Hari Ram Darshan Ram and Others vs Hari Krishan Sharma and Others

Swatanter Kumar, J.—The challenge in this revision is to the order dated 16.9.1998 passed by learned Additional Civil judge, Senior Division, Bhatinda, whereby he dismissed the application of the present petition dated 15.11.1997.

In a suit pending between the parties being suit No. 295 of 1989 parties entered into a compromise dated 25.4.1989. The terms and conditions of this compromise upon recording of the statement of the parties on 29.4.1989 was exhibited as Ex.C.1. The parties prayed for a decree to be passed in terms of this compromise. Consequently, the compromise was recorded and decree in terms of Ex.C.1 was passed. As the terms and conditions of this settlement-cum-decree were violated by the present petitioner, the other party filed an application for execution as well as a contempt petition u/s 12 of the Contempt of Courts Act read with Section 151 C.P.C. The contempt proceedings were initiated on the averments that the respondents have disobeyed the orders of the Court and have flouted the undertaking given by them and which was accepted by the Court. These actions of the petitioner were stated to be malafide.

An application was filed by the present petitioner before the trial Court stating therein that the respondent herein should be directed to elect his proceedings. In other words, either he should persue the execution or the contempt. It is this application of the petitioner, which was dismissed by the Judge vide the impugned order.

The argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the law does not permit continuation of both the proceedings together. According to him, they are not complimentary to each other but are alternative remedies available to a party. The argument is totally misconceived. The proceedings under the Contempt of Courts Act are primarily the proceedings between the contemnor and the Court. The applicant is primarily responsible only for bringing the facts constituting the contempt to the notice of the Court. The applicant has no recognisable right to drive any personal benefit in contempt proceedings while in execution proceedings, it is the decree-holder who has all the personal interests and he is the sole beneficiary within the four corners of law. These are two independent proceedings which operate in a different and independent sphere and have a different object to achieve. As such they cannot be termed as alternative proceedings. It is a settled principle of law that the proceedings in an execution can always continue during the pendency of contempt proceedings.

The order of the learned trial Court does not suffer from any jurisdictional or other error apparent on the face of the record which would call for interference of this Court in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction. On the contrary, keeping in view the facts and circumstances of this case, the order is fully sustainable and is justifiable. Consequently, I find no merit in this revision petition. The same is dismissed in limine.