Haldia Development Authority vs Sadhan Chandra Maji

The Haldia Development Authority-revisionist is aggrieved by the Appellate Award passed by the Additional District Judge, 2nd Court at Tamluk dated 10th December, 2014. He raises a jurisdictional question in reference to the definition of 'Court' under Section 2(5) of the West Bengal Industrial Infrastructure Development Corporation Act, 1974.

The brief facts relevant to the case are, inter alia, that the opposite party's land was acquired by Collector, Purba Medinipur for the benefit of the Haldia Development Authority for which compensation became payable to the opposite party-land owner. The Collector had decided an amount of compensation, which was enhanced by the Additional District Judge and Appellate Authority.

In aid of its grievance against the order of the Additional District Judge, 2nd Court, Tamluk, a jurisdictional question is raised in the context of the definition of the expression 'Court' used in Section 2(5) of the West Bengal Industrial Infrastructure Development Corporation Act, 1974. Section 2(5) of the West Bengal Industrial Infrastructure Development Corporation Act is required to be set out herein:

"2. Definitions. - In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires, -

(1) .........;

(2) ..........;

(3) ..........;

(4) ...........;

(5) "Court" means a principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction, and includes the Court of any Additional District Judge or Subordinate Judge whom the State Government may appoint, by name or by virtue of his office, to perform, concurrently with any such principal Civil Court, all or any of the functions of the Court under this Act within any specified local limits;"

A plain reading of that Section would indicate that appeal from the Collector's order an appeal would lie before the principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction which includes the Court of any Additional District Judge. However, without any punctuation. The sentence defining 'Court' however goes on further to add "or Sub- ordinate Judge whom the State Government may appoint by name ...........".

If the definition stopped there, it would abundantly clear that the appeal can be heard by the principal Civil Judge as well as Additional District Judge. However, a confusion arises with the insertion albeit with a comma and thereafter, "to perform concurrently with any such principal Civil Judge or all any function of the Court under the said Act within the specified local limit."

In the Bengal Agra Assam Civil Court Act, it is recognized and laid down that the Additional District Judge discharges the same function of the Principal District Judge. In other Statutes like the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 it has been held and now well settled that the application under Sections 9 and 11 can be made both before the Principal District Judge or the Additional District Judge.

The said two Judges, in fact, are empowered equally and discharge similar functions.

The Principal Civil Judge or the District Judge is only conferred with powers to discharge the administrative functions of the District Judgeship.

In the light of the above, I am compelled to interpret the expression 'Court' under Section 2(5) of the said Act of 1974 to mean that an appeal from an order of a Collector passed under 1974 Act aforesaid, can be decided by either a Principal District Judge or the Additional District Judge. Such Additional District Judge hearing an appeal against an order of Collector does not require a specific appointment or designation by the State for the purpose of hearing of such appeals. It is only the other authorities or other Judicial Officers or functionaries except the principal District Judge and the Additional District Judge that are required to be specifically appointed by the State Government to hear such appeal in the absence whereof they would lack jurisdiction to entertain such appeals.

In view of the above, I am of the clear view that the Additional District Judge, who has heard the appeal against the order of the Collector impugned herein, was fully empowered and had jurisdiction within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the 1974 Act to decide the appeal and pass the judgment impugned herein.

This Court appreciates the fairness of Mr. Probal Mukherjee, learned Senior Advocate for having assisted this Court by referring to other Statutes for the purpose of a fair determination and adjudication and interpretation of Section 2(5) of the 1974 Act.

Mr. Mukherjee, learned Senior Advocate appearing for the Haldia Development Authority is desirous of arguing on propriety of the merits of the impugned order.

It is submitted by the opposite party that they have also filed another revisional application being C.O. No. 4563 of 2016 challenging the same order, inter alia, saying that the compensation already enhanced by the Additional District Judge should be further enhanced.

Hence, the instant revisional application be listed along with C.O. No. 355 of 2018 and C.O. No. 4563 of 2016 on 12th March, 2019 for hearing and consideration.