a statutory right to make a motion to the Court by virtue of Section 15 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, for taking action against the contemnor, no such statutory right has been conferred upon any one in respect of civil contempt. Contempt proceedings before a Court, are proceedings between the contemnor and the Court and in the event that a person brings to the notice of the Court, a contemptuous act committed by any other person, he is merely an informant or a relator and he cannot be elevated to the status of a petitioner or an Applicant who has the right to institute an action, and such information provided by the ''informant'' falls outside the ambit of ''application as envisaged u/s 29(2) of the Limitation Act.''
iii) Section 20 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 does not provide a period of limitation but lays down a condition as a pre-requisite to the exercise of the Court''s power under the said Act. As the aforementioned section does not contemplate institution of a petition or an application be a private individual, and merely contemplates initiation of the proceedings by the Court, the question of condoning the delay does not arise since delay can be condoned only when a person who has a right to institute action has approached the Court and Section 20 of the Contempt of Courts Act does not contemplate such a situation.
iv) In view of the above, Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, 1963 is not applicable in the present case, which repels the applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, therefore the jurisdiction of this Court is barred u/s 20 of the Contempt of Courts Act.
v) Even if an application for taking action under the Contempt of Courts Act is filed within a period of one year from the date of the alleged commission of contempt, but the Court has passed no order before the expiry of one year from the said date, the jurisdiction of the Court is automatically barred by Section 20 of the Contempt of Courts Act.
vi) The Court also ultimately observed that the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, was a complete Code in itself. Relying on the judgment of the Hon''ble Supreme Court in Hukumdev Narain Yadav Vs. Lalit Narain Mishra, , wherein it is observed that the provisions of the Limitation Act are, therefore, necessarily excluded and its benefits cannot be called in aid to supplement the provisions of the Contempt of Courts Act, which is a special enactment.
b) Devi Kishan Vs. Madan Lal Verma,
i) The petitioner had filed a Contempt petition after six years. The Court relied upon Baradakanta Mishra Vs. Justice Gatikrushna Misra, Chief Justice of the Orissa High Court, wherein the Hon''ble Supreme Court held that Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 applied to filing of a suit, Appeal or Application within the prescribed period and not to initiation of proceedings and thus the Limitation Act and provisions thereof would not apply to contempt proceedings and the bar of Section 20 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 is absolute. It also relied upon Dinesh Bhai v. Kripalu Co-operative Housing Society Ltd. AIR 1980 Guj. 194, wherein the Court had held that the Schedule in the Limitation Act does not apply to contempt proceedings and Section 20 of the Contempt of Courts Act fills up the lacunae. Therefore, in the present case, it was held that after the period prescribed by Section 20 lapses, the jurisdiction of the Court evaporates and the Court automatically loses jurisdiction.
ii) The Court also explained that ''initiation of proceedings'' has a different connotation. Initiation means application of mind by the Court and the formulation of an opinion that a prima facie case was made out. It the instant case, no continuing wrong had been committed and hence Section 20 would apply. Further, the Court, while acknowledging the ratio laid down in (Anwar Khan v. State of Rajasthan) (1999)1 R.LW. 674, refused to convert the instant petition into a petition under Article 215 of the Constitution of India in light of the circumstances of the case as the petitioner had not pursued the case diligently.
c) Bank of Baroda Vs. Sadruddin Hasan Daya and Another, :
One of the pleas taken in this case was that the petition for initiating contempt proceedings was filed after more than one year. The Supreme Court, however, noted that the Application was filed within five months of obtaining knowledge of the undertaking. (The actual undertaking was given on 5/10/1999, while the Contempt petition was filed in May, 2001). The Court recognized that a person who is not a party to the suit or proceeding cannot obtain knowledge of the affidavits or documents filed therein. The Court held that the present proceedings could not be held to be barred by limitation in view of the law laid down in the Pallav Sheth Vs. Custodian and Others, . The Court observed that the Pallav Sheth case laid down that the period of limitation can begin to run only from the date of knowledge.
d) (A.K. Bajpai v. State of U.P.) (2005)10 S.C.C. 188:
A Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court had taken the view that the provisions of Section 20 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, read with Rule 5 of Chapter 35-E of the Allahabad High Court Rules would apply and the Court would not issue notice if more than a year had elapsed from the alleged act of contempt and the contemnor could not avail of Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963. The Hon''ble Supreme Court, however, stated that it was not expressing any view on the matter, with regard to the application of Section 14.
e) Union of India (UOI) and Others Vs. Subedar Devassy PV, and State of Orissa and Another Vs. Aswini Kumar Baliarsingh, .
The Supreme Court held that the Tightness or wrongness of a particular order cannot be urged in a contempt proceedings.
f) Hanif Azami Eliyas Azami Vs. Shabana Mohsin Ghazi @ Shaikh and Another, .
