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Judgment
Per Justice G.S. Ahluwalia
By this common judgment, Cr.A. Nos. 892/2016, 902/2016, 925/2015 and 981/2016 shall be decided.
Criminal Appeal No. 892/2016 has been filed by appellants Harendra, Manoj Singh, Ramkesh, and Pawan, Criminal Appeal No. 902/2016 has been filed by appellants Pramod Yadav, Gandharv Singh, and Shishupal, Criminal Appeal No. 925/2016 has been filed by appellant Kamlesh Yadav, whereas Criminal Appeal No. 981/2016 has been filed by appellant Ramveer Singh.
A statement was made that appellant Gandharv Singh in Criminal Appeal No. 902/2016 has expired. The State Counsel, after verification from Central Jail informed that appellant Gandharv Singh in Criminal Appeal No. 902/16 has expired. Accordingly, the appeal filed by Gandharv Singh in Criminal Appeal No. 902/16 is dismissed as abated. Counsel for the appellants were directed to carry out necessary amendment in the cause title, and accordingly, with permission of the Court, necessary amendment was also carried out.
It is not out of place to mention here that Criminal Appeal No. 2053/2019 has been filed by complainant against the acquittal of Golu alias Rajendra Yadav, Ballu alias Balveer, Bharat, and Munna Singh. The said appeal shall be decided by a separate judgment. It is also not out of place to mention here that Appellant Ramveer was also acquitted of the charges under Sections 147, 148, 302 read with Section 149 (on two counts) of the IPC r/w Section 11/13 of the MPDVPK Act, Section 395 read with Section 149 IPC and Section 11/13 of the MPDVPK Act, and under Section 307 read with Section 149 IPC (3 counts) and Section 11/13 of the MPDVPK Act but has been convicted under Section 404 of IPC, but his acquittal has not been challenged either by State or by complainant.
All the criminal appeals have been filed against the judgment and sentence dated 26/08/2016 passed by the Additional Sessions Judge & Special Judge (Dacoity), Lahar, District Bhind in Special Sessions Trial (Dacoity) No. 73/2015, by which the appellants have been convicted and sentenced as under:-
| Name of appellants | Convicted under section | Sentenced to |
| Gandharv Singh Pramod Kamlesh Harendra Ramkesh Shishupal Manoj Pavan | 302 read with 149 of IPC (on two counts) | to undergo life imprisonment (concurrently for two counts) with fine of Rs.1,00,000/-(for each count total fine Rs.2,00,000/-), in default to suffer RI for 4 years for offence u/s 302, IPC. |
| 148 of IPC | to undergo RI for 2 years with fine of Rs.5,000/- in default to suffer RI for 2 months. | |
| 11/13 of MPDVPK Act | No separate sentence. | |
| Pramod Manoj | 25(1B)(a) of the Arms Act | to undergo RI for 1 year with fine of Rs.5000/- in default to suffer RI for 2 months |
| Ramveer | 404 of IPC | to undergo RI for 3 years with fine of Rs.25,000/- in default to suffer RI for 6 |
months. with the direction that the custodial sentences except default imprisonments, shall run concurrently.
Facts necessary for disposal of present appeals, in short are that on 14/05/2015, deceased Vinod, along with his bodyguard Vikram Singh Yadav, his companion Surendra Singh (deceased), Dilip Singh Gurjar (brother of Surendra), and his father Sobaran Singh, was going towards Sevdha from his Village Girvasa in his Bolero Jeep, which was being driven by Brajendra Yadav (PW4). As soon as the Bolero Jeep reached near the Anohi culvert, a red-colored Mahindra tractor, which was being driven by accused Gandharv Singh, dashed into the Bolero Jeep from front. As a result, driver Brajendra stopped the Bolero Jeep. As soon as the Bolero Jeep of deceased Vinod was stopped, accused persons Kamlesh, Pramod, Shishupal, Pawan, Ramkesh, Munna, Bharat, Harendra, and Manoj, in furtherance of their common object and in conspiracy with other co-accused persons namely Golu alias Rajendra, Ramveer Singh, and Ballu alias Balveer, started firing indiscriminately on deceased Vinod and Surendra. Gunshot injuries were caused on different parts of the bodies of Surendra and Vinod. As a result, they died on the spot. When persons who were sitting in the Bolero jeep of Vinod tried to run away, then gunshots were also fired with an intention to kill them, but they survived unhurt. The nephew of Sobran Singh, namely Dhruv Yadav alias Banti, and brother-in-law Sardar Singh also came on the spot. The accused persons took one .315 licensed gun belonging to Surendra and a gold chain from the neck of the deceased Vinod, and ran away by showing the guns. The accused persons, while fleeing away, left the tractor and trolley on the spot. The aforesaid incident took place at about 8:00 PM, whereas the father of the deceased Vinod, namely Sobran Singh (PW1), lodged the Dehati Nalishi on the same day at 9:00 AM i.e. within one hour. The merg intimation (Ex.P/2) was registered. The FIR (Ex.P/16) was registered in Crime No. 27/2015. The dead bodies of deceased Vinod and Surendra were sent for postmortem. Ramveer, Ballu, and Golu, who were discussing about the mines of Vinod, were also found to be involved in the offence and accordingly, they too were arrested. The .315 bore gun of deceased Vinod was recovered from possession of accused Ramkesh, whereas firearms used in the offence were seized from the possession of Manoj Yadav and Pramod Yadav. The firearms were sent for ballistic report. Firearms were also seized from the possession of other co-accused persons. Sanction for prosecution under the Arms Act was obtained in respect of accused Manoj and Pramod.
The police, after completing their investigation, filed the chargesheet for offences under Sections 147, 148, 149, 307, 302, 396, and 120-B of the IPC and under Section 11/13 of the MPDVPK Act and 25,27 of the Arms Act, 39/192, 146/196 of the Motor Vehicles Act on 21/09/2015 against Gandharv Singh, Manoj, Harendra, Bharat, Munna, Ramkesh, Pawan, Shishupal and Kamlesh, whereas investigation was kept pending against accused Pramod, Ballu, and Golu S/o Pappu Yadav and Ramveer. Thereafter, supplementary chargesheet was filed against Pramod for offence under sections 147, 148, 149, 307, 302, 396, and 120-B of the IPC and under Section 11/13 of the MPDVPK Act and 25,27 of the Arms Act, 39/192 and 146/196 of the Motor Vehicles Act. Investigation was still kept pending under section 173(8) of the Cr.P.C. against Ballu, Golu and Ramveer. Thereafter, a supplementary chargesheet was filed against Ballu, Ramveer and Golu for offence under sections 147, 148, 149, 302, 307, 396, 120B of IPC, 11,13 of the MPDVPK Act and 25,27 of the Arms Act.
The trial Court, by order dated 23rd of November 2015, framed charges under Sections 147, 148, 302 read with Section 149 (on two counts) of the IPC r/w Section 11/13 of the MPDVPK Act, Section 395 read with Section 149 IPC and Section 11/13 of the MPDVPK Act, and under Section 307 read with Section 149 IPC (3 counts) and Section 11/13 of the MPDVPK Act against Gandharv Singh, Harendra, Bharat, Ramkesh, Pawan, Shishupal, Kamlesh, and Munna Singh. By order dated 23/11/2015 charge under sections under Sections 147, 148, 302 read with Section 149 (on two counts) of the IPC r/w Section 11/13 of the MPDVPK Act, Section 395 read with Section 149 IPC and Section 11/13 of the MPDVPK Act, and under Section 307 read with Section 149 IPC (3 counts) and Section 11/13 of the MPDVPK Act were framed against Manoj Singh and by order dated 25/5/2016 charges under sections 25(1B)(a) and 27 of the Arms Act were enhanced. By order dated 25/11/2015, charges were framed under Sections 147, 148, 302 read with Section 149 (on two counts) of the IPC r/w Section 11/13 of the MPDVPK Act, Section 395 read with Section 149 IPC and Section 11/13 of the MPDVPK Act, and under Section 307 read with Section 149 IPC (3 counts) and Section 11/13 of the MPDVPK Act against Ballu alias Balveer and Ramveer Singh. By order dated 25/11/2015, charges under sections under Sections 147, 148, 302 read with Section 149 (on two counts) of the IPC r/w Section 11/13 of the MPDVPK Act, Section 395 read with Section 149 IPC and Section 11/13 of the MPDVPK Act, and under Section 307 read with Section 149 IPC (3 counts) and Section 11/13 of the MPDVPK Act were framed against Pramod Yadav and charge under sections 25(1)(1B)(a) and 27 of the Arms Act was enhanced by order dated 25/5/16. By order dated 9/2/2016, charges were framed under sections under Sections 147, 148, 302 read with Section 149 (on two counts) of the IPC r/w Section 11/13 of the MPDVPK Act, Section 395 read with Section 149 IPC and Section 11/13 of the MPDVPK Act, and under Section 307 read with Section 149 IPC (3 counts) and Section 11/13 of the MPDVPK Act against Golu.
Appellants as well as acquitted co-accused persons abjured their guilt and pleaded not guilty.
The prosecution, in order to prove its case, examined Sobaran Singh (PW1), Sardar Singh (PW2), Dhruv Yadav alias Banti (PW3), Brajendra Yadav (PW4), Bikram Singh Yadav (PW5), Dilip Singh Gurjar (PW6), Munni (PW7), Veer Singh (PW8), Manoj Mujalde (PW9), Mahendra Singh Rathore (PW10), Munna Lal Dubey (PW11), A.S. Tomar (PW12), Birendra Singh (PW13), Dr. Surendra Kushwah (PW14), Vivek Dhurve (PW15), Arvind Rawat (PW16), ShriKrishna Tiwari (PW17), Vinod Kumar Chhavai (PW18) and Mahendra Singh Bhadoriya (PW19). The appellants examined Sandeep Singh (DW1), Mahesh Kumar (DW2), Sitaram (DW3), Bhure (DW4), Asharam (DW5), Janak Singh (DW6), and Dhyaanendra Singh (DW7).
By the impugned judgment and sentence passed by the trial court, Golu alias Rajendra Yadav, Ballu alias Balveer, Bharat, and Munna Singh have been acquitted of all charges, whereas the other appellants have been convicted and sentenced for the offences mentioned above.
Challenging the judgment and sentence passed by the trial Court, it is submitted by counsel for appellants that the trial Court, by assigning reasons in paragraph 125 of its judgment, has disbelieved prosecution witnesses Sardar Singh (PW2) and Dhruv Yadav alias Banti (PW3), and by assigning reasons in paragraph 126 of its judgment has disbelieved Dilip Singh Gurjar (PW6). It is further submitted that so far as the other eyewitnesses, namely Brajendra Yadav (PW4) and Vikram Singh Yadav (PW5) are concerned, they have not supported the prosecution case with regard to the identity of the assailants. Both the witnesses have not stated about the presence of Sobaran Singh (PW1). It is further submitted that the prosecution has failed to prove the guilt of the appellants beyond reasonable doubt.
Per contra, the appeals are vehemently opposed by counsel for the State.
Heard, learned counsel for the parties.
On 19/8/2026, the following order was passed:-
“It is submitted by Shri Tiwari that appellant Gandharv Singh has expired on 22.07.2026 in Central Jail, Gwalior. Counsel for State prays for and is granted a day's time to verify the factum of death of appellant Gandharv Singh. During the course of arguments, it was found that the Trial Court has disbelieved Sardar Singh (PW-2), Dhruv Yadav @ Bunty (PW-3) and Dilip Singh Gurjar (PW-6), but for convicting the appellants, relied upon the evidence of Sobran Singh (PW-1), Brajendra Yadav (PW-4) and Vikram Singh (PW-5). This Court would like to examine the reasons given by the Trial Court for disbelieving Sardar Singh (PW-2), Dhruv Yadav @ Bunty (PW-3) and Dilip Singh Gurjar (PW-6). Accordingly, counsel for appellants are requested to address this Court as to why the reasons given by the Trial Court for disbelieving Sardar Singh (PW-2), Dhruv Yadav @ Bunty (PW-3) and Dilip Singh Gurjar (PW-6) be not reversed and why these witnesses may not be relied upon. Arguments could not be concluded. Call on 20.08.2026. Matter shall be taken up at 02:30 pm irrespective of serial number at which it might be listed.”
