Harpal & Ors. vs State Of U.P. & Ors.

(Per: Siddharth Nandan ‘J’)

Heard Shri Mahesh Narain Singh, learned counsel for the petitioners and learned Standing Counsel for the State-respondents.

By way of the present writ petition, inter alia, the grounds taken, the petitioner has sought a writ of mandamus directing the respondents-authorities to correct the revenue entry and to record the petitioners as bhumidar over the land bearing Khasra No.238, 324, 337, 340, 341, 342, 344, 345, 350, 532, 361, 371, 378, 380 and 559 situated in village-Salenagar, Nawadia Pargana, Tehsil and District Bareilly; and further a direction to the respondents-authorities, not to interfere with the peaceful possession of the petitioners over the land in question.

The present writ petition has been filed in the year 2014, seeking issuance of writ of mandamus, with the averments that one Jograj (predecessor in interest of the petitioner) was recorded in the revenue records as bhumidhar and has died in September, 1981; and after his death the petitioners had acquired bhumidhari rights over the land in dispute by way of inheritance and are in actual physical possession over the land in question, duly recorded in the revenue records.

It is the case of the petitioners that the proceedings under Section 8(4) of the U.P. Urban (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 (hereinafter referred to as the “Act, 1976”), were initiated against Jograj, being registered as Case No.211/51/1982 (State vs. Jograj); and further that no notice of the aforesaid proceedings ever “appears” but have been served upon Jograj and an ex-parte order declaring the land in question, as surplus was passed; but however along with the petition, no documents except an order dated 30.09.1982, in relation to an application under Section 20 of the Act 1976 and the khatauni for 1416-1421 fasli has been filed.

The explanation of the petitioners for the delay in approaching this Court, is that in a routine manner, when an inspection of the revenue records was made and a copy of the khatauni was obtained, the petitioner was surprised to see that an endorsement is contained to the effect that the land in question has been declared as surplus and thereafter obtaining the necessary information, the present writ petition has been filed.

Per contra, learned counsel appearing on behalf of respondents submits that the original tenure holder Jograj, was given notice under Section 8(3) of the Act, 1976 and he had also filed his objection, where after an order under Section 8(4) was passed. Having regard to the aforesaid, the contention of the respondents are that as per the scheme of the Act, after the disposal of the objections, the competent authority determined the vacant land held by the petitioners, in excess of the ceiling limit and a copy of the final statement was served as per the requirement of Section 9 of the Act; where after a notification under Section 10(1) was also issued giving the particulars of the vacant land, held by such person in excess of the ceiling limit and eventually publication was also made under Section 10(3); where after the land vested absolutely in the State Government free from all encumbrances.

The original record of the proceedings was also produced to demonstrate that in pursuance of the notice under Section 10(5)/10(6) of the Act, 1976, dakhalnama was also prepared on 10.01.1992 and relevant entries were also made and the khatauni (1389-1394 and 1404-1409), are evidence of the aforesaid fact.

It is admitted case of the petitioner that the property was recorded in the tenure holders name i.e. Jograj in the revenue record as bhumidhar and the proceedings under the Act, 1976 was initiated against the original tenure holder; and it is also evident that he had filed his objections, which were decided under Section 8(4) of the Act, 1976 in proceedings registered as Case No.211/51/1982 (State vs. Jograj). Records demonstrate that a final statement was issued under Section 9 of the Act, 1976; where after notification under Section 10(3) of the Act was issued on 27.05.1989, notice under Section 10(5) was served on 29.08.1989; and eventually proceedings under Section 10(6) was undertaken; and after taking of the possession the dakhalnama was also executed, on 10.01.1992. The original records summoned by the Court, also corroborates, the above.

Learned counsel for the petitioners submits that there are certain irregularities in the dakhalnama as the signature of the person, who has handed over the possession is not available on the said document.

