Hanumayamma vs Kottapalli Ankamma

Horacs Owen Compton Beasley, C.J.—This Letters Patent Appeal comes before us on account of a difference of opinion between

JACKSON and Thiruvenkataohariar, JJ., upon one point.

The facts of the case are as follows:- The Appellant bid at a Court sale; his bid was accepted but he failed to pay the twenty-five per cent

deposit as is prescribed by Order XXI, Rule 84, Code of Civil Procedure. Having defaulted in the payment of the deposit, a fresh proclamation

was issued and a resale of the property held. This sale resulted in a deficiency of Rs. 630 and the Appellant was ordered under Order XXI, Rule

71, Code of Civil Procedure, to make good the deficiency. He objects to that order on the ground that the sale was not held ""forthwith"" to use the

word which appears in Order XXI, Rule 84, Code of Civil Procedure, which provides that, upon failure of a bidder to pay the twenty-five per

cent deposit, the property shall ""forthwith"" be resold. The sale at which the Appellant defaulted was held on the 1st September 1923 and closed at

5 p.m. that day. The Appellant, as before stated, failed to pay the twenty-five per cent deposit; the next day and the day after that, were holidays,

and on the 4th September a fresh proclamation was directed to be issued proclaiming the property for sale, and the sale was held on the 5th

November 1923 and resulted, as before stated, in a deficiency. The District Munsif, before whom the matter came, after going in detail into the

facts and into the law, seems to us to have come to the conclusion that, although a fresh proclamation was not obligatory, it was necessary in the

interests of the defaulting bidder to proclaim the property again for sale. We may say at once, that we think, that in the interests of the defaulting

bidder it was necessary for the property to be again proclaimed for sale. Had the property been put up for sale on the 4th September, clearly there

would have been no notice to prospective bidders and very likely no bidders would have attended the sale at all. In the lower Appellate Court,

however, the District Judge took the view that, where a bidder defaults in payment of the deposit, the property cannot be resold unless there has

been a fresh proclamation of sale; and he held upon that basis that, as the sale of the property had to be freshly proclaimed, the sale had been held

forthwith"". When the matter came before Jackson and Thiruvenkatachariar, JJ., they agreed that a fresh proclamation was not necessary under

such circumstances, but disagreed on the question as to whether the property had been sold ""forthwith"". Jackson, J. took the view that although it

was not obligatory to freshly proclaim the sale, nevertheless, in the interests of the defaulting auction-bidder, it should be freshly proclaimed, that

there had been no unnecessary delay and that the sale should be said to have been held ""forthwith"". He gave his understanding of the word

forthwith"" and rendered it as follows: ""as expeditiously as circumstances permit""; and that, in our view, would be a good rendering of the word. It

is very difficult to say how the word ""forthwith"" should be defined; but we think that the rendering of it by Jackson, J. is probably as good a one as

there can be and that ""as expeditiously as circumstances permit"" is probably the correct definition of that word. Another rendering might be ""such

time as appears to be reasonably early having regard to all the circumstances."" Obviously in some cases it might reasonably be held that the resale

should take place immediately following on the abortive sale. For instance, take the case of a sale of ten lots of property where the first lot is put up

for auction, the bid of a bidder is accepted but he then and there defaults in payment of the deposit. Under these circumstances, probably, it could

quite reasonably be held that the property should be sold ""forthwith"", meaning that it should be sold then and there, before the sale of the other nine

lots is proceeded with; but it must depend entirely upon the circumstances of each case. In this case, we think that although it was not obligatory

for a fresh proclamation of sale to be issued, yet it was in the interests of the auction-bidder that there should be a fresh proclamation for sale; that

being so, there was no unnecessary delay, and in these circumstances the sale can be said to have been held ""forthwith"". The appeal must therefore

be dismissed. No costs, as the Respondent is unrepresented before us.