As already pointed out, the trial Court by assigning reasons in paragraphs 125 and 126 of its judgment has disbelieved Sardar Singh (PW2), Dhruv Yadav alias Banti (PW3), and Dilip Singh Gujjar (PW6). Accordingly, this Court, by order dated 19/8/2026 requested counsel for the appellants to address on the issue as to why the reasoning assigned by the trial Court for disbelieving prosecution witnesses Sardar Singh (PW2), Dhruv Yadav alias Banti (PW3), and Dilip Singh Gurjar (PW6) may not be set aside, and why the aforementioned three witnesses may not also be relied upon. Counsel for the appellants were also directed to address as to whether this Court, while affirming the conviction and sentence passed by the trial Court, can set aside the reasoning recorded by the trial Court for disbelieving the evidence of Sardar Singh (PW2), Dhruv Yadav alias Banti (PW3), and Dilip Singh Gurjar (PW6) ?
It was fairly conceded by counsel for appellants that this Court can always look into the reasoning assigned by the trial Court for disbelieving a witness, and if it is found that the reasons assigned by the trial Court are not proper and are perverse, then the said findings can be set aside while hearing an appeal filed by the accused persons. It is further submitted that in the present case, the complainant has also preferred an appeal against the acquittal of four persons; therefore, it was submitted by Shri S.K. Tiwari that the Court is well within its jurisdiction to reconsider the findings recorded by the trial Court for disbelieving Sardar Singh (PW2), Dhruv Yadav alias Banti (PW3), and Dilip Singh Gurjar (PW6).
The first question for consideration is as whether the deceased Vinod and Surendra died a homicidal death or not?
Dr. Suresh Kushwah (PW14) had conducted the postmortem of Vinod and Surendra. Dr. Suresh Kushwaha (PW14) found following injuries on the dead body of Vinod. The postmortem report of Vinod is Ex.P/38
Body lying down in supine position on P.M. Table. Face tilted right side. Both eye semi opened, mouth semi-opened, Both upper limb Flexed, Both Lower Limb Extended. Body wearing cloth are – Dark Blue Shirt, Blue Jean & Pant, White Baniyan.
1.One gunshot wound of entry over left side of the chest, 8cm below the left nipple, just medial to the nipple line, size 2cmx2cm, margins lacerated, edges inverted`, there is no tattooing or blackening over the skin around the wound. Direction is oblique posteriorly downward & backward.
2.Gunshot wound of exit corresponding to injury no. 1 over the back of chest, 15cm below the raphar of the neck in the midline size 6cmx3cm margins lacerated, edges everted. Fracture of vertibrae. The exit wound two cork piece of bullet found one 3cm below and another on the right side of exit wound. Both present & shield & handed over to P.C.
3.Gunshot of injury over left cheek in mandibular region size 10cmx6cm margins lacerated, edges inverted, broken mandible pieces and teeth visible. Fracture of mandible, maxilla, ethmoid left side of bones. Direction oblique upwards medially. No blackening and tattooing around the skin of wound.
4.Gunshot wound of exit, corresponding injury no. 3 over right parieto temporal frontal and occipital region of the scalp just about the pinna of right ear, size 18cmx10cm, fracture of bones right sided temporal, frontal, parietal and occipital bone, margins lacerated, edges everted, brain matter and skull bones coming out from the wound.
5.Gunshot wound of entry, right arm and anterio, medially aspect, upper size 7cmx5cm, margins lacerated, edges inverted. No blackening and tattooing.
6.Gunshot wound of exit, corresponding injury no. 5 over right arm upper part, posteriorly 15cmx10cm, blood vessels and bone pieces of humorous bone coming out from the bone. Margins lacerated, edges everted, fracture of humorous bone. Another lacerated wound over right arm upper part, posterio- medially, 6cmx3cm, margins lacerated, everted edges
On internal examination, multiple fractures of skull bone were found. Left side of ribs was fractured at the sight of injury no. 1. Right lung was ruptured at right side of injury no. 2 with blood present. Left lung was ruptured and blood was present.
Doctor opined that ante mortem injuries were caused by fire arm weapon fatal to life in ordinary course of nature to cause death. Two cork pieces found from injury no. 2 were preserved & shield & handed over to P.C. for ballistic expert opinion.
Blood stained clothes were preserved and shield & handed over to P.C. for FSL opinion.
In the opinion of doctor, cause of death was cardio-respiratory failure due to injury to brain and internal vital organ and hemorrhage. Mode of death was homicidal. Duration of death was within 4-12 hours from post mortem examination.
Dr. Suresh Kushwaha (PW14) also found following injuries on the dead body of Surinder Singh. The postmortem report of Surendra is Ex.P/39.
Body lying down supine position on the P.M. table, face tilted towards right sided. Both upper limbs semi-flexed, hand clenched. Both lower limb extended. Both eyes semi-opened, mouth semi-opened. Body bearing cloth – white colour Safi, blueish & brown lined shirt, Asmani colour pant, white Banyan, all clothes are blood stained. Rigor mortis fully developed.
1.Gunshot wound behind the middle of the left ear, going upward towards up to middle of the forehead, 16 cm in length, extending up to occipital region left side, including left parietal-temporal region in 15 cm wide; in which brain matter & multiple fracture skull bones frontal, parietal & temporal visible.
2.Gunshot wound of entry over just beside of neck right side, anterio laterally, just above of clavicle bone, size 1.5 cm × 1.5 cm, margins lacerated, edges inverted, no blackening & tattooing around the skin of wound. Direction is downward laterally Right sided.
3.Gunshot wound of exit, corresponding injury No. 2, over Right lumbar region of the abdomen, in mid axillary line, size 11 mm × 8 cm; margins lacerated, edges everted, omentum and intestine coming out from the wound. One cork piece of bullet found from the wound, preserve & shield and handed over to the police constable.
On internal examination, the right lung was found ruptured and filled with blood. Lever was ruptured and pale. Small and large intestine was both ruptured. According to doctor, ante-mortem injuries caused by firearm weapon, fatal to life in ordinary course of nature to cause death.
One cork piece found from the wound number 3, preserved & shield & handed over to P.C.
Blood stained clothes were preserved and shield & handed over to Police Constable.
In the opinion of doctor, cause of death was cardio-respiratory failure due to injury to brain and internal vital organs and hemorrhage. Mode of death was homicidal. Duration of death was within 4-12 hours from postmortem examination.
This witness was cross-examined. He stated that all the injuries received by the deceased Vinod were ante mortem and were caused from a distance of more than four feet, as no blackening, tattooing, or charring marks were found. He further stated that the direction of injury No.2 sustained by Surendra Singh was downward, whereas the direction of injury No.1 sustained by Surendra Singh was upward. No other questions were asked from this witness. Thus, it is clear that the deceased Vinod and Surendra died a homicidal death.
Now, the next question for consideration is who is the author of the injuries sustained by deceased Vinod and Surendra.
Before appreciating the evidence, this Court would like to consider the principles for appreciation of evidence of witness. The Supreme Court in the case of State of M.P. v. Balveer Singh, reported in (2025) 8 SCC 545 has held as under :
61.However, where the allegation of tutoring pertains to fabrication—meaning that certain portions of both the testimony and the previous statement of a particular witness have been doctored or falsified—in such circumstances twin conditions would have to be proved, namely; (i) the possibility or opportunity of the witness being tutored AND (ii) the reasonable likelihood of the tutoring.
62.The first condition, namely, the ―possibility or opportunity of the witness being tutored‖ can be established by demonstrating or laying down certain foundational facts that suggest the probability that a part of the testimony of the witness might have been tutored. This may be done either by showing that there was a delay in recording the statement of such witness or that the presence of such witness was doubtful, or by imputing any motive on the part of such witness to depose falsely, or the susceptibility of such witness in falling prey to tutoring. A mere bald assertion that there is a possibility of the witness in question being tutored is not sufficient.
63.The second condition ―reasonable likelihood of tutoring‖ requires that the foundational facts established in the first step be further proven or cogently substantiated before any portion of the witness‘s testimony can be deemed tutored. This may be done by leading evidence to prove a strong and palpable motive to depose falsely that was imputed to the witness, or by establishing that the delay in recording the statement is not only unexplained but is indicative and suggestive of some unfair practice by the investigating agency for the purpose of falsely supporting the case of the prosecution as held in Ranbir, or by proving that the witness fell prey to tutoring and was influenced by someone else either by cross-examining such witness at length that leads to either material discrepancies or contradictions, or exposes a doubtful demeanour of such witness rife with sterile repetition and confidence-lacking testimony, or through such degree of incompatibility of the version of the witness with the other material on record and attending circumstances that negate their presence as unnatural.
64.Irrespective of whether the testimony of a witness is tutored or not, the same, generally may be classified into three categories:
(i)wholly reliable;
(ii)wholly unreliable;
(iii)neither wholly reliable nor wholly unreliable.
In the first category of proof, the court should have no difficulty in coming to its conclusion either way — it may convict or may acquit on the testimony of a single witness. If it is found to be beyond approach or suspicion of interestedness, incompetence or subordination. In the second category, the court equally has no difficulty in coming to its conclusion. It is in the third category of cases, that the court has to be circumspect and has to look for corroboration in material particulars by reliable testimony, direct or circumstantial. There is another danger in insisting on plurality of witnesses. Irrespective of the quality of the oral evidence of a single witness, if courts were to insist on plurality of witnesses in proof of any fact, they will be indirectly encouraging subordination of witnesses. Situations may arise and do arise where only a single person is available to give evidence in support of a disputed fact. The court naturally has to weigh carefully such a testimony and if it is satisfied that the evidence is reliable and free from all taints, which tend to render oral testimony open to suspicion, it becomes its duty to act upon such testimony. The law reports contain many precedents where the court had to depend and act upon the testimony of a single witness in support of the prosecution. (See: Ramratan v. State of Rajasthan; Guli Chand v. State of Rajasthan; Badri v. State of Rajasthan.)
65.The appreciation of testimony of a witness is a hard task. There is no fixed or straitjacket formula for appreciation of the ocular evidence. The judicially evolved principles for appreciation of ocular evidence in a criminal case can be enumerated as under:
65.1.While appreciating the evidence of a witness, the approach must be whether the evidence of the witness read as a whole appears to have a ring of truth. Once that impression is formed, it is undoubtedly necessary for the court to scrutinise the evidence more particularly keeping in view the deficiencies, drawbacks and infirmities pointed out in the evidence as a whole and evaluate them to find out whether it is against the general tenor of the evidence given by the witness and whether the earlier evaluation of the evidence is shaken as to render it unworthy of belief.
65.2.If the court before whom the witness gives evidence had the opportunity to form the opinion about the general tenor of evidence given by the witness, the appellate court which had not this benefit will have to attach due weight to the appreciation of evidence by the trial court and unless there are reasons weighty and formidable it would not be proper to reject the evidence on the ground of minor variations or infirmities in the matter of trivial details.
65.3.When eyewitness is examined at length it is quite possible for him to make some discrepancies. But courts should bear in mind that it is only when discrepancies in the evidence of a witness are so incompatible with the credibility of his version that the court is justified in jettisoning his evidence.
65.4.Minor discrepancies on trivial matters not touching the core of the case, hypertechnical approach by taking sentences torn out of context here or there from the evidence, attaching importance to some technical error committed by the investigating officer not going to the root of the matter would not ordinarily permit rejection of the evidence as a whole.
65.5.Too serious a view to be adopted on mere variations falling in the narration of an incident (either as between the evidence of two witnesses or as between two statements of the same witness) is an unrealistic approach for judicial scrutiny.
65.6.By and large a witness cannot be expected to possess a photographic memory and to recall the details of an incident. It is not as if a video tape is replayed on the mental screen.
65.7.Ordinarily it so happens that a witness is overtaken by events. The witness could not have anticipated the occurrence which so often has an element of surprise. The mental faculties therefore cannot be expected to be attuned to absorb the details.
65.8.The powers of observation differ from person to person. What one may notice, another may not. An object or movement might emboss its image on one person‘s mind whereas it might go unnoticed on the part of another.
65.9.By and large people cannot accurately recall a conversation and reproduce the very words used by them or heard by them. They can only recall the main purport of the conversation. It is unrealistic to expect a witness to be a human tape recorder.
65.10.In regard to exact time of an incident, or the time duration of an occurrence, usually, people make their estimates by guesswork on the spur of the moment at the time of interrogation. And one cannot expect people to make very precise or reliable estimates in such matters. Again, it depends on the time-sense of individuals which varies from person to person.
65.11.Ordinarily a witness cannot be expected to recall accurately the sequence of events which take place in rapid succession or in a short time span. A witness is liable to get confused, or mixed up when interrogated later on.