A perusal of the dakhalnama indicates that there are two signatures and thumb impression of independent witnesses, along with signature of the Tehsildar; and thereafter no objection on behalf of the original tenure holder or their legal heirs, is on record; and as such they were aware of the proceedings, on account of service of notice under Section 10(5) and the declaration under Section 10(3), based on which the revenue entries were also made in the name of the respondents-State; therefore, in view of the aforesaid it has to be examined whether the belated claim, merely on the ground of pendency of the application under Section 20 of the Act, 1976 and by not seeking remedy against the dispossession under the Act, 1976 by the original tenure holder, whether interference is warranted under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

The petitioners does not dispute the records, which has been produced by the respondents but only raises two objections that the documents pertaining to the taking over of the possession are irregular and as a matter of fact they are still in de facto possession, while the de jure possession cannot dislodge the claim of the petitioners based on the benefit which accrues from Section 3/4 of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Repeal Act, 1999. For ready reference Section 3 and 4 of the Act, 1999 is reproduced below:-

The petitioners further claim the benefit of Government Order dated 09.02.2000 and 29.09.2015 under which the land holders, who were in possession of the land at the time of coming into force the Repeal Act, 1999 would be entitled to the benefit of Section 4 of the Act, 1999; as the proceedings under the Act, 1976 shall stand abated; and as such land holders were entitled to remain in possession of the vacant land.

Learned counsel for the petitioner has also urged that it is for the respondents to establish that the possession was taken under Section 10(6) of the Act, 1976; and as on date the petitioners are in possession.

However, no document in support of their contention regarding the factum of possession has either been brought on record along with affidavit in the writ petition or the rejoinder affidavit filed by the petitioners.

It is the stand of the respondents, that the original tenure holder as well as the legal heirs were aware of the proceedings under the Act of 1976; and that he had also preferred an application under Section 20 of the Act, which was pending since 1982, and though reliance has been placed on the revenue records, but what is required to be seen is whether the petitioners were in actual possession of the land in question, on the date of notification of the Act of 1999, i.e., 18.03.1999. Any subsequent forceful possession or re-entry subsequent to the aforesaid date, cannot give them the benefit of Section 4 of the Act of 1999.

We have perused the records and the pleadings between the parties and we only find that apart from the revenue records, no other documents has been annexed and more so ever since an application under Section 20 of the Act, 1976 was moved as long back as in the year 1982, it can be safely concluded that the proceedings under the Act and the notification under Section 10(3) of the Act, 1976 was within the knowledge of the original tenure holder and legal heirs; but they had not taken any action against the dispossession under the Act, 1999; while the dakhalnama dated 10.01.1992 establishes their dispossession and had only approached this Court in the year 2014 i.e. at a highly belated stage, i.e. more than 22 years from the date of taking over of the possession.

A perusal of the records also indicates that no objection was raised by the original tenure holder at the stage of notification under Section 8(3) of the Act, 1976 or subsequent to the revenue entries; and after a delay of 15 years i.e. after coming into force of Repeal Act, 1999, the question of de facto possession also cannot be looked into. The Court is conscious of the fact that as far as the revenue records are concerned, the same are not proof of title but however, the same can only raise a rebuttable presumption regarding the possession. On one side there is a dakhalnama which is said to have been executed in the year 1992 and on the other side there is a khatauni of the year 1416-1421 fasli, which shows the continuation of the name of the legal heirs of the original tenure holder over Plot No.350(Mi) 0.4170 hectare.

The Apex Court in this regard, in the case of State of Haryana and another v. Amin Lal (since deceased) through his LRs and others, decided on 19.11.2024 had held as under:

As noted herein above, the date of possession is to be seen on the date of coming into force of the Repeal Act, 1999, which is 18.03.1999 and more so ever the khatauni indicates that plot no.350 is a milzumla plot, which could meant that the area which was left out in the said plot, being within the permissible limit, the name of the petitioners may have continued. Accordingly, there is no corroborative evidence, along with the revenue entries, to establish possession over surplus land, on the date of coming into force the Repeal Act, 1999 i.e. 18.03.1999.

Nevertheless, there is no evidence on record to demonstrate that the petitioners were in possession, subsequent to the execution of the dakhalnama in the year 1992 or on the date of coming into force of the Repeal Act, 1999 i.e. 18.03.1999; and as such without assailing the dispossession under the Act, 1976, the question of de facto possession of the petitioners cannot be looked into, in exercise of powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

As far as Government Orders dated 29.09.2015 and 09.02.2000 are concerned, a perusal of the Government order dated 29.9.2015 reveals that the same was issued after the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of State of UP. v. Hariram,^{11.. 2013 (4) SCC 280}. Further the said Government order also places reliance upon the previous Government orders dated 9.2.2000, 9.8.2000 and 24.1.2001. The Government order dated 29.9.2015 reads as under:

The Government order dated 29.9.2015 lays emphasis on Government orders issued in this regard in the past and accordingly we may also advert to the first Government order dated 9.2.2000 issued in this regard, which has also been relied upon by the petitioners in several writ petitions, the same reads as under:

We have perused the Government orders dated 29.9.2015 and 2.9.2000, and that Section 3 and Section 4 of the Repeal Act, 1999 are themselves self explanatory and have been relied on, in both the Government orders.