The learned Single Judge of our High Court, relying upon the Pallav Sheth''s, case, held that contempt action was maintainable and the Contemnor was found guilty of contempt.
g) Metal Box India Ltd. Vs. State of Maharashtra and Others, .
The learned Single Judge of our High Court considered the question whether it could review its own order while exercising powers under the Contempt of Courts Act or Article 215. It answered in the negative relying upon the Pallav Sheth case and the Supreme Court Bar Association Vs. Union of India and Another, . In the earlier case, the Hon''ble Supreme Court had observed that despite the absence of express provisions restricting the powers of the Hon''ble Supreme Court to invoke Article 129 or 215; such power would still have to be exercised in consonance with the Limitation Act. The Court drew an analogy between the bar of limitation contained in Section 20 of the Contempt of Courts Act and the power of review of contempt proceedings.
h) Mahendra Builders Vs. Parvez Ghaswala and Others, :
On the facts of the case, the learned Single Judge of the Bombay High Court observed that the petitioner had not taken any initiative and had not made any reasonable investigation to discover the true position after acquiring knowledge of the creation of third party rights by the respondent (it was alleged by the petitioners that such act amounted to contempt), nor did the petitioners file a contempt petition within a year. In the light of these facts, the Court held that the Pallav Sheth case could be of no avail to the petitioner, particularly in view of para 47 of the said case. The Court believed that the petitioner did not deserve the indulgence of the Court, nor did the act of contempt amount to a continuing wrong. Moreover, the respondents had also cited para 41 of the Pallav Sheth case which stated that a litigant must act diligently and not sleep over his rights.
i) (High Court on its own motion v. Gopinath Mundhe and Ors.) 2007(1) Bom.C.R.(Cri.)563.
The Division Bench of the Bombay High Court referred to a decision in the (State of Maharashtra v. J.V. Patil) (1974) 78 Bom.L.R. 116 where it had been held that the date on which the matter is placed before the Division Bench of the High Court and the date on which the rule is granted, is the date when contempt proceedings can be said to be initiated, not the date when reference is made by the subordinate Court u/s 15(2). The Court also referred to the Manjit Singh and Others Vs. Darshan Singh and Others, where the Court had observed that if limitation were to run from the date when the act of criminal contempt was brought to the knowledge of the Court, then it would frustrate the very purpose of the legislature in providing for a period of limitation u/s 20 of the Contempt of Courts Act. The Court also applied the Pallav Sheth case, observing that suo motu contempt proceedings were also hit by limitation u/s 20.
The learned Senior Counsel for the respondents, Mr. Madon, relied on the judgment of the Hon''ble Supreme Court in the case of Pallav Sheth Vs. Custodian and Others, to further their argument that the provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 are applicable to a petition under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. The learned Senior Counsel submitted that the Hon''ble Supreme Court, in the Pallav Sheth case, affirmed the applicability of the provisions for condonation of delay contained in Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 to contempt petitions.
A brief summary of the Pallav Sheth case and the propositions laid down therein are as follows:
i) The case concerned an appeal by Special Leave granted by the Hon''ble Supreme Court, filed by the appellant (Pallav Sheth) against an order of the Special Court holding Pallav Sheth to be guilty of Contempt of Court and sentencing him to one months simple imprisonment and imposing a fine of Rs. 2000/-. By a separate order, the Special Court had also dealt with the contention that its action was not barred by limitation as contemplated by Section 20 of the Contempt of Courts Act. Therefore, the only question for consideration in the Appeal before the Supreme Court was whether in view of the provisions of Section 20 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, the Special Court was prohibited from taking any action as, according to Counsel for the appellant, the Court had initiated proceedings for contempt after the expiry of a period of one year from the date on which the contempt was alleged to have been committed.
ii) It was the case of the appellant that contempt, if any, was committed more than one year prior to the initiation of proceedings by the Special Court and Section 20 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 prohibited the Court from taking any action at a belated stage.
iii) The Counsel for the respondent, however, contended that the power of the High Court to commit for contempt of itself contained in Article 215 of the Constitution cannot be abrogated, stultified or restricted by any statutory provision, including Section 20 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. He also contended that ''initiation of proceedings'' within the meaning of Section 20 commenced with the filing of an application.
iv) In this case, the Hon''ble Supreme Court had discussed earlier cases relating to the contempt of Court and laid down the following propositions:
In Sukhdev Singh Sodhi Vs. The Chief Justice and Judges of The Pepsu High Court, , it recognized that the 1926 Act placed a limitation on the amount of punishment which could be imposed.
Baradakanta Mishra Vs. Justice Gatikrushna Misra, Chief Justice of the Orissa High Court, was decided on the interpretation of Section 19 of the 1971 Act, namely, that there was no right of appeal if the Court did not take action or initiate contempt proceedings.