65.12.A witness, though wholly truthful, is liable to be overawed by the court atmosphere and the piercing cross-examination by the counsel and out of nervousness mix up facts, get confused regarding sequence of events, or fill up details from imagination on the spur of the moment. The subconscious mind of the witness sometimes so operates on account of the fear of looking foolish or being disbelieved though the witness is giving a truthful and honest account of the occurrence witnessed by him.
65.13.A former statement though seemingly inconsistent with the evidence need not necessarily be sufficient to amount to contradiction. Unless the former statement has the potency to discredit the later statement, even if the later statement is at variance with the former to some extent it would not be helpful to contradict that witness.
65.14.The evidence of an interested and/or related witnesses should not be examined with a coloured vision simply because of their relationship with the deceased. Though it is not a rule of law, it is a rule of prudence that their evidence ought to be examined with greater care and caution to ensure that it does not suffer from any infirmity. The court must satisfy itself that the evidence of the interested witness has a ring of truth. Only if there are no contradictions and the testimony of the related/interested witness is found to be credible, consistent and reasonable, can it be relied upon even without any corroboration. At the end of the day, each case must be examined on its own facts. There cannot be any sweeping generalisation. (See Bharwada Bhoginbhai Hirjibhai v. State of Gujarat; Leela Ram v. State of Haryana; Tahsildar Singh v. State of U.P.)
66.To put it simply, in assessing the value of the evidence of the eyewitnesses, two principal considerations are whether, in the circumstances of the case, it is possible to believe their presence at the scene of occurrence or in such situations as would make it possible for them to witness the facts deposed to by them and secondly, whether there is anything inherently improbable or unreliable in their evidence. In respect of both these considerations, the circumstances either elicited from those witnesses themselves or established by other evidence tending to improbabilise their presence or to discredit the veracity of their statements, will have a bearing upon the value which a court would attach to their evidence. Although in cases where the plea of the accused is a mere bald assertion of tutoring, yet the evidence of the prosecution witnesses has to be examined on its own merits, where the accused raises a definite plea or puts forward a positive case which is inconsistent with that of the prosecution, the nature of such plea or case and the probabilities in respect of it will also have to be taken into account while assessing the value of the prosecution evidence.
The prosecution has examined Sobaran Singh (PW1), Sardar Singh (PW2), Dhruv Yadav alias Banti (PW3), Brajendra Yadav (PW4), Vikram Singh Yadav (PW5), and Dilip Singh Gurjar (PW6) as eyewitnesses. As already pointed out, the trial Court has disbelieved Sardar Singh (PW2), Dhruv Yadav alias Banti (PW3), and Dilip Singh Gurjar (PW6). However, this Court would separately consider the reasons assigned by the trial court for disbelieving these three eyewitnesses.
Sobaran Singh (PW1) is the father of deceased Vinod, who also lodged the Dehati Nalishi and is an eyewitness. Similarly, Brajendra Yadav (PW4) and Vikram Singh Yadav (PW5) are also eyewitnesses. So far as eyewitnesses Brajendra Yadav (PW4) and Vikram Singh Yadav (PW5) are concerned, although they have supported the prosecution case, but they have turned hostile on the question of the identity of the assailants. Therefore, their evidence will be considered for the purpose of corroboration of evidence of other eyewitnesses with regard to the manner in which the offence was committed.
Sobaran Singh (PW1) has stated that accused Gandharv Singh, Harendra, Bharat, Manoj Singh, Ramkesh, Pawan, Shishupal, Kamlesh, Munna Singh, Pramod Yadav, Ballu alias Balvir, Ramveer Singh and absconding accused Golu are known to him. All these accused persons are known to him from their faces also. He further stated that he is under some suspicion because the accused persons had tied handkerchief around their face. The incident took place on 14.05.2015 at about 07:00-8.00 a.m. The incident took place near Arnoi Culvert, Sevada-Lahar Road and at the time of occurrence he was present. He was coming from the mines on Bolero jeep. Brajendra was driving the Jeep whereas deceased Vinod was sitting in front. This witness, Surendra and Dilip were sitting on the middle seat whereas Vikram was sitting on the back seat. They were going to Sevada. The incident took place at a distance of 4 to 5 kms away from the mines. As soon as the Bolero jeep reached the place of occurrence, they saw that one tractor of red colour with trolley was coming from the side of Sevada. Tractor was being driven by accused Gandharv. Gandharv deliberately dashed the Mahindra tractor with Bolero Jeep. As a result the deceased Vinod asked the driver to stop the Jeep and to find out as to who had dashed the Jeep. When Vinod de-boarded the Jeep, then it was found that some persons were sitting on the trolley under a Tripal. As soon as Vinod de-boarded the Jeep, Kamlesh, Pramod, Shishupal, Ramkesh, Pawan, Bharat, Munna, Harendra as well as two or one more person came out of the trolley which was covered by Tripal. Kamlesh was having Mouser, Harendra was having 12-bore gun, Ramkesh was having country made pistol, Shishupal was having Mouser, Manoj was having country made pistol, Bharat was having lathi, Munna was having lathi, Pawan was having fire arm. All of a sudden they started firing at Vinod. Vinod suffered first gunshot injury on his right hand, another gunshot injury was caused on the chest and chin, Surendra suffered a gunshot injury on his abdominal region, head and no other person sustained any other gunshot injury. Kamlesh, Ramkesh, Pramod, Gandharv, Pawan etc. had shouted that Vinod should not be spared and he should be killed. The witnesses tried to take shelter behind the Jeep. As soon as the firing started, then Banti and Sardar who were at a distance of 100 feet also came on the spot. They also witnessed the incident. After causing injuries, the accused persons took away the gold chain of Vinod. They also took away the money which was kept in the pocket of Vinod. Ramkesh, Pramod, Shishupal ensured as to whether Vinod has expired or not, Surendra was having a gun which was taken away by the accused persons. This witness after witnessing the incident got upset. Thereafter the accused persons escaped from the spot and went towards Duda. For sometimes the witnesses remained in hiding. Vinod and Surendra had expired on account of gunshot injuries. Surendra was the gunman of the deceased Vinod. After 20 minutes the SHO Rathore also reached on the spot. He clearly stated that he did not inform the police, but he does not know as to who had given information to the police. When the police enquired about the incident, then an information was given, and accordingly, Dehati Nalishi (Ex.P/1) was recorded. The Merg Dehati Nalishi (Ex.P/2) was also recorded. Both the documents contain his signatures. They stayed back at the place of occurrence for about 1 hour. The dead bodies were sent for postmortem. On the very same day, spot map (Ex.P/3) was prepared. When the witness was directed to identify the accused persons who were standing in the dock, then this witness specifically stated that he can identify all the accused persons and he has no doubt and he also offered that in case if the Public Prosecutor wants, then he can identify the accused persons by their names. All the accused persons were present on the spot. It was the accused persons who had committed the offence.
This witness was cross examined. In cross examination, he stated that he had two sons, namely Kamlesh and Vinod. Kamlesh has already expired about 5 years back. He admitted that earlier Vinod was in Army. However, as he got implicated in an offence under Section 302 of IPC, therefore he was ousted from the service. Vinod had run a sand mine for about 5 years after taking it on lease. The documents pertaining to lease were with Vinod. Vinod was having two tractors and two dumpers apart from one JCB machine. He was having one Bolero and one Safari Jeep also. He further admitted that Vinod was having one house in Sevada and another in Gwalior. In all, he admitted that the total value of the property of Vinod must be around 3 crores. Since Vinod had enmity, therefore, Surendra was employed as his bodyguard. Dhruv is his nephew. Sardar Singh is distantly related as his brother-in-law (Sala). He denied that criminal cases were pending against Vinod. He admitted that one trial pertaining to the offence of murder was registered against Vinod. The details of the offences were put to this witness, but it was denied by this witness. This witness further stated that his village is Rampura, however, he resides in Sevada. He also claimed that he occasionally visits Rampura. He denied that in his Dehati Nalishi he had informed the police that one Ravi was killed and Vinod was an accused in that case and on account of that enmity, Vinod has been killed by the accused persons but could not explain as to why the said fact is mentioned in his Dehati Nalishi (Ex.P/1). He further denied the mentioning of enmity in his Marg Dehati Nalishi intimation (Ex.P/2), but could not explain as to why the said fact is mentioned. He denied that the Dehati nalishi was lodged by him on the information given by the witnesses. He claimed that since he himself had witnessed the incident, therefore the Dehati Nalishi was lodged. He further stated that he had witnessed the incident while staying back at the place of occurrence. He had informed the Inspector about the place from where he had witnessed the incident. There was a gap of approximately 10 to 5 steps between the deceased and the accused persons. He admitted that after deboarding the jeep Vinod had walked for 10 to 5 steps, only then the gunshots were fired. This witness was not in a position to tell that which accused fired how many gunshots. He further claimed that after the gunshots were fired, he did not run away and he and other witnesses took shelter under the jeep. The first gunshot had hit Vinod. Vinod was in front of Surendra. Since this witness was afraid, therefore he did not run away. Vinod and Surendra had run towards the northern side. After the accused persons left the place of incident, he noticed the dead body of deceased Vinod and found that he had suffered three gunshots injury. Surendra had also suffered gunshots injury. In para 12 of his cross examination, he denied the suggestion that after the accused persons had challenged the witnesses then this witness also ran away from the spot. He further stated that when the gunshots were fired towards the witnesses, he was not in the vehicle but they had already deboarded the vehicle. Vinod and Surendra had fallen down at a gap of 10 to 5 steps. On account of collision with tractor, the windshield of the Bolero jeep had broken down but none of the witnesses sitting in the jeep suffered injury. Dhruv and Sardar had also reached to the place of occurrence immediately after hearing the noise of gunshot firing. After the gunshot injuries were caused to the deceased, accused Ramkesh, Pramod, Shishupal, Gandharv, Harendra, Bharat and Munna had gone to ensure as to whether Vinod and Surendra have expired or not. The SHO had reached the place of occurrence within 15-20 minutes. He admitted that he does not know as to who had informed the police about the incident. He further stated that 14 rounds of fired cartridges of Mouzer, one live round of Mouzer and 10 fired empty cartridges of 12 bore were seized by the SHO from the spot. He admitted that Golu, Ballu and Ramveer were not present on the spot, but after 1 month of the incident, they came to the house and threatened that this witness will also be killed like his son Vinod. He further admitted that Vinod was tried for an offence of committing murder of Ravi, but claimed that as all the prosecution witnesses had turned hostile, therefore Vinod was acquitted. He further admitted in paragraph 22 of his cross-examination, that different cases were registered against Vinod. He further admitted that his elder son Kamlesh was also killed by the people who were residents of Dhammukhar. He further admitted that the residents of Dhammukhar were rebellions and they had an enmity with the family of this witness. However, he claimed that all those persons have expired. He further admitted that the enmity started on account of contesting of election by his daughter-in-law (Bahu) Rekha for the post of Member, Janpad Panchayat . He further admitted that Ravi is also the resident of Girvasa. He further admitted that accused Pramod, Gandharv, Ramkesh, father of accused Manoj and younger brother of accused Ballu were the witnesses but all of them turned hostile and they claimed that his son Vinod is innocent person and accordingly Vinod was acquitted. After the murder of his son Vinod and Surendra, his condition had deteriorated. He further stated that police had reached to the spot at about 08:30 p.m. and at that time his condition was not good. He denied that Dehati Nalishi (Ex.P/1) and Dehati Marg Intimation (Ex.P/2) respectively were recorded by police on account of his acquaintance with police persons. Thereafter this witness was further examined on 18.02.2016 in respect of Golu alias Rajendra Yadav. Since Golu alias Rajendra Yadav has been acquitted, therefore the evidence of this witness shall be considered while considering Criminal Appeal No. 2053/2019, which has been filed against the acquittal.
Thus, it is clear from the evidence of this witness that he had claimed himself to be an eyewitness. He was mainly cross-examined on the issue that Vinod had an enmity with various persons. Therefore, it was submitted by counsel for appellant that Vinod might have been killed by other persons and the appellants have been falsely implicated. It was further submitted that the presence of this witness on the spot is suspicious because this witness did not interfere in the matter specifically when gunshot injuries were being caused to his son. It is also the case of the appellants that Brijendra Yadav (PW4) and Vikram Singh Yadav (PW5), who were the eyewitnesses have not stated about the presence of this witness on the spot. However, it is fairly conceded by the counsel for the appellants that Brijendra Yadav (PW4) and Vikram Singh Yadav (PW5) have turned hostile on the question of identity. It was further submitted that this witness had claimed that he had fallen down on the dead body of his son Vinod and his clothes also got cloaked with the blood. However, by referring to the evidence of Investigating Officer, it was submitted by counsel for appellant that since no blood stains were found by the I.O. on the clothes of this witness and even the clothes of this witness were not seized, therefore it is clear that the presence of this witness on the spot was unrealistic.
