Harbans Singh Gill vs Central Bureau Of Investigation

The petitioner by the present petition under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973^{11.Hereinafter referred to as ‘CrPC’}/ Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023^{22.Hereinafter referred to as ‘BNSS’} seeks to challenge the judgment dated 06.02.2026 passed by the learned Special Judge (PC Act) (CBI)-16, Rouse Avenue Courts Complex, New Delhi^{33.Hereinafter referred to as ‘Sessions Court’} in Crl. Rev. No.40/2025 entitled ‘Harbans Singh Gill vs. CBI.’ since his revision petition against the order dated 05.08.2025 passed by the learned ACJM-05, Rouse Avenue Court Complex, New Delhi^{44.Hereinafter referred to as ‘ACJM’} in CBI No.3/2025 has been dismissed.

The brief facts germane to the present petition are that the Central Bureau of Investigation registered an RC on 01.01.1992 against the petitioner and other co-accused persons since they were sending people to foreign countries by arranging forged travel documents.

Three such co-accused persons, Kamaljeet @ Kamal, Neena Kapoor and Sohan Bajaj after being convicted, were sentenced by the learned ACJM vide order dated 11.12.2024 to undergo imprisonment for the period already undergone by them and also imposed fine of Rs.50,000/- each. Interestingly, since the petitioner herein never faced trial, he was declared a Proclaimed Offender vide order dated 01.03.1994, which, even after the passage of time, still stands today. In those circumstances, the petitioner filed an application under Section 265B CrPC, albeit, through his Special Power of Attorney (SPA) holder Mr. Iqbal Singh, seeking benefit of plea-bargaining claiming to be a resident of United States of America and suffering from Stage IV cancer and cardiac ailment, which came to be dismissed by the learned ACJM vide order dated 05.08.2025 inter alia holding that plea-bargaining through SPA is neither permissible nor envisaged under CrPC.

The petitioner assailed the said order dated 05.08.2025 of the learned ACJM by availing the statutory remedy of filing a revision petition under Section 397 of the CrPC^{55.397. Calling for records to exercise of powers of revision-(1) The High Court or any Sessions Judge may call for and examine the record of any proceeding before any inferior Criminal Court situate within its or his local jurisdiction for the purpose of satisfying itself or himself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order, recorded or passed, and as to the regularity of any proceedings of such inferior Court, and may, when calling for such record, direct that the execution of any sentence or order be suspended, and if the accused is in confinement, that he be released on bail or on his own bond pending the examination of the record. Explanation.-All Magistrates, whether Executive or Judicial, and whether exercising original or appellate jurisdiction, shall be deemed to be inferior to the Sessions Judge for the purposes of this sub-section and of Section 398. (2) The powers of revision conferred by sub-section (1) shall not be exercised in relation to any interlocutory order passed in any appeal, inquiry, trial or other proceeding. (3) If an application under this section has been made by any person either to the High Court or to the Sessions Judge, no further application by the same person shall be entertained by the other of them.} before the learned Sessions Court, which has also since been dismissed vide judgment dated 06.02.2026 as there was no infirmity found in the order impugned therein.

Aggrieved thereby, the petitioner invoked the extraordinary powers of this Court under Section 482 CrPC^{66.528. Saving of inherent powers of High Court.—Nothing in this Sanhita shall be deemed to limit or affect the inherent powers of the High Court to make such orders as may be necessary to give effect to any order under this Sanhita, or to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice.}/ Section 528 BNSS^{77.482. Saving of inherent powers of High Court.—Nothing in this Code shall be deemed to limit or affect the inherent powers of the High Court to make such orders as may be necessary to give effect to any order under this Code, or to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice.}.

Since there was an issue of maintainability regarding whether it is permissible for the petitioner to take recourse to the inherent powers of this Court after already having exhausted his remedy of revision before the learned Sessions Court, especially, in the wake of Section 397(3) CrPC/ Section 438(3) BNSS and Section 399(3) CrPC^{88.399. Sessions Judge's powers of revision-(1) In the case of any proceeding the record of which has been called for by himself, the Sessions Judge may exercise all or any of the powers which may be exercised by the High Court under sub-section (1) of Section 401. (2) Where any proceeding by way of revision is commenced before a Sessions Judge under sub-section (1), the provisions of sub-sections (2), (3), (4) and (5) of Section 401 shall, so far as may be, apply to such proceeding and references in the said sub-sections to the High Court shall be construed as references to the Sessions Judge. (3) Where any application for revision is made by or on behalf of any person before the Sessions Judge, the decision of the Sessions Judge thereon in relation to such person shall be final and no further proceeding by way of revision at the instance of such person shall be entertained by the High Court or any other Court.}/ Section 440(3) BNSS expressly prohibiting a second revision by the same party, whence the present petition was first listed on 01.07.2026, after hearing learned counsel for the petitioner at considerable length, this Court passed the following order:-

Today, a new learned counsel has appeared, who also addressed arguments de novo. Be that as it may, the moot issue even today remains the same, i.e. qua the maintainability of the present petition.