It is further pointed out here that even the Government orders relied in the past lay down that after coming into force of the Repeal Act, 1999, the land holders who were in possession of their land, declared vacant under the Act, 1976 would continue to remain in possession of the same, subject to the refund of any amount paid to the land holder.

Thus, the Government orders simply relied on the provisions of Section 3 of the Repeal Act, 1999, which clearly provides that if possession of vacant land has not been taken over by the State or by any person duly authorized by the State Government in this behalf or by the Competent Authority and the ownership of the land, if vested, in the State Government under Section 10 (3), would be required to be restored to the original land holder, subject to repayment of any amount, that has been paid by the State Government with respect to such land. Further the proceedings under the Act, 1976 in respect of such vacant land would abate under Section 4 of the Act, 1976.

As far as the relief of mandamus in deciding the ceiling cases of the petitioners in pursuance of the Government order dated 29.9.2015 is concerned, it is the specific case of the respondent that the proceedings under the Act, 1976 stood concluded prior to coming into force of the Repeal Act, 1999.

In view of the specific case of the respondents, that proceedings under the Act, 1976 stood concluded prior to coming into force of the Repeal Act, 1999, while the entry of the State in the revenue records also not being disputed or subjected to any proceedings, and entry in the revenue records with respect to a miljumla plot cannot be basis for establishing the possession over the surplus land and as such the benefit of Section 4 of the Act, 1999 or the Government Order dated 29.09.2015 and 09.02.2000 cannot be extended to the petitioners in the facts of the present case; especially when there is no specific challenge, to the dispossession under the Act, 1976, which has now attained finality.

The aforesaid view is also fortified by decision in the case of State of Assam vs. Bhaskar Jyoti Sarma^{22.. 2015 (5) SCC 321}, wherein also the original tenure holder had submitted the returns and a notification under Section 10(3) of the Act was issued to the effect that surplus land of the original tenure holder, now vests in the Government; and the name of the original tenure holder was also deleted from the revenue records; after the taking over of the possession in the year 1992 and the Act being repealed, a challenge was raised that the disposition was not preceded by any notice under Section 10(5) of the Act.

The Apex Court, having considered the legal position, opined that having the actual possession been taken from the landholder, any grievance raised under Section 10(5) ought to have been made within a reasonable time of such dispossession; and in absence of any such objection by the original owner or the person in possession, it shall be deemed to have waived his right under Section 10(5) of the Act.

Any other view would give a licence to a litigant to make a grievance not because he has suffered any real prejudice that needs to be addressed but only because of fortuitous circumstance of the Repeal Act tempted him to raise the issue regarding his dispossession, being in violation of the prescribed procedure. For ready reference, paragraph Nos. 16 and 17 of the judgment in the case of State of Assam (supra) is reproduced below:

In view of the aforesaid, we have no hesitation in holding that in view of the fact that the erstwhile owner has not raised any grievance based on breach of Section 10(5) or Section 10(6) of the Act, at any stage during his lifetime, implying thereby that he had waived his right to do so; and accordingly the Issue No. 1 is determined against the petitioners, i.e., in case the original owner is found to have been dispossessed pursuant to a notice under Section 10(5) or by undertaking the proceedings under Section 10(6) of the Act of 1976, and against such dispossession, if no remedial proceedings have been undertaken by the original tenure holder, no writ of mandamus can be issued for correction of the revenue entries or for any consequential benefit.

Issue No. ii:- Whether approaching the Court after a

considerable delay from the date of possession and the entry into the revenue records, any relief can be given to the petitioners, who are legal heirs of the original tenure holder or the possession of State, would acquire legitimacy by sheer lapse of time.

Petitioners have contended that no notice were given to the legal heirs of the original tenure holder of the proceedings under Section 10 of the Act, 1976, which was ex-parte; and no possession as claimed under Section 10(6) of the Act, 1976 was given by the petitioners and their name continues in the revenue records; and as such their possessions were never disturbed.