So far as the fact as to whether the clothes of this witness had got stained with the blood of Vinod and as to whether this witness had fallen down on the dead body of Vinod is concerned, in the considered opinion of this Court there are always some embellishments and improvements in the evidence of the witnesses. There is a tendency of improving the evidence to make their evidence more trustworthy. However, such a circumstance cannot be a good ground to discard the evidence of the eyewitness, who had lodged the Dehati Nalishi within 1 hour of the incident. Minor improvements in the evidence cannot be a ground to disbelieve the evidence. The Courts must not pick up one or two sentences while appreciating the evidence. The Supreme Court in the case of Sunil Kumar Sambhudayal Gupta (Dr.) v. State of Maharashtra, reported in (2010) 13 SCC 657 has held as under :
Material contradictions
30.While appreciating the evidence, the court has to take into consideration whether the contradictions/omissions had been of such magnitude that they may materially affect the trial. Minor contradictions, inconsistencies, embellishments or improvements on trivial matters without effecting the core of the prosecution case should not be made a ground to reject the evidence in its entirety. The trial court, after going through the entire evidence, must form an opinion about the credibility of the witnesses and the appellate court in normal course would not be justified in reviewing the same again without justifiable reasons. (Vide State v. Saravanan.)
31.Where the omission(s) amount to a contradiction, creating a serious doubt about the truthfulness of a witness and the other witness also makes material improvements before the court in order to make the evidence acceptable, it cannot be safe to rely upon such evidence. (Vide State of Rajasthan v. Rajendra Singh.)
32.The discrepancies in the evidence of eyewitnesses, if found to be not minor in nature, may be a ground for disbelieving and discrediting their evidence. In such circumstances, witnesses may not inspire confidence and if their evidence is found to be in conflict and contradiction with other evidence or with the statement already recorded, in such a case it cannot be held that the prosecution proved its case beyond reasonable doubt. (Vide Mahendra Pratap Singh v. State of U.P.)
33.In case, the complainant in the FIR or the witness in his statement under Section 161 CrPC, has not disclosed certain facts but meets the prosecution case first time before the court, such version lacks credence and is liable to be discarded. (Vide State v. Sait.)
34.In State of Rajasthan v. Kalki, while dealing with this issue, this Court observed as under : (SCC p. 754, para 8)
―8. … In the depositions of witnesses there are always normal discrepancies however honest and truthful they may be. These discrepancies are due to normal errors of observation, normal errors of memory due to lapse of time, due to mental disposition such as shock and horror at the time of the occurrence, and the like. Material discrepancies are those which are not normal, and not expected of a normal person.‖
35.The courts have to label the category to which a discrepancy belongs. While normal discrepancies do not corrode the credibility of a party‘s case, material discrepancies do so. (See Syed Ibrahim v. State of A.P. and Arumugam v. State.)
36.In Bihari Nath Goswami v. Shiv Kumar Singh this Court examined the issue and held : (SCC p. 192, para 9)
―9. Exaggerations per se do not render the evidence brittle. But it can be one of the factors to test the credibility of the prosecution version, when the entire evidence is put in a crucible for being tested on the touchstone of credibility.‖
37.While deciding such a case, the court has to apply the aforesaid tests. Mere marginal variations in the statements cannot be dubbed as improvements as the same may be elaborations of the statement made by the witness earlier. The omissions which amount to contradictions in material particulars i.e. go to the root of the case/materially affect the trial or core of the prosecution case, render the testimony of the witness liable to be discredited.
It is also not out of place to mention here that FIR (Ex.P/16) was recorded at 09:30 a.m. i.e. within 1 and a half hours of the incident. According to Sobaran Singh (P.W.1), the police had reached the spot at 08:30 a.m. and the Dehati Nalishi was lodged at 09:00 a.m. Therefore, it is clear that all proceedings took place within short period of time thereby giving no opportunity to any witness to deliberate upon the incident. Thus it is clear that this witness was present on the spot and he had witnessed the incident. Although the counsel for the appellant has also referred to the evidence of Sardar Singh (PW2) to claim that after the incident Sughar Singh and Sobaran Singh (P.W.1) had come from village Rampura on their motorcycle and reached to the hospital as soon as the dead bodies reached to the hospital, but this Court is of considered opinion that said aspect is not sufficient to disbelieve the prosecution witness Sobran Singh (PW1). The prompt recording of FIR/Dehati Nalishi is an indicative of the fact that the witness had actually seen the incident. Furthermore there is another aspect in the matter which cannot be lost sight of. A suggestion was given to this witness in his cross-examination that this witness ran away from the spot after the gunshots were fired. This suggestion given to this witness can be treated as an admission on the part of the accused persons with regard to the presence of this witness on the spot. The Supreme Court in the case of Balu Sudam Khalde v. State of Maharashtra reported in (2023) 13 SCC 365 has held as under:-
36.In Tarun Bora case [Tarun Bora v. State of Assam, (2002) 7 SCC 39 : 2002 SCC (Cri) 1568] , this Court, while considering the evidence on record took note of a suggestion which was put to one of the witnesses and considering the reply given by the witness to the suggestion put by the accused, arrived at the conclusion that the presence of the accused was admitted. We quote with profit the following observations made by this Court in paras 15, 16 and 17, respectively, as under : (Tarun Bora case [Tarun Bora v. State of Assam, (2002) 7 SCC 39 : 2002 SCC (Cri) 1568] , SCC pp. 43-44)
―15. The witness further stated that during the assault, the assailant accused him of giving information to the army about the United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA). He further stated that on the third night he was carried away blindfolded on a bicycle to a different place and when his eyes were unfolded, he could see his younger brother-Kumud Kakati (PW 2) and his wife Smt Prema Kakati (PW 3). The place was Duliapather, which is about 6-7 km away from his Village Sakrahi. The witness identified the appellant Tarun Bora and stated that it is he who took him in an Ambassador car from the residence of Nandeswar Bora on the date of the incident.
16.In cross-examination the witness stated as under:
‗Accused Tarun Bora did not blind my eyes nor he assaulted me.‘
17.This part of cross-examination is suggestive of the presence of accused-Tarun Bora in the whole episode. This will clearly suggest the presence of the accused Tarun Bora as admitted. The only denial is that the accused did not participate in blind-folding the eyes of the witness nor assaulted him.‖
37.In Rakesh Kumar v. State of Haryana [Rakesh Kumar v. State of Haryana, (1987) 2 SCC 34 : 1987 SCC (Cri) 256] , this Court was dealing with an appeal against the judgment of the High Court affirming the order of the Sessions Judge whereby the appellant and three other persons were convicted under Section 302 read with Section 34IPC. While reappreciating the evidence on record, this Court noticed that in the cross-examination of PW 4 Sube Singh, a suggestion was made with regard to the colour of the shirt worn by one of the accused persons at the time of the incident. This Court taking into consideration the nature of the suggestion put by the defence and the reply arrived at the conclusion that the presence of the accused, namely, Dharam Vir was established on the spot at the time of occurrence. We quote the following observations made by this Court in paras 8 and 9, respectively, as under : (SCC p. 36)
―8. PW 3, Bhagat Singh, stated in his examination-in-chief that he had identified the accused at the time of occurrence. But curiously enough, he was not cross-examined as to how and in what manner he could identify the accused, as pointed out by the learned Sessions Judge. No suggestion was also given to him that the place was dark and that it was not possible to identify the assailants of the deceased.
9.In his cross-examination, PW 4 Sube Singh, stated that the accused Dharam Vir, was wearing a shirt of white colour. It was suggested to him on behalf of the accused that Dharam Vir was wearing a shirt of cream colour. In answer to that suggestion, PW 4 said:‗It is not correct that Dharam Vir accused was wearing a shirt of cream colour and not a white colour at that time.‘ The learned Sessions Judge has rightly observed that the above suggestion at least proves the presence of accused Dharam Vir, on the spot at the time of occurrence.‖
38.Thus, from the above it is evident that the suggestion made by the defence counsel to a witness in the cross-examination if found to be incriminating in nature in any manner would definitely bind the accused and the accused cannot get away on the plea that his counsel had no implied authority to make suggestions in the nature of admissions against his client.
39.Any concession or admission of a fact by a defence counsel would definitely be binding on his client, except the concession on the point of law. As a legal proposition we cannot agree with the submission canvassed on behalf of the appellants that an answer by a witness to a suggestion made by the defence counsel in the cross-examination does not deserve any value or utility if it incriminates the accused in any manner.
40.It is a cardinal principle of criminal jurisprudence that the initial burden to establish the case against the accused beyond reasonable doubt rests on the prosecution. It is also an elementary principle of law that the prosecution has to prove its case on its own legs and cannot derive advantage or benefit from the weakness of the defence. We are not suggesting for a moment that if prosecution is unable to prove its case on its own legs then the Court can still convict an accused on the strength of the evidence in the form of reply to the suggestions made by the defence counsel to a witness. Take for instance, in the present case we have reached to the conclusion that the evidence of the three eyewitnesses inspires confidence and there is nothing in their evidence on the basis of which it could be said that they are unreliable witnesses. Having reached to such a conclusion, in our opinion, to fortify our view we can definitely look into the suggestions made by the defence counsel to the eyewitnesses, the reply to those establishing the presence of the accused persons as well as the eyewitnesses in the night hours. To put it in other words, suggestions by itself are not sufficient to hold the accused guilty if they are incriminating in any manner or are in the form of admission in the absence of any other reliable evidence on record. It is true that a suggestion has no evidentiary value but this proposition of law would not hold good at all times and in a given case during the course of cross-examination the defence counsel may put such a suggestion the answer to which may directly go against the accused and this is exactly what has happened in the present case.
41.The principle of law that in a criminal case, a lawyer has no implied authority to make admissions against his client during the progress of the trial would hold good only in cases where dispensation of proof by the prosecution is not permissible in law. For example, it is obligatory on the part of the prosecution to prove the post-mortem report by examining the doctor. The accused cannot admit the contents of the post-mortem report thereby absolving the prosecution from its duty to prove the contents of the same in accordance with law by examining the doctor. This is so because if the evidence per se is inadmissible in law then a defence counsel has no authority to make it admissible with his consent.
42.Therefore, we are of the opinion that suggestions made to the witness by the defence counsel and the reply to such suggestions would definitely form part of the evidence and can be relied upon by the Court along with other evidence on record to determine the guilt of the accused.
43.The main object of cross-examination is to find out the truth on record and to help the Court in knowing the truth of the case. It is a matter of common experience that many a times the defence lawyers themselves get the discrepancies clarified arising during the cross-examination in one paragraph and getting themselves contradicted in the other paragraph. The line of cross-examination is always on the basis of the defence which the counsel would keep in mind to defend the accused. At this stage, we may quote with profit the observations made by a Division Bench of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Govind v. State of M.P. [Govind v. State of M.P., 2004 SCC OnLine MP 344 : 2005 Cri LJ 1244] The Bench observed in para 27 as under : (SCC OnLine MP)
―27. The main object of cross-examination is to find out the truth and detection of falsehood in human testimony. It is designed either to destroy or weaken the force of evidence a witness has already given in person or elicit something in favour of the party which he has not stated or to discredit him by showing from his past history and present demeanour that he is unworthy of credit. It should be remembered that cross-examination is a duty, a lawyer owes to his clients and is not a matter of great personal glory and fame. It should always be remembered that justice must not be defeated by improper cross-examination. A lawyer owes a duty to himself that it is the most difficult art. However, he may fail in the result but fairness is one of the great elements of advocacy. Talents and genius are not aimed at self-glorification but it should be to establish truth, to detect falsehood, to uphold right and just and to expose wrongdoings of a dishonest witness. It is the most efficacious test to discover the truth. Cross-examination exposes bias, detects falsehood and shows mental and moral condition of the witnesses and whether a witness is actuated by proper motive or whether he is actuated by enmity towards his adversaries. Cross-examination is commonly esteemed the severest test of an advocate's skill and perhaps it demands beyond any other of his duties exercise of his ingenuity. There is a great difficulty in conducting cross-examination with creditable skill. It is undoubtedly a great intellectual effort. Sometimes cross-examination assumes unnecessary length, the Court has power to control the cross-examination in such cases. (See Wrottescey on cross-examination of witnesses). The Court must also ensure that cross-examination is not made a means of harassment or causing humiliation to the victim of crime [See State of Punjab v. Gurmit Singh [State of Punjab v. Gurmit Singh, (1996) 2 SCC 384 : 1996 SCC (Cri) 316] ].‖
44.During the course of cross-examination with a view to discredit the witness or to establish the defence on preponderance of probabilities suggestions are hurled on the witness but if such suggestions, the answer to those incriminate the accused in any manner then the same would definitely be binding and could be taken into consideration along with other evidence on record in support of the same.
