Hargobind Kaur vs State Of Punjab & Ors.

Sandeep Moudgil, J

The present writ petition has been filed by the petitioner seeking quashing of the order dated 19.06.2024, whereby her services as an Anganwadi Worker were terminated, as well as the consequential appellate order dated 19.11.2024, whereby her appeal against the termination was dismissed. The petitioner also seeks her reinstatement with continuity of service and consequential benefits.

The petitioner, Hargobind Kaur, was enrolled as an Anganwadi Worker at Village Chak Kala Singh Wala, District Sri Muktsar Sahib, under the Integrated Child Development Services (ICDS) Scheme and had been serving since 16.11.1990.

On 03.05.2024, a show-cause notice was issued to the petitioner alleging her involvement in political activities during the Model Code of Conduct. The petitioner submitted her reply on 06.05.2024. Thereafter, another notice dated 09.05.2024 was issued alleging that she had availed excess leave, to which she also submitted a reply.

Upon consideration of the matter, the Child Development Project Officer, Sri Muktsar Sahib, vide order dated 19.06.2024, withdrew the work assigned to the petitioner and terminated her services, primarily on the allegations of availing excess leave and participating in political activities during the Model Code of Conduct. Aggrieved, the petitioner preferred an appeal on 12.07.2024. The appeal was dismissed vide order dated 19.11.2024.

The petitioner has thereafter approached this Court by way of the present writ petition, seeking quashing of the termination order dated 19.06.2024 and the appellate order dated 19.11.2024, along with consequential relief of reinstatement and other service benefits.

Learned counsel for the petitioner contended that the termination of the petitioner, an Anganwadi Worker, is arbitrary, unlawful and violative of Articles 14, 19 and 21 of the Constitution. It was argued that the petitioner had rendered long service since the year 1990 and there was no allegation that she had failed in discharge of her duties as an Anganwadi Worker.

Learned counsel further submitted that the allegation of participation in political activities was misconceived. Anganwadi Workers are honorary/voluntary workers and do not hold civil posts. Reliance was placed upon State of Karnataka v. Almeerbi, (2007) 11 SCC 681, wherein the Supreme Court held that Anganwadi Workers do not hold statutory or civil posts and are not holders of civil posts. It was argued that the petitioner was, therefore, not amenable to the service restrictions applicable to government employees.

It was further contended that the petitioner had merely raised the demands and grievances of Anganwadi Workers before political representatives during the election period and such advocacy could not, by itself, be treated as participation in political activities.

Learned counsel argued that the termination was also contrary to the departmental guidelines, which contemplated a preliminary inquiry before withdrawal of work in cases involving unsatisfactory conduct or performance. According to the petitioner, no proper inquiry was conducted and the allegations were not substantiated before the drastic action of termination was taken.

It was lastly contended that the appellate order dated 19.11.2024 was non-speaking, as the petitioner's specific grounds and contentions were not considered and the appeal was dismissed merely by recording that the committee had perused the record and found the termination appropriate.

Per contra, learned State counsel submitted that the present writ petition is premature and is not maintainable in view of the efficacious alternative appellate remedies available to the petitioner under the departmental instructions dated 07.02.2023. It was contended that against the first appellate order, the petitioner could avail the remedy of second appeal and thereafter a third/final appeal before the Administrative Secretary. Learned counsel contended that the petitioner had approached this Court without exhausting the prescribed appellate hierarchy and, therefore, the writ petition deserved dismissal on the ground of availability of an alternative remedy.

On merits, learned State counsel submitted that the petitioner had availed excess leave and had also participated in political activities during the Model Code of Conduct. Several notices were issued to her and she was afforded an opportunity to submit her explanation; however, her replies were found unsatisfactory. Consequently, disciplinary action was taken and her services were terminated vide order dated 19.06.2024.

Learned State counsel further submitted that the termination was based upon the departmental instructions and the approval of the District Programme Officer, after the petitioner had been given opportunities to explain her conduct. It was thus argued that the action of the respondents was lawful and warranted in the facts of the case.

