Harbhajan Singh vs State of Punjab

S.S. Grewal, J.

This appeal is directed against the order of acquittal passed by the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Jalandhar, dated 9th July, 1993, whereby, the present respondent was acquitted of the charge framed against him under Section 325 of the Indian Penal Code on the complaint filed by Harbhajan Singh.

According to the complainant, his son Karnail Singh was working in a factory at Goraya and used to go to the factory and return to his house after working hours. Karnail Singh was staying with the complainant during those days. On 14.4.86 at about 6.30 P.M. Karnail Singh went towards the fields of Ajit Singh and Gurmit Singh in village Bhargo Majara, in order to ease himself. Mehnga accused had an altercation with Kuldip Singh nephew of the complainant and was giving beating and abusing Kuldip Singh while the said accused was in a drunken condition. Karnail Singh tried to rescue his cousin from the clutches of Mehnga accused, who, after leaving Kuldip Singh threw Karnail Singh on the ground whereby his neck was fractured. Mehnga accused kicked Karnail Singh on the private parts who became unconscious. This occurrence was narrated to him by Kuldip Singh, Manohar Singh and Bikram Singh. Thereafter the complainant went to the spot and brought his injured son on a cot. Karnail Singh narrated the manner in which the occurrence took place. The complainant took his injured son to P.G.I. Chandigarh where he was admitted in Emergency Ward on 17.4.1986 for urinary trouble. After having treatment Karnail Singh was discharged from the hospital on 9.5.1986. Karnail Singh died on 10.6.1986. The police did not register any case so the complainant filed complaint in the Court of the Ilaqa Magistrate at Nawanshahr.

Initially the respondent was summoned for committing an offence punishable under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code and was committed to the Court of Session to stand his trial.

Additional Sessions Judge, Jalandhar, vide his order dated 15.9.1988 held that only offence under Section 325 of the Indian Penal Code was made out against Mehnga accused i.e. the respondent in the present appeal and the case was sent to the Court of Chief Judicial Magistrate for trial.

Only testimony of Malkiat Singh MHC PW. 1. and that of the complainant as PW. 2 was recorded. The evidence of the complainant was closed by order dated 9.7.1993 passed by the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Jalandhar.

The learned counsel for the parties were heard.

The main grievance of the appellant is that he was not given adequate opportunity to produce his evidence by the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Jalandhar to whom the case had been sent back for conducting trial under Section 325 of the Indian Penal Code by the Additional Sessions Judge, Jalandhar and that adequate opportunity may be granted to the complainant to produce his entire evidence.

Perusal of the order passed by the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Jalandhar shows that no PW was present on 9.7.1993 and the complainant had not come and taken dasti summons as already directed. The case filed was received from the High Court on 3.6.1991 which earlier on dismissed the revision filed by the complainant on 6.5.1991 against the order of Additional Sessions Judge, Jalandhar. The order of the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Jalandhar, dated 9.7.1993 further shows that many opportunities had been given to the complainant to produce his evidence. On 24.2.1992 on the request made by the complainant adjournment was granted and dasti summons were ordered to be given to him. However, no other witness was produced by the complainant in this case and ultimately the trial Magistrate closed the evidence of the complainant by order of the Court.

In our view the complainant had been granted adequate opportunities to produce his evidence. The complainant seems to be careless as he could not produce even his own nephew Kuldip Singh who is alleged to be an eye witness in this case. It is pertinent to note that the complaint in this case was filed as far back as 6.8.1986 and Mehnga accused respondent had already underwent agony of trial for about eight years. In these circumstances there does not seem to be any cogent reason to set aside the order whereby the evidence of the complainant was closed by the order of the Court or to order retrial. Such a procedure in our view would cause material prejudice to the respondent.

In view of the fact that none of the eye witnesses had been examined on behalf of the complainant, the testimony of the complainant himself based on hearsay evidence has no evidentiary value. Nor the testimony of the complainant would be sufficient to fill in this important lacuna. Suspicion however strong, cannot take the place of legal proof.

For the foregoing reasons we are of the view that the order of acquittal passed by the learned trial Court does not suffer from any legal infirmity. This appeal is accordingly dismissed.