45.However, it would all depend upon the nature of the suggestions and with what idea in mind such suggestions are made to the witness. Take for instance in case of a charge of rape under Section 376 of the Penal Code, the statement of the accused contained plain denial and a plea of false implication, a subsequent suggestion by the defence lawyer to the prosecutrix about consent on her part would not, by itself, amount to admission of guilt on behalf of the accused. In cases of rape, it is permissible for the accused to take more than one defence. In such type of cases a suggestion thrown by the defence counsel to a prosecution witness would not amount to an admission on the part of the accused. At the same time, if the defence in the cross-examination of the prosecutrix, with a view to support their alternative case of consent procure answers to the questions in the form of suggestions implicating the accused for the offence of rape then such suggestions would definitely lend assurance to the prosecution case and the Court would be well justified in considering the same. We may give one more example of a case where the accused would plead right of a private defence. Such a defence is always available to the accused but although if such a defence is not taken specifically during the course of trial yet if the evidence on record suggests that the accused had inflicted injuries on the deceased in exercise of his right of private defence then the Court can definitely take into consideration such defence in determining the guilt of the accused. However, if a specific question is put to a witness by way of a suggestion indicative of exercise of right of private defence then the Court would well be justified in taking into consideration such suggestion and if the presence of the accused is established the same would definitely be admissible in evidence."
(Underline Supplied)
So far as the reference to the evidence of Sardar Singh (PW2) to show that Sobaran Singh (P.W.1) had reached the hospital after the incident from his Village Rampura is concerned, it is suffice to mention here that a similar suggestion was also given to Sobaran Singh (P.W.1) in paragraph 37 of his cross-examination which was specifically denied by this witness. He denied that he reached to the spot after the incident and he also went to the hospital after the dead bodies had already reached to the hospital. As already pointed out, on the contrary, In paragraph 12 of his cross examination, this witness was given the suggestion that after this witness was noticed and challenged by the appellants, this witnesses had run away from the place of incident. Although this suggestion of running away from place of incident was denied, but in view of law laid down by Supreme Court in the case of Balu Sudan Khalde (Supra) it is held that the appellants themselves had admitted that this witness was on the spot at the time of incident. Further more, the evidence of this witness that indiscriminate firing was done by the accused persons/appellants is further corroborated by seizure of multiple fired cartridges from the spot.
From the reading of entire evidence of Sobaran Singh (P.W.1) it is held that he is a reliable witness and has been rightly relied upon by the Trial Court.
Brijendra Yadav (PW4) has claimed that accused Gandharv Singh, Harendra, Bharat, Manoj Singh, Ramkesh, Pawan, Shishupal, Kamlesh, Munna Singh, Pramod Yadav, Ballu alias Balveer, Ramveer Singh, Golu alias Rajendra are not known to him, whereas deceased Surendra and Vinod were known to this witness. He has also stated that at about 7:45-8:00 AM he was accompanying Vinod in his vehicle. He was driving the vehicle. The jeep was dashed by a red coloured tractor. The driver of the tractor had covered his face, therefore, he could not identify him. Thereafter, Vinod instructed him to stop the vehicle. As soon as Vinod and Surendra de-boarded the jeep, then the persons who were sitting on the trolley started firing. About 30-35 gunshots were fired. Some gunshots injuries were sustained by Vinod and Surendra. As this witness was afraid, therefore, he fell in the pit and thereafter he ran away by hiding his presence. Since this witness had turned hostile on the question of identity, therefore, he was declared hostile by the Public Prosecutor. He admitted that the persons who had fired the gunshots had covered their faces and they were hiding in a trolley which was covered by Tripal and accordingly he could not identify them. However, he stated that Gandharv Singh, Harendra Singh, Bharat, Manoj, Ramkesh, Pawan, Shishupal Singh, Kamlesh, Munna Singh, Pramod Yadav, Ballu alias Balveer, Ramveer, Golu alias Rajendra might have fired the gunshots, but he cannot say so. He denied that he has connived with the accused persons. This witness also denied the facts which were recorded in his police statement. Thus, it is clear that although this witness has supported the manner of incident but has turned hostile on the question of identity.
This witness was cross-examined and he stated that at the time of incident, he, Vinod, Surendra and Vikram were in the jeep. As soon as the tractor dashed the jeep, the gunshots were fired. The firing continued for 2-3 minutes. He claimed that at the place of incident, except he and Vikram, no other witness was there. He further admitted that while fleeing away, Vikram had called the Police and the Police had also reached on the spot within five minutes. He further admitted that the police had taken away the dead bodies of the deceased. He further claimed that after the incident, Sobaran had come directly to the hospital from Rampura.
Bikram Singh Yadav (PW5) has also turned hostile on the question of identity, but has supported the prosecution case regarding manner in which the incident took place. Thus the evidence of Brijendra (PW4) and Bikram Singh Yadav (PW5) can be considered only to verify the manner in which the incident took place and to corroborate the evidence of Sobaran (PW1) with regard to the manner in which the incident took place.
Now the only question for consideration is as to whether Sardar Singh (PW2) Dhruv Singh Yadav alias Bunti (PW3) and Dilip Singh Gurjar (PW6) are trustworthy eyewitnesses or not?
Sardar Singh (PW2) has stated that the incident had occurred at about 8 AM. The incident took place at a distance of 200-250 feet away from his Tubewell. At the time of incident, he was at his Tubewell along with Dhruv alias Banti (PW3) who is his nephew. The vehicle of Vinod had come to his Tubewell and Vinod had asked Banti to accompany him, then Banti told him to go and he would come after collecting vegetables. Sobaran Singh, Surendra Singh, Brajendra, Vikram and Vinod were in the vehicle. The vehicle was of white colour but this witness could not tell about the name of the company of the jeep. When the vehicle moved forward to a distance of 200-250 feet from the tubewell, it was dashed by the tractor. After the tractor dashed the Jeep, he reached on the spot along with Banti. As soon as they reached on the spot, gunshots were fired. This witness also stated that gunshots were fired by Kamlesh, Ramkesh, Shishupal, Harendra Singh, Pramod, Manoj, Pawan and the tractor was being driven by Gandharv. He further stated that after hearing the gunshots, he and Banti fell in the pit. About 15-20 gunshots were fired towards Vinod and Surendra. Gunshots were fired towards the witnesses also but they survived. The accused persons ran towards Duda. Thereafter, Banti informed the police and police also reached on the spot. Vinod and Surendra were lying dead on the spot. The report was lodged by Sobaran Singh.
This witness was cross-examined. Certain minor omissions and contradictions were got proved. In his cross-examination, he stated that at the time of occurrence he was at his tubewell. He does not know as to whether the jeep was deliberately dashed or it was an accident. However, the gunshots were fired after two minutes of the incident of dashing the jeep. After hearing the noise of gunshots, he rushed towards the place of incidence. He denied that he was also an accused of murder of Ravi. However, he claimed that he was falsely implicated. Vinod was an accused in the said case. He denied that his statement was recorded on the next day of incident. He on his own stated that his statement was recorded on the date of incident. He admitted that Sobaran, Vinod, Sughar Singh are his relatives. Sughar Singh is his real Bahnoi and a resident of Rampura. At the time of postmortem, he had also reached to Lahar hospital. He claimed that report was lodged in Lahar hospital. He further stated that Sobaran Singh, Sughar Singh also came from Rampura on their Motorcycle. Police had also obtained signatures of Sobaran Singh in hospital at 2-3 places. He further admitted that in the case of murder of Ravi, accused Kamlesh had supported the family of Ravi. He further admitted that it was his understanding that name of this witness and deceased Vinod were implicated by Kamlesh in the case of murder of Ravi. It was also the understanding of Sobaran Singh and Sughar Singh. He further admitted that appellant Pramod and Ramveer are cousin brothers of Ravi. Appellant Gandharv is uncle of Ravi whereas Bharat and Munna are also cousin brothers of Ravi. He admitted that in the trial of murder of Ravi, Manoj, his father, appellant Gandharv Singh and family members of Manoj did not disclose their names and, accordingly this witness and Vinod were acquitted. He further admitted that he along with others had lifted the dead bodies of deceased from the spot and, accordingly his clothes also got stained with blood of deceased, but police did not seize clothes of witnesses. He further stated that after getting released on bail, he had sold certain land to Kaptan. He denied that he had sold certain land to Komal Yadav also. He further denied that he had sold his house to Komal Yadav. He further admitted that Komal Yadav was cultivating the land which was originally belonged to him. He further admitted that at the time of incident, Komal Yadav had temporary connection. He denied that he was not present on the spot. He denied that Gandharv Singh was not driving the tractor.
Dhruv Yadav alias Banti (PW3) has also narrated the incident in the same manner. He has also stated that he was picking vegetables at the time of incident. At that time, his brother had come on his Bolero Jeep and inquired from him as to whether he would accompany him or not. He replied that he would follow them after picking up the vegetables. The vehicle had moved for 30-40 feet where it was dashed by the tractor. After hearing the noise, he went towards the place of occurrence to find out as to who had dashed the vehicle. Then at that time, the accused persons started firing indiscriminately. He further stated that after the Bolero Jeep was dashed, Vinod, and Surendra had de-boarded the Jeep and had scolded the accused, Gandharv Singh, about the manner of driving the tractor. 20-25 gunshots were fired. His brother Vinod and deceased Surendra had sustained multiple gunshot injuries. He had seen Kamlesh Yadav, Shishupal Gurjar, Pawan, Manoj, Harendra, Pramod, Ramkesh were firing. Munna and Bharat were having Lathi. He had witnessed the incident from a distance of 25 feet. At the time of occurrence, the Jeep was being driven by Brijendra (PW4), whereas his brother Vinod (the deceased) was sitting by the side of the driver. Surendra, Sobaran Singh, and Dilip were sitting on the middle seat of the Jeep, whereas Vikram was sitting on the back seat. This witness immediately informed the constable Kriparam, who was posted at police station Aswar, and thereafter, he and Sardar Singh (PW2) reached to the place of occurrence. They had noticed the dead body of Vinod and Surendra. They did not do anything till the arrival of the police. The police had inquired from the witnesses. Sobaran Singh had lodged a report. The police had stayed back at the place of occurrence for about one and a half hours. The dead bodies of Vinod and Surendra were shifted to police station. The mining lease was in the name of Vinod. He further stated that along with him, his maternal uncle and his Tau (Sobaran Singh) were also on the spot, and therefore, he did not run away at the time of incident. Police had recovered fired cartridges of Mouser and 12 bore gun. He admitted that lot of criminal cases were registered against his brother Vinod. However, he expressed his ignorance about the nature of the offences. He further stated that when Vinod and Surendra were sitting in their Bolero Jeep, at that time, no gunshot was fired at the Jeep.
Similarly, this witness was further examined on 18/2/2016 in respect of accused Golu alias Rajendra. Since Golu alias Rajendra Yadav has been acquitted, therefore, the evidence of this witness shall be considered while considering Cr.A. No.2053/2019.
Dilip Singh Gurjar (PW6) is another eyewitness. He has also narrated the incident in the same manner. He is the brother of the deceased Surendra. He has stated that he was in the Bolero Jeep along with deceased and other witnesses. He has also narrated the incident in detail as has been done by the other witnesses. In cross-examination, he stated that “Hare Ram Hare Krishna” and ―Kunwar Rahul Gurjar Bhai Anshul” were written on the trolley. Certain minor omissions and contradictions were also got proved from the records. He further stated in paragraph 10 of his cross-examination that on 13/5/2015, he along with Vinod, Sobaran, Surendra, Brijendra, Vikram and all the accused persons had a dinner in Girvasa school. The dinner continued up to 9-10 of the night. He claimed that no gunshot was fired from the complainant side.
The Trial Court, by assigning reasons in paragraphs 125 and 126 of the judgment, has disbelieved Sardar Singh (PW2), Dhruv Yadav alias Bunti (PW3) and, Dilip Singh Gurjar (PW6).