This Court has heard learned counsel for the petitioner as also gone through the documents and materials on record.

At the outset, before proceeding on the merits involved, this Court notes that in the year 1973, certain changes/ introductions carried by the Legislature in the CrPC were with a view to clearly distinguish and distinctly draw a visible difference/ demarcation amongst the remedies available to any party under revision under Section 397 CrPC from that of an appeal available under Section 372^{99.372. No appeal to lie unless otherwise provided.—No appeal shall lie from any judgment or order of a Criminal Court except as provided for by this Code or by any other law for the time being in force:} CrPC from that of the “inherent powers” of a Court available under Section 482 CrPC. The Legislature consciously made the said distinction to prevent repetitive and frivolous litigation(s).

The aforesaid intention/ purpose/ mandate of the Legislature is also apparent from the fact that the Legislature continued with the very same difference/ demarcation while replacing provisions of revision as available under Section 397 CrPC with that of Section 438 BNSS, that of an appeal as available under Section 372 CrPC with that of Section 413 BNSS and that of “inherent powers” of a Court as available under and Section 482 CrPC with that of Section 528 BNSS.

As such, none of the aforesaid provisions can be read into the other. The parameters prescribed in each of them are separate from the other, and there are no reasons of their interplay. This Court, thus, cannot interpret something which was not the intention of the Legislature from the very beginning, be it while enacting the CrPC or thence while replacing it with the now existing BNSS. Under such circumstances, this Court is only to interpret provisions of the Statutes as they are, more so, as it is the domain of the Legislature to enact such Statutes.

As per the facts involved herein, the petitioner herein initially filed an application under Section 265B CrPC before the learned ACJM. Being aggrieved by the rejection thereof, the petitioner then rightly filed a revision petition thereagainst under Section 397 CrPC, which also was dismissed. Thereafter, the petitioner has now filed the present petition under Section 482 CrPC/ Section 528 BNSS seeking setting aside of the said judgment passed by the learned Sessions Court in a revision petition by simply challenging it in the form of an appeal.

Therefore, this gives rise to the issue of maintainability of the present petition, more so, since there is no express provision for the same anywhere in the Statutes, be it the CrPC and/ or the existing BNSS. This is more relevant as there is a specific bar contained in Section 397(3) CrPC/ Section 438(3) BNSS read with Section 399(3) CrPC/ Section 440(3) BNSS, after a Court has already exercised its revisional jurisdiction under Section 397 CrPC/ Section 438 BNSS.

Accordingly, the “inherent powers” of this Court as preserved under Section 482 CrPC/ Section 528 BNSS cannot be invoked by anyone like the petitioner herein as a matter of course, much less, to subvert the existing salient provisions of the Statute i.e. the CrPC/ now existing BNSS. It was always incumbent upon the petitioner to fit within the contours of Section 482 CrPC/ Section 528 BNSS as no party like the petitioner herein can be allowed to invoke the “inherent powers” of this Court by simply challenging any impugned order in the form of an appeal thereunder to somehow circumvent the bar imposed under Section(s) 372, 397, 397(3), 399(3) and 482 of the CrPC/ Section(s) 438, 438(3), 440(3) and 582 of the BNSS. A party like the petitioner has to make out a case to come within the dominion of extraordinary jurisdiction of a High Court, and that too only whence it is able to establish that there is an abuse of process of law and/ or it is necessary for securing the ends of justice and/ or if there has been a miscarriage of justice and/ or if there is a non-compliance of any mandatory provision(s) of law and/ or if there is ignorance of material(s) on record and/ or if there is something of a like nature, by the Court below, while exercising its revisional jurisdiction.

