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Judgment
Pankaj Jain, J.
By way of present writ petition filed under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner prays for issuance of a writ in the nature of certiorari quashing order dated 24.06.2000 (Annexure P-2) passed by respondent No.2.
On 16.08.1976, petitioner-Harkishan Lal filed a declaration in terms of Section 9 of the Haryana Ceiling of Land Holdings Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as the 1972 Act). The Prescribed Authority accepted the declaration, holding that there was no surplus land in the hands of Harkishan Lal vide order dated 16.06.1979 (Annexure P-1). Along with the declaration filed by the petitioner, the declaration made by his mother, namely, Jamuna Bai (widow of Munshi Ram) was also
accepted.
In the year 1998, respondent No.1 requested respondent No.2 to invoke suo motu powers as contemplated under Section 18(6) of the 1972 Act to set aside order Annexure P-1.
On notice, the petitioner objected to the invocation of Section 18(6) of the 1972 Act on the ground of delay. The petitioner claimed that suo motu power cannot be exercised after more than 19 years of passing of the order and that too after the death of original land owner. Respondent No.2 vide order dated 24.06.2000 (Annexure P-2) accepted the application filed by respondent No.1 and remanded the case to respondent No.3, setting aside order Annexure P-1.
Learned counsel for the petitioner relies upon the bare provision of Section 18(6) of 1972 Act to submit that even though the law contemplates exercise of suo motu power “at any time”, but the same has to be exercised within a reasonable time. He submits that the Financial Commissioner does not have an unbridled power to entertain revision after lapse of several years in the absence of any allegations of fraud etc. against the petitioner. Revisional Authority ought not have been resorted to Section 18(6) after lapse of 19 years. In order to hammer-forth his contention, he relies upon Loku Ram v. State of Haryana 2000(1) RCR (Civil) 141, Latoor Singh v. State of Haryana 2016(4) RCR (Civil) 16, State of Haryana v. Chandgi Ram (LPA No.97 of 2014) (P&H), State of Gujarat v. Patel Raghav Natha & ors. 1969 AIR (SC) 1297, Ibrahimpatnam Taluk Vyavasaya Collie Sangham v. K. Suresh Reddy & ors. 2003(7) SCC 667, Sita Sahu & ors v. State of Jharkhand & ors. 2004(8) SCC 340, Jaswant Kaur and another v. State of Haryana & another 1977 AIR P&H 221, Madan Gopal v. State of Haryana 2005(3) RCR (Civil) 644, Smt. Lajwanti v. Financial Commissioner Haryana & ors. 2003(1) RCR (Civil) 802 and Surinder Nath Dewan v. State of Haryana & ors. 1994 AIR (SC) 1871.
Per contra, counsel for the respondent-State would submit that there being error apparent on the face of order passed by Prescribed Authority dated 16.06.1979 (Annexure P-1), respondent No.2 rightly exercised suo motu revisional jurisdiction. It has been contended that the decree suffered by the big landlord in favour of his mother on 15.04.1972, i.e. after appointed day on 24.01.1971, was wrongly accepted by the Prescribed Authority, even though “mother” does not fall within the ambit of “family” as defined under Section 3(f) of the 1972 Act. He further submits that the age of son of the petitioner namely, Ram Chand, was wrongly mentioned. He, having not attained majority on the relevant date, was not entitled for separate unit. Counsel for the State relies upon Kehar Singh vs. State of Haryana reported as 1996 AIR Pun. & Har. 21.
I have heard counsel for the parties and have carefully gone through the records of the case.
In order to appreciate the rival contentions raised by counsels, it will be apt to peruse the bare provision contained in Section 18(6) of 1972 Act which reads as under:-
“Section 18(6). Notwithstanding anything contained in the foregoing sub-sections, the Financial Commissioner may suo motu at any time call for the record of any proceedings or order of any authority subordinate to him for the purpose of satisfying himself as to the legality or propriety of such proceedings or order, and may pass such order in relation thereto as he may deem fit.”
Careful perusal of the bare provision would reveal that suo motu power has been vested with the Financial Commissioner to ascertain legality or propriety of proceedings or orders passed by authorities subordinate to him. The provision further empowers him to exercise the said jurisdiction “at any time”. The expression “at any time” in reference to Section 18(6) of the 1972 Act is no more res integra and has been interpreted by this Court as well as Supreme Court. This Court in the case of Kehar Singh (supra) observed as under:-
“xx xx xx
9.It was then contended that the power under Section 18(6) cannot be invoked regardless of time and delay. The contention has no merit. Admittedly, no period of limitation has been prescribed. In fact, the legislature has authorised the Financial Commissioner to exercise the power at "any time". When the legislature, in its wisdom, has not placed any limitation on the power of the Financial Commissioner, the Court cannot add to the words of the statute and lay down a period of limitation. A similar contention had been raised in the context of Section 42 of the East Punjab Holdings (Consolidation and Prevention of Fragmentation) Act, 1948. It was rejected by a Full Bench of this Court in Nar Singh Mansoor Singh v. State, AIR 1967 Punj 111, and by a Division Bench in Haqiqat Singh v. The Additional Director Consolidation of Holdings, Punjab, AIR 1981 Punj & Har 204. In view of these authoritative pronouncements, the contention has to be rejected.”