For disbelieving Sardar Singh (PW2) and Dhruv Yadav alias Bunty (PW3), the trial Court has held that these witnesses have stated that before reaching to the place of occurrence, the Bolero Jeep had passed by the side of the tube well, and Vinod had requested Banti to accompany him. However, it was held that this fact is not mentioned in their police statements (Ex.D/2 and Ex.D/3). Sardar Singh (PW2) and Dhruv Yadav alias Bunti (PW3) in their police statement had stated that the people used to commit theft of earth and sand from the mines of Sardar Singh and, for watching the same, they had gone to the mines, but that fact indicates that the presence of these witnesses is that of a chance witness. It was also held that Sardar Singh (PW2) has stated that after the police reached on the spot, then he saw the dead bodies of Surendra and Vinod, whereas according to the witnesses, both the witnesses were present at the spot, but they did not sign any document of investigation. The statements of these witnesses were not recorded on 14/5/2015, and accordingly, it was held that both the witnesses had reached to place of incident as a chance witness. They did not participate in any police proceedings or investigation. Their police statements were not recorded on the very same day. Both the witnesses were closely related to the others, but even then they did not inform the police. They waited for police to arrive to the place of incident, and the police had also reached to the place of occurrence about one hour after the incident. Accordingly, it was held that Sardar Singh (PW2) and Dhruv alias Bunti Yadav (PW3) are not reliable witnesses.
According to these witnesses, they were already working at the nearby place. It is not the case of the defence that the fields where the witnesses were allegedly working did not belong to them.
Now the next question for consideration is as to whether the findings given by the Trial Court that these witnesses were the chance witnesses is correct or not and even if these witnesses are treated as chance witnesses, then, what would be the reliability and credibility of the evidence of chance witnesses?
As already pointed out, the names of Sardar Singh (PW2) and Dhruv alias Banti Yadav (PW3) are mentioned in the Dehati Nalishi (Ex.P/1) as eyewitnesses and it has been specifically alleged that when the offence was being committed, these witnesses had reached on the spot. If the presence of a chance witness has been satisfactorily explained, then his evidence cannot be rejected by saying that he was a chance witness.
The Supreme Court in the case of State of U.P. v. Jodha Singh, reported in (1989)3 SCC 465 has held as under:-
―14. The presence of PW 1 at the scene can never be disputed because of various factors. He was one of the victims of the attack and he had sustained injuries. The accused also admits his presence there. He is the first informant in the case. Such being the position, his evidence cannot be brushed aside lightly by saying he is an interested witness. As regards PW 2, he has given satisfactory explanation for his presence at the scene. His shirt, which became bloodstained, when he caught hold of PW 1 in order to prevent him from falling down after he sustained the injuries, has been seized by the police. His name has been mentioned in the FIR given soon after the occurrence. Hence his evidence cannot be thrown overboard by saying he was a chance witness. As regards PW 3, the accused themselves admit his presence at the scene. In fact their version is that he joined Jai Ram Singh and his sons in attacking A-2 and A-3. In such circumstances it passes our comprehension as to how the High Court can doubt his presence at the scene. His name has also been mentioned in the FIR. As to PWs 2 and 3 having figured as witnesses along with PW 1 in a case registered under Sections 107 and 117 CrPC on the report given by a third party, that is no reason why they should align themselves against the accused and give false evidence against them.‖
The Supreme Court in the case of Dargahi v. State of U.P. reported in (1974) 3 SCC 302 has held as under:-
―12. The prosecution has examined four witnesses of the occurrence and they have all supported the prosecution case. Out of the four eyewitnesses, Harihar Nath (PW 1) is the brother of Lachhman Prasad deceased. Harihar Nath admits enmity with the accused and that fact would make the Court scrutinise his evidence more closely. If that evidence can stand that test, it can be acted upon in spite of the inimical relations of Harihar Nath with the accused. Gur Saran PW and Behari PW, the other two eyewitnesses, have no enmity with the accused and we find no particular reason as to why they should depose falsely against the accused. The submission made on behalf of the appellants that Gur Saran and Behari are chance witnesses and that the Court should not therefore place much reliance upon their testimony, in our opinion, is not well founded. The occurrence took place on the road going to Fatehpur. In the very nature of things the occurrence could have been witnessed by the persons going on that road. In a sense any one going on the road in question at the time of the occurrence would be a chance witness but that fact by itself would not be enough to discredit his testimony.‖
The Supreme Court in the case of Namdeo v. State of Maharashtra reported in (2007) 14 SCC 150 has held as under:-
―39. In the present case, PW 6 Sopan is the son of deceased Ninaji. The incident took place at the residence of Ninaji as well as the witness (PW 6 Sopan). It was nighttime about 3.00 a.m. Obviously, therefore, his presence in his own house was natural and he could not be said to be a ―chance witness‖. PW 6 was sleeping in his own room along with his wife and deceased Ninaji was in the courtyard on his cot. That was also natural. There is nothing unusual in his (PW 6 Sopan) coming out of his room when his father cried ―Bapa re Bapa re‖. It was also normal behaviour on the part of the son to chase the accused as he had seen the accused administering axe-blow on the head of his father. Unfortunately, however, due to darkness outside the house, the accused was successful in making his escape. The testimony of PW 6 Sopan appears to both the courts to be trustworthy and reliable.‖
The Supreme Court in the case of Khujji v. State of M.P. reported in (1991) 3 SCC 627 has held as under:-
7.That brings us to the evidence of PW 1 Komal Chand. Komal Chand's evidence was not accepted by the trial court on the ground that he was not a natural witness and was only a chance witness. PW 1 explained his presence by stating that he had gone to the market to purchase vegetables and while he was returning therefrom on foot with his cycle in hand he heard a commotion and saw the incident from a short distance. Being a resident of Suji Mohalla, the place of occurrence was clearly in the vicinity thereof and, therefore, his presence at the market place could not be considered to be unnatural. It is not unnatural for working people to purchase vegetables at that hour and, therefore, his explanation regarding his presence cannot be ruled out as false. The sketch map prepared by PW 11 Gaiser Prasad shows that he had seen the incident from a short distance of hardly 22 feet although PW 1 says he saw it from the square. Since the incident occurred at a public place with a lamppost nearby, the possibility of his having identified the assailants could not be ruled out. The examination-in-chief of this witness was recorded on November 16, 1976 when he identified all the assailants by name. He stated that he knew the six accused persons in court and they were the persons who had surrounded the rickshaw and launched an assault on PW 4 and the deceased Gulab. Of them Gopal struck PW 4 with a chain. He also stated that the appellant Khujji and his companions Gudda and Parsu were armed with knives and when Khujji tried to assault PW 4 with a knife, Gopal shouted ‗Khujji that man is not Gulab‘. Thereupon Khujji and his companions ran after the deceased Gulab, overtook him and the appellant, Parsu and Gudda assaulted Gulab with their weapons. Gudda struck Gulab from the front on his chest, Parsu stabbed him on the side of the stomach while Ram Kishan and Gopal held him and the appellant attacked him from behind with a knife whereupon Gulab staggered shouting ‗save save‘ and fell in front of the house of advocate Chintaman Sahu. Thereafter all the six persons ran away. His cross-examination commenced on December 15, 1978. In his cross-examination he stated that the appellant Khujji and Gudda had their backs towards him and hence he could not see their faces while he could identify the remaining four persons. He stated that he had inferred that the other two persons were the appellant and Gudda. On the basis of this statement Mr Lalit submitted that the evidence regarding the identity of the appellant is rendered highly doubtful and it would be hazardous to convict the appellant solely on the basis of identification by such a wavering witness. The High Court came to the conclusion and, in our opinion rightly, that during the one month period that elapsed since the recording of his examination-in-chief something transpired which made him shift his evidence on the question of identity to help the appellant. We are satisfied on a reading of his entire evidence that his statement in cross-examination on the question of identity of the appellant and his companion is a clear attempt to wriggle out of what he had stated earlier in his examination-in-chief. Since the incident occurred at a public place, it is reasonable to infer that the street lights illuminated the place sufficiently to enable this witness to identify the assailants. We have, therefore, no hesitation in concluding that he had ample opportunity to identify the assailants of Gulab, his presence at the scene of occurrence is not unnatural nor is his statement that he had come to purchase vegetables unacceptable. We do not find any material contradictions in his evidence to doubt his testimony. He is a totally independent witness who had no cause to give false evidence against the appellant and his companions. We are, therefore, not impressed by the reasons which weighed with the trial court for rejecting his evidence. We agree with the High Court that his evidence is acceptable regarding the time, place and manner of the incident as well as the identity of the assailants.
The Supreme Court in the case of Rana Partap v. State of Haryana reported in (1983) 3 SCC 327 has held as under:-
3.There were three eyewitnesses. One was the brother of the deceased and the other two were a milk vendor of a neighbouring village, who was carrying milk to the dairy and a vegetable and fruit hawker, who was pushing his laden cart along the road. The learned Sessions Judge and the learned counsel described both the independent witnesses as ―chance witnesses‖ implying thereby that their evidence was suspicious and their presence at the scene doubtful. We do not understand the expression ―chance witnesses‖. Murders are not committed with previous notice to witnesses, soliciting their presence. If murder is committed in a dwelling house, the inmates of the house are natural witnesses. If murder is committed in a brothel, prostitutes and paramours are natural witnesses. If murder is committed on a street, only passersby will be witnesses. Their evidence cannot be brushed aside or viewed with suspicion on the ground that they are mere ―chance witnesses‖. The expression ―chance witnesses‖ is borrowed from countries where every man's home is considered his castle and every one must have an explanation for his presence elsewhere or in another man's castle. It is a most unsuitable expression in a country whose people are less formal and more casual. To discard the evidence of street hawkers and street vendors on the ground that they are ―chance witnesses‖, even where murder is committed in a street, is to abandon good sense and take too shallow a view of the evidence.
The Supreme Court in the case of Ramveer v. State of U.P. reported in (2009) 15 SCC 254 has held as under:-
―11. The learned counsel appearing for the appellant has raised many submissions before us. His first submission was that the FIR is ante-timed and that the time of incident has also been changed by the prosecution to suit their purpose. It was also submitted that all the witnesses examined by the prosecution as eyewitnesses are chance witnesses. It was further submitted that semi-digested and digested food was found in the stomach of the deceased which indicates that the food was taken about 3-4 hours prior to the time of incident and therefore, the incident must have happened at about 11 p.m. in the night and not at 6.15 p.m. as alleged by the prosecution.
14.The eyewitnesses examined in the trial cannot be said to be chance witnesses as they were the residents of the same village and at about 6.15 p.m. these eyewitnesses were moving around, some were going to their agricultural field while some were coming from their respective agricultural fields. The incident had happened near a sugarcane crop which is near the agricultural field. The time 6.15 p.m., being broad daylight, the presence of the eyewitnesses at the place of occurrence is quite natural. The witnesses being the residents of the locality, their presence at the place of occurrence could not be considered unnatural. They had no cause to give false evidence. Accordingly, their testimonies cannot be discarded.‖
The Supreme Court in the case of Jarnail Singh v. State of Punjab reported in (2009) 9 SCC 719 has held as under:-
20.After considering the oral as well as documentary evidence on record, the High Court came to the conclusion that the statement of Gurcharan Singh (PW 18) in respect of the fact of hatching of a conspiracy by Balbir Singh and Gurdip Singh, at Bus-stand Bassi Pathana on 21-6-2000 at 7.30/8.00 p.m. was not worthy of credence. Gurcharan Singh (PW 18), a chance witness could not explain under what circumstances he was present at the bus-stand at the said time.
21.In Sachchey Lal Tiwari v. State of U.P. [(2004) 11 SCC 410 : 2004 SCC (Cri) Supp 105] this Court while considering the evidentiary value of the chance witness in a case of murder which had taken place in a street and a passerby had deposed that he had witnessed the incident, observed as under:
If the offence is committed in a street only a passerby will be the witness. His evidence cannot be brushed aside lightly or viewed with suspicion on the ground that he was a mere chance witness. However, there must be an explanation for his presence there. The Court further explained that the expression ―chance witness‖ is borrowed from countries where every man's home is considered his castle and everyone must have an explanation for his presence elsewhere or in another man's castle. It is quite unsuitable an expression in a country like India where people are less formal and more casual, at any rate in the matter of explaining their presence.