It was also submitted that the petitioner had, in fact, availed the first appellate remedy and was given an opportunity to present her case before the appellate committee, which considered the official record and unanimously upheld the action taken against her.

Having considered the pleadings and the material placed on record, this Court finds that the objection regarding availability of an alternative remedy cannot, in the facts of the present case, come to the aid of the respondents.

At the outset, it is necessary to notice the nature of the power exercised by the respondents in the present case. The petitioner is an Anganwadi Worker and, therefore, her engagement is governed by the departmental instructions issued for Anganwadi Workers/Helpers i.e. “Rules regarding services for Anganwadi Workers/Anganwadi Helpers” in short as “Rules”. The said instructions do not confer an unfettered power upon the Child Development Project Officer to terminate the services of an Anganwadi Worker at his discretion. On the contrary, Part VII of the instructions prescribes a specific disciplinary mechanism. It contemplates due investigation, a finding of guilt for indiscipline and thereafter the disciplinary measures prescribed therein. More importantly, where the conduct is of such a nature as to warrant termination, the concerned Child Development Project Officer is required to recommend termination to the District Programme Officer; the power is not vested in the CDPO to straightaway terminate the services.

The distinction is of considerable significance. The impugned order dated 19.06.2024 (Annexure P-5/T) has been issued by the Child Development Project Officer and records that the petitioner's services were being terminated, although reference has been made to the approval of the District Programme Officer. The Rules, however, contemplate a recommendation by the CDPO to the District Programme Officer in a case warranting termination. Thus, the prescribed statutory/administrative scheme could not have been bypassed by treating an approval from the District Programme Officer as a substitute for the procedure and jurisdiction expressly contemplated by the Rules.

The principle that an authority must exercise only such power as is conferred upon it, and strictly in the manner prescribed, is too well settled to admit of any debate. In Babu Verghese v. Bar Council of Kerala, (1999) 3 SCC 422, the Supreme Court reiterated that where a statute prescribes a particular manner for doing an act, the act has to be done in that manner or not at all. Likewise, in Commissioner of Police, Bombay v. Gordhandas Bhanji, AIR 1952 SC 16, the Supreme Court held that a power vested in a particular authority has to be exercised by that authority in accordance with law and cannot be usurped or exercised contrary to the statutory scheme.

The defect here, therefore, is not a mere irregularity in the exercise of an otherwise available power. It goes to the very source and competence of the authority to pass the order. An administrative authority cannot derive a power to terminate merely from the fact that it exercises general supervisory control over an Anganwadi Worker. The power must flow from the governing instructions, and the limits attached to that power are equally binding upon the authority. The respondents, having themselves framed the procedure governing disciplinary action, were bound to adhere to it.

There is another material aspect. Part VIII of the Rules separately deals with withdrawal of assigned work and prescribes a preliminary inquiry and an opportunity to the worker before such action is taken. The Rules thus make a conscious distinction between disciplinary action and withdrawal of work. They cannot be read as conferring an unrestricted power to convert every allegation of absence or unsatisfactory conduct into termination of engagement.

The impugned order, however, proceeds on the allegations of excess leave and participation in political activities and straightaway withdraws the work and terminates the petitioner's services. The record placed before this Court does not demonstrate compliance with the disciplinary mechanism in the manner contemplated by Part VII of the Rules, particularly the foundational requirement of a proper investigation followed by a finding of guilt and the prescribed course leading to recommendation for termination. The mere issuance of show-cause notices cannot, by itself, be equated with the disciplinary process contemplated by the governing instructions.

This Court is also conscious that the petitioner is not claiming the status of a regular civil servant. Indeed, in State of Karnataka v. Ameerbi, (2007) 11 SCC 681, the Supreme Court held that Anganwadi Workers do not hold civil posts, their engagement being under the scheme. But that proposition does not mean that the State is free to act de hors the very scheme under which the engagement exists. The absence of a civil post may exclude the protection of Article 311; it does not confer upon the executive an unregulated or arbitrary power to terminate an engagement in disregard of the governing instructions.