To the contrary, Supreme Court in the case of Loku Ram (supra) observed as under:-
“xx xx xx
5.No doubt, the section uses the expression "at any time" but it cannons be indefinite. The power has to be exercised within a reasonable time. While construing the expression "at any time", this Court in State of Gujarat v. P. Raghav, A.I.R. 1969 S.C. 1297, has stated the law thus:-
“11.The question arises whether the Commissioner can revise an order made Under Section 65 at any time. It is true that there is no period of limitation prescribed Under Section 211, but it seems to us plain that this power must be exercised in reasonable time and the length of the reasonable time must be determined by the facts of the case and the nature of the order which is being revised.”
6.Section 18(2) of the Act prescribes a period of 15 days for filing an appeal and Section 18(4) prescribes a period of 30 days for filing a revision before the Commissioner. When the two Sub-sections prescribe a very short period of 15 and 30 days respectively, it will be unreasonable to hold that the Financial Commissioner has unlimited power to entertain a revision after a lapse of several years.
7.The test prescribed by this Court in Raghav's case has been ignored by the Financial Commissioner in the present case. His order does not disclose any reason to hold that a period of nearly seven years is reasonable on the facts of the case. Nor has the High Court gone into the question and decided whether the power has been exercised on the facts and circumstances within a reasonable period, Hence we allow the appeal and set aside the or-der of the High Court. The order of the Financial Commissioner is also set aside. The order of the Collector dated 18.6.1982 is restored. No costs.”
The ratio of law laid down by Supreme Court in the case of Loku Ram (supra) was followed by Division Bench of this Court in the case of Latoor Singh (supra) observing as under:-
“xx xx xx
9.The legal issue involved in the present petition is as to whether suo-motu power could be exercised by the Financial Commissioner under Section 18 (6) of the Act after 11 years of passing of the order even if there is no time limit as such fixed in the Act for exercise of that power. The issue was considered by Hon'ble the Supreme Court in Santoshkumar Shivgonda Patil and others' case (supra). It was a case under Maharashtra Land Revenue Code, 1966 (for short, 'the Code'). The suo-motu power was sought to be exercised in the year 1993 against the order passed by the subordinate authority in the year 1976. The suo-motu power therein could be exercised under Section 257 of the Code. While referring to the earlier judgments of Hon'ble the Supreme Court in State of Gujarat v. Patil Raghav Natha, (1969) 2 SCC 187; Mohd. Kavi Mohamad Amin v. Fatmabai Ibrahim, ((1997) 6 SCC 71 and State of Punjab v. Bhatinda District Coop. Milk Producers Union Ltd., 2007(6) Recent Apex Judgments (R.A.J.) 158: (2007) 11 SCC 363, it was opined that even if a statute does not prescribe any time limit for exercise of revisional power, it does not mean that the same can be exercised at any time. It has to be exercised within reasonable time. Things settled cannot be unsettled after lapse of long time. In that case, reasonable time was opined to be three years. Exercise of power after 17 years was held to be abuse of process of law. Relevant paragraph 16 thereof is extracted below:
"16.It seems to be fairly settled that if a statute does not prescribe the time-limit for exercise of revisional power, it does not mean that such power can be exercised at any time; rather it should be exercised within a reasonable time. It is so because the law does not expect a settled thing to be unsettled after a long lapse of time. Where the legislature does not provide for any length of time within which the power of revision is to be exercised by the authority, suo motu or otherwise, it is plain that exercise of such power within reasonable time is inherent therein. Ordinarily, the reasonable period within which the power of revision may be exercised would be three years under Section 257 of the Maharashtra Land Revenue Code subject, of course, to the exceptional circumstances in a given case, but surely exercise of revisional power after a lapse of 17 years is not a reasonable time. Invocation of revisional power by the Sub-Divisional Officer under Section 257 of the Maharashtra Land Revenue Code is plainly an abuse of process in the facts and circumstances of the case assuming that the order of the Tahsildar passed on 30.3.1976 is flawed and legally not correct. Pertinently, Tukaram Sakharam Shevale, during his lifetime never challenged the legality and correctness of the order of the Tahsildar, Shirol although it was passed on 30.3.19765 and he was alive up to 1990. It is not even in the case of Respondents 1 to 5 that Tukaram was not aware of the order dated 30.3.1976. There is no finding by the Sub-Divisional Officer either that the order dated 30.3.1976 was obtained fraudulently."
The precedents to the same effect can be multiplied. The issue remains that the expression “at any time” does not mean in perpetuity. The same means within a reasonable time. However, there is only one exception thereto, i.e. ‘fraud’. Wherever an order has been obtained under ‘fraud’, limitation does not hold hand of the Authority to correct the same.
Applying the aforesaid parameters to the present case, this Court finds that there being no allegation of fraud or misrepresentation against the petitioner and the fact of date of decree and Jamuna Bai being his mother having been disclosed in the declaration made by big land owner, respondent No.2 ought not have invoked suo motu powers to correct errors after 19 years.
As a sequel of the above discussion, this Court finds that the impugned order dated 24.06.2000 (Annexure P-2) passed by respondent No.2 cannot be sustained. The same is set aside.
Writ petition filed by the petitioner is allowed.
Since the main case has been decided, pending miscellaneous application, if any, shall also stand disposed off.
(PANKAJ JAIN)
23.09.2026 JUDGE Whether speaking/reasoned : Yes Whether Reportable : Yes