Thereafter, the petitioners alleged that in a routine manner, they inspected the revenue records for the purpose of obtaining copy of the khatauni, and upon having obtained the said khatauni they came to see the endorsement, contained in the khatauni, with regard to land in question, having been declared surplus under the Act, 1976. For ready reference paras 16 and 17 of the affidavit filed along with the writ petition is reproduced below:-

From the perusal of the aforesaid pleadings it is evident that no particular date was disclosed regarding the date of knowledge and in a very vague manner, delay with respect to the filing of the present proceedings i.e. after a period of more than 22 years, from the date of taking over the possession by the State and 15 years from coming into force of the Repeal Act, 1999, has been sought to be explained; and as such the respondents claimed that the writ petition is liable to be rejected on the ground of delay and latches itself; and the rights, if any, of the petitioners over the land in dispute stood waived, on account of the delay and acquiescence.

Learned counsel for the petitioner has also relied upon the various judgments of the Apex Court; and we proceed to examine the facts of those judgments, as we cannot loose sight of the fact, that said judgments, must be read as applicable to the facts proved or assumed to be proved. Since also that the generality of the expression, which may be found there, are not intended to be exposition of whole law but governed and qualified by a particular facts of the case, in which such expressions are to be found.

The Apex Court in the case of Bharat Petroleum Company Ltd. v. N.R. Vairamani,^{33.. (2004) 8 SCC 579} while holding that Court should not place reliance on decisions without discussing as to how the factual situation of the case in hand fits in with the facts, situation of the decision on which reliance has been placed, had held as under:-

If we examine the facts in the case of State of U.P. v. Hari Ram (supra), we find that in the said case, proceedings were initiated under the Act, 1976 against the land holder. On 19.6.1999, the Prescribed Authority issued a notice under Section 10 (5) of the Act, 1976 directing the land holder to hand over possession of the land declared as surplus to duly authorized persons. Aggrieved by the same, the land holder had preferred an appeal under Section 33 of the Act, 1976 contending that no notice as contemplated under Section 8(3) of the Act, 1976 was served upon him. The appeal was allowed vide the judgment dated 14.12.1999 and the order dated 29.6.1981 passed under Section 8(4) of the Act, 1976 was quashed. The State being aggrieved by the order passed in appeal, had challenged the same in writ petition but the writ petition was ultimately dismissed, upholding the order passed in appeal. Subsequently the State had approached the Hon'ble Supreme Court. The Hon'ble Supreme Court while considering the various provisions of the Act, 1976 and the Repeal Act, 1999 had found no infirmity in the judgment of the High Court and the appeal was accordingly dismissed alongwith other appeals. It is pertinent to mention here that the Repeal Act, 1999 was enforced in the State of Uttar Pradesh on 18.3.1999 and the notice under Section 10(5) in the said case was issued subsequent thereto on 19.6.1999.

In the case of A.P. Electrical Equipment Corporation v. Tehsildar and others^{44.. 2025 SCConline SC 447}, the panchnama under Section 10(6) dated 8.2.2008, was prepared; and it was contended by the State that the possession of the land was taken in pursuance thereto. However, it was the contention of the land holder (M/s. A.P. Electrical Equipment Corporation) that the State had only taken symbolic possession and actual possession continued to remain with the land holder.

In the meanwhile Repeal Act, 1999 was brought into force in the State of Andhra Pradesh on 22.4.2008 w.e.f. 27.3.2008. It was around the year, 2009 that the State authorities tried to take possession of the land and the land holder had challenged the said action by filing a writ petition. The writ petition so filed was ultimately allowed wherein it was held that the land holder had continued to remain in physical possession of the land in dispute. Subsequently the State had approached the Division Bench of the High Court and the appeal so filed was ultimately allowed as it was held that the learned Single Judge had erred on facts as well as in law, in declaring notice dated 5.1.2008 made under Section 10(5) of the Act, 1976 as well as the panchnama dated 8.2.2008 void ab initio and non est in the eye of law. The land holder being aggrieved by the order passed in appeal had approached the Hon'ble Supreme Court and ultimately the Hon'ble Supreme Court while considering the law laid down in that regard while setting aside the order passed in appeal, had upheld the judgment of the Single Judge of the High Court.

The petitioners have also relied on a recent judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Dalsukhbhai Bachubhai Satasia and others v. State of Gujarat and others^{55.. AIR 2026 SC 475}, in support of the case of the petitioners.