In the case of Manjit Singh and Others Vs. Darshan Singh and Others, , a Full Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High Court outlined the various classes of contempt proceedings, those initiated on the Court''s own motion or ''otherwise'', and recognized the different terminus ad quern for limitation for different types of proceedings.
In Firm Ganpat Ram Rajkumar Vs. Kalu Ram and Others, , the Court did not hold that Section 20 of the 1971 Act was inapplicable. It came to the conclusion that the application for initiating contempt proceedings was relevant for the purpose of determining the limitation date of filing and furthermore that it was a case of continuing wrong.
The case of Goodwill Paint and Chemical Industry Vs. Union of India and another, , referred to the abovementioned case as well as R.L. Kapur Vs. State of Madras, and held that notwithstanding the codification of the law of contempt, the power of the High Courts as courts of Record to initiate proceedings for contempt remained unaffected. This was reiterated in the case of In re: Vinay Chandra Mishra (the alleged contemner), , where it was held that the amplitude and power of this Court to punish for contempt could not be curtailed by the law made by the Parliament or State Legislature. Although this decision was partially set aside in Supreme Court Bar Association Vs. Union of India and Another, , the abovementioned proposition remained unaffected.
In State of West Bengal and others Vs. Kartick Chandra Das and others, , the provisions of the Limitation Act were held to be applicable in dealing with application u/s 5 in connection with a Letters Patent Appeal filed u/s 19 of the Limitation Act.
A three-Judge Bench in Dr. L.P. Misra Vs. State of U.P., observed that the procedure provided by the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 had to be followed even in exercise of the jurisdiction under Article 215 of the Constitution of India.
In the case of Om Prakash Jaiswal Vs. D.K. Mittal and Another [OVERRULED], , this Court held that the filing of an application or petition for initiating proceedings for contempt or a mere receipt of such reference by the Court did not amount to ''initiation of the proceedings'' by the Court within the ambit of Section 20 of the Contempt of Courts Act. It observed that strictly speaking, this section does not provide limitation in the sense in which the term is understood in the Limitation Act.
v) Therefore, in Pallav Sheth''s case, the Hon''ble Supreme Court, after discussing the abovementioned cases, observed that it would, therefore, follow that if Section 20 is so interpreted that it does not stultify the powers under Article 129 or Article 215 then, like other provisions of the Contempt of Courts Act relating to the extent of punishment which can be imposed, a reasonable period of limitation can also be provided. The Court observed that prescribing a period of limitation for initiating contempt proceedings cannot be said to abrogate or stultify the powers inherent in Article 215 of the Constitution.
vi) According to the Court, because of the two broad categories through which contempt proceedings may be initiated (either on the motion of the Court or otherwise), the proper construction to be placed on Section 20 was that action must be initiated, either by filing of an application, or by the Court issuing notice suomotu, within a period of one year from the date on which the contempt is alleged to have been committed.
vii) Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, 1963 provides where any special or local law prescribes for any suit, appeal or application a period of limitation different from the period prescribed by the Schedule, the provisions of Section 3 shall apply as if such period were the period prescribed by the Schedule and for the purpose of determining any period of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application by any special or local law, the provisions contained in Sections 4 - 24 (inclusive) shall apply insofar as, and to the extent to which they are not expressly excluded by such special or local law. The Court observed that it had already been held in the case of Kartik Chandra Das that by virtue of Section 29(2) read with Section 3, limitation stands prescribed as a special law u/s 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act. Consequently, the provisions of Sections 4 - 24 would be attracted. Therefore, in the present case, Section 17 of the Limitation Act would also be applicable. This provision mandates that when the knowledge of the right or title on which plaintiff/applicant bases his suit/application, had been concealed by fraud, the period of limitation will not begin to run until such fraud is discovered. Thus, applying Section 17 to the facts of the present case, (where the Custodian discovered the fraud of the appellant only through the letter of the Income Tax Department on 5 May, 1998 and initiated contempt proceedings on 18 June, 1998, well within the period of limitation prescribed by Section 20 of the Contempt of Courts Act) and in the light of the discussion concerning the correct interpretation of Section 20 of the Contempt of Courts Act, the Hon''ble Supreme Court upheld the action taken by the Special Court punishing the appellant for contempt.