In fact, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of Amar Nath v. State of Haryana^{1010.[Provided that the victim shall have a right to prefer an appeal against any order passed by the Court acquitting the accused or convicting for a lesser offence or imposing inadequate compensation, and such appeal shall lie to the Court to which an appeal ordinarily lies against the order of conviction of such Court.]}, while dealing with the express bar qua interlocutory order under Section 397(2) CrPC, expressed in the following words:-

[Emphasis Supplied]

Further, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the celebrated judgment in the case of Madhu Limaye v. State of Maharashtra^{1111.(1977) 4 SCC 137,}, also went on to reaffirm the aforesaid position of law by expressly laying down the following principles in relation to exercise of the inherent powers of the High Court as under:-

[Emphasis Supplied]

As apparent therefrom, the prohibition entailed in Section 397(3) CrPC/ Section 438(3) BNSS read with Section 399(3) CrPC/ Section 440(3) BNSS may apply, but if harmoniously construed, inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC/ Section 528 BNSS can be invoked, however, not as a blanket rule under all circumstances. What entails therefrom is that the scope of Section 482 CrPC/ Section 528 BNSS has not been expanded and a party like the petitioner herein has to satisfy this Court to fall within the narrow category therein.

Moving further, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Madhu Limaye (supra) only in this backdrop recognised the limited but indispensable role of inherent jurisdiction and gone onto further to hold as under:-

Similarly, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in its subsequent judgment of Krishnan v. Krishnaveni^{1212.(1977) 4 SCC 551}, rendered in the present context of Section 397(3) and Section 482 CrPC held as under:

Now adverting to the facts herein, the present petition is simpliciter a challenge to the judgment passed by the learned Sessions Court in its revisional jurisdiction. Though there is nothing of the sort which calls for any exercise of its “inherent powers” under Section 482 CrPC/ Section 528 BNSS, however, in response to the query put by this Court, learned counsel for petitioner has drawn attention of this Court to paragraph nos.3, 5 and 24 and ground ‘R’ of the present petition to contend otherwise. The said paragraphs, for ease of reference, are reproduced as under:-

Alas, a bare perusal of the whole petition herein, including the aforesaid, clearly reflects that they are general submissions/ grounds raised by the petitioner, which, in no manner can be held to be sufficient for this Court to exercise its “inherent powers” under Section 482 CrPC/ Section 528 BNSS, and that too against a judgment passed by the learned Sessions Court while exercising its revisional jurisdiction under Section 397 CrPC. Barely challenging any order passed by a Court exercising a revisional jurisdiction in form of an appeal under Section 482 CrPC/ Section 528 BNSS like the present, one does not call for interference. Through the present petition, the petitioner is once again seeking to rake the very same issues by making the very same submissions and raising the very same grounds, which, this Court finds have already been duly negated by the learned Sessions Court by a well-reasoned impugned judgment. Also, in view of the said concurrent findings rendered by the learned ACJM and the learned Sessions Court, there is no case made out by the petitioner for this Court to interfere and/ or use its “inherent powers” under Section 528 BNSS.

Accordingly, in view of the aforesaid, the legal maxim “Quando aliquid prohibetur ex directo, prohibetur et per obliquum” [What cannot be done directly, cannot be done indirectly] squarely applies and no party like the petitioner can try to circumvent the existing position of law.

Conceptually seen also, the petitioner has failed to show anything which comes within the realm of there being any abuse of process of law and/ or there has been a miscarriage of justice and/ or there has been a non-compliance of any mandatory provision(s) of law and/ or there has been any ignorance of material(s) on record and/ or there has been something of a like nature.

In fact, these proceedings emanate from the hands of a petitioner who has never paid any regard to the process of law as it is he who had left India and remained absconding during the whole trial, only to be declared a Proclaimed Offender vide order 01.03.1994. Strangely, even as on date, the petitioner merely filed an application for plea-bargaining through his SPA.

In view thereof, though learned counsel for the petitioner has sought to rely upon the decision of Hon’ble Supreme Court in Prabhu Chawla vs. State of Rajasthan and Another^{1313.(1997) 4 SCC 241} and Vinod Kumar Pandey and Another vs. Seesh Ram Saini and Others^{1414.(2016) 16 SCC 30}, however, since both the judgments were rendered in a totally different context, and in view of the aforesaid findings and analysis hereinabove, they are not applicable to the facts of the present case.

Based on all the above, especially in view of the law as enunciated by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Amar Nath (supra), Madhu Limaye (supra) and Krishnan (supra), which still hold the field and stand strong, in the considered opinion of this Court, the present petition does not fall within the given contours of Section 482 CrPC/ Section 528 BNSS and is per se not maintainable.

Accordingly, the present petition is dismissed in limine.