The principal defence advanced by learned State counsel is that the petitioner ought to have exhausted the further appellate remedies before invoking the writ jurisdiction of this Court. The departmental instructions do provide for an appellate hierarchy. Ordinarily, this Court would be slow to interfere where an effective and efficacious alternative remedy is available. However, the rule of alternative remedy is a rule of discretion and self-restraint and not one of jurisdictional bar. The Supreme Court in Whirlpool Corporation v. Registrar of Trade Marks, (1998) 8 SCC 1, has categorically held that a writ petition can be entertained notwithstanding an alternative remedy, inter alia, where the impugned action is wholly without jurisdiction.

The present case falls squarely within that exception. The challenge is not founded merely upon an allegation that the competent authority has arrived at an incorrect conclusion on facts. The very competence and manner of exercise of the power to terminate are under challenge. Where an authority acts beyond the limits of the power conferred upon it, relegating the aggrieved person to another departmental authority would serve little purpose, particularly when the foundational question is whether the impugned action itself was authorised by law.

Indeed, the alternative remedy pleaded by the respondents is itself not entirely efficacious in the circumstances of the present case. The instructions relied upon by the respondents place the appellate mechanism under Part IX, which is expressly captioned as relating to “Redressal of grievances regarding recruitment of Anganwadi workers/Anganwadi helpers.” The petitioner, on the other hand, challenges an order terminating an existing engagement. More significantly, the first appellate committee merely recorded that it had perused the record and unanimously found the termination appropriate, without dealing with the specific objections raised by the petitioner.

In these circumstances, the availability of further departmental appeals cannot be permitted to become a shield for an action which is alleged, and on examination found, to have travelled beyond the authority conferred by the governing instructions.

The manner in which the power has been exercised also attracts the well-settled doctrine against colourable exercise of power. The expression encompasses a situation where a power entrusted for a particular purpose is employed to achieve an end beyond the scope of that power. In State of Punjab v. Gurdial Singh, (1980) 2 SCC 471, the Supreme Court explained that where the custodian of power is influenced by considerations outside the purpose for which the power has been entrusted, the exercise becomes colourable or a fraud on power. Thus, where a statute confers a power and prescribes the manner in which it is to be exercised, the prescribed method necessarily excludes any other method of exercising that power.

Applying the aforesaid principles to the present case, this Court is unable to sustain an action whereby a disciplinary mechanism expressly requiring investigation, finding of guilt and a recommendation for termination has been replaced by a direct order of termination. The respondents cannot, under the guise of exercising administrative control, assume a power which the governing rules do not confer upon the authority passing the impugned order. Such an exercise is ultra vires the governing instructions and amounts to an impermissible exercise of jurisdiction.

The respondents, therefore, have failed to demonstrate before this Court the legal source of the power under which the CDPO directly terminated the petitioner's services or the manner in which the mandatory disciplinary procedure preceding such termination was complied with.

Consequently, the impugned order dated 19.06.2024 (Annexure P-5/T) cannot be sustained. Once the foundational order is found to be without jurisdiction and contrary to the governing instructions, the appellate order dated 19.11.2024, which merely affirms such action without independently curing the jurisdictional defect, also cannot survive.

31 Accordingly, the writ petition deserves to be allowed. The order dated 19.06.2024 passed by the Child Development Project Officer, Sri Muktsar Sahib, terminating the petitioner's services, as well as the consequential appellate order dated 19.11.2024, are hereby quashed. The petitioner shall be taken back in service alongwith consequential benefits, which shall carry interest at the rate of 6% per annum and be relased within a period of 8 weeks from the date of reciept of certified copy of this order in accordance with law.

Accordingly, the present writ petition is allowed in the aforesaid terms.

Pending application(s), if any shall disposed off.