Har Phul vs The Financial Commissioner and Others

Gurdev Singh, J.—This petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India raises the question of the interpretation of Section 39 of the Pepsu Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act (No. 13 of 1955).

The sale of agricultural land situated in the erstwhile Pepsu State effected by Amrao Singh, Respondent No. 3, was pre-empted by the Petitioner Harphool. In execution of that decree granted by the Subordinate Judge, Mohindergarh, Harphool ejected the tenants on paying them Rs. 1950-8-6 as determined by that Court. Subsequent thereto, on 20th July, 1958, the Pepsu Tenancy and Agricultural Lands (Amendment) Ordinance, 1958, was promulgated inserting Section 8-A in the Pepsu Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act (No. 13 of 1955). Under this new provision the ejected tenants got option of repurchasing from the pre-emptor or to be put back in possession and become tenants under the pre-emptor. The tenants, Rehta and Fateh Singh, Respondents Nos. 1 and 2, availed of this concession and applied to the Assistant Collector, 1st Grade, Mohindergarh, for repurchase of the land in dispute on payment of Rs. 1950-8-6.

Harphool contested the application urging that the Respondents Nos. 1 and 2, were never the tenants under the original owner Amrao Singh and thus they could not avail of the provisions of Section 8-A of the amending Ordinance. The Assistant Collector, however, rejected this contention and ordered the restoration of possession to the Respondents Nos. 1 and 2 after repurchasing of the land.

Harphool thereupon filed an appeal to the Collector but the same was dismissed on the short ground that no such appeal was competent. A revision against this order was taken to the Financial Commissioner but it also met the same fate. It is for setting aside this order of the learned Financial Commissioner, dated 24th March, 1960, and that of the Collector, that Harphool has applied under Article 227 of the Constitution.

The sole question for consideration is whether an appeal lies to the Collector against an order passed by Assistant Collector under Sub-section (3) of Section 8-A of the Pepsu Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act as introduced by the Punjab Ordinance of 1958.

It is a general principle that right of appeal is not a natural or inherent right attaching to litigation and such a right does not exist and cannot be assumed unless expressly given by statute or by the rules having the force of law. Thus we have to turn to the provisions of the parent Act (Act No. 13 of 1955) as amended to ascertain if the Petitioner had a right of appeal against the order passed by the Assistant Collector u/s 8-A. The provision for appeals and revisions is contained in Section 39 of the Act, which runs as follows:

39(1) Any person aggrieved by any decision or order of the prescribed authority may, within thirty days from the date of the decision or order excluding the time spent in obtaining the copies of such decision or order, prefer an appeal to the Collector in such form and manner as may be prescribed:

Provided that the Collector may entertain the appeal after the expiry of the said period of thirty days if he is satisfied that the Appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from filing the appeal in time.

(2) Any person aggrieved by any decision or order of the Collector, not being a decision or order made in an appeal under Sub-section (1) may, within thirty days from the date of the decision or order excluding the time spent in obtaining the copies of such decision or order, prefer an appeal to the Commissioner in such form and manner as may be prescribed:

Provided that the Commissioner may entertain the appeal after the expiry of the said period of thirty days if he is satisfied that the Appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from filing the appeal in time.

(3) With respect to all matters dealt with under this Act, the Financial Commissioner shall have the same power to call for, examine and revise the proceedings of the prescribed authority or the Collector or the Commissioner as is provided in Section 84 of the Punjab Tenancy Act, 1887 (Punjab Act XVI of 1887).

The expression "Prescribed authority" has not been defined in the Act but the word "prescribed" has been defined in Section 2 of the parent Act as--

2(h). ''Prescribed'' means prescribed by rules made under this Act.

The Rule 3, however provides:

Every Tahsildar and a Naib-Tahsildar shall, within his jurisdiction be the prescribed authority for the purposes of any provision of the Act and shall exercise all the powers vested in the prescribed authority under any such provision.

From the above it will be evident that an appeal lies to the Collector only from an order passed by the prescribed authority under the Act and to the Commissioner from an order passed by the Collector not being an order or decision in an appeal.

Sub-section (2) of Section 39 provides an appeal against any decision or order passed by the Collector not being a decision or order made in appeal under Sub-section (1). In this Act, there is no other provision regarding appeals. It is thus obvious that no appeal has been provided against the order of an Assistant Collector.

An appeal against an order passed by an Assistant Collector would lie to the Collector only if the expression ''Prescribed authority'' contained in Section 39(1) of the Act is given a more extended meaning than the one contained in the definition of the ''prescribed'' authority in Rule 3 framed under the Act. If the definition was not there then the prescribed authority as occurring in Section 39 could be given a wider meaning and be interpreted to mean the authority which has been empowered to pass certain orders or deal with various matters under the Act irrespective of the fact whether it is a Naib-Tahsildar, Tahsildar, Assistant Collector or some other revenue officer. I, however, do not find it possible to ignore the definition of the ''prescribed authority'' given in the rules and to give it an extended meaning so as to include revenue officials other than Naib-Tahsildar and Tahsildar. It is a well-settled rule of construction that where a word or expression is used in different parts of a statute it should be given the same meaning unless it is excluded by the context in which it occurs. Apart from this, where a particular expression has been defined in the statute or the rules framed thereunder, it must be interpretted strictly in accordance with that definition. In this view of the matter the conclusion on which the learned Financial Commissioner has arrived is correct and neither he sitting as revising authority under Sub-section (3) of Section 39 nor the Collector acting as appellate Authority under Sub-section (1) of Section 39 of the Act can scrutinise or interfere with the order passed by the Assistant Collector, 1st Grade u/s 8-A of the Pepsu Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1955.

I am conscious of the fact that such an interpretation would lead to hardship and the scheme of the Act indicates that the legislature never intended that an order passed by an Assistant Collector under this Act be final or immune from all scrutiny yet it is for the Legislature to step in to prevent the hardship. The function of the Court is to interpret the intention of the Legislature as expressed by the words used in the statute. The whole trouble seems to have arisen because u/s 8-A introduced by the amending Ordinance an Assistant Collector 1st Grade has been specifically empowered to deal with applications under the provision of law, but the definition of ''prescribed authority'' contained in the rules, which had been framed prior to the amending Ordinance, was not enlarged or modified so as to include an Assistant Collector 1st Grade who was empowered to deal with applications u/s 8-A of the Act. The Court cannot remedy the omission and now that the lacuna has been pointed out it is for the appropriate authorities to remedy the situation if they so desire.

For the reasons stated above, I see no force in this petition and dismiss the same. In the circumstances of the case, the parties are left to bear their own costs.