22.The evidence of a chance witness requires a very cautious and close scrutiny and a chance witness must adequately explain his presence at the place of occurrence (Satbir v. Surat Singh [(1997) 4 SCC 192 : 1997 SCC (Cri) 538] , Harjinder Singh v. State of Punjab [(2004) 11 SCC 253 : 2004 SCC (Cri) Supp 28] , Acharaparambath Pradeepan v. State of Kerala [(2006) 13 SCC 643 : (2008) 1 SCC (Cri) 241] and Sarvesh Narain Shukla v. Daroga Singh [(2007) 13 SCC 360 : (2009) 1 SCC (Cri) 188] ). Deposition of a chance witness whose presence at the place of incident remains doubtful should be discarded (vide Shankarlal v. State of Rajasthan [(2004) 10 SCC 632 : 2005 SCC (Cri) 579] ).
23.Conduct of the chance witness, subsequent to the incident may also be taken into consideration particularly as to whether he has informed anyone else in the village about the incident (vide Thangaiya v. State of T.N. [(2005) 9 SCC 650 : 2005 SCC (Cri) 1284] ). Gurcharan Singh (PW 18) met the informant Darshan Singh (PW 4) before lodging the FIR and the fact of conspiracy was not disclosed by Gurcharan Singh (PW 18) and Darshan Singh (PW 4). The fact of conspiracy has not been mentioned in the FIR. Hakam Singh, the other witness on this issue has not been examined by the prosecution. Thus, the High Court was justified in discarding the part of the prosecution case relating to conspiracy. However, in the fact situation of the present case, acquittal of the said two co-accused has no bearing, so far as the present appeal is concerned.
The Supreme Court in the case of Baby v. Inspector of Police reported in (2016) 13 SCC 333 has held as under:-
29.A careful reading of the evidence on record clearly highlights the material contradictions and discrepancies in the prosecution evidence especially the testimonies of Mathai (PW 6) and Eldose (PW 17) upon which strong reliance has been placed by the High Court in convicting both the appellants by setting aside the acquittal order passed by the trial court. From the testimony of PW 6 one thing is clear that he is a chance witness who happened to have witnessed the incident by chance. It is a well-settled legal principle that the evidence of a chance witness cannot be brushed aside simply because he is a chance witness but his presence at the place of occurrence must be satisfactorily explained by the prosecution so as to make his testimony free from doubt and thus, reliable.
30.This Court in Jarnail Singh v. State of Punjab [Jarnail Singh v. State of Punjab, (2009) 9 SCC 719 : (2010) 1 SCC (Cri) 107] has elaborately explained the reliability of a chance witness as under: (SCC p. 725, paras 21-22)
―21. In Sachchey Lal Tiwari v. State of U.P. [Sachchey Lal Tiwari v. State of U.P., (2004) 11 SCC 410 : 2004 SCC (Cri) Supp 105] this Court while considering the evidentiary value of the chance witness in a case of murder which had taken place in a street and passer-by had deposed that he had witnessed the incident, observed as under: (SCC p. 414, para 7)
If the offence is committed in a street only a passer-by will be the witness. His evidence cannot be brushed aside lightly or viewed with suspicion on the ground that he was a mere chance witness. However, there must be an explanation for his presence there. The Court further explained that the expression ―chance witness‖ is borrowed from countries where every man's home is considered his castle and everyone must have an explanation for his presence elsewhere or in another man's castle. It is quite unsuitable an expression in a country like India where people are less formal and more casual, at any rate in the matter of explaining their presence.
22.The evidence of a chance witness requires a very cautious and close scrutiny and a chance witness must adequately explain his presence at the place of occurrence (Satbir v. Surat Singh [Satbir v. Surat Singh, (1997) 4 SCC 192 : 1997 SCC (Cri) 538] , Harjinder Singh v. State of Punjab [Harjinder Singh v. State of Punjab, (2004) 11 SCC 253 : 2004 SCC (Cri) Supp 28] , Acharaparambath Pradeepan v. State of Kerala [Acharaparambath Pradeepan v. State of Kerala, (2006) 13 SCC 643 : (2008) 1 SCC (Cri) 241] and Sarvesh Narain Shukla v. Daroga Singh [Sarvesh Narain Shukla v. Daroga Singh, (2007) 13 SCC 360 : (2009) 1 SCC (Cri) 188] ). Deposition of a chance witness whose presence at the place of incident remains doubtful should be discarded (vide Shankarlal v. State of Rajasthan [Shankarlal v. State of Rajasthan, (2004) 10 SCC 632 : 2005 SCC (Cri) 579] ).‖ (emphasis supplied)
31.However, in the instant case, the presence of PW 6, a chance witness, at the place of occurrence, is not free from doubt. PW 6 in his testimony has stated that he along with PW 5 while proceeding from Rajakkad to Kuthungal at about 11.45 p.m. witnessed the occurrence. He has accounted for his presence at the place of occurrence by stating thus:
―PW 5 Thomas asked me a loan of Rs 500. He requested for money 5/6 days back. I had agreed to pay him the money, as soon as I get it from the contractor. Had not stated, when would I get the money. After asking me for a loan, he reminded me about it twice. Had told Thomas that we would meet at Rajakkad. I went to Rajakkad, reaching there at 6.00 a.m. along with PW 5 I went to the contractor K.S.'s office. The contractor is K.S. Kunju Mohammed. Had met PW 5 Thomas that day. That was at Rajakkad. We sat at the room of K.S. for an hour. We spent there from 6.00 p.m. to 7.00 p.m. Since we could not meet K.S. we went to the cinema at the nearby theatre. After the show was over, we again went to the room of K.S. K.S. could not be met. We took food from fast food (thattukada) shop. After that when we were going home, we witnessed incident.‖ (emphasis supplied) However, PW 5 has not supported this version of PW 6. PW 5 in his testimony has stated that he did not witness anything.
32.Further, the deposition of PW 6 is full of contradictions. On the one hand he says:
―… Two persons were standing in the field. One among them was searching for something. After a while a head came out of slush. A person wearing shirt again pushed the head into the slush forcibly. A-1 standing in the dock was the person without shirt, and A-2 is the person who was wearing the shirt who pushed the head into the slush) is in the dock.‖ On the other hand, while deposing he says:
―… I had no personal knowledge when I left as to who attacked whom.‖
33.Further, the conduct of PW 6 in not disclosing the incident either to police or to anyone in the village, creates a suspicion and renders his version of the incident doubtful. PW 6 according to his testimony left the place of occurrence quietly and did not inform about the incident to anyone. The relevant portion from his testimony reads thus:
―… I did not tell anybody at the house what all I saw then. I did not make any noise (cry out); nor did I attempt to save the drowning person. Before telling the police, I had not spoken about the event to anybody else. That was on the next day at the scene of occurrence…. *** … Except for the statement to the police, I am speaking about the occurrence only before the court now. If I were not questioned by the police, I would not have spoken about the occurrence which I saw to anybody else. I went to the scene of occurrence and stood there. That was on the next day. Police invited those who had seen the occurrence to come forward and state the facts. At this juncture, I went forward and explained the facts.‖
34.From the aforesaid evidence, it is clear that PW 6 has acted in an unnatural manner. In this backdrop this Court is of the opinion that the learned Senior Counsel for both the appellants has rightly pointed out that this unusual behaviour on the part of PW 6 in not telling anyone about the incident of murder which he allegedly witnessed certainly casts a serious doubt upon his testimony. Therefore, the trial court has rightly rejected the evidence of PW 6 stating that the same is highly unreliable as it has failed to inspire confidence with regard to the presence of PW 6 at the place of occurrence at the time of incident. Hence, the trial court has rightly held thus:
―6. … His conduct in immediately not disclosing the fact that he witnessed the murder to anybody casts a suspicion on his veracity … According to PW 6 he had walked 3.5 km at about midnight and reached the place of occurrence when the incident was happening and without making any attempt to prevent the murder he just proceeded to his house still 3.5 km away by walk. In the considered opinion of this court the above evidence of PW 6 does not inspire confidence. It will be highly unsafe to rely upon the evidence of PW 6.‖
Thus, it is clear that if the presence of a witness has been satisfactorily explained and the incident has taken place on a street where lot of persons move in their natural course of life, under these circumstances, such witnesses cannot be said to be chance witnesses.
Therefore, it is clear that although evidence of a chance witness is to be appreciated minutely, but their evidence cannot be discarded merely on the ground that they are the chance witnesses.
As already pointed out, the defence has not challenged the ownership of the field where Sardar Singh (PW2) and Dhruv (PW3) were working. They immediately rushed to the place of occurrence. Their presence is also mentioned in the Dehati Nalishi (Ex.P/1) which was lodged within one hour of the incident Although it is the case of Dhruv Yadav alias Bunti (PW3) that he had also informed the constable Kriparam but even assuming that if these witnesses did not inform the police on mobile, then that by itself would not be sufficient to discard their presence because everything happened in such a quick succession where two persons had lost their lives and indiscriminate firing had taken place. Further, the police had also reached on the spot immediately after the incident. Thus, this Court is of considered opinion that the reasons for disbelieving these two witnesses, given by the trial Court cannot be approved. Accordingly, the reasons assigned by the trial court to discard Sardar Singh (PW2) and Dhruv Yadav alias Bunti (PW3) are hereby set aside and it is held that Sardar Singh (PW2) and Dhruv Yadav alias Bunti (PW3) are reliable witnesses.
At this stage, it is submitted by the counsel for the appellants that Sardar Singh (PW2) has admitted that Sughar Singh and Sobaran Singh (PW1) had also reached to the hospital from Rampura on their motorcycle, therefore, it is clear that Sobaran Singh (PW1) was not an eye witness.
Considered the submissions made by Counsel for Appellants.
It is suffice to mention here that a stray statement either this way or another, by a witness cannot be treated as fatal to the other circumstances and other aspects of evidence led by the prosecution. The Supreme Court in the case of Mustak Vs. State of Gujarat reported in (2020) 7 SCC 237 has held as under:-
“34.With the greatest of respect, the evidence of the witnesses have to be read as a whole. Words and sentences cannot be truncated and read in isolation. The witness has categorically stated that he would be able to identify and actually identified the driver of the motorcycle as the appellant. PW 11 being the Judicial Magistrate has corroborated identification of the appellant by the complainant in the test identification parade.‖
So far as the evidence of Dilip Singh Gurjar (PW6) is concerned, the same has been disbelieved by the trial Court by assigning reasons in paragraph 126 of its judgment. The trial Court has held that on 13.05.2010, the witnesses, along with the deceased, had a joint dinner and therefore his contention that in the morning they were coming from a different direction cannot be accepted. This witness like Sardar Singh (PW2) and Dhruv Singh (PW3) also did not participate in any of the police investigation. It was further held that this witness has tried to give clean chit to some of the accused persons.
Merely because on a previous night, the witnesses as well as the accused and the deceased persons had a dinner which continued upto 9-10 pm, it cannot be said that in the morning they cannot face each other by coming from a different direction. So far as the reasons for disbelieving Dilip Singh (PW6) that he has not stated against some of the accused person is concerned, it is suffice to mention here that the principle of falsus in uno and falsus in omnibus has no application in the country and the Court must try to separate the grain from the chaff. Furthermore, minor omissions or contradictions are indicative of truthfulness of the witnesses and therefore, minor omissions and contradictions cannot be given undue importance. Under these circumstances, the reasoning reasons assigned by the trial Court for disbelieving Dilip Singh Gurjar (PW6) as an eye witness is also hereby set aside and it is held that Dilip Singh Gurjar (PW6) is also a reliable witness.
So far as the observation made by the trial Court that Sardar Singh (PW2), Dhruv Yadav alias Bunti (PW3) and Dilip Singh Gurjar (PW6) did not participate in any of the investigation is concerned, it is suffice to mention here that the same cannot be a criterion to disbelieve the presence of the witnesses. Even otherwise, Sardar Singh (PW2) and Dilip Singh Gurjar (PW6) were the recipients of Safina form (Ex.P/4). Safina form was prepared on 14.05.2015 itself and the witnesses were called upon to carry out the inquest inspection. Inquest inspection (Ex.P/7) was prepared on 14/5/2015 itself which was signed by Sardar Singh (PW2) and Dilip Singh (PW6). (Sardar Singh had put his thumb impression.) Dilip Singh (PW6) had received the dead body of the deceased Vinod on 14/5/2015 vide Ex.P/8. Thus the observation made by the trial Court that the witnesses which were disbelieved by it had not participated in the police investigation is incorrect and is contrary to the record. Furthermore, it is the prerogative of the investigating officer that which person should participate in which part of investigation. Furthermore, no clarification was sought from the investigating officer as to why he did not allow Dhruv Yadav @ Banti to participate in atleast few investigation proceedings. Accordingly, it is held that Sardar Singh (PW2), Dhruv Yadav alias Bunty (PW3) and Dilip Singh Gurjar (PW6) are all reliable witnesses.