The facts involved in the said case reveal that a ceiling return was filed under Section 6 (1) of the Act, 1976 by the original land holder. Subsequently in the proceedings initiated under Section 21 of the Act, 1976 and vide the order dated 18.2.1980 the Competent Authority had amongst others held that land comprised in Survey No. 339 was within ceiling limit and as such there was no excess land being held by the family members of the original tenure holder. Thereafter a society had purchased land of Survey No. 339 at a public auction held by the Special Recovery Officer on 28.4.1981, the auction was confirmed and the name of the society was entered in the records of rights. The society obtained construction permission for constructing industrial units from the Surat Municipal Corporation. Thereafter possession receipts were issued to multiple sub plots holders-appellants, who had remained in possession of the said sub plots since the year 1983-84. The said plot holders had developed industrial units over the said land.

In the meanwhile on 12.10.1984 the Assistant Collector canceled the mutation entry entered in favour of the society, on the basis that the public auction dated 28.4.1981 was not conducted according to the provisions of the Act, 1976. The order so passed was challenged in appeal before the Collector but the appeal was also dismissed. Subsequently the revision filed before the Assistant Secretary, Revenue Department was also dismissed. The Government of Gujarat on 3.5.1988 exercised its power of revision under Section 34 of the Act, 1976 and set aside the order dated 18.2.1980 of the Competent Authority, passed under Section 21 of the Act, 1976 and remanded the matter back to the Competent Authority for reconsideration of the question of excess land with regard to Survey No. 339.

Thereafter on 16.1.1989 the competent authority passed an order declaring that 662.18 sq. meters out of total area of 9303 sq. meters of land in Survey No. 339 as ''excess land''. On 22.11.1990 a notice under Section 10(5) of the Act, 1976 was issued to the original land holder directing him to vacate and handover the possession of the excess land, pursuant thereto a Panchnama dated 21.1.1992 for taking over possession of excess land to the tune of 662.18 sq. meters was issued.

It is only when some of the sub-plot holders-appellants had tried to resell their sub-plots, the Competent Authority sent letters dated 20.6.2007 and 5.7.2008 refusing to grant 'No Objection Certificates' for the subsequent sale, on the ground that the constructed units were situated over the alleged excess land and as the said surplus land was taken over and therefore vested in the Government since 21.1.1992. It is only then the sub-plot holders-appellants, for the first time, came to know that the said property had been declared as excess land by the Competent Authority and consequently the writ petition was filed before the Gujarat High Court seeking a relief in the nature of direction to issue necessary ‘No Objection Certificates’ for sale of the sub plots in the year 2009. Another writ petition was filed in the year 2010 in respect of the land use of the said sub-plots.

The Apex Court in the said judgment while adverting to the factual controversy involved had held as under :

Hence, considering the factual aspect of the controversy involved in the said case, there was no dispute regarding the fact that the appellants were in actual possession of the land at the time of the enforcement of the Repeal Act, 1999. Further the appellants came to know that their land had been held to be excess land and taken over by the State Government for the first time only when the ‘No Objection Certificates’ were refused; and shortly thereafter the appellants had approached the High Court. Lastly notice under Section 10 (5) was issued to the original land holder but not to the appellants and it is also not disputed that the rights over the land in question stood transferred in favour of the appellants.

Thus, it is beyond doubt that the subject-matter in controversy in the said case, was very much different from that involved in the present proceedings, as there was no dispute regarding the possession of the land, at the time of enforcement of the Repeal Act, 1999; and also the question of delay in approaching the High Court was also not involved. Furthermore the sub-allottees were enjoying independent rights over the land in question and had no knowledge of proceedings under the Act, 1999.

However, in the present case the notice under Section 10 (5) was issued to the original land holders, the petitioners are descendants of the original land holder and claiming their rights through the original land holders. Further a reply/objection was also filed by Jograj and thereafter orders were passed under Section 8(4); and subsequently the petitioners and legal heirs, had filed objections under Section 20; as such it cannot be said that they had no knowledge regarding the proceedings under the Act, 1976.