Other cases referred to by the learned Senior Counsel for the respondents, Mr. Madon, and the ratios laid down therein are briefly summarized as below:
a) (Everest Enterprises v. N.K. Constructions Pvt. Ltd.) 2004(1) Bom.C.R. 730 : 2003(4) All.M.R. 3:
The contempt petition in this case concerned the alleged alienation of suit property by the respondent in violation of the Court''s order. The petitioner contended that the alienation was a continuing wrong. In arguments, he submitted that Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, was applicable to contempt proceedings and equity mandated that a party committing fraud cannot gain benefit of limitation. The respondent, on the other hand, submitted that under the provisions of the Contempt of Courts Act, cognizance of violation of the Court''s order must be within a year from the date of violation. Moreover, the provisions of the Act were punitive in nature and required strict construction. He relied on the judgment in (Union of India v. Popular Construction Co.) 2002(2) Bom.C.R. 123 to draw an analogy between the absolute bar on time contained in Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. The learned Single Judge of the Bombay High Court referred to the decision in the Pallav Sheth case and affirmed that it set aside the decision in Om Prakash Jaiswal''s case. It also recognized the two categories of initiation of contempt proceedings, viz. on the Court''s own motion and otherwise. Referring to the Pallav Sheth case where Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, was held to be applicable, it ruled that in the case at hand, the contempt petition was within the period of limitation. It also accepted the contention of the petitioner that it involved a continuing wrong.
b) State of Goa Vs. Western Builders, .
This case involved the applicability of Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963 (bona fide pursuit of remedies in a Court without jurisdiction), to the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. The appellant argued that in view of the civil nature of arbitration proceedings as also in the light of Section 43 of the 1996 Act, the Limitation Act would be applicable. Countering this, the Counsel for the respondent argued that the 1996 Act was a special enactment, thereby ousting the Limitation Act by virtue of Section 29(2). Section 34, which provides for a period of three months within which an application for setting aside an award must be made, as well as a further period of thirty days for the condonation of delay, is a complete code in itself. The Hon''ble Supreme Court, while acknowledging that the 1996 Act was enacted to expedite commercial issues, observed that Section 43 of the said Act clearly makes the Limitation Act applicable to arbitration. Section 29(2) excludes the provisions of the Limitation Act in the 1996 Act to the extent of the area covered by the latter. Since Section 34 prescribes an additional period of thirty days for the condonation of delay, Section 5 of the Limitation Act stands excluded to this extent. However, there is no provision in the 1996 Act which excludes the operation of Section 14 of the Limitation Act. If the two can be read harmoniously without doing violation to the words therein, there is no prohibition on the applicability of Section 14 of the Limitation Act to the 1996 Act. This decision of the Hon''ble Supreme Court was affirmed in the case of Union of India (UOI) Vs. Shring Construction Company Private Limited, .
After hearing all the learned Senior Counsel in the above, it is explicitly clear that after Pallav Sheth''s case as decided by the Hon''ble Supreme Court, after referring to a catena of cases, Section 5 of the Limitation Act would be applicable to cases arising out of Contempt of Courts Act, 1971.
Factually, in the instant case, there is absolutely no dispute that the appellant gave a categorical undertaking to this Court on 3rd May, 2002, which was duly accepted by this Court on 18th June, 2002. The appellant had partly complied with the undertaking. Thereafter the appellant himself took out a notice of motion in this Court on 7th December, 2006, being Notice of Motion No. 721 of 2006, praying for extension of time to rehabilitate the remaining tenants.
In the above, as per the directions of the learned Single Judge, the appellant, again filed an undertaking before the Court on 9th March, 2007, to complete the additional construction and rehabilitate the remaining Tenants. The appellant also gave an undertaking to furnish a bank guarantee of Rs. 1/- Crore to carry out the said work. Having regard to all the aforesaid circumstances, the learned Single Judge by his impugned judgment dated 20th April, 2007, condoned the delay of 2 years and 5 months.
In the instant case, the appellant, after furnishing the original undertaking on 3rd May, 2002, this Court had accepted the same and the appellant acted on the same and rehabilitated a number of tenants and thereafter again he himself took out a Notice of Motion No. 721 of 2006, on 7th December, 2006, seeking extension of time to comply with the earlier undertaking given on 3rd May, 2002. Over and above, the appellant gave again an undertaking to this Court on 9th March, 2007, to rehabilitate the remaining tenants and also undertook to furnish a bank guarantee of Rs. 1/- Crore to complete the remaining construction work to rehabilitate the tenants.
In the instant case, the facts and circumstances set out hereinabove, makes it abundantly clear that there is a continuing wrong, in the sense, that the appellant''s non-compliance of the undertaking and the appellant himself further took out a notice of motion on 7th December, 2006 for extension of time to comply with the earlier undertaking and again giving a further undertaking to this Court on 9th March, 2007, to fulfill the earlier undertaking and also furnishing a bank guarantee of Rs. 1/- Crore to comply with the same, clearly indicates that there is no need to condone the delay as the appellant himself accepted it as a continuing wrong, in the facts and circumstances as set out hereinabove.
Having regard to the aforesaid facts and circumstances, we are not inclined to interfere with the impugned judgment and order of the learned Single Judge. The appeal stands dismissed, however with no order as to costs.