Under these circumstances, it is held that the prosecution has successfully proved beyond reasonable doubt that the appellants (Except Ramveer) had killed Vinod and Surendra by indiscriminately firing after forcibly stopping the vehicle of deceased Vinod by dashing it with the help of the tractor which was being driven by Gandharv Singh.
So far as the conviction of Ramveer Yadav for offence under Section 404 of IPC is concerned, it is suffice to mention here that the Counsel for the appellant Ramveer did not challenge the seizure of one mouzer gun belonging to the deceased Surendra from his possession. The appellant Ramveer has also not given any explanation as to how he came in possession of gun of deceased Surendra. Therefore, it is held that the Trial Court has rightly convicted the appellant Ramveer for offence under Section 404 of IPC.
It is next contended by Counsel for Appellants that the FSL report donot implicate the appellants (Except Ramveer) in the offence, therefore, the evidence of eye witnesses is not reliable.
Considered the submissions made by Counsel for appellants.
Before considering the effect of scientific evidence, this Court would like to summarize the dates of arrest, memorandums and seizure of weapons from the accused persons. Exhibit Remark P/10 Memorandum of Pramod dated 07/01/2016. P/11 Seizure of country-made pistol of .315 bore and one .315 bore live cartridge from Pramod Singh Yadav on 07.01.2016. P/12 Memorandum of Harendra dated 08/06/2015. P/13 Seizure of one country made pistol of .315 bore and one live cartridge of mouser from Pavan Yadav on 20.08.2015. P/14 Arrest memo of Pavan Yadav dated 20/08/2015. P/15 Seizure memo of blood-stained earth near the dead body of Vinod Yadav. Plain earth near the dead body of Vinod Yadav. Blood-stained earth near the dead body of Surendra Gurjar. Plain earth near the dead body of Surendra Gurjar. Thirteen empty cartridges of .315-bore. One live cartridge of .315 bore. Three 12-bore fired empty cartridges, out of which 2 were red in colour and 1 was yellow in colour. Three live cartridges of red colour of 12 bore. One red-coloured Mahindra tractor whose front wheel had separated, on which S Gurjar S was written on the bumper; One trolley of blue-colour on which ―Hare Ram, Hare Kirshna‖ and ―Ku. Rahul Gurjar Bhai Anshul‖ was written. One white-coloured Bolero Jeep bearing registration No. MP07-CD-2751, multiple holes on the windshield caused on account of gunshots. The glass middle window of the driver side of jeep was broken. A dent was on the body of the driver's side of the jeep with hole; One belt carrying 19 live cartridges of .315-bore was found on the floor of the middle seat of the jeep; One bullet of .315-bore fired cartridge was found on the floor of the driver's seat of the jeep; and one gun licence in the name of Surendra Singh Gurjar was also found in the jeep. P/16 FIR P/17 Seizure of clothes of deceased Surendra and Vinod P/18 Arrest memo of Gandharv Singh Yadav, dated 31/05/2015. P/19 Arrest memo of Bharat Singh Yadav, dated 31/05/2015. P/20 Arrest memo of Manoj Yadav, dated 31/05/2015. P/21 Memorandum of Gandharv Singh, dated 31/05/2015. P/22 Memorandum of Manoj, dated 31/05/2015. P/23 Memorandum of Bharat Singh, dated 31/05/2015. P/24 Seizure of one lathi from Bharat Singh P/25 Seizure of one country-made mouser and one live cartridge from Manoj Yadav P/26 Arrest memo of Harendra Yadav, dated 07/06/2015. P/27 Memorandum of Harendra Yadav dated 07/06/2015. P/28 Seizure of one 12-bore single-barrel gun which was a licensed gun and 5 rounds of 12-bore live cartridges from Harendra Yadav P/29 Arrest memo of Munna Singh, dated 14/06/2015. P/30 Memorandum of Munna Singh dated 14/06/2015. P/31 Seizure of one lathi from Munna Singh on 14-6-2015 P/32 Arrest memo of Ramkesh Yadav dated 18/08/2015. P/33 Memorandum of Ramkesh, dated 18/08/2015. P/34 Memorandum of Ramkesh, dated 19/08/2015. P/35 Memorandum of Pavan Yadav dated 20/08/2015. P/36 Arrest memo of Shishupal Singh Gurjar, dated 11/09/2015. P/37 Memorandum of Shishupal Singh Gurjar dated 12/09/2015. P/38 Seizure of one mouser gun, two live cartridges of mouser and one photocopy of licence from Shishupal Singh on 13-9-2015 P/38 Requisition and post mortem report of Vinod Singh. P/39 Requisition and post mortem report of Surendra Singh. Memorandum of Shishupal Singh Gurjar, dated 12/09/2015. P/40 Memorandum of Shishupal Singh Gurjar, dated 13/09/2015. P/41 Memorandum of Shishupal Singh Gurjar, dated 14/09/2015. P/42 Memorandum of Shishupal Singh Gurjar, dated 15/09/2015. P/43 Arrest memo of Kamlesh Yadav, dated 17/09/2015. P/44 Memorandum of Kamlesh Yadav, dated 17/09/2015. P/45 Arrest memo of Pramod Singh Yadav, dated 06/01/2016. P/46 Arrest memo of Ramveer Yadav, dated 19/01/2016. P/47 Memorandum of Ramveer Yadav, dated 19/01/2016. P/48 Seizure of one licensed Mouser gun belonging to deceased Surendra from Ramveer Yadav on 19-1-2016 P/49 Arrest memo of Ballu Yadav, dated 13/01/2016. P/50 Arrest memo of Golu Yadav, dated 04/02/2016. P/51 Memorandum of Rajendra alias Golu, dated 05/02/2016. P/52 Letter of S.P. Bhind to Director State FSL, Sagar, dated 11/01/2016, for ballistic report of one .315-bore country-made pistol and one .315 bore live cartridge seized from Pramod Singh. P/53 Letter to Director State FSL, Sagar, for examination of the seized earth, fired cartridges etc. seized from the spot, as well as recovered from Manoj and the clothes of the deceased. P/54 Permission to prosecute under the Arms Act in respect of Manoj. P/55 Permission to prosecute under the Arms Act in respect of Pramod. SP/1 to Photographs of Bolero vehicle. SP/3 SP/4 Report of FSL Sagar in respect of the requisition relating to P/52. SP/5 Report of FSL, Sagar in respect of P/53. SP/6 Report of Scientific Officer, Regional Forensic Science Laboratory.
As per FSL report, Ex. SP4, firing impressions found on EC1 to EC13 (Fired empty cartridges which seized from spot) were not fired from .315 bore country made pistol seized from Pramod on 7-1-2016. Similarly, as per FSL report, Ex. SP5, the EC1 to EC13 were not fired from .315 bore Mouzer seized from Manoj on 31-5-2015, but they were fired from four different .315 bore fire arms.
Thus, at the most, it can be said that the prosecution has failed to recover the weapon of offence. It is not out of place to mention here that the incident took place on 14-5-2015, whereas appellant Pramod was arrested on 7-1-2016 i.e., after 6 months of the incident, whereas appellant Manoj was arrested on 31-5-2015 i.e., after 17 days of incident. The appellants had ample opportunity to destroy the weapons of offence. The seizure of weapon is made on the production of the weapons by the accused persons. If an accused with an intention to mislead the prosecution, deliberately produces a weapon other than the weapon used by him, then he cannot be allowed to take advantage of his own misadventures act.
The Supreme Court in the case of Goverdhan v. State of Chhattisgarh reported in (2025) 3 SCC 378 has held as under :
“83.It is now well settled that non-recovery of the weapon of crime is not fatal to the prosecution case and is not sine qua non for conviction, if there are direct reliable witnesses as held in Rakesh v. State of U.P. [Rakesh v. State of U.P., (2021) 7 SCC 188 : (2021) 3 SCC (Cri) 149] , wherein it was observed as follows : (SCC p. 196, para 12)
―12. Now so far as the submission on behalf of the accused that as per the ballistic report the bullet found does not match with the firearm/gun recovered and therefore the use of gun as alleged is doubtful and therefore benefit of doubt must be given to the accused is concerned, the aforesaid cannot be accepted. At the most, it can be said that the gun recovered by the police from the accused may not have been used for killing and therefore the recovery of the actual weapon used for killing can be ignored and it is to be treated as if there is no recovery at all. For convicting an accused recovery of the weapon used in commission of offence is not a sine qua non. PW 1 and PW 2, as observed hereinabove, are reliable and trustworthy eyewitnesses to the incident and they have specifically stated that A-1 Rakesh fired from the gun and the deceased sustained injury. The injury by the gun has been established and proved from the medical evidence and the deposition of Dr Santosh Kumar, PW 5. Injury 1 is by gunshot. Therefore, it is not possible to reject the credible ocular evidence of PW 1 and PW 2 — eyewitnesses who witnessed the shooting. It has no bearing on credibility of deposition of PW 1 and PW 2 that A-1 shot deceased with a gun, particularly as it is corroborated by bullet in the body and also stands corroborated by the testimony of PW 2 and PW 5. Therefore, merely because the ballistic report shows that the bullet recovered does not match with the gun recovered, it is not possible to reject the credible and reliable deposition of PW 1 and PW 2.‖ (emphasis supplied)
84.In this context one may also refer to the decision of this Court in Karamjit Singh v. State (NCT of Delhi) [Karamjit Singh v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2003) 5 SCC 291 : 2003 SCC (Cri) 1001] in which it was observed that the testimony of the police personnel involved in recovery of articles need not be disbelieved and testimony of police personnel is to be treated similarly as testimony of any other witness. It was held that : (SCC p. 296, para 8)
―8. Shri Sinha, learned Senior Counsel for the appellant, has vehemently urged that all the witnesses of recovery examined by the prosecution are police personnel and in the absence of any public witness, their testimony alone should not be held sufficient for sustaining the conviction of the appellant. In our opinion the contention raised is too broadly stated and cannot be accepted. The testimony of police personnel should be treated in the same manner as testimony of any other witness and there is no principle of law that without corroboration by independent witnesses their testimony cannot be relied upon. The presumption that a person acts honestly applies as much in favour of a police personnel as of other persons and it is not a proper judicial approach to distrust and suspect them without good grounds. It will all depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case and no principle of general application can be laid down.‖ (emphasis supplied)‖
Thus, non recovery of weapon of offence is not fatal to the prosecution case and would not make the evidence of eye witnesses unreliable.
Therefore, the conviction of the appellants Pramod, Kamlesh, Harendra, Ramkesh, Shishupal, Manoj and Pawan for offence under Sections 302 read with 149, 148 of IPC and under Section 11/13 of MPDVPK Act is here by affirmed. Similarly, the conviction of Pawan and Manoj for offence under Section 25(1-B)(a) of Arms Act also is hereby affirmed. The conviction of Ramveer Yadav for offence under Section 404 of IPC is hereby affirmed.
So far as the question of sentence is concerned, since the minimum sentence for the offence under Section 302 of the IPC is life imprisonment, therefore, the sentence awarded by the trial Court does not call for any interference. Similarly, the manner in which, the offence was committed, the sentence awarded by the trial Court to appellant Ramveer under Section 404 of IPC does not call for any interference.
Ex consequenti, the judgment and sentence dated 26/08/2016 passed by the Additional Sessions Judge & Special Judge (Dacoity), Lahar, District Bhind in Special Sessions Trial (Dacoity) No. 73/2015 is hereby affirmed.
Appellant Ramveer Singh is on bail. His bail bonds stand cancelled and he is directed to immediately surrender before the trial Court for serving out the remaining jail sentence. The appellant Pramod by order dated 28-7-2026 was granted temporary bail upto 5-8-2026. It is not known as to whether he has surrendered or not. Accordingly, it is directed that if appellant Pramod has not surrendered, then he would immediately surrender for undergoing the remaining jail sentence. All other appellants are in jail. They shall undergo the remaining jail sentence. They be intimated with the result of his appeal through Jail Superintendent concerned also.
Let a copy of the judgment be sent to the trial Court along with record of the trial Court.
Criminal Appeal No. 892/2016 filed by appellants Harendra, Manoj Singh, Ramkesh, and Pawan, Criminal Appeal No. 902/2016 filed by appellants Pramod Yadav and Shishupal, Criminal Appeal No. 925/2016 filed by appellant Kamlesh Yadav and Criminal Appeal No. 981/2016 filed by appellant Ramveer Singh are hereby dismissed.