Be that as it may the Apex Court in the said case had also observed as under :

Petitioners have also relied upon a judgment of this Court in Sanjay Kumar Pandey vs. State of U.P. and 3 others^{66.. Writ-C No.37803 of 2022 delivered on 20.01.2026}. In the aforesaid case, the respondents had failed to provide the date of possession over the land in question, being transferred to a development authority; and since vague assertions have been made regarding taking of possession by the respondents; and the failure to furnish a plausible reasons giving explanation as to why the land in question was recorded in the name of the State Government only vide order dated 20.09.2021 i.e. after lapse of more than 22 years from the enforcement of the Repeal Act, 1999, the judgment was made.

In the backdrop of the aforesaid facts, since the respondents had failed to provide an explanation, as to why they took more than 22 years to correct the entry in the revenue records, after coming into force of the Repeal Act, 1999; and also the mode of taking over the possession, the onus was put on the respondents-State to demonstrate de facto possession of the land in question; and accordingly the benefit of Section 4 of the Act in terms of the decision in the case of State of U.P. vs. Hari Ram (supra) was given to the petitioners therein; which facts are distinguishable.

Lastly the petitioners have also placed reliance on the case of Lallu and others vs. State of U.P. and others⁷, in which the question of defacto possession of the vacant land arose and while considering the evidence, the Court was of the view that voluntary surrender of vacant land or plea of forceful possession, under Section 10(5) or under Section 10(6) respectively, could not be demonstrated by the respondents-State; and on failure in establishing the aforesaid, the benefit of Section 3 of the Repeal Act, 1999 was given. There was a specific finding that the State did not bring on record any material to demonstrate that the State was handed over the possession by the tenure holder pursuant to notice under Section 10(5) nor there is any material to demonstrate that any notice under Section 10(6) of the Act was served, or forceful physical possession was taken by the State.

However, neither in the facts of the case in Sanjay Kumar Pandey (supra) nor in the facts of the case in and Lallu (supra), there is any similarity to the facts of the present case; as in the first case there was no explanation for entry in the name of the State, after lapse of 22 years from the enforcement of the Repeal Act, 1999; whereas in the present case, the entry in the revenue records was admittedly made in the year 1992 and on the contrary the original tenure holder is at fault of not assailing the dispossession under the Act, 1976 or challenge the revenue records; and now petitioners cannot be permitted to assail the same after a lapse of more than 22 years from the date of the possession and 15 years from the date of coming into force of the Repeal Act, 1999. In the second case, there was failure on the part of the State Government to bring on record the material demonstrating that the possession was either peacefully handed over, in pursuance to the notice under Section 10(5) or to demonstrate that forceful possession was taken by the State under Section 10(6) of the Act, 1976; but in the present case the service of notice under Section 10(5) of the Act, 1976 and consequential forceful 7. (2014) 9 ADJ 524 possession of the property in question under Section 10(6) of the Act, 1976, is there before this Court; and as such no benefit can be given to the petitioners.

No other argument has been raised on behalf of the petitioners.

From the pleadings and the material on record, it is evident that the proceedings were initiated against the original tenure holder and he has also filed his objection in pursuance of the notice under Section 8(3) and only thereafter that orders were passed under Section 8(4) of the Act, 1976.

It is thereafter that the final statement was issued under Section 9, leading to notification under Section 10(1) and the publication under Section 10(3) of the Act, 1976. It is also evident that the entry in the revenue records were also made in the year 1992; which proceedings and the entries remain unchallenged and in absence of the same no mandamus, as prayed, can be issued.

The explanation given by the petitioners, as noted herein above are absolutely vague and does not justify filing of this writ petition before this Court after a delay of 22 years from the date of taking over possession and 15 years from the date of enforcement of the Repeal Act, 1999; and as such the same are liable to be rejected.

We may also note, before parting with the judgment, that on account of the un-explained delay, this Court has no reasons, at such a belated stage, to examine the irregularity in the issuance of notice under Section 10(5) or the preparation of the Dakhalnama; and is constrained to hold that the petitioners shall be deemed to have waived their right, on account of not having objected within a “reasonable time”.

Our aforesaid view is also fortified by the ratio laid down, by a co-ordinate Bench of this Court in the case of Kumbh Karan vs. State of U.P. and others^{88.. (2026) 5 ADJ 66 (DB)}; wherein also the petitioner “Kumbh Karan” had slept over his rights (No Pun Intended); and this Court declined to grant any relief, on the ground of delay and latches.

In view of the aforesaid, no good grounds have been made for interference under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and accordingly, the writ petition is dismissed.

However, no order as to costs.