Hari Shankar vs State of Punjab and another

M.R. Sharma, J. (Oral)

Land was acquired for the Ludhiana Improvement Trust, Ludhiana and notification under section 36 of the Punjab Town Improvement Act, 1922 was issued on March 18, 1962. The Land Acquisition Collector fixed the compensation payable to the petitioner at the rate of Rs. 30 per biswansi. Feeling dissatisfied with this award, he filed a reference which was disposed of by the President Land Acquisition Tribunal, vide its judgment dated October 9, 1969. The petitioner has challenged this award by filing the instant petition.

The Tribunal has found that the petitioner admittedly acquired 1 bigha 4 biswas 17 biswansis of land for Rs. 9,800/ on May 13, 1960 from one Manohar Dass and later on he sold 400 square yards out of this land for Rs. 5,000/ to one Modan Singh. This sale took place on May 18, 1960. In spite of coming to this finding, the Tribunal fixed the compensation payable to the petitioner at the rate of Rs. 18/ per biswansi. The petitioner claims that he should be given compensation at the rate of Rs. 10/ per square yard.

Now, Ludhiana is a prosperous and fast expanding industrial city. The acquired land had a great building potential, because the Trust itself acquired it for extension of built up area. There is unimpeachable evidence to show that out of this very land the landowner sold 400 square yards of land for a sum of Rs. 5,000/ on May 18, 1960, i.e. a little less than two years prior to the date of the acquisition. I can take juridical notice of the fact that the prices in this city were and are continuing to increase very rapidly. The learned Tribunal also impliedly admitted that the prices in this locality were increasing and yet after giving a finding that out of this very land, some of it was sold at the rate of Rs. 12.50 per square yard, fixed the compensation ludicrously to low market value i.e. at the rate of Rs. 18/ per biswansi. The judgment rendered by the learned Tribunal is therefore not only unjust, but contrary to the evidence led by the petitioner.

Mr. Aggarwal, learned counsel for respondent No. 2 states that the determination of market value by the Tribunal is a question of fact and if this determination has been made after an appreciation of evidence, this Court should not interfere with this determination in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution.

I am not prepared to accept this argument, raised by Mr. Aggarwal. A writ of certiorari certainly lies when a Tribunal charged with the duty of making a quasi judicial determination either ignores the relevant evidence or decides contrary to the same. The total land belonging to the petitioner was 1 bigha 4 biswas 17 biswansis. This land could not have covered a huge area and it is natural to assume that each parcel of it was lying in a close proximity with each other. When 400 square yards out of this land have been sold at the rate of Rs. 12.50 per square yard about one year and 10 months prior to the date of acquisition, it does not stand to reason that in spite of fact that the prices in this city are rapidly increasing, the landlord should have been awarded compensation at the rate of Rs. 18/ per biswansi. I, therefore, allow this petition and quash the award made by the Tribunal.

Mr. Aggarwal states that a Division Bench of this Court has laid down that after quashing the award, the case should be remitted to the Tribunal for fresh decision and this Court should not take upon itself the duty of fixing the just compensation. Mr. Aggarwal is right on this point. The case is remitted to the Tribunal who is directed to fix compensation to be paid to the petitioner on the lines indicate above. The petitioner will have his costs which are assessed at Rs. 300/. The parties through their counsel are directed to appear before the Tribunal on September 21, 1981.